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Abstract 
This study examines the emerging floriculture industry in Ethiopia. For many years floriculture has 
been promoted by the major global financial institutions in structural adjustment programmes as 
a way for developing countries to increase export earnings. The resources required for its 
implementation, namely land and labour, are relatively cheap and abundant in the majority of 
developing countries whilst capital comes from either overseas aid or international investment. 
The high-value of flowers in developed countries together with high income-elasticity-of-demand 
means that if a country can establish their floriculture industry and remain competitive, then it 
can be a sustainable means of economic development.  
Many developing nations have attempted to advance their floriculture industries over the past 
four decades with varying degrees of success. Each attempt has occurred in the context of a 
unique set of historical, geographical and policy circumstances which have affected the fortunes 
of the industry. Over the past two decades, Ethiopia has gradually adopted economic policies 
which have resulted in a focus on increasing export earnings, and in the period since 2004 focus 
has been placed on floriculture which has experienced huge growth. Previous academic literature 
on floriculture as a development strategy has been critical, asserting that power is retained by 
multinational investors and international institutions with little newly generated wealth reaching 
the developing states or workers in the industry (Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 2007; 
Hughes and Reimer, 2004; Hale and Opondo, 2005; Maharaj and Dorren, 1995; Hughes, 2000; 
Meier, 1999; Hale and Opondo, 2005; Donohoe, 2007). A limited body of work has raised 
questions of the validity of floricultural investment as a strategy for economic development but 
has concentrated on quantitative analysis and has failed to recognise the importance specific 
geographical, political and economic circumstances locally play in the industry (Whitaker and 
Kolavalli, 2006; Asea and Kaija, 2000).  
This study uses the emergent Global Production Networks framework of analysis to examine the 
early stages of this industry and the relationships between its actors. Questions are asked on the 
future of the industry and Ethiopia’s potential for changing their role within it. The study analyses 
a combination of primary and secondary data sources including a quantitative survey conducted 
with the majority of flower exporters in Ethiopia; in-depth interviews with 102 actors from a wide 
range of actors involved directly in the Ethiopian floriculture GPN in addition to some interviews 
to obtain background information; secondary analysis of trade and other economic data; and 
discourse analysis of policy documents and public statements of institutional actors. The 
conclusions of the study contribute to the literature on the utility of an agricultural export–led 
development strategy. Findings include rapid industrial growth attributable to a range of natural, 
institutional, socioeconomic and ‘lifestyle’ conditions and changes that have occurred therein, 
both within Ethiopia and externally. Value is seen to have been captured by a range of actors with 
conclusions about the developmental potential of the industry more positive than previous 
studies, attributable to specific economic and natural characteristics of the geographical location 
in which the industry has developed. The study argues that institutional actors can best secure the 
benefits from engaging in global production networks by targeting industries in which they have a 
competitive advantage by discovering the underlying cost structure and then attempting to 
manufacture territorial embeddedness amongst investors in order spread the gains and risks 
involved with industrial specialisation. 
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1. Introduction 
Media reports and empirical observations in recent years have created an awareness of the rapid 
and unprecedented growth of the Ethiopian floriculture industry. However, the industry has yet 
to receive academic attention and, as such, the nature and extent of the growth, and how and 
why this growth has occurred, remain undocumented. At the broadest level this research is 
intended to address these gaps in the literature and subsequently provide an analysis of the 
developmental potential of the industry. Analysis of the potential for export floriculture, as one of 
a number of high-value agricultural export commodities promoted by International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) and academics alike in developing countries, as a mechanism by which economic 
development may be achieved, shall form the major contribution of the research. The thesis aims 
to document and analyse the Global Production Network (GPN) of the Ethiopian floriculture 
industry. It identifies the actors involved and how the relationships between these actors affect 
the benefits that accrue to them in the interest of the long-term economic sustainability of the 
industry. The overall objective of the research is to assess how the policy of the Ethiopian 
government and similar policies in other countries, of promoting non-traditional agricultural 
export commodities (NTAEs), affect developing world actors. 
NTAEs bear many of the same characteristics as cash-crops, differing only in that cash-crops may 
be traditionally cultivated but are not primarily intended for household consumption. Cash-crops 
can be defined as: 
High value agricultural products are often differentiated from lower value goods due 
to their perishability, scarcity, historical and cultural significance and/or difficulty in 
either production or delivery at quality to market. Higher returns are achieved 
because these products possess attributes for which the consumers are willing to pay 
premium prices (Davis, 2006; 7). 
The neoliberal perspective on cash-crops is summarised here by Masanjala, explaining their 
promotion as part of trade liberalisation programmes: 
Since cash crops earn higher value than food crops, the production of cash crops 
enables the farm households to obtain more income and food than it could by 
devoting the same resources to their own food production (Masanjala, 2006; 231). 
NTAEs have formed a significant part of developing countries’ economic development strategies 
for more than two decades and developing countries now account for more than half of global 
trade in NTAEs (Little, 1994; Hallam et al., 2004; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Watts and 
Little, 1994). The Singer-Prebisch hypothesis has led governments in developing countries to 
target higher-value or processed agricultural products in the hope of obtaining potential gains in 
foreign currency earnings, employment, and taxation income available from a movement into 
export sectors with higher income elasticity of demand than staple crops (Cramer, 1999). The 
employment these industries provide is often in rural areas where alternative employment 
opportunities are few, particularly for women, and together with the increased returns-per-
hectare available in NTAEs, developing country governments have seen such industries as having 
great developmental potential (Thrupp et al., 1995; Chandra, 2006; Damiani, 2000). Furthermore, 
successful NTAE industries have the potential to mitigate the negative impacts of rural-urban 
migration in developing countries, which acts as a further boon incentivising the promotion of 
such industries (Temu and Temu, 2005). 
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With its relationship to rural agriculture and its potential for creating employment for 
rural unskilled, and often landless, labour the export horticulture sector offers 
important potential poverty gains (Nadvi, 2004; 22). 
However, empirical evidence for poverty gains from NTAEs is at best mixed and there are a 
number of key areas in which debate is created (Hallam et al., 2004; Conroy et al., 1996; Carletto 
et al., 2007). Page (2006) following from the debate of Ravallion and Kakwani, raises the question 
of whether growth must disproportionately benefit the poor to be considered pro-poor 
(Kakwani), or whether an overall reduction in absolute poverty is sufficient (Ravallion) (Ravallion 
and Chen, 2003; Kakwani and Pernia, 2000). Much of the empirical evidence on NTAEs has found 
the latter to be more common, with aggregate growth resulting in a reduction in absolute poverty 
but with investors reaping a far greater proportion of the benefits from these industries than the 
poor. Furthermore, smallholders have found integration into export markets difficult (Victor, 
2007; Ponte, 2009; Damiani, 2000; Dijkstra, 2001). 
With regard to direct impacts of NTAEs on the poor, criticism revolves around three related major 
issues. The first issue surrounds the inclusion of smallholders in export markets which is 
significantly affected by the nature of the commodities themselves which are commonly more 
knowledge or capital intensive than those normally grown by smallholders. This issue is made 
more acute by the high quality requirements demanded in export markets which determine the 
ability of smallholders to compete (Diao et al., 2003; Collins, 1995). However, for those 
households that have been able to participate in NTAEs, incomes have in general increased 
(Victor, 2007). Indeed, Bigsten et al. (2003) use household panel survey data to show how the 
increase in production of the cash-crops coffee and chat (a stimulant used throughout East Africa 
and the Middle East) since the fall of the Derg, in Ethiopia, documented in Chapter 4, has had 
significant effects in improving the livelihoods of the rural poor in Ethiopia. 
The second criticism of how NTAEs impact directly on the poor concerns the distribution of 
benefits. Carletto (2007) displays how the pro-poor objectives of Guatemala’s NTAE policies 
became less effective over time and more than two thirds of the initial adopters of the industry 
had dropped out by the time of the study. For subsistence farmers, specialisation in favour of 
short-term profits in markets which are subject to price volatility can be risky and so they may 
participate sporadically, which has negative implications for quality. Furthermore, much criticism 
has arisen around issues of worker welfare in the NTAE industries. This relates primarily to waged 
labour rather than smallholder engagement in NTAE industries. Criticism ranges from issues of 
safety in the workplace to low wages and health care provision. However, the prevalence of these 
issues vary significantly depending on both the location and the industry in question (Barrientos 
et al., 2009; Dolan, 2007; Whitaker and Kolavalli, 2006). 
The third criticism of the direct impact of NTAEs on the poor, which is closely linked to their 
decision to participate in export markets, relates to food security. There are, however, two 
distinct effects on food security that relate to the different types of NTAE participation in 
developing countries. The first treatment of the issue relates to households that participate, or 
don’t participate, in growing NTAEs at the expense of subsistence food production. For these 
households food security issues can be complex as intra-household decisions are made over 
potential profits amid price volatility, climatic variations, and market access, as has been 
documented extensively elsewhere (Goetz, 1993; Fafchamps, 1992; Longhurst, 1988; Govereh 
and Jayne, 2003). Masanjala (2006), for example, provides evidence from cash-crop producing 
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households in Malawi showing no significant link between food purchases and the increased 
income seen from involvement in cash-crops.  
A second and academically neglected aspect to the question relates to the effect on food security 
of households through participation in NTAE production by surplus labour. This involves a 
completely different set of considerations for the household including the impact that engaging in 
extraneous labour has on subsistence production, the remuneration received for the work 
conducted and the impact of NTAE production on aggregate food availability and prices.  
The second aspect of Page’s identification of possible ‘pro-poor’ effects of a given phenomena - 
the macro-level impacts on developing countries – has drawn criticism with regard to NTAEs. 
NTAEs commonly require foreign investors in order to fill knowledge and capital gaps. However, 
much of the investment made is mobile and consequently “commodity areas may appear and 
disappear, labour forces are created and dispersed, firms go in and out of business” (Carter et al., 
1993; 3), meaning that any benefits realised from the industry are fragile. Further criticism 
centred on the limited scope of NTAEs to provide any real poverty impacts. Diao et al. argue that 
of agricultural enterprises, NTAEs “have the fewest constraints and remain the most profitable 
option for increasing export earnings” but “...because of their relatively small base they only have 
limited potential to raise incomes on the scale required to affect overall economic growth and 
poverty reduction over the next 10-15 years” (2003; iv). This argument is further advanced by 
Thrupp et al.: 
[T]here is a lack of concrete evidence showing a causal link between NTAE growth 
and broad based economic growth nationally...[E]xporting country governments 
have gained very little in direct revenues or debt alleviation from NTAEs since most 
governments have eliminated export taxes (1995; 63-64). 
This draws out the dual considerations in the limited scope of NTAEs to provide poverty gains in 
that they are both relatively small scale, meaning they make only a small contribution to 
alleviating problems such as unemployment, and that, partially as a consequence of this scale but 
also because of governmental incentives offered to NTAE investors, they provide little by way of 
direct tax revenues. 
A final group of overarching criticisms relate to the impact of the industry as a whole, affecting 
developing country actors on both a macro and a micro scale, through the impact of NTAEs on 
resources. Firstly, the contentious issue of the land on which NTAEs are produced. From a 
household perspective, in certain locations government policy on NTAEs has resulted in 
displacement of smallholders, which can have serious negative poverty impacts. At a national 
scale, land resources have been transferred to NTAE production with significant opportunity cost 
incurred as a result. Secondly, there are multiple examples of NTAEs degrading resources in 
developing countries including negative environmental impacts on water resources and land 
quality (Hengsdijk and Jansen, 2006; Stonich, 1991; Thompson and Scoones, 1994). 
The examples from the literature show that the effect of NTAEs on an economy can be limited, in 
some cases, to low-waged labour but, in other cases, can provide large numbers of stable jobs in 
many different income-bands and allow for organic growth of support industries. The specific 
experience of one country with one crop can, seemingly, be affected by a large number of factors; 
primarily concerning public policy on the introduction of a new industry with regard to fiscal 
revenues, knowledge transfer, and engendering entrepreneurship. 
  14 
 
In recent years Ethiopia has made a dramatic entry into the international floriculture market, 
growing from negligible export earnings to the fourth largest producer of roses globally, in little 
over half a decade. This research is motivated by a desire to understand the reasons behind this 
growth and the nature of it, the consequences it has had and will continue to have for different 
actors and, finally, the implications of the growth and how it has occurred for other developing 
countries targeting growth in NTAEs as a developmental priority. 
1.1 Research Questions 
The undocumented nature of the subject matter at hand has resulted in an unusual, two-stage 
approach to the formulation of research questions. The first stage consisted of formulating 
research questions based on what was known about the industry, and similar NTAE industries in 
developing countries, and the ultimate goals of the research, as opposed to examining existing 
research to identify areas for further development. Based on these research questions, a 
theoretical framework was selected which both addressed the aims of the research and allowed 
for flexibility in the research design to accommodate the undocumented and changing nature of 
the industry. The theoretical framework is selected inductively in order to provide an analytical 
schema guiding how the questions should be answered. While academic research on the subject 
had not yet been produced, occasional media reports and empirical observations by the author 
were sufficient to postulate that the cut flower export industry in Ethiopia had grown rapidly to a 
point where, when this research began in 2007, the industry had made an impact on international 
floriculture and it is upon this assumption that the following research questions were designed: 
- Why did the cut flower export industry in Ethiopia grow as rapidly and to the size that it did 
and why did this growth occur when it did? 
- What is the structure of the industry in terms of the actors involved and the relationships 
between them including the geographical origin and industrial histories of firms involved? 
- Who have been the primary beneficiaries of this growth to this point and how might the 
distribution of benefits change in future? 
- What, if any, are the multiplier impacts of the industry on the broader economy? 
- What are the developmental impacts of the industry, both now and in the longer term? 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into 12 chapters. This introductory chapter, Chapter 1, has served to outline 
the problem and set it within the context of the wider literature on NTAEs. In the following 
chapter, Chapter 2, a review of literature on theoretical frameworks for the analysis of 
internationally and inter-regionally traded commodities is conducted before the most appropriate 
framework is selected and its strengths and weaknesses outlined. Chapter 3 considers the 
possible methodologies which could have been employed in order to satisfy the research 
questions within this theoretical framework and the methods selected are then justified. This 
chapter includes a discussion of ethical and positionality issues which had to be considered during 
the course of the research. The chapter also explains that, owing to the undocumented nature of 
the network and the iterative nature of the framework, empirical findings and secondary data are 
then interwoven in the remainder of the thesis. 
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Chapter 4 then describes the recent political and economic history of Ethiopia as it relates to the 
growth of the flower industry. This is followed by Chapter 5 documenting the nature of the GPN 
of floriculture including the recent changes that have occurred in the patterns of production and 
consumption. These two chapters form a key part of the local and industrial context which is 
fundamental to GPN research. Chapter 6 describes the Ethiopian floriculture GPN including the 
actors and nodes involved and the relationships between them. Chapter 7 examines how value is 
created within the GPN and the factors which act as constraints to the creation, enhancement and 
capture of this value. 
Chapter 8 examines in greater detail how value can be enhanced and captured through the 
marketing strategies of growers. It examines the challenges that growers face in their integration 
into different marketing streams. Chapter 9 documents labour issues in the Ethiopian floriculture 
GPN. While previous studies of floriculture have focussed upon issues of worker welfare, this 
research seeks to examine labour dynamics from the perspective of corporate and institutional 
actors in order to look at the way in which they might influence the benefits that accrue to 
Ethiopian actors on a macro level. Chapter 10 then focuses more closely on how the industry 
affects Page’s two different developmental metrics by looking at both the factors affecting the 
growth of the industry on a macro scale and factors affecting the distribution of benefits created 
by the industry. 
Chapter 11 then examines how the growth of floriculture has impacted upon other industries, 
both those that support the floriculture industry directly and those whose growth has been 
influenced by floriculture. Finally, Chapter 12 draws together the empirical findings from the 
previous chapters in order to provide some conclusions. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Changing Development Paradigms 
The growth of the Ethiopian floriculture industry has been facilitated by changes in patterns of 
global trade and investment referred to herein as ‘globalisation’. In this chapter, theoretical 
approaches to economic development, globalisation and commodity analysis are explored as they 
relate to the research. The theoretical framework which guides this thesis is then justified and 
alternative approaches that highlight other factors important to the research are identified so 
that a comprehensive theoretical approach can be defined with which to address the research 
questions. 
The Bretton Woods, post-war notion of an interventionist, top-down approach to development 
has to a large extent, at least ostensibly, been confined to the annals of history. Several powerful 
critiques (Escobar, 1995; Chambers, 1983; Crush, 1995), debates surrounding the conditionality of 
aid (Fischer, 1997; Stone, 2008) and the influence of unconditional capital from newly 
industrialised countries, in particular China, have led to a shrinking influence of the more 
prescriptive policies of the IMF and World Bank, which have recently sought more bespoke and 
country-led strategies in developing countries (Zafar, 2007; Wade, 2006). Developing countries 
increasingly rely on their attractiveness to foreign investment as a means by which they can 
develop economically, seeking to exploit competitive advantages over countries at similar stages 
of development (Gore, 2000).  
As part of this shift in development policy, in the last two decades global patterns of trade and 
production have changed significantly. Although it is commonly perceived that there has been an 
increase in international trade and the global economy has become more integrated, in what has 
been termed globalisation, this phenomenon is academically contested. Nayyar (2006) compares 
global trade in the last quarter of the 19th Century with the last quarter of the 20th Century and 
reveals how figures can be misleading about the degree to which international trade has 
increased. Much of the increase in trade is composed of financial flows in foreign exchange, 
government debt trading and financial markets (Bridge, 2004). A significant proportion of trade is 
now also intra-firm trade between a firm and its vertically integrated subsidiaries, all of which 
distort the figures on international trade. Despite these contentions, it is commonly accepted 
that, if not the levels of trade, then the patterns have certainly altered in the post-Cold War era 
(Sachs et al., 1995).  
Many production processes in the developing world are conducted solely to raise export revenue 
from developed world consumers. This differs from the historical pursuit of resource extraction in 
that the majority of developing countries are now sovereign nations, in the post-colonial era, and 
are now engaged in a range of industries from primary to quaternary. Since the new patterns of 
production and consumption began to emerge, several economies have witnessed sustained high 
growth rates, with China and Ethiopia averaging over 10% annually for the five years to the end of 
2008 and many more consistently exceeding 5% growth, which, when compared with, the 1% 
growth of Britain during the industrial revolution for example, has led some to suggest that 
international development can be significantly advanced by the mechanisms of globalisation 
(Chang and Rowthorn, 1995; WDI, 2011). This led McMichael (1996) to assert that during the 
1980s and 1990s, the ‘development project’ had given way to the ‘globalisation project’. 
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Amongst the proponents of this shift in policy were the major IFIs of the IMF and the World Bank. 
The change in emphasis went in tandem with the promotion of Washington Consensus policies in 
the structural adjustment programmes of these institutions. Previous developing country policies 
of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) were, by and large, replaced with export-orientated 
policies of trade liberalisation. Developing countries sought to exploit comparative advantages 
they held over developed nations with the power to invest, as well as seeking to create new 
comparative advantages through trade liberalisation (Krueger, 1998). Firstly, lower wages, large 
populations, high unemployment, and lack of labour regulation makes labour-intensive activities 
far cheaper to conduct in the developing world. Secondly, many developing countries have higher 
land availability than many of the developed countries from which much FDI originates. 
Moreover, the climatic conditions in the tropical areas of the world in which many developing 
countries are situated make this land more suitable to the production of certain commodities. 
These natural factors of production give competitive advantages to developing countries over 
advanced nations as a whole in a large number of commodities, but developing countries must 
still compete amongst each other to attract investment. Trade liberalisation has taken place in 
order to negate deficiencies in factors of production where countries did not have a comparative 
advantage to producing goods where they see growth opportunities. To varying degrees, capital 
markets have been liberalised, taxes have been lowered or removed, and capital subsidies have 
been given. This model of export promotion and international trade liberalisation has contributed 
significantly to the new patterns that have emerged in the production and trade of goods and 
services internationally with which this study is concerned.  
2.2 Global Production Networks 
Here, the different academic approaches to the study of inter-regionally and internationally 
traded commodities and services are explored and their impact on development considered. 
These approaches all, broadly, come from a Marxist tradition in their attempts to subjectivise 
value, but range from heterodox to orthodox in their ideological disposition. The contemporary 
work of the ‘Manchester School’1 (Bathelt, 2006), in what they term GPN Analysis, forms the 
foundation for this research. This chapter justifies the selection of GPN although elements from 
other theoretical frameworks of commodity analysis and alternative analytical approaches from 
management, economics and other disciplines are integrated where GPN analysis is insufficient in 
explaining the dynamics of the interactions between actors in the network. Firstly, the GPN 
framework is defined and the tools it provides for this research identified before its characteristics 
in relation to other paradigms of commodity analysis are analysed. GPN analysis is born out of a 
long epistemological tradition of commodity analysis. The aim of such studies reflects the 
intention of this study, which is to: 
[E]xplain how global industries are organized and governed, and how, in turn, those 
relationships affect the development and upgrading opportunities of the various 
regions and firms involved (Coe et al., 2008b; 267). 
                                                          
 
1
 Coe et al. (2008b) acknowledge the simultaneous development of GPN theory by Ernst (Ernst and Kim, 
2002) but the development of the theory and the majority of the seminal literature emerged from the 
‘Manchester School’. 
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Or, alternatively: “a means to the end of understanding the evolution of the world capitalist 
economy” (Bair, 2008; 348). These analyses of the production, distribution and consumption 
processes are born out of a desire to humanise commodities by considering the social factors 
which affect these processes: 
Notwithstanding Marx’s definitive deconstruction and interrogation of the 
commodity (in Part I of the first volume of Capital), the discourse of commodities has 
long been captured by orthodox economics of whatever paradigm. As a 
consequence, it has transmuted into a reified language shorn of its social content. 
There is a need, therefore, to refocus attention on the social circumstances under 
which commodities are produced and consumed and thus avoid the ever present 
danger of slipping into a perception of commodities as de humanized building blocks 
involved in the making of other commodities (Henderson et al., 2002; 444).  
A GPN is defined as: 
[T]he globally organized nexus of interconnected functions and operations by firms 
and non firm institutions through which goods and services are produced and 
distributed (Coe et al., 2004; 471) 
This framework’s nomenclature originates, firstly, because of the multidirectional 
interconnectedness of the nodes in such networks, which differentiates it from the concept of a 
chain. Secondly, production allows intangible goods such as telecoms to be analysed in the same 
way as material ‘commodities’. Finally, global defines the spatial dimension and allows scope for 
analysis from a community, regional, national and international perspective2. More importantly, 
GPN analysis advocates a change in emphasis, as in Henderson et al.’s definitional paper, to focus 
more intently on issues of value, power and embeddedness summarising: 
In order to understand the dynamics of development in a given place, then, we must 
comprehend how places are being transformed by flows of capital, labour, 
knowledge, power etc. and how, at the same time, places (or more specifically their 
institutional and social fabrics) are transforming those flows as they locate in place 
specific domains (2002; 438). 
Henderson et al. (2002; 448) produce this diagram showing a disaggregation of the various facets 
of a GPN, and a framework for how they may be studied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
2
 Coe et al. (2008b) acknowledge that transnational would be a more appropriate term than global but 
chose to use global owing to current prevalence of usage. 
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Figure 2.1 A Framework for GPN Analysis; Source: Henderson et al. (2002; 448) 
The GPN is concerned with three conceptual categories; value, power, and embeddedness. Value 
refers to economic rent and Marxian surplus value and looks at how this can be: i) initially created 
within firms, nodes or collective actors in a GPN; ii) enhanced, via mechanisms including 
technology transfer, entrepreneurship at the site of production and yield improvement; and iii) 
captured for the benefit of a particular location within the network through government policies 
or firm ownership structures.  
Power is divided into i) corporate, the ability of a lead firm to influence the distribution of 
resources and other actors’ decisions within the network; ii) collective, this is power held by trade 
unions, employer associations, NGOs and informal organisations, used to pressure other bearers 
of power including corporate and state actors; and iii) institutional, which includes power held by 
local3 and national state actors, international agencies such as the EU, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, UN agencies and international credit rating agencies. This structural view of power 
used in this initial conception of the GPN framework mainly relates to the empirically observable 
notions of power and how it determines the ability of actors and nodes within the network to 
negotiate outcomes. As such this element of the GPN framework has since received criticism and 
                                                          
 
3
 The term ‘local’ has been used to apply to a diverse range of actors at a range of spatial scales with a 
plethora of criteria qualifying them as such. It is, therefore, important to clarify the meaning of the term 
‘local’, which is critical to many aspects of the analysis herein, as it is used in this study so that a consistent 
definition can be applied throughout. For the purposes of this research, ‘local’ refers to respondents that 
self describe as Ethiopian. For the reasons described in Chapter 6, many of these respondents do not 
formally hold Ethiopian nationality. They do, however, view Ethiopia as their permanent country of 
residence. 
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attempts have been made to further develop its conception in the framework. Institutional power 
and the dimension of ‘institutions’ are seen as concrete organisations – whether formal or 
informal – composed of groups of people. Neilson and Pritchard (2009), following from Hodgson 
(2006), seek to expand the definition of institutions4 to encompass the more intangible notions of 
societal norms and values which can shape outcomes in a production network. However, as an 
expansion of the institutional concept within a GVC framework this merely serves to compensate 
for the paucity of explanatory power owing to the absence of notions of embeddedness within 
that framework. As is discussed below, territorial embeddedness introduces the place specific 
dynamics of societal norms and values which this broadening of the concept of institutions seeks 
but allows the categories of Value, Power and Embeddedness to retain their individual 
contributions to the configuration of the GPN. 
The concept of embeddedness has influenced work across disciplinary boundaries from 
economics (Polanyi, 1944; Polanyi, 1971) to sociology (Granovetter, 1985) but the term began to 
enter geographical discourse in the early 1990s (Dicken et al., 1994). The meaning of the term 
embeddedness has evolved with its use across academic disciplines. The original conception of 
embeddedness views systems of exchange as operating on a scale from market exchange which 
considers only price in determining terms of transactions (disembedded societies) to those which 
consider social and cultural factors in transactions reflecting the extra monetary value in the 
governance of exchange (embedded societies). However, patterns of global trade were very 
different at the time of Polanyi’s (ibid.) initial development of the embeddedness concept and as 
such its spatial dimensions were not explicit and did not consider the global nature of firms as 
they exist today (Hess, 2004; 168-169).  
Recent developments related to the concept of embeddedness are closely linked to the parallel 
literature on business systems and business cultures discussed in the context of the Ethiopian 
economy in Chapter 4 (Whitley, 1994b; Whitley, 1994a; Whitley, 1999). This literature sees that 
systems of economic coordination and control are spatial differentiated according to the 
dominant social and institutional norms at the spatial scale concerned - commonly the nation 
state. The evolution of the embeddedness concept including its definition in GPN literature 
discussed below, has frequently led to an examination of questions surrounding the subjects – 
who is embedded, the objects – in what, and the scale – where does this embeddedness occur. 
While other conceptions of embeddedness have viewed these dynamics as ranging from purely 
firm-level actors being embedded in institutional frameworks on a national scale to individuals 
being embedded in interpersonal relationships at the regional scale, GPN analysis is concerned 
with a range of firms, institutions, individuals, sectors and networks at local to global scale. 
However, there has been a degree of debate within GPN analysis about what this wide range of 
actors and networks at a range of geographical scales are embedded in (Hess, 2004). 
                                                          
 
4
 The authors do this as a development of the GVC framework but in doing so are attempting to introduce 
the explanatory power of institutional dynamics from GPN analysis into GVC research and are therefore 
proposing an expansion of its conception in GPN research by extension. 
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Embeddedness refers to the extent to which each of the actors is attached to both the network 
itself and the location, which in turn affects the power and value structures. Network 
Embeddedness is defined as: 
...the connections between network members regardless of their country of origin...It 
is most notably the architecture, durability and stability of these relations, both 
formal and informal, which determines the agents’ individual network 
embeddedness as well as the structure and evolution of the GPN as a whole 
(Henderson et al., 2002; 453) 
Territorial Embeddedness is the concept that GPNs, and any constituent part(s) of them, can 
become embedded in a place such that they “absorb, and in some cases are constrained, by the 
economic activities and social dynamics that already exist” in the places in which they locate 
(Henderson et al., 2002; 452). These two forms of embeddedness are intertwined and in some 
cases the degree to which one form of embeddedness exists can influence changes in the other 
form of embeddedness. 
Since the inception of the GPN framework the concept of embeddedness has been developed by 
some to include a third dimension beyond network and territorial embeddedness, to consider the 
impact of ‘societal embeddedness’ (Hess, 2004; Polanyi, 1971). This links back to the origins of the 
GPN framework in the work of Polanyi (1944), discussed below, in which forms of exchange or 
types of economy are seen as differentially embedded in a society. Societal Embeddedness as 
defined by Hess (2004) examines the influence of cultural and political background of individuals 
and collective actors on their actions and interactions within a GPN. This concept has synergies 
with path dependency theories of development in that an individual’s or firm’s future strategy is 
strongly influenced by their past (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
For the purposes of this research the original conception of embeddedness will be used for two 
primary reasons. Firstly, the literature on this triple conception of embeddedness within the GPN 
framework is not yet fully developed and it was unclear how the additional element of societal 
embeddedness would add explanatory power. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
concept of societal embeddedness seeks to explain phenomena which can be sufficiently 
explained by a combination of territorial and network embeddedness, and existing literature has 
yet to successfully argue that this is not the case. The concepts of territorial and societal 
embeddedness are inextricably linked in a way that network and territorial embeddedness are 
not. Actors, firms and institutions can move between networks and space, but societies are firmly 
grounded in space. Individuals and collective actors can be territorially embedded in the location 
from which they came, effectively removing the need for a concept of societal embeddedness. 
For example, a firm can be embedded in more than one place simultaneously and to different 
degrees. A Dutch investor in the Ethiopian floriculture industry can be embedded in the norms or 
and the business systems of the Netherlands. Similarly, networks themselves have their own 
norms and business systems and it is difficult to separate out the contributions of an actor’s 
personal from their industrial history in ascertaining the influence of their embeddedness in social 
values and norms. It is possible to explain such phenomena by using the nuances allowed for 
within the conception of territorial and network embeddedness in influencing actors’ behaviour. 
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It therefore seems that societal embeddedness is a facet of territorial embeddedness and so, for 
the purposes of this research and without a full engagement with the subject as the literature is 
still developing, ‘embeddedness’ will be conceptualised here in its original, bimodal form. 
For corporate actors, high levels of territorial embeddedness result in reduced geographical 
mobility while high levels of network embeddedness result in reduced sectoral mobility. For 
labourers, high levels of territorial embeddedness can limit mobility and thus the capture of value 
but increased network embeddedness may lead to increased possibilities for training and 
increased capture of value. The exact dynamics affecting the territorial and network 
embeddedness of different actors within a GPN are, like the other conceptual categories of the 
GPN, situationally-specific as is explored in the present research for Ethiopian floriculture. The 
‘dimensions’ of firms, institutions, networks and sectors are, in effect, the instruments through 
which the concrete effects of the conceptual categories are played out. The relationships between 
these dimensions represent the current outcomes of the interplay between the conceptual 
categories in terms of public policy, wages, unionisation of labour etc. The cumulative outcome of 
these dimensions, configuration/coordination, is what determines the development outcomes. 
Throughout these conceptual categories and dimensions, knowledge is seen as a key component 
in the shaping of outcomes and actors’ abilities to change these outcomes over time, as it has in 
many other frameworks of commodity analysis. However, previous frameworks have 
concentrated on formal training, technology transfer, and emergence of research and 
development (R&D) capabilities as the only means by which knowledge can change outcomes, 
despite knowledge transfers outside of these mechanisms, or incidental knowledge transfer, 
often being more influential. In what is explicitly termed a ‘Global Value Chains Study’, Oliver et 
al. (2008) conclude the following about their case study of the ceramic tile industry: 
...the main knowledge transfer and acquisition process within clusters is based on 
informal relationships related to cooperation and information exchanges, which are 
underpinned by mutual trust and face to face contact which lead to information 
flows utilization to combine ideas and capabilities for supporting entrepreneurial 
actions within the cluster (508). 
GPN research acknowledges the potentially integral role of what is termed, in this research, as 
‘incidental knowledge’ transfer but has been referred to in other GPN studies as ‘embrained’ or 
‘encultured’ (Ernst, 2000; Ernst and Kim, 2002) and refers to the transfer of less formal and 
codified forms of knowledge than are traditionally accounted for in studies of globalisation. 
This research looks firstly at the potential of the industry to create, enhance and capture value for 
each of the nodes within the network through the relationship between these nodes, across 
spatial scales. Secondly, the research considers the current structures of corporate, institutional 
and collective power in floriculture and explores what potential the interaction of the three has to 
change their relations over time. Herein, a structural conception of ‘power’, whereby actors and 
nodes within the network are able to exert economic and political control over other elements of 
the network, is used in keeping with its conceptualisation within the GPN framework. However, 
where appropriate, more sociological views of power are incorporated as Foucauldian notions of 
knowledge and control, and the use of discursive language are influential in determining relations 
between certain groups of actors. Finally, the research examines the extent and effects of 
territorial and network forms of embeddedness in the unique context of Ethiopian floriculture. A 
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high or growing degree of territorial embeddedness will generally result in a shift in the power 
structures increasing the power of local actors to influence outcomes in the network over time 
(Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002; Hess and Yeung, 2006; Coe et al., 2008b; Hess, 2004). 
Furthermore, high levels of territorial embeddedness have been shown in a number of other 
contexts to result in greater multipliers at the site of production (Dicken et al., 1994; Yeung and Li, 
2000; Amin and Thrift, 1994; Conti, 1997). Embeddedness, particularly network embeddedness, 
can also assist in the capture of value through the formation of trust between actors in the 
network (Vieira and Traill, 2008; 463). The GPN framework draws substantially from evolutionary 
and heterodox economics in analysing each of its conceptual categories and here, the 
situationally-specific agency of different groups of actors to alter the structures of value, power 
and embeddedness is seen as a target for study (Chang and Grabel, 2004; Schumpeter, 1961; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). Methodologically, Henderson et al. (2002) identify five central foci for 
study: 
i) The networks of firms involved in R&D, design, production and marketing of a given 
product, and how these are organized globally and regionally 
ii) The distribution of corporate power within these networks, and changes therein 
iii) The significance of labour and the processes of value creation and transfer 
iv) The institutions – particularly government agencies, but also in some cases trade unions, 
employer associations and NGOs – that influence firm strategy in the particular 
locations absorbed into the production chain 
v) The implications of all these issues for technological upgrading, value-adding and 
capturing, economic prosperity and so on for the various firms and societies absorbed 
into the chains. (447) 
To demonstrate the utility of this framework, what follows is a set of examples from the 
literature, illustrating how the GPN approach can be applied to particular networks. Bridge (2008), 
as part of a special edition of the Journal of Economic Geography exploring GPN analysis, uses the 
framework to analyse the extractive sector. He begins by using the literature to explain the 
functions of the oil industry and discusses the states, firms and non-state actors involved at each 
stage of the process. He then uses diagrams to show how each node within the network interacts 
with each other in the process from exploration through to disposal, recycling or carbon capture. 
This focus on relational analysis is a key feature of the GPN approach and one that Bridge believes 
makes it superior in the analysis of this sector (406). Bridge then explains the changes that have 
occurred within the network in recent years and how this has affected relationships by creating 
tensions that alter the structures of power and value within the network. By applying a GPN 
perspective to an industry on which the existing literature was highly developed, Bridge is able to 
show the advantages that such an approach brings when compared with other frameworks of 
analysis: 
The greater attention that a GPN perspective gives economies of scale, scope and 
the organization of technological innovation, however, reveals how competitive 
conditions can produce some forms of local and regional advantages (2008; 411). 
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Lim (2006) uses a GPN analytical lens for a more practical exploration of the film industry in Hong 
Kong. Lim summarises how the three primary elements of GPN analysis are intrinsically linked: 
[A] film production house may be an active participant in a product innovation 
network (thus creating or enhancing value in the making of a film), but the value (or 
relational rent) created may not be captured for the firm’s benefit due to unequal 
power relations in that network (i.e. the bigger and more powerful financiers call the 
shots and seek to appropriate rents, often disproportionate to the effort they 
invested). This could consequently be due to that production house’s low degree of 
territorial and network embeddedness, such as lack of both local and foreign 
institutional support and poor social connections (341). 
Dilts (2001; 16) contends that much of the literature on commodity networks ‘deals with results, 
not steps to achieve the results’, a strategy justified in the GPN approach. As argued by Lim 
(2006), the GPN both allows and requires an open-mindedness in the methodological approach 
with the end result of explaining the functions, actors and interactions of the network seen as far 
more important than the way this information is obtained: 
On the methodological front, then, the GPN demands a concoction of quantitative 
analyses, actor network tracing, in situ research and abstraction/deconstruction 
(342). 
As such, Lim uses extensive secondary sources including both academic publications and 
interviews with targeted respondents from journalistic sources in addition to his own qualitative 
interviews and quantitative data, a similar model to that used in this study as examined in 
Chapter 3. Lim also advocates flexibility in the scope of a study. Referring to Henderson et al.’s 
five suggested methodological foci for study within a GPN, Lim argues that all may not be feasible 
within a single study depending on both the current level of knowledge about the network and on 
each element’s ‘empirical observability’. This argument is also advanced by Phyne and Mansilla 
(2003) who see providing an exhaustive account of all dimensions of a given network as an 
improbable and difficult task. This is an allusion to the potential of corporate actors to withhold 
information; a key consideration in this research, as documented in Chapter 3.  
2.3 Alternative Approaches to Commodity Analysis 
Since the late 1980s the patterns of production, distribution and consumption of goods and 
services have changed considerably. These new patterns demanded academic attention as they 
had significant implications for a wide range of disciplines in social science. This set of studies, 
including GPN Analysis, which is referred to herein broadly as ‘commodity analysis’, has its roots 
in the seminal works of Polanyi (1971; 1944) and received substantial academic attention in the 
1980s through the work of Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982), and Porter (1985; 1990). It was not 
until 1994 however, with talk of globalisation rife in media and academic discourse and an 
atmosphere of global economic cooperation that the field of study was popularised by Gary 
Gereffi (1994). In the short time since then, this interdisciplinary area of social science has 
undergone something of an identity crisis. A brief scan of the literature would find analyses under 
the names of global commodity chains (GCC) (Raikes et al., 2000); global value chains (GVC) 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002); systems of provision (SOP) (Cook and Crang, 1996); Commodity 
Circuits (Leslie and Reimer, 1999); commodity networks (Hughes, 2000); commodity cultures 
(Jackson, 1999); new regionalism (Ethier, 1998); the filière approach; enhanced value chains (EVC) 
(Hauknes, 2001); political economy of agriculture (PEA) (Goodman, 2004); and finally, GPNs 
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(GPN)(Henderson et al., 2002), completing a list which is by no means exhaustive. The majority of 
these theoretical frameworks continue to co-exist, with research still being conducted under each 
label. In practical terms however, the differences between the analyses, though important, are 
few and the key points of contention are now identified. 
2.3.1 Commodity Mapping 
The first major area in which these analyses differ is in how they conceptualise the processes 
which take a commodity from production through distribution and consumption, which is 
referred to here as commodity mapping. Early conceptualisations, such as Commodity Chains and 
SOP, followed later by GCC and GVC frameworks, focus on a mono-directional linear relationship 
between actors (Raikes et al., 2000). A dichotomy is implied between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ in 
value extraction, economic and social costs and, therefore, power (Gereffi et al., 1994). In these 
frameworks, the core is seen as externalising economic pressures towards the periphery, whether 
this is in the buyer-driven chains of low technology branded goods or in the producer-driven 
chains of high tech goods with their high barriers to entry. The linear nature of this form of 
commodity mapping affords little or no agency to ‘peripheral’ actors, which is often an inaccurate 
portrayal of the ‘realities’ the framework seeks to highlight. Such analyses have been criticised for 
being structuralist and reductionist in nature, imposing a generic, preconceived framework onto 
inappropriate localities and industries, removing them significantly from the Marxist basis of 
much of the commodity analysis literature  (Cramer, 1999). They also tend to ignore institutional 
frameworks, such as industry collectives and regional and national governments involved in 
commodity processing, focussing instead on purely inter-firm relations. 
Early reactions to Commodity Chain analysis sought to address these criticisms by conceptualising 
a more fluid construction of the interactions between actors at different stages of the production 
process. The first attempt to do this came from Commodity Circuits analysis, which visualised 
production, distribution and consumption as interacting in a circular fashion whereby the driving 
force for production could be initiated at any point, and in any direction in the circuit (Leslie and 
Reimer, 1999; Hughes, 2000). However, Commodity Circuits allow little room for the explanation 
of relationships between horizontally associated actors, often part of geographical or political 
associations or clusters (Grote and Täube, 2007). A more flexible conceptualisation of commodity 
mapping emerged more recently in the form of commodity networks. In this model, actors can 
interact between all levels and the potential exists for power to be exerted from raw material 
extraction or other primary stages of production right through to the consumption of the product. 
This ‘flatter’ conception in commodity mapping represents a significant departure from the 
hierarchical structures of GCC and GVC (Hughes and Reimer, 2004; Thrift and Olds, 1996).  
Pilot research conducted into the floriculture industry, together with secondary data, strongly 
indicated that the relationships between actors were more complex than allowed for by chain or 
circuit mapping. Some firms in the industry are almost entirely vertically integrated, operating 
farms, transportation, marketing and import elements, and delivering a finished product into 
retailers, but they operate alongside firms involved in networks with no vertical integration.  
Other studies into floriculture have shown evidence of horizontal integration of firms which can 
be clustered geographically, based on nationality, path dependency or social ties. Industrial 
collectives govern the terms of interaction in some areas with state actors playing a minimal role 
while in other areas these roles are reversed. Neither of these groups can be accounted for in the 
GVC conception of commodity mapping making it an inappropriate framework. The network 
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mapping concept allows for the exploration of the complex and diverse relations involved in 
Ethiopian floriculture and the power relations that govern them in different geographical areas. 
2.3.2 Core Objectives 
The second area in which the frameworks for commodity analysis vary is in their core objectives. 
GVC, GCC, SOP and PEA state policy relevance as their primary, if not their sole objective, by 
‘unveiling the economic realities at sites of production’ (Hughes, 2000). Commodity cultures and 
Commodity Circuits frameworks reject this goal, seeking instead to look deeper into the 
qualitative aspects of the assignment of meaning to commodities by different individuals or 
groups at different stages of the process from production right through to consumption. Social 
scientists from political and economic perspectives have criticised these frameworks for 
underestimating the significance of power relations and switching from the producer-centric 
approach of the previous paradigm to a consumer-centric approach. Subsequently, GPN, 
Commodity Networks and EVC frameworks set out a more balanced set of objectives involving 
evaluating the distribution of power within a network whilst avoiding the prioritisation of one 
sphere of commodity circulation over another (Hughes, 2000). Such approaches aim to be policy 
relevant whilst accounting for geographical and cultural variations as opposed to creating a 
‘model’ which is entirely generalisable across spatial and cultural contexts as well as applying to 
any value chain.  
2.3.3 Scope 
The final area of disagreement between the frameworks is over the scope of the study. GCC, SOP 
and PEA studies tend to focus on national-level government policies and the actions of 
transnational corporations. Commodity cultures and Commodity Circuits approaches concentrate 
on micro-level interactions between local level, regional and sub-regional actors, and the meaning 
they assign to the commodities with which they are involved. Finally, GPN, Commodity Networks 
and EVC approaches set their scope at a ‘trans-local’ level, breaking down the state- and firm-level 
units to examine interactions between actors, or nodes, at all spatial scales. 
The Global Value Chains framework aims to synthesise literature on the cross-border linkages 
within and between firms involved in global production such as Global Commodity Chains with 
literatures on industrial clustering and local level determinants of firm competitiveness. As such it 
shares a multi-scalar focus with GPN research and is the most viable alternative framework for 
the analysis of Ethiopian floriculture. In practice however, GVC research lacks the empirical 
flexibility to examine the local-level interactions allowed for within the GPN framework and so 
ignore the influence of individuals and community level actors in determining outcomes. 
 
2.4  The Selection of the GPN Framework 
The central aims of this research are to find the likelihood of the flower industry providing a 
sustainable form of export income for Ethiopia, examine the benefits that accrue to different 
actors within the network and the potential for this distribution of benefits to change over time. It 
aims to evaluate how local actors are changing their level of involvement in the industry in order 
to improve economic outcomes. Ethiopia is a culturally, climatically and politically heterogeneous 
country. The outcomes achieved, and the strategies employed by actors at all levels to alter these 
outcomes, vary greatly by region and a broad-based macro-level study using a chain framework 
would be inappropriate. However, the goals still include regional, national and potentially 
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international policy relevance and so a network framework is seen as more beneficial than a 
circuit style approach. 
The Commodity Networks approach is then, in practice, a combination of both CCA and 
Commodity Circuits, focusing on individual nodes within the production/consumption process and 
examining the relations between them. Nodes are understood as groups of actors that perform a 
specific function within the commodity chain or network. The network is understood in terms of a 
web where it is possible for all strands to be connected to one another and where influence can 
be exerted in any direction. A network is the most useful way to disentangle the complex relations 
between different nodes in the floriculture production sphere and it is one that has been 
frequently used to analyse other aspects of horticulture (Barrett et al., 1999; Hughes, 2000; 
Whatmore and Thorne, 1997; Klooster, 2005). For example Barrett et al. (2004) use the 
Commodity Networks approach to analyse the workings of the market in high-value vegetables 
exported from Kenya to the UK focusing on four nodes: sites of retailing and consumption; sites of 
production; sites of import; and sites of export. Through this framework of analysis it is possible 
to investigate processes at work from a local to an international level. However, since 2002, a new 
form of commodity analysis has emerged in the form of GPN, changing the emphasis of 
Commodity Networks to one that is far more appropriate for this study. 
The Global Value Chains framework aims to synthesise literature on the cross-border linkages 
within and between firms involved in global production such as Global Commodity Chains with 
literatures on industrial clustering and local level determinants of firm competitiveness. As such it 
shares a multi-scalar focus with GPN research and is the most viable alternative framework for 
the analysis of Ethiopian floriculture. 
Bair (2008) conducts an in-depth exegesis of commodity frameworks literature in which some of 
the many salient points reflect the criticisms of older frameworks documented above. Guiding the 
reader through the evolution of commodity analysis, Bair sets out various frameworks on scales of 
purely economically-governed to purely socially-governed concepts and from those that examine 
only international issues through to community-level focus. The article points to what Bair sees as 
the failings of both the GPN framework and Granovetter’s ‘New Economic Sociology’ in not 
achieving in practice what they set out to in theory. Bair argues that while the GPN framework 
calls for attention to be paid to important elements omitted from GCC studies, such as 
institutional context, in practice studies and research agendas have differed little from those of 
GCC. While Granovetter calls for balance between social and economic forms of organisation 
(1985), Bair notes that, as acknowledged by Granovetter himself, studies under the banner of 
New Economic Sociology have tended towards local and social forms of organisation. However, 
Bair’s rigour in following theory through to practice is not applied as thoroughly to GVC literature. 
Bair argues that GVC studies purposefully sideline ‘institutional context and path dependent 
dynamics’ in order to “develop a theoretical form of governance that is generalisable across 
space” (357). However, GVC studies such as that of Palpacuer and Parisotto (2003) dispute this 
assertion, in practice seeming to advocate a GPN analysis: 
Although the GVC approach is a fundamental tool to understand global production, 
we will argue that it should be combined with other ‘territorially based’ 
approaches...in order to better grasp the social and institutional context in which 
global networks operate at the local level, and how this context influences network 
dynamics (99). 
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Bair also makes a differentiation between GVC theory, where the inter-firm relations are 
governed by and built upon Coase’s transaction cost theory and New Economic Sociology where 
network governance is based on trust (1937). However, some studies, such as Vieira and Traill’s 
(2008) “Trust and Governance of Global Value Chains: The Case of a Brazilian Beef Processor”, 
which define themselves as GVC, have used trust-based governance to explain certain networks. 
Nadvi’s (2004) assessment of how GVC research can inform the policy debate appears to stray 
from the GVC’s stipulation of scale, referring to the need to look at households, workers and 
‘poverty nodes’ in terminology more commonly found in GPN literature. This is, then, a clear 
indication that GVC studies too, have strayed from their theoretical origins. This could be as a 
consequence of the prescriptive nature of the GVC framework. Until one collects primary data on 
a commodity network, one cannot determine who the key actors are or whether they conform to 
the assumptions of a GVC study. The flexibility granted by the GPN framework allows for a more 
iterative process. Bair concludes, in concurrence with the second identified difference of 
commodity analyses, that the choice of framework is largely dependent upon one’s core 
objectives: 
Ultimately, the choice between the explanatory power of a parsimonious theory of 
GVC governance and the complexity and richness of the context specific case studies 
generated by the GPN approach may come down to larger questions of disciplinary 
location and substantive research interests (357). 
Essentially, a GPN approach is iterative in that it examines production networks and attempts to 
discover the influences of power, embeddedness and value on the network. It leaves scope for 
any element, such as institutional power, to be insignificant in a particular network and does not 
ascribe a methods set to studies. The GVC approach, as the most viable alternative, seeks to 
generalise too widely. One cannot expect to apply the same ‘model’ to such a wide range of 
commodities in geographically disparate and culturally heterogeneous locations as, in certain 
industries, factors such as the local state institutions ignored by the ‘model’ are the primary factor 
determining the governance of the network. 
2.5 Shortcomings of the GPN Framework 
The iterative and flexible nature of the GPN framework means that few criticisms can arise from 
its analytical focus (the main criticism being that it is too flexible and can become unfocused). 
However, as a relatively young framework in the field of commodity analysis, the GPN framework 
and the literature that has employed it, have thus far not covered all of the scope allowed for 
within the framework. The majority of studies have been in the form of short articles which do 
not have purview to explore all of the issues which may influence the structures of power, value 
and embeddedness within a GPN. As such, studies have tended to focus on the potential for 
industrial upgrading amongst developing country firms. Whilst this is an important aspect of the 
explanatory capacity of the GPN framework, in an assessment of how these global industries 
affect developing country actors such studies have tended to neglect the impact on labourers’ 
incomes and welfare. In developing countries, where poverty is widespread, the potential of 
these industries to create employment and improve living standards for the poor represents one 
of the major opportunities of export industries in high-value commodities. In many frameworks of 
commodity analysis and, to a lesser extent, in GPN analysis, the influence of labour processes on 
the success of an industry is largely ignored. Labour is often conceptualised solely as a factor of 
production that influences the location of industrial activity but the motivations and practices of 
labour show great geographical variation and are influenced by a range of economic, political and 
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social circumstances which have a significant influence on the success of the industry, as is seen in 
Chapter 9.  
This study looks at the different, regionally specific ways in which a workforce can be created, 
transformed and maintained in order to ensure the success of the industry. To this end, elements 
of mainstream economic theory and political economy are drawn upon for the analysis of labour 
dynamics (Yamada, 1996; Munslow and Finch, 1984; Larner, 2002). 
While the range of possibilities allowed for within the GPN framework have not been, as yet, fully 
explored, the emphasis on attempting to understand the dynamics of power, value and 
embeddedness from local to global scales means that, inevitably, some of the positive 
contributions of either ethnographic studies at a local level, or international relations studies on 
an international scale, will not be feasible within the scope of a GPN study. Such approaches 
would have offered different advantages in exploration of this problem. Meier (1999) uses an 
ethnographic method set to explore the impact of the floriculture industry in Colombia on 
women. This enabled the author to circumvent some of the more evasive practices engaged in by 
the actors in the network discussed below and is undoubtedly the most efficient way to obtain 
data directly from labourers. However, for the reasons discussed elsewhere this did not meet the 
objectives of this research. Similarly, Strange (1992), from an international relations perspective, 
examines new patterns in global trade and how lead firms have been able to influence national 
governments. While this approach enables a broader view to be taken of economic and political 
relations on an international scale, which is more generalisable across space, it does not allow for 
an in-depth understanding of the unique multi-scalar relations which this research sees as key to 
satisfying the research agenda. 
In this section it has been argued that the specific emphases of GPN analysis, together with its aim 
of investigation transcending national and regional boundaries, make it the most appropriate 
framework for examining Ethiopian floriculture. In the following chapters, GPN analysis is used to 
determine the processes occurring at all stages of the Ethiopian floriculture industry and the 
structures of power, embeddedness and value governing them. To do this a suite of qualitative 
and quantitative methods is used to determine and document the interactions between the 
nodes within the network. 
2.6 Analytical Schema 
Having identified and justified a theoretical framework which provides the best tools for the 
analysis of an under-researched production network, the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 
can now be addressed using the GPN framework to develop an analytical schema for the 
research. The following points for analysis are drawn from previous empirical evidence and theory 
in the fields of floriculture, high-value commodity exports and trade liberalisation.  
 An exploration of how Ethiopian floriculture created, enhanced and captured value 
through the relationship between regional and national government, local employees and 
entrepreneurs, and the potential for each of these value transformations to change over 
time. 
This point assists in addressing several of the research questions. Firstly, in examining the 
potential of the industry to create value, an assessment can be made of how the Ethiopian 
floriculture industry was able to grow so rapidly, although in order to determine why the growth 
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occurred when it did, issues of embeddedness and power structures from the subsequent 
question will be incorporated. Secondly, the potential of the industry to capture value is a key 
determinant of the distribution of benefits, with the question of for whom this value is captured 
encompassed within the analysis. The degree to which value can be enhanced within the industry, 
then, makes a significant contribution to determining how benefit distribution may change in 
future. 
 An analysis of how territorial and network embeddedness affected the level and 
distribution of benefits accruing to different nodes of the Ethiopian floriculture GPN and 
how might levels of embeddedness change over time. 
High levels of territorial embeddedness are likely to result in greater positive effects on the 
broader Ethiopian economy. High levels of network embeddedness are, over time, more likely to 
result in value creation, capture, and most significantly enhancement, which can change the 
structure of benefit distribution within the industry. 
 An examination of the current structures of corporate, institutional and collective power 
in floriculture and the potential for the interaction between value and embeddedness to 
impact on power structures over time. 
In addressing this point contributions are made to several research questions. Power structures 
within the industry can influence the benefits accruing to different groups and the ability of 
individual nodes to alter the distribution of benefits. Power structures within the industry also 
have an impact on actors that have been able to gain access to the GPN. Ultimately, power 
structures influence the developmental impact of the industry. One of the key contributions of 
the GPN framework, though, comes in the examination of how the structures and changes in 
value and embeddedness shape the distribution of power within the network, which is likely to 
have a significant impact on the changes in the distribution of benefits over time. 
Any remaining aspects of the research questions are satisfied through elements drawn from a 
combination of these three points in the analytical schema. The structure of the industry and the 
nature of the interactions between the various nodes of the GPN are addressed using all aspects 
of the schema. The developmental impact of the industry is effectively an assessment of what 
benefits have accrued to which local actors as a result of the industry and how sustainable these 
benefits are, tempered by any negative impacts that industry has had. This question, too, is 
informed by a combination of all three aspects of the analytical schema. 
  31 
 
3. Methodology 
The interdisciplinary nature of the GPN framework allows a flexible lens to be applied to the 
subject matter, facilitating examination of phenomena through an array of quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies with the aim of either mutual reinforcement or uncovering plurality of 
causation not visible with the use of a single method. When working in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
necessity of using a large method set becomes even more acute. Much of the data produced by 
international agencies such as the UN and the World Bank is unreliable (Loup and Naudet, 2000; 
Murray, 1991). As discussed later in the study, there is very little academic work on Ethiopian 
floriculture and data and publications on floriculture in general are inadequate, making fieldwork 
a necessity. For those reasons, a mixture of secondary quantitative data sources together with 
primary quantitative and qualitative data are required for this research. This flexibility in 
methodology is advocated in the GPN theoretical framework discussed above and the 
methodology used was iterative with the method set altered based on the findings of initial data 
collection. Meier (1999) found, when studying the Colombian flower industry, that information 
must be obtained slowly and meticulously and, as such, the methodological focus shifts as results 
are analysed in the field. 
This research employed a comprehensive methods set with the aim of triangulation. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with 40 of the 80 flower farms exporting at the time of primary 
research. Interviews were conducted with 62 further respondents in other nodes of the 
production network. A quantitative survey was conducted with 64 of the 68 farms exporting at 
the time of the survey. Secondary data on trade and other economic statistics were analysed as 
they related to the research. Discourse analysis was employed where appropriate in relation to 
government documents and policies. What follows, then, is an appraisal of the various methods 
that were considered for this research and a justification for the choices made. 
3.1 Pre-Fieldwork Research 
Before embarking on any primary data collection it was important that all existing information 
was gathered and the research design shaped accordingly so that fieldwork time could be used 
most efficiently. Contact time with key respondents is often limited and must be utilised fully. Pre-
fieldwork research involved extensive reading of secondary sources, a series of telephone 
interviews and a small number of personal interviews in addition to a large number of preliminary 
email surveys. In the initial literature search conducted for the study, it became apparent that 
much of the secondary data on aggregate statistics for the Ethiopian industry and some of the 
macro-economic statistics for Ethiopia were not widely available. These statistics had to be sought 
from government agencies, banks and industry associations within Ethiopia which would likely 
entail access problems. The broad range of disciplines encompassed within this study, and the 
emergent and secretive nature of some of its subject matter, posed many problems in the 
sourcing and understanding of secondary data. Literature on some subject matter, such as 
floricultural genetic modification which initially appeared important for the research, is sparse. 
Consequently, information occasionally had to be sought from the authors of publications 
themselves, which was useful in establishing contact for future correspondence. Additionally, the 
diversity in subject matter meant that in order to gain a basic understanding, particularly of 
technical literature on IPRs and genetic modification, reading groups were engaged in with 
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academics and practitioners in areas including law and genetics while biotech firms in the UK 
were visited to gain an overview of their operations. 
During the pre-fieldwork period approaches were made to several key actors in the industry 
which were followed-up during the pilot research period with a view to conducting further 
interviews with them during primary fieldwork. These approaches had varying degrees of success. 
This was the first element of what became a protracted and complex process of ‘networking’ in 
order to gain access to data and respondents. In this process it was important to graduate the 
level of contact with respondents and build a relationship over time. The remote contact by 
telephone or email engaged in at this stage was the first level of engagement with respondents, 
which was then built upon in the pilot study. 
3.2 The Pilot Study 
A logical part of methodologies for the investigation of undocumented production networks is the 
pilot study. This is not a traditional pilot study in which a prescribed methodology is conducted on 
a small scale in order to test for the sample size and scope of the final study; rather this is an 
exploratory process consisting of using as broad a range of methods as possible to collect as a 
wide a range of information as possible with a view to finding who the key actors in the industry 
are and how access to the required data may be gained. Many production networks, including 
that of Ethiopian floriculture, are, as yet, undocumented. Unlike the global value chain 
framework, GPN analysis sees spatial, institutional and social context as integral to explaining 
outcomes in a network and while studies have been conducted on floriculture industries in other 
countries, the absence of significant literature on the Ethiopian network in addition to an absence 
of literature which has examined the modern floriculture industry in the requisite detail means 
prescribing a methodology prior to an exploration of the network may result in an inappropriate 
focus. The initial pilot study was conducted in March and April of 2009 and consisted of informal 
interviews with as many key actors as could be accessed in Holeta to the north of Addis Ababa, 
Addis Alem to the west of Addis Ababa, and Debre Zeit and Ziway to the south of Addis Ababa, as 
well as with industrial collective and corporate actors based in Addis Ababa itself. It began with 
the Hortiflora 2009 conference held in Addis Ababa which provided excellent networking 
opportunities and opportunities to visit flower farms for the first time. 
Previous first-hand experience of working in Ethiopia and experiencing the functional difficulties 
in conducting research there meant the presence of potential problems which may have arisen in 
primary fieldwork, which were reinforced by pre-fieldwork research, were clear:  
...you have worked in Ethiopia so you know this is not particularly a very easy 
environment to work in...There are other countries in Africa where it is much, much 
easier to work. They will not very easily provide you with data, it’s not very open, it’s 
difficult, very difficult to get the stuff (IG1). 
It was envisaged that an extended period of pilot research would be necessary in order to 
establish sufficient contacts to conduct the primary fieldwork, which had, in itself, been allocated 
an extended period of time due to envisaged operational difficulties. However, the flexibility of 
the GPN framework allowed this research design to be modified significantly during pilot research 
based on unforeseen circumstances. In the initial stage of pilot research in Addis Ababa attempts 
were made to reinvigorate social networks, none of which had previously been connected to 
floriculture. As documented below, many actors within this social network were now key actors in 
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floriculture, indicating the growth of status of the industry within the country, and through a 
technique of snowballing, access was gained to high-level actors throughout the industry. The 
conference too proved an unexpected opportunity to conduct some primary data collection. 
Initial communications with contacts in the industry revealed this to be a rare opportunity to 
obtain information from some of the key actors in the industry, normally dispersed over a large 
number of rural and relatively inaccessible farms and several other institutions and 500km, with 
poor telecommunications and postal links. Furthermore, several important international actors 
were spatially confined to the Millennium Hall, Addis Ababa, for the duration of the conference, 
with a number of periods where they were available for interview or survey. This allowed a 
quantitative survey to be conducted with a large number of flower growers, in addition to 
qualitative interviews with several other key actors. 
3.3 Selections and Rejections 
This section documents the methods that, with the information gathered during the pilot study, 
were selected for the final research design and the alternative methods that were not chosen, 
with justifications for each. 
3.3.1 Approaches and Interview Methods 
As described in the previous section, ‘networking’ was a vital element of this research and was 
engaged in during both the pre-fieldwork and pilot study phases. In this process, it was also 
important to identify and adapt to social and business systems. These systems are conceptualised 
by some theorists, particularly those operating under the banner of New Institutional Economics, 
as norms of a production network or economy (Pedersen and McCormick, 1999). North (1990) 
sees such norms as one of the ‘rules of the game’ that have evolved over time and shape human 
interaction within the network. These business systems vary significantly across national and 
regional boundaries and are attributable to ‘deep-rooted historical and social reasons’ (Pedersen 
and McCormick, 1999).  
The different business systems in all of the countries in which research was conducted governed 
every element of the research and while the specific manifestations of how the business system 
affected each node within the network are explained more fully in Chapters 5-11, its relevance to 
the approaches and methodologies used are discussed here. The important features of Ethiopia’s 
business system for the methods used in this research include the face-to-face business culture, 
which is more akin to a middle-eastern business system than a northern European system (Simiar, 
1983; Fazel and Ray, 1979; Mole, 2003). It was also important to note normative business 
practices. In Ethiopia, common practices which affected research included appointments being 
made for the same day or the following day and no further in advance. The transnational nature 
of the fieldwork, together with the diverse nationalities of its respondents, meant that an 
appreciation of the different business systems present in each location and the expectations of 
each respondent was necessary. 
Once a respondent was identified the best way to establish contact was assessed. The most 
effective way of obtaining a meeting with a targeted respondent was through a pre-existing 
connection (Laurila, 1997). Where successful, introductions were made through a mutual friend, 
colleague or associate, which was largely dependent upon luck (Hughes, 1999; McDowell, 1998; 
Parry, 1998). However, with increased personal network embeddedness in floriculture, 
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connections were made and developed making obtaining access to the vast majority of targeted 
respondents easier.  
In pre-pilot work, relationships were developed by graduating the level of contact, beginning with 
a polite formal email explaining the study, personal background and the type of information 
required from the respondent. Over 1000 emails were sent, directed at various nodes of the GPN 
and the response rate was very low (<6%). People were more likely to respond if they were 
certain that they were not going to be of assistance, whilst some suggested alternatives. Of those 
that responded and were still involved in the industry, around 30% initiated dialogue that 
eventually resulted in an interview or telephone conversation. To those who did not respond, 
another email was sent attaching the original message explaining the importance of the research 
and their contribution to it. This achieved a further response rate of approximately 5% but the 
overall response was still poor. 
Finally, telephone calls were made to the remaining respondents drawing attention to the emails 
and requesting an interview. A telephone interview may be used as “a good-compromise 
between postal and interviewer-administered questionnaires” (Parfitt, 2005; 103). The cost of 
telephone interviews is financially and temporally lower than face-to-face interviews, which made 
them feasible for the pre-fieldwork research (Oksenburg and Cannell, 1988). However, the poor 
telephone connections to the rural areas of Ethiopia with which this research was concerned 
made detecting subtleties in conversation difficult which, together with other inherent difficulties 
of telephone interviews such as short duration, limited the effectiveness of this method (Groves, 
1988). Consequently, in the primary fieldwork, telephone interviews were only conducted when 
necessary, with respondents in disparate locations that provided contextual information, and not 
data which was integral to the conclusions of the study. Over 200 phone calls were made, most of 
which were to Ethiopia, the Netherlands or Israel. At this point of the pilot study, the decision was 
made to stop requesting information from respondents in small respondent pools. To risk 
alienation with these respondents would be to jeopardise the chance of obtaining an interview 
during primary fieldwork with both that respondent and their immediate network. 
Face-to-face interviews were highly productive in all phases of the research as in the early stages 
of a GPN study, particularly when investigating an under-documented GPN, one’s focus can 
change during the course of an interview as the relative importance of certain aspects appears to 
alter. This was a significant advantage of face-to-face interviews over self-administered surveys. 
The semi-structured nature of these interviews allowed avenues which had not previously been 
considered, and so would not have been included in the format of a structured data collection 
format, to be explored at length5. 
3.3.2 Quantitative Data 
A key component of the framework selected for this research is the triangulation of methods. 
Whilst verification of phenomena through the use of multiple methods is the optimum way of 
conducting all research, it is particularly important in an Ethiopian context given the prevalence of 
two socio-cultural phenomena which are explained in detail in Chapter 4. The first of these 
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 See Appendix 1; Typical Interview Schedule 
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phenomena relates to the autocratic nature of the government. A legacy of the post-socialist 
society, an atmosphere of suspicion percolates through society, resulting in the majority of 
Ethiopians being guarded in their attitudes to enquiry and the information they provide (Young, 
1998; 202). Furthermore, in many aspects of government, there is a lack of independent auditing 
with a percentile rank of 11.4 for ‘voice and accountability’ in the most recent Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI). This compares with Uganda’s percentile rank of 33.6 and Kenya’s 
39.8, giving Ethiopia by far the lowest score for accountability of any major flower exporter 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). This afflicts a number of aspects of public life including elections, 
censuses and official statistics on industries including floriculture. The second phenomenon is 
something which has been found in previous empirical work conducted by the author; the strong 
fear among many Ethiopians of appearing ignorant leading to a proffering of answers to questions 
of which they are unsure (Levine, 1965). The first phenomenon leads to unreliability of 
quantitative data while the second phenomenon casts doubt upon qualitative interviews. As such, 
data must be triangulated using as many methods as possible in order to ensure the accuracy of 
conclusions. Where financial data is given in local currency, Ethiopian Birr (ETB), this is the 
accurate figure in local currency as given by the respondents, official statistics or document 
concerned. No accurate conversion could be applied due to the volatility of exchange rates, 
regular currency devaluations and the existence of a readily accessible black market in currency 
exchange. However, an approximate conversion has been applied to $US using historical nominal 
exchange rates in order to guide the reader as to the approximate level of the figure concerned. 
The first component of quantitative data collection consisted of obtaining and analysing figures 
from government institutions, industry associations, auction actors, national banks and 
commercial finance organisations. This consisted of a personal process of trust and relationship 
building than the obtaining of secondary data would ordinarily entail. Data was often piecemeal 
and only available in person from disparate locations. On occasion, services such as web design, 
copyediting or speechwriting were required in order to gain access to the data.  
The second component of quantitative data required was a survey. This gave the advantage of 
placing less importance on the questionable integrity of official statistics and gave some broader 
context to the qualitative interviews obtained. This survey had to be delivered in person in order 
to obtain the required response rate, given the difficulties encountered in pre-fieldwork research. 
The Hortiflora 2009 conference provided the ideal opportunity to do this with a captive audience 
including over 90% of currently exporting growers present. Being present while respondents 
completed the survey to assist with any difficulties and ensure the survey was completed 
improved both the data quality and the response rate. 
3.4 Overarching Issues 
3.4.1 Scale and Scope 
In designing a methodology, decisions had to be made as to the scale and scope possible within 
the financial and temporal constraints of the research. Floriculture is a truly global industry with 
research institutions and capital investors based on six continents. In the absence of the available 
funds to visit all locations to conduct face-to-face interviews, decisions were made on which 
locations were feasible within the scope of the study. Furthermore, the locations of nodes within 
the GPN are fluid and so it was difficult to schedule research too far in advance. One potentially 
interesting option would have been to conduct a comparative study of the Ethiopian flower 
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industry with that of Ecuador. However, one of the primary contributions of this research is an 
analysis of the undocumented structures of power, value and embeddedness that govern the 
Ethiopian industry. Given this focus and the parameters of the study, it was decided that this 
research would focus solely on Ethiopia. 
Within the Ethiopian floriculture GPN, there are nodes of the network that have not been fully 
explored in this research owing to the study’s scope. The primary purpose of the research is to 
explore the benefits that accrue to various actors within the network as a means of understanding 
the developmental impact of the industry. Previous studies that have examined floriculture with a 
developmental lens have tended to focus closely on issues of worker welfare and the 
environmental impact of the industry, in locations including Kenya, Ecuador and Colombia 
amongst others (Whitaker and Kolavalli, 2006; Dolan, 2007; Hale and Opondo, 2005; Hengsdijk 
and Jansen, 2006; Hughes, 2001; Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 2007; Maharaj and Dorren, 
1995; Meier, 1999). Worker welfare is an important aspect of any assessment of the development 
impact of an industry. In developing countries, the provision of income and other benefits which 
may improve the quality of life for large numbers of people are one of the primary ways in which 
an industry may benefit the country. However, for two main reasons, labour issues are not 
engaged with fully in this study.  
Firstly, issues of worker welfare in floriculture are comprehensively addressed in the literature on 
floriculture. Although the GPN framework emphasises the importance of situational specificity 
and the studies that have focused on worker welfare have been conducted in different locations 
with different social and institutional contexts, work which has focused on labour issues has done 
so at the expense of broader issues of the sustainability of the industry and which other groups of 
domestic actors benefit from it. It was therefore considered more important for this study to 
prioritise the neglected aspects of studies into floriculture in developing countries than to 
investigate the specific issues that affect labour in the industry as they differ from other industries 
in other locations.  
Secondly, interviewing workers in floriculture would require the employment of multiple 
translators for the different languages spoken in the various agro-ecological zones and would be 
highly time-consuming. Therefore, while labour issues of employment creation and wages are 
covered here, it would neither be possible nor productive within the scope of this study to fully 
address labour issues. 
The issue of the environmental impact of the floriculture industry too has the potential to impact 
on the long-term economic impact of the industry. If, as has occurred in Kenya, water tables were 
to drop significantly and water courses were to become polluted as a result of the industry, this 
would impact on both the future of the industry and the future of agricultural land as a whole as 
the quality of arable land is degraded. The situation in Ethiopia, and also within the different agro-
climatic regions of the country, is significantly different to that of Kenya and a full study of the 
environmental impact to build on that of Hengsdijk and Jansen (2006) is warranted but would be 
better approached, in the first instance, from a natural science perspective. As such, while the 
findings of others on the environmental impact of floriculture in Ethiopia, where available, are 
accounted for in the drawing of conclusions about the economic impact of the industry, no 
primary data has been collected on this issue. 
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3.4.2 Access Issues 
Access, both to respondents themselves and to data, proved a significant obstacle to conducting 
this research and significantly altered the research design. Previous work and pilot research 
revealed that the industry and, due to the prevailing business system, a great number of Ethiopian 
respondents are both somewhat guarded in the information they provide. Commercial actors in 
any industry are understandably protective of any data which may compromise their competitive 
position. Services had to be offered in web design, copyediting and data analysis in order to gain 
access to data from certain actors. Some respondents requested contact details and information 
on other respondents which introduced ethical issues as detailed in the following section. Four 
specific groups posed individual challenges with regard to access. 
Firstly, institutional actors, both state and industrial, required extensive networking and 
introductions by third party agents in order to gain access to the information required. Within 
many Ethiopian institutions there were no predefined rules about which data would be released 
and which would not, and the process of obtaining data was highly bureaucratic. All offices had to 
be visited in person and, commonly, several branches had to be visited in order clear each level of 
bureaucracy.  
Secondly, breeders and intellectual property institutions, whose livelihood is often dependent on 
the protection of information, were understandably reluctant to grant access to information 
(Zucker et al., 1998). 
[M]ost of this work is kept secret by private sector breeding programmes until it is 
commercialised, one cannot know all that is being considered, investigated, or in 
progress (Harbaugh, 2006; 658). 
After the pilot study, it became clear that IPRs and, particularly genetic modification, were not 
likely to significantly affect outcomes for Ethiopian floriculture. While interesting and a potential 
area for further research intellectual property proved to be superfluous to the objectives of this 
research.  
Thirdly, supermarkets, whose role in GPNs is increasingly influential (Barrett et al., 2004), present 
well established access problems (Hughes, 1999). The importance of public relations to 
supermarkets means that information is carefully controlled to ensure studies do not reflect 
negatively upon them. Again networking was required to obtain names and contact details of the 
desired respondents and all interviewees insisted on complete anonymity. 
Finally, flower farm investors, presented challenges not in the access to respondents which was 
relatively unproblematic using snowballing techniques, but, as a product of both the Ethiopian 
business system and the nature of the industry, in gaining access to specific data. Respondents 
were found to present different data to different people in order to protect their own interests as 
documented in Chapters 6-8.  
 I do have [the data] on an individual basis but I am not allowed to hand them over. I 
am also in discussions with the government of Ethiopia to supply them info and they 
also would like to have all the data you are requesting (IG2). 
Initially, the research design included a series of statistical analyses using firm profitability as the 
dependent variable with data on a range of independent variables obtained from the quantitative 
survey conducted. Despite persistent approaches to a number of firms and institutions, no data 
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could be obtained and an adequate proxy was unavailable. In the absence of this data, the 
influence of quantitative data in the triangulation of methodologies was limited to secondary data 
and more descriptive analysis of the quantitative survey data. 
3.4.3 Positionality 
One factor that must be considered in the design of all research phases is the positionality of the 
researcher. Whilst commonly perceived as primarily a problem of ethnographic research, 
researchers across the methodological spectrum must control for the influence of their own 
characteristics, physical attributes, personal history etc., on both the data given and the 
interpretation of it. Indeed, the preparedness of qualitative scientists to defend their 
methodologies against accusations of a lack of rigour has often led such approaches to be far 
more rigorous in controlling for such influences (Scheyvens and Storey, 2003). 
For this research, numerous considerations were made in gathering and analysing data due to the 
influence of the researcher’s position. Positionality affected the data gathered from different 
respondents, obtained using different methodologies in different ways. The position of the 
researcher as a young, white, English-speaking male undoubtedly eased the access to both 
quantitative and qualitative data from certain groups of actors. Among Ethiopian institutional 
actors, owing to a patriarchal society, and foreign corporate actors, due to a sense of identifying 
the researcher as being on their side of the social divide which exists amongst growers, data was 
given more freely than it would to a researcher with different characteristics. This was confirmed 
in conversations with Ethiopian academics attempting to conduct research with similar 
respondents. The influence of power dynamics must also be considered in data gathering. 
Respondents who perceive themselves as holding less power in their relationship with the 
interviewer may be more accommodating in arranging interviews and answering questions than 
those who perceive themselves as more powerful. However, analysis of the data must be 
tempered by the fact that respondents who perceive a negatively skewed power asymmetry 
between themselves and the researchers may seek to present information that they believe the 
researcher expects them to present. This is just a single aspect of positionality in which the 
dynamics of the interaction between interviewer and respondent must be considered in both 
data gathering and analysis and, as such, these dynamics have been considered in the 
presentation of data herein. 
3.4.4 Sampling 
As described above, the opportunity provided by the Hortiflora 2009 conference meant that there 
were very few considerations involved in the quantitative survey. Sixty-five of the sixty-eight 
currently exporting flower farms that are members of the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers and 
Exporters Association (the only flower farms that were not members of the association are those 
that were not yet exporting), at the time of the conference, exhibited at the conference and 
attempts were made to conduct the survey with all of them, although a small number did not 
agree to participate. Of the farms that did not participate, all were less than 14 hectares in size 
(small-medium), three were wholly Israeli-owned and one was Ethiopian-owned. These firms 
appeared to have a blanket policy of not engaging with researchers and no information could be 
gained from them at any time during the research. The survey was subsequently conducted with 
the three farms that were exporting at that time but were not present at the conference through 
farm visits, although a number of other farms have since begun exporting. 
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Sampling for qualitative interviews involved many more considerations. The initial research design 
included interviews with at least one respondent from a number of key nodes of the floriculture 
GPN including government institutions, industry associations and breeding institutions. Regarding 
flower farms, however, it was important to speak at length with a representative sample of a 
number of key groups including long established farms/new entrants to the industry, Ethiopian-
owned farms/farms owned by foreign investors, small/medium/large farms and farms growing in 
each of the three main agro-ecological zones. With the small number of farms (a total of around 
80 producing during the qualitative research period) and the access difficulties already discussed, 
it would have been difficult to obtain a statistically significant sample of each group. The necessity 
of networking in order to obtain respondents through snowballing meant that implicit targets 
were set to obtain at least one, but to strive for as many as possible from each of these groups. 
Additionally, a target for the total number of interviews with flower farms was set at a minimum 
of 20. This was set knowing the potential difficulties likely to be encountered in obtaining 
interviews. These in-depth interviews were intended to add detail and richness to the 
explanations of relationships within the network. Due to the success of the snowballing process, 
qualitative interviews were conducted with 40 of the 80 currently producing flower farms, 
commonly with interviews conducted with a number of respondents for each farm. Additionally, 
interviews were conducted with representatives of a large number of other nodes within the 
network, resulting in a total of 102 interview respondents, with whom multiple interviews were 
conducted. The flower farms with which qualitative interviews were conducted have been 
disaggregated by the origin of the investors, size of the production area and time in the industry 
in order to show the spread of the sample across different types of farms. The reason for farms 
being divided in this way is that these were found in pilot research to be key differentiators of the 
type of farm being considered, while the size and time parameters were taken as important 
points at which to separate small/medium from large farms and established farms from new 
entrants to the industry. 
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Respondent   
Flower Farm 
Owners/Senior 
Employees 
Ownership Structure 
Production 
Area 
Time in the Industry   
>3 Years <3 Years   
Wholly Foreign-
Owned 
>14 Ha 3 3 
40 
<14 Ha 4 2 
Mixed Locally/Foreign-
Owned 
>14 Ha 7 3 
<14 Ha 2 2 
Wholly Locally-Owned 
>14 Ha 4 2 
<14 Ha 2 6 
Auction Respondents 5 
Supermarket Respondents 7 
Institutional Respondents 16 
Importing Agents 5 
Consultants 7 
Intellectual Property Actors 6 
Others 16 
Total 102 
Table 3.1 Summary of Interview Sample 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
Whilst this research, as broadly economic in nature, was not particularly ethically problematic, it 
was important to consider any ethical issues which may have arisen from the methods used. As 
discussed above, access proved the most significant problem in both the quantitative and 
qualitative methods used. Despite not interviewing labourers, the vast majority of respondents 
were answerable to someone whether it was a shareholder, direct line manager or board of 
directors, who was both responsible for granting the interview and influencing what information 
was released. A firm may seek to serve its own agenda in the provision of information, briefing 
employees or selecting which employees can be surveyed so that a particular picture is portrayed 
which introduces sample bias (Popper, 1959). Alternatively, gaining private access to individuals 
may be difficult primarily because the sampling frame, i.e. the names of the respondents able to 
provide the required information, would be obtained from the companies, which may be 
unwilling to provide the information. An alternative option for obtaining a sample is through 
personal referrals, which has implications for the validity of the sample strata, but given the 
comprehensive nature of the quantitative element of the research and the targeting of companies 
for qualitative interviews, snowballing was merely required to provide names and in some cases 
recommendations, rather than identifying respondents, minimising the chances of sample error 
(Scott & Yu, 2005). Regardless of the techniques employed, the validity of the information given 
may still have been influenced by the workers’ fear of reprisals from their employer. To overcome 
this, attempts were made to gain the trust of the respondents, both by signing a confidentiality 
agreement and by spending time with respondents to manufacture mutual trust.  
Yeung (1995) lists opportunism, social relationships, and withdrawal as the key elements of 
organisational research in order to obtain guarded information. This presents some difficulties for 
research design in the field as it is difficult to plan for opportunism. One must also exercise 
caution in the use of social relationships to gain access as they can compromise the objectivity of 
the data or the relevance of the sample (Goldstein, 2002). In this study in some cases access was 
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gained to the sampling frame through negotiation with employers, either giving assurances about 
the nature of the data and what might be published, or through sufficient in-kind remuneration. 
For this research, it became clear from the pre-fieldwork research and the pilot study that full 
disclosure and the building of relationships through spending time within firms were the most 
appropriate approaches, reducing the ethical problems of the research.  
During field research, one particular ethical issue which had not previously been considered 
during the research design became very prominent. Interviews revealed that purposeful 
duplicitous tactics were being employed by growers in their relations with the auction house with 
regard to the reporting of Non-Auction Turnover (NAT), discussed in Chapter 8. Information 
received from one group of respondents conflicting with information they are obliged to provide 
to another group of respondents could seriously jeopardise their competitive position if 
confidentiality was not observed. Whilst this provided a very interesting point for investigation, 
for ethical reasons questions could not be tailored to Dutch auction respondents which may 
identify actors breaking their agreements and so compromise their future business relationship. 
A further area where there were unconsidered ethical implications of the research was in 
respondents offering to provide financial data on firms in return for money. As discussed above, 
the provision of this key dependent variable would have been an integral part of any quantitative 
data analysis. However, the fact that this practice would have been ethically questionable, and 
illegal, would have jeopardised the future employment of the respondent and, as such, would not 
have been publishable meaning the offer had to be declined. 
The final area in which ethical considerations had to be made in this research came in the 
reporting and dissemination of findings. Due to the sensitive nature of the data gathered, full 
disclosure of respondents’ names, positions or companies had the potential to compromise them 
personally or professionally. Therefore, as both a means to obtain the data required and as a 
moral imperative to ensure no negative consequences occur for respondents as a result of their 
participation, assurances had to be given that steps would be taken in the presentation of 
research to protect their identity. From the point of view of the research however, it was 
important to provide some information as to the position of the respondent to provide context to 
the information they gave. Consequently, anonymity agreements were signed with all qualitative 
interview respondents and verbal agreements were made about how they would be referred to in 
the written research. 
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4. Ethiopian Context 
The GPN framework sees an understanding of the geographical, cultural and institutional context 
of the study region as one of its key explanatory components. This study sees these local 
conditions as integral to explaining the outcomes in the establishment and growth of the 
Ethiopian floriculture industry. This chapter describes and analyses the relevant events and trends 
that have occurred in Ethiopia, which are then used in the analysis of primary data. 
4.1 Recent Political History 
Ethiopia has undergone a turbulent recent political past, the legacies of which demonstrably 
manifest themselves in the political and economic strategies pursued by the state today. Ethiopia 
is amongst the most culturally and ethnically heterogeneous states in the world, home to over 
150 distinct ethnicities and over 80 languages (Vaughan, 2003). Power has traditionally rested 
with the Amhara6 ethnic minority and was passed down along monarchical lines. Christianity has 
been the national religion and Amharinya the national language throughout Ethiopia’s history. 
The coup of 1974, which resulted in the military dictatorship known as the Derg, sought to alter 
these traditions, deposing the monarchy, declaring equality of churches and plurality in the use of 
languages. The Derg’s eventual leader, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, sought a move away from 
‘mono-ethnic’ government (Kissi, 2006). After the overthrow of the Derg by a coalition of rebel 
groups and the subsequent secession of Eritrea removing Ethiopia’s sea access, Ethiopia 
implemented a constitution that guarantees, at least legally, regular democratic parliamentary 
elections accessible to all ethnic groups. However, in the years since the constitution was 
adopted, the government has remained in the hands of the Tigrayan former TPLF (Tigrayan 
People’s Liberation Front) leader, Meles Zenawi. Many ethnically-motivated rebel/paramilitary 
groups remain in Ethiopia, primarily the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF), and the country is now divided into nine federal states and two chartered 
cities, based broadly on ethnic lines. Government policies and spending are still influenced by 
political and ethnic objectives which have implications for the growth of new industries such as 
floriculture (Abbink, 2006). 
Ethiopia then underwent, at least ostensibly, a relatively rapid transition from a feudal autocracy 
to a Marxist/Leninist (Stalinist) dictatorship (1974-1991) to a western-looking neoliberal economy 
(1991-present). The TPLF, from which the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) came, was one of a number of explicitly socialist organisations operating in Ethiopia in 
the 1980s. Despite this, the government’s Ethiopian Transitional Economic Policy (ETEP) of 1992, 
produced as a precondition for the first Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) (1991-1993) funds 
from the IMF, had a distinctive neoliberal theme with Araia stating that the new government 
“seems to favour a diminished role of the state in the economy” (1995; 199). The exact political 
ideology of the government of Ethiopia, which has effectively been in power for two decades 
(with a further remit until 2015), differs between policy and discourse. Its ideology, and the 
                                                          
 
6
 Ethnicity in Ethiopia had become far more complex than is displayed here, with Emperor Haile Selassie 
himself partially Oromo and Gurage, the ‘Amharicization’ of Ethiopian society was more a matter of conduct 
than blood lines but was still used as grounds for discrimination (Clapham, 1990). 
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policies it results in, is of key importance to the growth of the floriculture industry and its 
developmental impacts and, as such, will now briefly be examined in conjunction with its 
relationships with the international community. 
In order to overthrow the Derg, the Ethiopian rebel forces led by the TPLF required financial 
support. At the height of the Cold War, the ‘Western World’ and particularly the United States, 
saw a strategic and humanitarian incentive for the removal of the Derg regime and so were 
forthcoming with support to rebel forces (Woodward, 2006). Whilst the TPLF were not seen as 
ideal replacements for the Derg given their socialist leanings, their anti-Soviet sentiment led them 
to be viewed as the least worst alternative (Young, 1996). Despite the left-wing roots of the 
current administration, Ethiopia retains an overtly Western focus in its public discourse. 
Compliance with broader US objectives - including acting as a strategic ally in the ‘War on Terror’ 
with Prime Minister Meles stating that the relationship with the US was critical to securing peace 
and security in the Horn of Africa (Tekle, 2011) - has helped the country to remain ‘the darling’ of 
the policy community despite questions concerning human rights. As such, the country continues 
to receive high levels of overseas development assistance (ODA) in an attempt to improve its 
developing economy (Economist, 2007; Andrews et al., 2005). As Wallis (2010) contends, in 
Ethiopia “...development experts [are] arguing that a trade-off between growth and civil liberties 
is inevitable” while they “...hosted deeply flawed elections with little or no consequence for their 
relations with the outside world”. 
This fragile, post-socialist political context in which the floriculture industry has emerged has had 
a significant impact on the development of the industry. The economic context will now be 
analysed in order to further determine the political objectives of the government, adding an 
explanatory element to the development of the industry. 
4.2 Recent Economic Performance 
While a political move to the right and the government’s express intention to move from a 
planned to capitalist economy were clear, whether the government’s public discourse has been 
executed through their policies is less so. This section will give a brief synopsis of the major 
economic changes that have occurred in the last two decades in Ethiopia, which are partially 
responsible for the growth of the floriculture industry. Since the EPRDF took power, the party has 
governed the country, ostensibly adopting the policies prescribed by the Washington Consensus, 
although the compliance with the policies prescribed by the International Policy Community (IPC) 
has been less close in practice than in rhetoric. If this government’s industrial policy of targeting 
the floriculture industry in Ethiopia proves successful in improving livelihoods of domestic actors 
then their approach to liberalisation is likely to have been key in achieving this result. 
Ethiopia spans over one million square kilometres and has a population well in excess of 75 
million people (estimates vary) of which 85% is rurally-based. Factor endowment models of 
growth suggest that there is a natural disposition to develop through agriculture (WDI, 2011). 
Agriculture constitutes just under half of national GDP (46.3% in 2007) with industrial production 
accounting for little over 10% (WDI, 2011). The fact that this balance has not changed greatly over 
the past 15 years during significant overall GDP growth is a reflection of the government’s 
agricultural-led growth policies. The ETEP included a change of emphasis in government policy 
from industry-led to agriculture-led development (Alemu et al., 2003). The key principle of 
Ethiopia’s Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) policy strategy (sic), which has 
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governed the EPRDF’s economic policy throughout their tenure, is to direct resources to 
agricultural extension programmes and rural infrastructural development, prioritising rural 
agriculture over development in manufacturing or other urban-focused sectors. Specific 
provisions that have run throughout the individual development programmes during the 
government’s tenure include inputs provision to peasants; promotion of small scale irrigation; 
improved livestock herds; environmental protection and natural resource management; grain 
marketing efficiency; promotion of farmers’ organisations; rural infrastructure provision; and, 
critically for floriculture, expanding women’s participation in agriculture (Holt and Dessalegn, 
1999). Since the EPRDF took power, real GDP growth has been good and, although war with 
Eritrea and two notable droughts have had short-term impacts on growth, the last five years has 
seen sustained high growth rates, averaging over 11.5% (WDI, 2011). There is strong evidence 
that this growth has been pro-poor in nature and significant progress has been made towards 
achieving the millennium development goals by 2015 (MoFED, 2010). 
A caveat must be applied to these statistics, as it must to statistics throughout the thesis, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Here in particular though: 
It is an open secret that the double digit growth of recent years is supported by 
dubious statistics (Wallis, 2010). 
Since 1991, the Ethiopian government has maintained a constant budget deficit of around 5% of 
GDP, contrary to IMF advice, in an attempt to induce growth. The government has been largely 
successful in ensuring positive real interest rates throughout its tenure. However, the 
liberalisation of financial markets is an area where there has been consistent disagreement. By 
1994, the state had begun to allow the establishment of private domestic banks, but they 
continue to refuse to allow foreign banks to enter the country which has significant implications 
for capital availability for start-ups in capital intensive industries such as floriculture. Whilst still 
not truly market-determined with the availability of a black market, exchange rates are one area 
where the government has made clear and sustained progress in the eyes of the IPC. 
A related economic objective is that of inflation which, until the fuel and food price increases 
beginning in 2007, the government had kept relatively stable at approximately 11%. The peak of 
around 62.4% in July 2008, caused by the Global Financial Crisis7 leading to falling demand for 
Ethiopian exports combined with rising global food, fuel and construction material prices, has now 
passed and inflation is expected to return to 2006 levels (Reuters, 2009; WDI, 2011). This progress 
towards low and stable inflation has been threatened by the government’s devaluation of the 
currency in 2010, which significantly increased the price of imports. One of the motivations 
behind this devaluation was to improve the balance of payments, which is also a key motivation 
behind the promotion of the flower industry as documented in the following chapters. Despite 
the increase in exports documented below, the balance of payments deficit has continued to 
increase as incomes have risen, leading to higher demand for imports (McClure, 2010). The 
                                                          
 
7
 The term Global Financial Crisis, referred to elsewhere as the global economic downturn, global recession 
and credit crunch amongst other terms, is used here to encompass the series of events felt primarily in the 
2007 2009 period which had significant macro economic impacts on Ethiopia and specific effects on 
floriculture as documented throughout the present research. 
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devaluation of the currency, in addition to increasing the price of imports leading to a fall in 
demand, affects the other side of the balance of payments equation through a fall in the price, 
and consequent increase in demand, for exports. This is the first demonstration of the 
government using a “deliberately undervalued exchange rate...to pursue a more aggressive 
strategy of import substitution” (Davison, 2010). This attempt at import substitution runs contrary 
to Washington Consensus liberalisation policies promoted by the IMF, although recent policy 
dialogue has been more flexible in this regard (IMF, 2010).  Many of the other mechanisms by 
which the balance of payments could be reduced are constrained by the government’s desire to 
join the WTO and access the benefits that membership entails. This manipulation of currency is a 
controversial way in which the balance of payments can be improved and has recently been used 
by China in suppressing the value of the Yuan below market levels in order to increase exports 
(BBC News, 2010b). 
International trade has been liberalised significantly under the EPRDF. Weighted mean tariffs have 
consistently been ~10% and Ethiopia’s recent accession to the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) means they are tied to a common external tariff and WTO membership 
is likely to be completed by 2013 (Kidane, 2009). Furthermore, in October 2008, an agreement 
was made to create a free trade area between COMESA, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC), meaning the union now covers 26 
African countries (BBC News, 2008). 
Investors have also been able to take advantage of the preferential trade terms with the EU. A 
complex and changing set of regulations has governed trade between developing nations and the 
EU in recent years. Since 1971, the EU has had rules governing trade between the EU and African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries guaranteeing unreciprocated, preferential treatment for 
the developing countries in terms of lower or eliminated tariffs on imports of certain items, 
formalised in 1976 with the Lome Agreement. This agreement was succeeded by the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2000 but WTO rules have resulted in the agreement having to be revised on two 
subsequent occasions, with the latest revision being provisionally enforced from November 2010. 
These revisions have been necessitated, in part, by the yet-to-be-concluded Doha Round of WTO 
discussions which have had significant implications for trade between the Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and major markets such as the EU and the US. The removal of tariffs on imports 
between all WTO member countries proposed in the Doha Round would remove some of the 
progress that LDCs had made with regard to their export industries using the competitive 
advantages created by agreements such as Cotonou, Everything But Arms (EBA), Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) and GSP+, known as preference erosion. Until 2000, quotas were 
imposed on imports of roses from all African producers which have now been removed. LDCs, of 
which Ethiopia is one while Kenya is not, benefit from tariff-free and quota-free access to EU 
markets under the EBA scheme which was agreed with WTO members. Further support is given to 
ACP countries attempting to enter EU markets through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 
which, while they require a graduated introduction of reciprocity in terms of trade, aim to offset 
any potentially negative impacts on developing countries in a number of ways including funding 
for infrastructural development by the EU. Ethiopia has not, as yet, signed an EPA unlike other 
COMESA members including Zambia and Zimbabwe, and all EAC members, including Kenya, as the 
terms of trade available would not be as favourable as they are under the above schemes. A 
further system of measures available to LDCs is currently being implemented under a revision to 
GSP+ which will provide further trade-related incentives to countries complying with a set of 
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labour, human rights, environmental, and good governance objectives. It remains to be seen 
whether Ethiopia will meet these requirements.  
While the EU is the primary export market for Ethiopian roses, both flowers and a number of 
other commodities benefit from further preferential trade agreements including from GSP+ with 
Japan, Australia and Canada and under a separate agreement with China. 
The most important area of macroeconomic policy for floriculture is the foreign investment code 
with a view to attracting FDI. There has been a continued and gradual improvement8 of the 
investment code under the EPRDF and FDI has been pinpointed as a key mechanism to induce 
economic growth. While there is a general move within the EPRDF to encourage FDI, certain 
sectors, for various political, strategic and economic reasons, are protected from foreign 
investment, while others have been identified as priority sectors with additional incentives 
offered. Protected sectors include retail; import trade; export of several major primary 
commodities including coffee, chat and oilseeds; construction; leisure industries; air transport; 
broadcasting; telecommunications; and banking. The theory behind these exemptions is that the 
skills and resource bases exist for domestic actors to utilise opportunities in these sectors. 
However, in the priority sectors - horticulture, floriculture, agro-processing, textiles and garments, 
and leather products - the government considers there to be significant potential but a deficiency 
in the requisite skills or knowledge base. For these priority sectors the investment code has been 
designed to attract as much FDI as possible with measures including low-interest loans with long 
repayment periods; customs duty exemption on inputs and capital goods; provision of low-cost 
land with long-term leases; technical support where available; personal income tax and 
corporation tax exemption for up to seven years with a two-year loss carry-over period; and tax-
free repatriation of capital and dividends. 
In 1999 the government signed up to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agreement (MIGA) in 
the hope of instilling confidence in foreign investors (EIU, 2000). The investment code has had to 
be continually improved due to the non-response of investors and levels of investment in the 
country are still relatively low, attributable to political instability, corruption, instability in the 
banking sector and uncompetitive conditions presented by a bias towards EPRDF-owned 
enterprises. Some of these are factors which the government has tried to address with increased 
privatisation and anti-corruption commissions but progress has been slow. 
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 The term ‘improvement’ with respect to the investment code referred to here is taken from the economic 
perspective of the foreign investor whilst the specifics of the costs and benefits of such a movement are 
examined throughout the thesis. 
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Figure 4.1 FDI Inflows Data: WDI, 2011 
Although advocated by the IMF, the type of investment code offered in Ethiopia does have its 
critics. Stiglitz (2002) points to the offering of tax concessions to investors as a transferral of the 
burden of raising public revenue for investment in infrastructure onto the workers and, as such, a 
regressive measure. There is also a fear that after the period of incentives expires, the capital is 
fluid enough to move elsewhere without the investor incurring substantial losses; the result being 
a ‘race to the bottom’ in developing countries. Whether EPRDF policies on FDI have had a 
significant effect on the levels of FDI attracted is not clear. Despite numerous changes in the 
investment code, levels of FDI were largely non-responsive as can be seen from Figure 4.1. The 
Global Financial Crisis undoubtedly had a significant impact on FDI in Ethiopia but investment is 
increasing once more, and the profile of investors is diversifying. A range of agricultural investors 
from a number of countries including Egypt and India have been attracted as documented in 
Chapter 11, and foreign investment with a more mixed investment portfolio has also been 
attracted including that from Turkey with total investment, in areas including manufacturing and 
agriculture, increasing from $22.5m in 2008 to $819m in 2010 (Walta Information Centre, 2010b).  
As part of both the privatisation and liberalisation of the Ethiopian economy and as part of the 
drive to increase food production in the country, Ethiopia has become a focal location of the 
much publicised global ‘land grab’. The government has allocated a total of 3 million hectares of 
land with a view to developing large-scale, mechanised agricultural production, about which the 
Ethiopian Ambassador to the UK wrote in The Guardian: 
The phrase "land grab" implies that wealthy foreign investors are misappropriating 
land and that Ethiopia has no control over the process. In fact, Ethiopia chooses to 
allocate land to investors depending on best use. The key is to achieve balance. 
Commercial farms tend to become hubs that link smallholders to value chains and 
help spread knowledge and best practice to other farms. So the debate is not about 
big versus small. We will continue to support commercially viable small farms, which 
offer increased food supplies, jobs and incomes in both the farm and non farm 
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economy. This will help Ethiopia achieve wider economic development and 
prosperity (Kebede, 2011). 
Privatisation of former state-owned enterprises has occurred in Ethiopia but has been slow. In 
addition to the liberalisation of the banking sector, privatisation of land ownership is another 
issue about which there has been major disagreement between the government and IMF, and an 
area which has a significant impact on the floriculture industry. 
The peculiar system of land tenure in Ethiopia merits special attention here as it affects the 
growth potential and distribution of benefits from the majority of industries in Ethiopia to some 
degree, as is explored specifically for floriculture below. Prior to the revolution of 1974, two main 
systems of land tenure existed in Ethiopia. Rist saw land allocated to any member of a community 
that could sufficiently demonstrate kinship ties to the land. Land would then be divided equally 
amongst a landholder’s children upon their death, but could not be sold, gifted, or otherwise 
bequeathed. The community as a whole would pay the state for the land, with individual 
members contributing according to the size of their holding. Security of tenure under this system 
was low as land claimants frequently emerged to challenge existing agreements. Gult consisted of 
large estates being granted to a small aristocracy, often seen to have given service to the crown. 
Famers would then pay in goods or labour for the right to farm the land. Additionally, there were 
a large number of other tenure systems including those through which both the Orthodox Church 
and the State held vast tracts of land (Rahmato, 1984).  
The system of land tenure was one of the major driving forces for the revolution and in 1975, the 
Derg nationalised all rural land without compensation. Each rural family was given usufruct rights 
to land less than or equal to 10 hectares. During the 1980s a number of other measures were 
implemented in order to combat the associated problems of low productivity and increasing land 
insecurity. These included the formation of peasants associations intended, amongst other things, 
to promote advanced agricultural techniques and the formation of cooperatives, and the 
resettlement of large numbers of people from food insecure areas. Furthermore, many of the 
larger private commercial farms were transformed into state farms under the Derg, intended to 
combat food shortages. These farms then received a large proportion of the available inputs to 
agriculture but were unsuccessful in improving food security. Under the EPRDF regime land policy 
has continued largely unchanged and ownership by the ‘State and Peoples of Ethiopia’ is now 
constitutionally entrenched. Despite opposition from IFIs the government have remained 
belligerent in their defence of the policy on grounds of fairness and equality (Crewett and Korf, 
2008). 
Some general consequences of land policy relating to the EPRDFs broader political and economic 
agenda are addressed here. Firstly, the distribution of land means that farms, an important factor 
of production in such agrarian economy, are highly constrained in size. Neoclassical economics 
lists a lack of intensive agricultural techniques and flexible specialisation, discouragement of 
foreign investors and ultimately a decreased yield lowering food security as consequences of such 
a policy (Holden and Yohannes, 2002; Deininger et al., 2003). Secondly, the policy also has 
implications for entrepreneurship as there is no opportunity for individuals to use land as 
collateral and no scope for limited liability companies. The government justifies the policy on 
grounds of equality, however in practice it has led to an espousal of subsistence farming. In 2005, 
the government introduced a certification scheme whereby individuals could use land as 
collateral in order to obtain loans despite not owning the land, the results of which have yet to be 
  49 
 
analysed (EIU, 2006). Furthermore, in a bid to increase food production, the government has 
begun to issue ultimatums to all tenants that their land will be reclaimed by the government if 
they fail to build on it or use it effectively, although they will be compensated for this 
expropriation under the ‘certification’ scheme (EIU, 2009; Kifle, 2010). 
As part of the improvement in investment codes, much bureaucracy has been removed from the 
process of doing business. As a consequence, in the WB’s ‘Doing Business’ report (World Bank, 
2009a) which measures ease of conducting business around the world, Ethiopia was ranked 116th 
in the world and, although it represents a fall of seven places from the previous year leaving the 
country third behind Kenya and Uganda as the best place in East Africa for doing business, it is a 
great improvement on the country’s position a decade earlier. It has now slipped a further five 
places in the rankings due to the political violence in recent times but remains well placed within 
East Africa. The main elements of the report on which it scores badly are registering property, for 
the reasons listed above, and trading across borders which is unsurprising given that is country is 
currently almost entirely surrounded by conflict zones9. 
It can be seen from this brief review of recent economic trends that the Ethiopian government is 
not strictly following the model for economic liberalisation recommended by IFIs. The 
government has adopted a cautious and controversial approach, while largely maintaining the 
financial support of the donor community, which has resulted in regular conflicts with the IMF, 
the primary IFI operating in Ethiopia. 
In the latest five year development plan (2010-2015), Growth and Transformation (GTP), versions 
of which have shaped government economic policy since 1991, emphasis has been placed firmly 
on infrastructure, with a view to further facilitating ADLI outlined in previous strategies. Five 
thousand kilometres of railway are to be laid, including two thousand kilometres between Addis 
Ababa and Djibouti, which should reduce costs and expedite sea freight. New roads will be built at 
a cost of ETB122Bn (~$7.2Bn US), financed and planned primarily with Chinese capital. The plan 
also includes increasing power generation by five times with the majority of additional capacity 
allocated to increasing agricultural output. A further mechanism for increasing agricultural output 
is the construction of a fertilizer production facility, designed to provide a significant proportion of 
the country’s needs in this area. This will have the  additional  impact of improving the country’s 
balance of payments through ISI, the importance of which is documented in Chapter 6 (Sisay, 
2010). Fertiliser is a vital input in such an agriculturally-based economy and its procurement and 
distribution has proven highly contentious during the EPRDF’s tenure. The foreign exchange 
necessary to procure fertiliser has been largely limited to state governments or para-statal 
enterprises which has affected prices and ultimately reduced access for smallholders (Jayne et al., 
2003; Croppenstedt et al., 2003). Domestic production of fertilisers should increase competition 
and transparency, ultimately increasing access for smallholders. Overall, the plan predicts average 
annual growth during the five year period of 11-14.9% (Reuters, 2010). 
The development plans, which have governed Ethiopian economic policy during the EPRDF’s 
tenure, are an example of a developing country pursuing an active industrial policy, the utility of 
                                                          
 
9
 Northern Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea as well as conflicts in Sudan and Gambella in the West of Ethiopia. 
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which is controversial among development academics and practitioners. It is a commonly held 
perception that post-war East Asian growth occurred as a result of an active industrial policy 
which involved ‘picking winners’, facilitated by the size and strength of the state. Proponents of 
this view hold that such a ‘developmental state’ is not possible in sub-Saharan Africa due to the 
prevalence of corruption and rent-seeking activities, contributing to relatively weak states. This 
weakness of state combines with a purported absence of possible winners to pick, i.e. there is an 
absence of sectors, industries or firms with the potential for growth, to make such a strategy 
impractical. However, Wade (2009) contends that rent-seeking and corruption were at least as 
prevalent in Taiwan and South Korea in the immediate post-war period as they are in much of SSA 
today. Furthermore, Wade (ibid) states that Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) was 
key to their development by identifying growth sectors and ‘betting on success’. It did not entail 
‘picking winners’ so much “as an incremental process of upgrading and diversification...based on 
dense interaction between IDB officials and private firms in an informal and bilateral way” (ibid: 
359; also - Maxwell, 2005; Lall, 1995).  
Institutional economics would suggest that weak state, legal and financial institutions would 
preclude the successful pursuit of an active industrial policy, and act as a barrier to the growth of 
an export-orientated business such as floriculture (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008). However, 
Wijnands et al. (2007) find that, although growth in GDP-per-capita is strongly correlated with 
good institutions, the growth of exports in cut flowers had no correlation with the strength of 
institutions. The reasons for this, they suggest, stem from the absence of a domestic market and 
skills base necessitating foreign expertise and capital, resulting in foreign institutional frameworks 
often being imported for floriculture as a ‘special case’. The GPN framework accommodates this 
potential for the strength of states to shape the fortunes of production networks through its 
examination of power within institutions. However, the flexible nature of the framework allows 
for the situational specificity of different production networks in different locations to be 
differentially affected by the strength of institutions. 
Unlike Wijnands et al., Blattman believes that it is, in fact, the strength of the Ethiopian state 
which has allowed an active industrial policy to be pursued and has assisted in the growth of the 
industry, when compared with, for example, Uganda (Blattman, 2009). Whether growth in the 
floriculture sector is an example of the Ethiopian government ‘picking winners’, or if it represents 
far more of an ‘incremental process of upgrading and diversification’, which, as Wade displays 
proved successful in Taiwan’s export development (2009), will be examined further below. The 
strength of the Ethiopian state and institutions and their ability to influence the development of 
floriculture together with any evidence for the import of foreign institutional frameworks is 
discussed in the following chapters.  
4.3 Export Profile of Ethiopia and How to Grow Export Sectors 
Ethiopia has had a relatively stable export profile, both in terms of commodities and volumes, 
since the end of the WWII. Table 4.1 compares Ethiopia’s export profile in 2001 and 2010 
including commodity groups and values. The figures for 2001 broadly reflect those of the 
preceding half century, while those for 2010 show how the Ethiopian economy has grown and 
changed in the past decade and as such these are not exceptional years. 
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HS 
Code 
Product label 
Nominal Exported 
value in 2001  
Nominal Exported 
value in 2010  
(Thousand 
$US) 
% of 
Total 
Exports 
(Thousand 
$US) 
% of 
Total 
Exports 
'09 Coffee, tea, mate and spices 149824 37.2 805717 34.6 
'41 
Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) 
and leather 74636 18.5 74418 3.2 
'14 
Vegetable plaiting materials, vegetable 
products 54271 13.5 NA 0 
'12 
Oil seed, oleagic fruits, grain, seed, fruit, 
etc, 38665 9.6 382463 16.4 
'07 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and 
tubers 27613 6.9 452736 19.4 
'10 Cereals 18952 4.7 NA 0 
'26 Ores, slag and ash 10151 2.5 NA 0 
'52 Cotton 8897 2.2 26241 1.1 
'71 
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, 
etc 4541 1.1 203696 8.7 
'13 
Lac, gums, resins, vegetable saps and 
extracts 2833 0.7 NA 0 
'06 
Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut 
flowers etc NA 0 182848 7.9 
'01 Live animals NA 0 146649 6.3 
'84 Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc NA 0 58660 2.5 
'02 Meat and edible meat offal NA 0 54870 2.4 
Table 4.1 Ethiopian Exports in 2001 and 2010 Data: (International Trade Centre, 2011)   
The total value of exports in 2001 was marginally over $400m US while in 2010 it was just over 
$2.5Bn US. The share of the top 10 exported commodities in exports total was 77% in 2001 and 
rose to 93% by 2010, which is an indication of the rapid export growth within some of these 
groups and also the low overall level of exports in 2001. The overall growth in exports from 2001 
to 2010 was 641%. Between 2009 and 2010 alone, the value of exports grew by 59%, largely 
attributable to a rise in market prices for some of Ethiopia’s key exports, in addition to the rise in 
exported volumes. In 2001, 14 groups had exported values of over $1m and by 2010 this had risen 
to 41 groups, showing a significant diversification in the export profile. Several of the groups 
which include food items saw increases in export levels during this period, a trend which looks set 
to continue as documented in Chapter 11. Within group ‘09, coffee makes up 96% of the total 
export value and still remains Ethiopia’s primary export commodity. Whilst, as yet, no significant 
export industry exists in the extractive sector, Ethiopia can be said to experience a degree of the 
resource curse paradox more commonly associated with areas dominated by extractive 
industries. Coffee is endemic to Ethiopia and is a high-value export which has dominated the 
country’s export profile for many centuries, potentially at the expense of other industries. Today, 
other significant export commodities include oil seeds (primarily sesame, linseed and niger seeds) 
(Wijnands et al., 2009), gold, and chat – comprising a large proportion of group ‘09. Ethiopia is 
also a major producer of potash, a principal component of soil fertiliser but, to date, little fertiliser 
production has taken place in the country, which the government intends to rectify in the 
development plan outlined above. 
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Whilst the majority of Ethiopia’s exports remain unprocessed primary commodities, increasingly 
attempts are being made to process commodities into consumer products, particularly in the 
export of leather goods. Indeed, the government has recently both banned the export of raw hide 
and skins (APA, 2011) and removed leather from the list of priority sectors, preventing foreigners 
from obtaining export licences (Yewondwossen, 2011). The government has predicted a 10% 
growth in exports during 2011 while the IMF estimates 7% increase (Malone, 2010). Many of the 
commodities that have seen significant growth in export values have done so with the aid of 
government programmes targeted at particular sectors. This model of export promotion is 
strongly advocated by the World Bank, which views this as a successful element of Ethiopia’s 
structural adjustment programme (World Bank, 2002). One such industry that has been targeted 
by the Ethiopian government to promote exports is floriculture, as documented in the following 
chapters. 
One of the key arguments of this thesis is that the factors determining economic sustainability 
and the success of an industry are contextually specific and socially nuanced. Sutton and Kellow 
(2010) conduct a comprehensive profiling of lead firms in Ethiopia’s 13 largest industrial sectors as 
well as the major multi-sectoral firms, analysing a total of 50 firms. The historical analysis of the 
development of these firms gives an indication of common characteristics among firms that have 
successfully grown in this environment. Twenty-four of the 50 largest companies across all sectors 
began as import-export companies while two were started by managers who had gained 
knowledge of their sector within another firm in Ethiopia. Nine of the top 50 firms were traceable 
to foreign companies starting operations within Ethiopia while the remainder were formerly 
public sector enterprises. The authors see the importance of traders in the development of lead 
firms as demonstrative of the importance of a detailed knowledge of the local and international 
market, viewing it as far more influential in the success of these firms in this context than 
technical knowledge (ibid; 4). 
Having reviewed firms in all of the largest industrial sectors, the authors identify two key 
components for success in this specific context;  
1. The presence, or ability to create, a well-organised and efficient team of substantial size. 
2. Market Intelligence – what to produce and where to position the firm in relation to 
existing distribution networks and how to develop new distribution channels. 
It is in the second of these components where import-export firms are well positioned to succeed 
within the market. If such knowledge is not available within the geographical context, i.e. if no 
trading relevant to the industrial sector in question has occurred in the country previously, then 
the importance of foreign actors who hold this specific knowledge becomes more relevant. 
Foreign actors may however be deficient in the capabilities necessary to satisfy the first 
component of success. These two issues emerged in primary research as key components in the 
success of the floriculture industry and as such are addressed broadly in Chapter 7 and more 
specifically in Chapters 9 and 8 respectively. 
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5. The Floriculture GPN 
In this chapter, the literature on floriculture, economic liberalisation, and literature on other GPNs 
is used to inform this study. As is common in studies conducted using the GPN framework to 
analyse an undocumented network, primary data from interviews, surveys and other research is 
integrated with secondary literature in order to further explain the network. 
5.1 The Flower Trade – A Growing Sector 
One of the key challenges for the millennium development goals is to provide the 
organisation, market linkages, technology, and know how that will enable a 
proportion of poorer producers to participate in markets for higher value crops and 
livestock products in the rapidly expanding urban centres in developing countries 
and for export to the more industrialised nations (Davis, 2005; 6). 
5.1.1 Historical Context 
The culture of cut flowers as gifts in what is now the developed world has existed for centuries 
and waned in Roman times before its Renaissance revival in the Netherlands when flowers were 
given as gifts between the ruling Dukes (Goody, 1993). More intensive floriculture began in the 
19th Century with the production of flowers for display in the homes of the upper-classes in 
England. By the early 20th Century production had primarily shifted to the Netherlands partially 
due to its flat, fertile land and ease of transport to the growing market in continental Europe but 
also because the Dutch market had become the largest in Europe with the fashion of floristry 
percolating down the social hierarchy. Until the 1960s the Netherlands was firmly established as 
the undisputed centre of world floriculture and the vast majority of commercial cut flowers had, if 
not been grown in the country, at some point been through its well-established flower auctions. 
Despite a general move into tertiary industries, the high value-added nature and exponentially 
rising demand in the floriculture sector meant it remained a focus for economic activity. 
5.1.2 Shift of Production 
The potential profitability of the market was observed by many outside the Netherlands who 
sought new ways to increase yields, increase quality and decrease costs. Concurrently, in the 
American market which is not as dependent on the Netherlands, production began to shift from 
the main consumption centres in the east to the western and southern states in the 1950s, made 
possible by the inception of regular commercial air transport. The western and southern states 
had the advantages of cheaper land and labour and better climates for production. The shift was 
also facilitated by technological advances in post-harvest technology, decreasing senescence. 
There was also an increase in farm size as the market grew and firms began to seek economies of 
scale.  
In the early 1960s, an American student entered parameters, such as wage rates, temperature, 
hours of sunlight, and altitude, into a computer programme attempting to find the best place to 
grow carnations and the location it returned was Bogotá, Colombia (ILO, 2001). Between 1966 
and 1980 the country grew to become the second largest exporter of cut flowers globally. Mendez 
(1991) sees the growth of the Colombian flower industry as a continuation of the internal 
relocation of flower producers within the US, in search of cost advantages facilitated by 
technological advances. This is evidenced by the fact that the first producers to commercially 
export flowers from Colombia were American producers that had chosen to relocate to Colombia. 
While the government had periodically attempted to implement policies to facilitate the growth 
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of the industry, it cannot be said that the growth of the industry was attributable to government 
policy in any way. The government did begin to implement policies throughout the 1970s to 
reduce the country’s anti-export bias but none of these measures had a specific impact on the 
growth of the floriculture industry. Indeed throughout the industry’s growth, several of these 
policies were reintroduced in addition to the implementation of some new policies which resulted 
in an anti-export bias. In Colombia, “the government’s general economic policies have been a 
burden on cut flower growers” (ibid, 1991; 17). However, the most significant obstacle to growth 
during the 1966-1980 period was protectionist measures implemented by the US government 
(Mendez, 1991). 
Other countries including Chile, Ecuador, Uganda, the Gambia, India, Kenya, and Zimbabwe 
subsequently attempted to emulate Colombia and flower exports are now a notable part of the 
economy in these countries (Wainwright and Hart, 1999; Sawers, 2005). This was part of a wider 
trend in what has been termed the peripheralisation of production (Amin and Thrift, 1994). In 
many industries, particularly those with characteristics such as labour or land intensity, all or part 
of the production functions have been relocated so that a large number of commodities are now 
produced in the ‘periphery’ solely for consumption in the ‘core’, representing a departure from 
the historical situation of industries locating close to their market (Leslie and Reimer, 1999; 
Maharaj and Dorren, 1995; Hughes, 2000; Wainwright and Hart, 1999).  
In addition to changes in production, as disposable income has increased throughout the 
developed world so too has the market for the consumption of cut flowers and, in doing so, has 
changed in structure. If incomes continue to grow, the potential exists for the cut flower market 
in every country to reach the mature market stage (Figure 5.1). The UK, Europe’s second largest 
consumer of cut flowers, is still viewed here as an emerging market where the majority of flowers 
are still bought for special occasions. Whilst reductionist in assuming that consumption in each 
market will follow the same pattern, Figure 5.1 does give a visual representation of how the 
global market in cut flowers, which has seen continued strong growth for over 40 years, still offers 
prospects for continued growth. Implicit within this is change in the composition of demand. In 
immature and emerging markets the majority of consumption is of quality flowers with low levels 
of price sensitivity: consumers tend to be less concerned about the price of flowers for weddings 
and funerals than they are for a discretionary weekly purchase. In mature markets, the majority of 
demand is for ‘own use’ and so there is a greater degree of price sensitivity. However, demand for 
‘own use’ flowers does not come at the expense of flowers for special occasions as, in mature 
markets, aggregate demand is far greater. Global trade flows in cut flowers now amount to over 
$70Bn US annually, although a significant proportion of this, particularly of the almost $40Bn US 
attributable to the Netherlands, is the resale or handling of flowers (UN Comtrade, 2010). 
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Figure 5.1 European Flower Markets; Source: (Labaste, 2005; 43) 
Whitaker and Kolavalli (2006) argue that countries such as Kenya have ‘challenged the historical 
dominance’ of Europe in flower production; this ignores the influence of European actors in this 
transferral process, something which is discussed in subsequent chapters. Hughes (2000) details 
how the cut-flower industry has been championed in the SAPs of the IMF and World Bank since 
the 1980s while Maharaj & Dorren (1995) describe it as an ‘ideal activity for encouragement in an 
SAP’ owing to its use of private investment and its ability to command foreign exchange. The 
industry simultaneously satisfies the dual objectives of agricultural development and the 
promotion of exports. Furthermore, this ties in with the WTO agenda of growth through trade 
liberalisation, with Ethiopia hoping to join the organisation by 2013 (WTO, 2008; Kidane, 2009). In 
the following sections the reasons behind the shift of production are examined before the specific 
conditions affecting Ethiopia’s floriculture industry are analysed in Chapter 7. 
Flower producers in the traditional production hub of the Netherlands have had to modify their 
market strategy as production has shifted to lower-cost production locations. The initial shift of 
production came in lower-quality, higher-volume varieties where the knowledge and skill 
requirements for optimum production were lower. This led traditional producers to refocus their 
production on these high-value varieties where, being located closer to the market, they could be 
more responsive to consumer demand and take flowers to market in optimum sale condition 
without considerations of perishability during transit. However, as the production capabilities of 
developing countries have improved, they have begun to encroach on the market for the highest 
quality products, and continue to produce these varieties at a greatly reduced cost, narrowing the 
Dutch production scope to those varieties which are most easily damaged in transit, or can be 
easily produced without energy or labour inputs (IG2).  
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5.1.2.1 Why Companies Choose Developing Countries 
One of the primary reasons behind the shift in production was the agro-ecological conditions 
available in tropical regions. Although each variety has specific requirements of soil type, 
temperature, light intensity and water for optimal growth, there are a set of general conditions 
which are conducive to good flower growth. These include high sunlight intensity, moderate 
daytime and cool evening temperatures, mineral rich soil and plentiful fresh water. Such 
conditions will result in the long-stemmed, large-budded flowers that command the highest price 
at auction and will produce these flowers in the shortest possible time. These conditions are most 
commonly available in the tropical, high-altitude, volcanic regions of the world, which are, by and 
large, developing countries. 
Production by the traditional methods used in developed countries, including the Netherlands, 
entailed the use of heaters and coolers and comparatively high levels of inputs in order to 
replicate the conditions described above, which are naturally available in some developing 
countries. This meant that energy costs were one of the principal components of overhead costs 
for flower production. Whilst suitable growing areas in developing countries are located further 
away from the primary markets in Europe and North America than the traditional growing areas, 
the energy required to transport the produce to market is significantly lower than the energy 
costs involved in producing flowers close to the market (Williams, 2007). Whilst flowers require 
the same inputs as traditional agricultural commodities in terms of land (although not in the same 
quantities) - labour, and good growing conditions - the return-per-hectare is significantly higher 
for flowers. The high sales price mean that the high transport and storage costs that cannot be 
covered with some agricultural products can be absorbed. Agricultural commodities which do not 
demand the same level of freshness of flowers can be transported by sea and land to reduce 
transport costs which is opening up other segments of agriculture to developing countries. 
Another cost significantly reduced by production in developing countries is labour. Floriculture is a 
labour-intensive industry, and in developed countries this constitutes the majority of production 
costs. Flowers are a delicate commodity and each must be picked by hand which, along with 
packing, are the unskilled jobs which form the primary labour requirements of the industry. Many 
developing countries have a surplus of unskilled labour and the wage costs are significantly lower 
than in developed countries. Indeed, Schumacher and Marsh (2002) found the labour and energy 
prices to be by far the largest element of the final cost of a flower produced in the US. Average 
wages in countries such as Ethiopia are as low as 1.5% (2008 World Bank Estimates) of those in 
the U.S. and energy requirements are negligible by comparison. By contrast, in Ethiopia 74% of 
the costs in floriculture are attributable to transport and marketing, showing just how significant 
location is for labour and energy costs (GDS, 2006). The cost of labour, in addition to other labour 
dynamics such as unionisation and productivity, varies significantly between developing countries 
as documented in Chapter 9. 
The final reason why floricultural firms have chosen to relocate their production operations to 
developing countries is the government incentives offered to investors in the sector. Although 
these vary by country they include tax exemptions, discounts on land, cheap finance and grants, 
and other specialist incentives aimed at facilitating growth of the industry (Barrett et al., 1999; 
Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Watts and Little, 1994; Hughes and Reimer, 2004; Ernst and Kim, 
2002). The question that is examined below is why do governments offer these incentives? 
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5.1.2.2 Why Developing Countries Choose to Promote Floriculture 
In the modern global economy, many developing countries have few resources that command a 
high price. Highly skilled or educated labour, high-value natural resources such as diamonds or oil 
and geographical advantages such as location and facilities integral to trade routes are in short 
supply in most of the world’s poorest countries and Ethiopia’s dearth is particularly acute (Homer-
Dixon, 1995; Bhorat et al., 2002; Campbell, 1991). Historically, countries with abundant fertile 
land and cheap labour have focused on food production explained by the Heckscher-Ohlin factor 
endowment model of trade. Whilst this increases food security and is stabilised by domestic 
demand, prices for agricultural products are low and the relative transport and tariff costs are 
high. Global protectionism on food products remains high as countries seek self-sufficiency in the 
event of conflict (Swinbank and Tanner, 1996). Additionally, the opportunity for growth in many 
traditional agricultural products has a ceiling based on low income elasticity of demand. As 
incomes in the developed world increase, they are unlikely to want substantially more wheat, 
maize or rice, whilst demand for meat, and therefore feed crops, may increase slightly among 
low-income households. These factors make the prospects for high export earnings from 
agriculture bleak, despite the anomalously high price of agricultural commodities since 2006.  
As a luxury consumer good, flowers have a high income elasticity of demand (YED). If developed 
world consumers have more money to spend, the likelihood is that they will spend some of it on 
flowers. This means that the country can continue to develop their exports to cater to market 
trends and continue to receive premium prices for their products (Storck, 1970). As argued by 
Appelbaum et al. (1994) the key difference between rich and poor countries is the relative values 
of the commodities produced in each area and, in order to ensure higher value commodities are 
produced, the prevailing conditions can be altered: 
Comparative advantage is created (and designed) by the combined effects of human 
actors (Sawers, 2005; 63). 
As described above, many developing country governments have offered specific incentives to 
investors in floriculture, but what are the incentives for these governments to develop this 
sector? Developing countries experience high levels of unemployment, contributing to high levels 
of poverty. The introduction of an industry which requires high levels of unskilled labour has the 
potential to address this problem and, while some argue that wages are too low, a wage is better 
than no wage. The wages and power dynamics of labour in the Ethiopian flower industry are 
examined in Chapter 9. 
In offering incentives to foreign investors, the government hopes to increase FDI. Whilst 
developing countries may have the natural resources necessary for the industry to succeed, they 
are unlikely to have the capital necessary to invest in the industry in order to exploit these assets. 
Foreign investment brings capital, but also knowledge. Both sector-specific and generic business 
knowledge is welcome in developing countries and can possibly be transferred to local actors. In 
order to maximise the profitably of their investment, it is common for foreign investors in 
floriculture to contribute to the improvement of several aspects of the regional infrastructure. 
The building of this infrastructure and the provision of several other services are potential 
multiplier effects that may result in further job creation as a result of the investment. 
Furthermore in developing an export industry the government hopes to create direct, indirect and 
induced multiplier effects and generate broader economic growth as has occurred in Uganda 
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(Asea and Kaija, 2000). Evidence on the extent to which each of these effects have occurred in 
Ethiopia is examined in Chapter 11. 
Many developing countries also experience a balance of trade deficit, which is exacerbated by the 
weak position of their currencies. The introduction of a large export industry has the potential to 
increase the availability of foreign exchange, which in turn will assist in the purchase of imports to 
further assist growth of the industry (Coe et al., 2004; Collins, 1995; Damiani, 2000; Davis, 2005).  
5.1.2.3 Critiques of Floriculture in Developing Countries 
Some of the general critiques applied to NTAEs are relevant to floriculture in developing 
countries. In terms of the direct impact on the poor, the integration of smallholders into export 
markets is near impossible with flowers due to their knowledge and capital intensive nature. One 
reason for this is that farmers in developing countries are more likely to diversify their income 
streams, minimising the risk of income failure at the expense of total income. In countries like 
Ethiopia, the historically founded fear of crop failure has meant that subsistence farmers are not 
willing to focus production on single crop, particularly if it has no calorific value or for which there 
is limited demand in local markets (Reardon et al., 1992). Indeed, in 1992 in Zimbabwe, where, 
owing to a number of historical legacies, the agricultural sector is comprised of small subsistence 
and large export-orientated farms and many farmers had switched production to cash-crops, 
widespread famine was seen when the country exported $60m US of flowers but had to import 
$70m US in food aid as the irrigation for floriculture had left certain areas in drought (Maharaj 
and Dorren, 1995). The hope of developing country governments is that through the ‘trickle 
down’ effect, the benefits of increased GDP and decreased unemployment will permeate down to 
smallholders (Hirschman, 1958).  
Secondly, critics have noted the distribution of benefits from floriculture as favouring large and 
commonly foreign companies over local entrepreneurs and labourers. Kenya’s floriculture 
industry is examined for the World Bank by Whitaker and Kolavalli (2006). Their opinion on the 
industry is evident from the book’s title ‘Technology, Adaptation and Exports: How Some 
Developing Countries Got It Right’, yet the chapter fails to show any evidence of pro-poor growth 
admitting that: the industry is dominated by a small and declining number of large firms with 
primarily foreign ownership; the country is unlikely to move up the production chain due to its 
capital intensity; and that there has been a large outflow of human capital to neighbouring 
countries as a result of the training programmes implemented by the Kenyan government. The 
bank’s position is made clear: where growth has not occurred, it is due to “the inability of the 
government to liberalise and privatise in a timely and effective way” (349-350), confirming 
floriculture’s position as ideal for promotion in structural adjustment policies. Other studies have 
displayed the poor standards of worker welfare in floriculture for local labourers which, together 
with low wages, make commentators pessimistic about the developmental potential of 
floriculture (Dolan, 2007; Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 2007; Meier, 1999; Hale and 
Opondo, 2005). 
Finally, in relation to the direct impact of floriculture on the poor, the limited work that has been 
done suggests a negative impact on food security as a result of the growth of the floriculture 
industry. One of the few studies to conduct research into these alternative effects of NTAE 
production was that of Patel-Campillo (2010), who investigated the impacts of participation in the 
flower industry in Colombia on food security. The study claims negative effects on food security as 
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a result of the flower industry using flawed statistics to imply diminishing purchasing power for 
labourers in the industry. In fact, between 1992 and 2007, in the context of a growing population 
and soaring world food prices incentivising exports, real average wages increased significantly and 
food production-per-capita increased by a total of 5%. Production increases include those in the 
primary subsistence crop of maize, the price of which increased from $160 US/tonne in 1990 to 
$307 US/tonne in 2007, an annual increase of 4.35%. Between the periods 1990-92 and 2006-08, 
undernourishment in the total population decreased by 40%. Further statistical 
misinterpretations include the assumption that there is a direct causal relationship between one 
region’s specialisation in a single crop - flowers, and their increased food insecurity. Furthermore, 
the author points to increases in production area and volume in percentage terms but the relative 
land areas of different crops differ greatly. For example, in 2004, 6544 Ha of flowers were under 
production compared with 616,000 Ha of maize. The author’s reported doubling in the production 
area of flowers in the 1995-2006 period therefore represents an addition of approximately 3000 
Ha to the production area. 
The author seems to ignore a key consideration in the assessment of participation in waged 
labour in floriculture as opposed to smallholder production, namely the agency of workers in their 
decision to work in the industry. If subsistence farming was more profitable, they are not bonded 
and could re-engage in subsistence production. The primary contribution of the paper comes in 
the identification of comparative advantage as a key factor in improving or maintaining food 
security.  As previously identified by Maxwell, the combination of cash-crops and food production 
for domestic consumption is ‘‘the best route to food security, following the principle of long-term 
comparative advantage rather than of self-sufficiency for its own sake’’ (1996; 164). This case 
study highlights the importance of local and industrial context and the shortcomings of research 
in this area. This thesis therefore seeks to address the current deficiency in research in this area. 
In terms of the macro-economic effects of floriculture on developing countries, the general 
criticisms of NTAE production have specific implications. Firstly, criticism has been drawn to the 
fragility of gains made from floriculture due to the tendency towards capital flight, as examined in 
this chapter, and price volatility. Maharaj & Dorren (1995) point to the historical example of cut 
flowers’ ‘ancestors’: tea and coffee. There are clear similarities in terms of the high barriers to 
entry, government incentivisation and even the countries with conducive growing conditions. For 
a number of reasons, the literature on the potential of floriculture is largely pessimistic. The 
potential for overproduction due to increased competition and the ease with which an unskilled 
investor can enter the market with very low risk levels - as it is not necessarily the barriers to 
entry but the barriers to prosperity that are high - are commonly cited as reasons for this 
pessimism. In essence, readily available cheap capital, labour and land mean that it is possible for 
developing country governments to target floriculture and allow unskilled investors to enter the 
market. These investors may not be able to operate their farms efficiently or sustainably but the 
low risk to investors means that there is a treadmill of investors willing to supply the market 
leading to oversupply (Wainwright and Hart, 1999; Maharaj and Dorren, 1995; Hughes, 2000). As 
is documented in subsequent chapters, it is possible for foreign investors to enter the market as a 
gamble, contribute to overproduction and leave the market with little or no personal liability. 
Rapidly increasing production of higher value niche market products will lead to 
rapid oversupply of markets, causing a collapse in prices and a need to produce 
more to achieve the same level of income (Davis, 2005; 4). 
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This is an example of what Abegaz (2004) sees as the reasons for Ethiopia’s persistent economic 
failure. These ‘myopic agricultural practices’ combine with a focus on ‘unsustainable exports’ to 
drain all the potential resources for growth. However, this research contends that the significant 
impact of multiplier effects, at varying degrees of abstraction from floriculture, have had positive 
consequences in diversifying the export profile of the country, documented in Chapter 11. Further 
contributions have been made in the improvement in the balance of payments, job creation and 
improving worker welfare as documented in subsequent chapters, without suffering from some of 
the negative consequences associated with other NTAEs. 
Benefits available to new entrants to the flower industry have been limited by the number of 
developing countries who have sought to enter the industry for the reasons described above. 
...after-many-years-of-an-undersupplied-market,-world-cut-flower-supply,-especially-for-
the-most-common-varieties,-has-now-expanded-to-match-or-exceed-what-has-been-
relatively-slow-growth-in-demand-in-the-past-few-years (Trade Matters, 2007; 2). 
Whilst this is true to some extent within mature markets, new markets are continually opening up 
and demand for flowers globally continues to grow. Floriculture had until recently been seen as a 
rare opportunity to utilise the assets of developing countries in the production of a product with 
high-YED and, as such, demand would continue to increase with global growth. However, the 
Global Financial Crisis displayed how an export profile focused on high-YED goods can leave an 
economy vulnerable during less prosperous periods. In mature markets, such as Germany, where 
the impact of the Global Financial Crisis was severe, several trends were seen as a result of the 
crisis: 
In simple terms it was a steadily growing market until 2007...the number of stems in 
the UK would have bombed, and what has happened now...is that we’ve kind of gone 
back to where it was before. So it feels like it was kind of a blip (IG5).  
During the crisis there were also changes in the composition of demand. One might have 
expected ‘trading down’ to occur, which would have had an asymmetric impact on the growers in 
developing countries as they primarily produce roses, which are among the most expensive 
flower varieties.  
We didn’t see customers trading down...we didn’t see customers that would 
normally buy a bunch of roses for £5 suddenly start buying a bunch of roses for £3 
but...customers that we would term price sensitive would start buying flowers less 
often or would kind of drop out of the category all together because it’s a 
discretionary purchase...We didn’t see a big drop in sales of our [most expensive] 
flowers and a big increase in the cheap ones which is I think what you might assume. 
If a retailer doesn’t do a good job you can damage your own sales irrespective of the 
market because it’s not a product that’s needed, it’s not like baked beans or 
carrots...sometimes a retailer’s performance is as much about what they’ve done this 
year versus what they did last year as well as other factors (IG5). 
During the contraction of the industry, coinciding with the Global Financial Crisis and due to the 
different costs and benefits involved with export from different locations, in order to compete on 
price certain governments have subsidised industries running at a loss in the hope that they 
would force other producers out of the market and prices would eventually rise. Due to the 
comparative advantages Ethiopia has in the production of cut flowers, the government hopes to 
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benefit from this exogenous shock with the weaker producers removed from the industry (BBC 
News, 2009). 
...prices have been poor, we expect this to, well, not to be solved next week, we 
think that 2010 will still be the same situation, hopefully slightly recovering, our 
hopes are 2011 we will start going the right way again but I think the general line of 
thought is that it will take many years before we are again where we already were. 
We’re not easily going to get there. And you know production is not so easily 
influenced by prices because production is up even when they go bankrupt there is 
probably someone who is going to buy it at a cheaper price and is going to continue 
production so...production will be there (IG2). 
As a mechanism to minimise capital flight governments have traded off tax revenues in order to 
attract new investment to floriculture and retain that which they have already attracted, 
prompting a ‘race to the bottom’ amongst developing countries (Korovkin and Sanmiguel-
Valderrama, 2007). A further concern with NTAEs which is of particular relevance to floriculture is 
the small scale of the industry and consequently its limited scope to provide developmental 
impacts. Although labour intensive relative to it spatial extent, floriculture is by no means a 
panacea and if it were to attract focus and investment away from other industries with growth 
potential then the marginal returns would quickly diminish from a governmental perspective. 
Issues concerning opportunity cost of land use and environmental degradation which are among 
the primary criticisms of some NTAEs are less pertinent in floriculture due to the relative size of 
the industry, but in particular areas such as Lake Naivasha in Kenya, the high level of chemical 
inputs to the industry have caused concern (Collinson, 2001). 
5.2 Supermarket Influences 
Since the mid-1990s there has been a further change to floriculture’s GPN (Hughes, 2001). As a 
commodity with a significant market in the UK and Germany, two countries where supermarkets 
form the major component of consumer spending, and with annual growth rates of between six 
and nine percent globally (Wainwright and Hart, 1999), major European supermarkets have 
sought greater involvement in floriculture in search of economies of scale and greater influence 
over the nature and timing of production (Thrupp et al., 1995; Trade Matters, 2007; Barrett et al., 
1999; Hughes, 2000; Barrett et al., 2004; Asea and Kaija, 2000).  
The traditional network for flowers grown in developing countries consisted of all of the following 
elements, with two or more stages amalgamated into the same organisation in some instances. 
Figure 5.2 shows the transition of a flower from concept to vase. 
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Figure 5.2: Process Diagram for Cut Flowers 
Many more actors, including input and packaging manufacturers, distributors, service suppliers 
and marketing agents, are involved in the production process but differ in each GPN and have not 
been directly affected by recent changes in the organisational structure of the industry. 
Additionally, there are several regulatory and industrial actors that can influence the network but 
they are also too contextually specific to be factored into this process flow and are examined in 
relation to the Ethiopian network in detail below. 
Firstly, genetic material produced by breeders is propagated and then sold to growers with 
royalties paid on a per-plant basis. Roses are then grown in greenhouses, picked and packed and 
put into refrigerated storage facilities on the farm site. The flowers are transported, primarily in 
refrigerated trucks, and usually transferred directly to waiting aircraft and flown to airports in 
Belgium or the Netherlands for sale at the Dutch auctions or other national airports for sale direct 
to buyers around the world. The flowers are handled by airport staff and transported to the 
auction house. One relatively recent development at this stage of the process is the introduction 
of electronic auction systems. These involve flowers being bought while they are still at the farm 
and then shipped and distributed from regional centres, such as Miami for South West USA. From 
the Dutch auction houses, flowers were then bought by wholesalers/exporters and transported 
back to warehouses in the destination country where florists would buy them and sell them on to 
consumers. This includes wholesalers/exporters from other parts of the world buying flowers and 
flying them back to North America, the Middle East or Asia. These flows have been reduced with 
the growth of auctions in the Middle East and the increase in electronic auctions and direct 
purchasing, but remain the primary way of buying flowers globally. The only element of this 
process which differed prior to the relocation of the industry to developing countries was the 
removal of the need for air freight prior to auction sale. 
The major change that has occurred in this production process in the past 15 years is the increase 
in the influence of supermarkets. Previously, supermarkets sold a narrow range of varieties in 
relatively low volumes and, as such, acted as a large florist, purchasing from wholesalers at a 
slightly reduced rate due to bulk purchasing. In the last decade, however, supermarkets’ share of 
the market – particularly in the UK and Germany – has grown exponentially and, as such, the 
supermarkets have sought vertical coordination10 in the production process for flowers and the 
                                                          
 
10
 This has not commonly been in the form of a supermarket establishing buying, growing or transport 
functions. Instead they have divested responsibility for the shortening of time to market to a new group of 
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creation of organisational rents. Vertical integration has been sought for many reasons: i) cost 
reduction – fees would be eliminated at the Dutch auction houses and reducing the number of 
stages in the production process would mean less of the profit being extracted at various stages; 
ii) improved product quality – decreasing the time-to-market of the products would improve 
freshness; iii) increasing the influence of corporate power on the GPN – with vertical integration 
supermarkets could dictate to the producer what they require and when; iv) increasing demand 
for traceability and control over horticultural markets with the increased prevalence of cross-
border agricultural control procedures. With food produce this is governed in the UK by the Food 
Safety Act 1990 but supermarkets prefer to keep tight controls on the movements of all 
horticultural produce (Hale and Opondo, 2005; Coe and Hess, 2005).  
The large UK supermarket chains have not sought full vertical integration within floriculture, 
stopping short of setting up their own farms or transportation companies in developing countries. 
This is because they do not want to bear all the economic risk of investing in what is often a 
politically uncertain environment and so the risk is externalised by competitively offering 
contracts to grow certain varieties or bouquets. The companies to which these contracts are 
offered have experience in the field and, while extra profit taking actors are added to the 
production network, the risk of geographical or product fixation, as well as the potential for 
inefficiencies through diseconomies of scale, are removed.  
The lack of direct primary involvement in a country gives a supermarket the option and more 
pertinently the threat, of being able to move their custom to another company in another 
country; an option not so easily available to growers (Coe and Hess, 2005). In such a situation, the 
influence of corporate power relative to institutional power can force governments – pressured 
by growers who have been pressured by supermarkets for lower costs and greater reliability - into 
expenditure on infrastructure as happened with the Kenyan government building a new airport at 
Eldoret (Barrett et al., 1999). This is close to the floriculture areas of Lake Bogoria and Nakuru and 
will ease the pressure on Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi, which handles the majority of 
passenger traffic and produce from the Lake Naivasha area. 
This is one example of how the mobility of capital in floriculture has been used to exert pressure 
on developing country governments. Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama (2007) explain how this 
mobility has been used in different ways in both Colombia and Ecuador to diminish the rights of 
labour. In addition to the fiscal and monetary incentives that a government can provide, they 
argue that labour rights and the environment are being used in the competition to attract or keep 
investment; a claim examined in an Ethiopian context in Chapters 6-11. 
Despite the potential pitfalls of supermarket involvement in floriculture, some see it as a way to 
achieve consistent growth for the industry in developing countries. According to Asea and Kaija 
(2000), in order to achieve cheaper prices, supermarkets place longer-term orders giving greater 
stability to firms allowing them to grow. This strategy is being employed by some Ethiopian 
                                                                                                                                                                                
 
actors referred to here as ‘Importing Agents’ (see Chapter 6). They exert a great degree of influence over 
these actors and are able to obtain many of the benefits of traditional vertical integration, whilst minimising 
their own risk. 
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growers with Karuturi Networks accepting a large, long-term order for roses, carnations and 
hypericum from the UK-based Morrison’s supermarket in 2006 (Melaku, 2006). Joosten (2007) 
believes that the influence of supermarkets in Ethiopian floriculture will continue to increase and 
with it, price competition will increase both between companies and between countries, putting 
increasing pressure on growers. Whilst supermarkets have limited their integration to the 
consumption end of the production network, this report recommends that in order to attract 
supermarket orders by becoming cost leaders in their sector, producers should seek production-
end integration amongst growers, logistical services and importers and wholesalers. Ethiopia must 
seek to out-compete countries in different market sectors, each of which make different demands 
of policy makers and producers. Competition in high-quality, high-price niche markets would 
require high levels of market information and the development of a strong R&D sector, while 
competition in the higher volume supermarket flower sector requires consistent output and 
membership of a number of international environmental and labour welfare standard schemes, 
as discussed in Chapters 8 and 9. 
The future of floriculture in Europe remains uncertain. Whilst there has been a shift in 
consumption patterns across much of Europe away from traditional florists to supermarkets, 
trends have differed in both their speed and their reach across national borders. With other 
commodities, including many food items, the proportion of the commodity sold in supermarkets 
as opposed to smaller independent retailers has continued to increase and the vast majority of 
food products are now sold in supermarkets in the majority of European countries (Kacker, 1993). 
This does vary, however, across national borders, with supermarkets commanding a far larger 
market share for example in the UK and Germany than they do in Italy. Whether the pattern of 
consumption for cut flowers will mirror that for food commodities remains to be seen and, as 
described throughout the following chapters, this will have a significant impact on the marketing 
strategy of Ethiopian flower producers. 
You have to analyse the different systems in the market and no one knows how the 
future will be...Supermarkets every day lower prices. You just have to look what has 
happened in Holland, in Germany, in England, they are fighting with the dairy farmers 
every day. That is where [major importing agents] sell to. Connected to that is the 
long term contracts...The industry is for those type of people, and it will grow, but 
everybody assumes that the supermarket parts will grow, the florists will go 
down...But the claim that long term contracts will be better, I completely deny cause 
the end user is the supermarket and the supermarkets are only there to do this 
[squashing action] (IG7). 
Regardless of the extent to which the supermarkets increase their market share, patterns of 
production are changing as a result of their power within the GPN. The security they have been 
able to offer growers has meant that the traditional auction system has been challenged for the 
first time and has had to adapt in order to continue to attract growers. These changes are 
documented in the subsequent chapters but include the creation of organisational and relational 
rents, simplifying their logistical operations and externalising pressures of quality control onto 
growers.  
[Quality control]’s the responsibility of the growers themselves. We used to work 
that way; that the grower sends and we determine what quality it is but it’s a lot of 
work because you have to see each flower each day (IG2). 
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In diversifying their activities, the auctions have begun to encroach on the territory of some of 
their members, removing their functions from the network. Exporters, wholesalers, and importers 
have seen the function they occupied within the traditional auction system change as the auctions 
have moved towards a more direct marketing system where flowers are sold whilst still on the 
farm. 
So basically [the exporter] is not buying or selling but just organising for the product 
to get to his clients. It’s still a big job in the sense that it’s not an easy product to 
export to transport because you know you have to unpack, you have to gather, you 
have to build. To load a truck efficiently it’s quite a job still of course, it’s not like this 
wholesaler in Italy can just make sure there’s a truck there waiting and get in the 
flowers and off it goes. So they still have a big job, a big position but it’s changing 
(IG2). 
Any new entrant to global floriculture, whether at national or firm level, has to be mindful of 
these changes in order to conduct a successful marketing strategy. 
5.3 Breeding 
Whilst - barring the ‘blip’ of the Global Financial Crisis - demand continues to rise in the cut-flower 
trade, it remains important that new and innovative varieties are regularly produced in order to 
maintain this level of demand (Hornberger et al., 2007). It is therefore important for developing 
countries to adopt a sustainable strategy for floriculture by “target[ing] growth markets so that 
new entrants can be absorbed into the supply chain” (Davis, 2005; 4). Due to the relative factor 
endowments of traditional and new production centres, breeding remains firmly territorially 
embedded in developed countries. However, the protection of the intellectual property for these 
new breeds is a relevant issue for developing countries so that they may obtain the best varieties 
and, consequently, the best prices on the open market. This represents an interesting area for 
further research but, as outlined in Chapter 12, has not been explored here as it has yet to have a 
significant impact on the Ethiopian industry.   
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6. The GPN of Ethiopian Floriculture 
This chapter begins by providing a brief narrative of the floriculture industry in Ethiopia based on 
primary data collected from qualitative interviews and data collected from government agencies. 
Key statistics about the growth of the industry are then identified. Following this abbreviated 
history and a set of descriptive statistics, the network is explored in greater detail, by outlining the 
functions of Ethiopian floriculture’s GPN and the interactions between its actors, again based on 
the primary data obtained from qualitative interviews with a wide range of actors in many of the 
multiple countries involved in the network in addition to survey data. 
6.1 Brief History and Profile of Ethiopian Floriculture 
The first private farm to produce cut flowers for export from Ethiopia was a locally-owned 
summer flower (open field) farm that began exporting in 1994/5. This consisted of low volumes of 
low input flowers without the need for greenhouse growth. In post-socialist Ethiopia, even such 
embryonic forays into private commerce attracted international attention as a development to be 
nurtured and, in 1995, the European Union, in conjunction with Ethiopia’s Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, sent a delegation to view the farm and suggest programmes for its further development. 
Subsequently, an agricultural consultant was commissioned by the EU to investigate the available 
inputs, market opportunities and climatic conditions in Ethiopia to recommend particular varieties 
and market strategies to be trialled on a commercial scale (IG8). The first variety trialled, with a 
plot of half a hectare, was carnations which were, again, low-input summer flowers. Whilst the 
industry lacked the critical mass to make it cost-competitive enough to make an impression in 
major markets, producers began to see the potential of the industry and by 1999 production of 
roses for export under wooden greenhouses was underway, followed in 2000 by the introduction 
of modern PVCU greenhouses. The industry was still limited to just a handful of small producers 
and in 2002, the Ethiopian Horticultural Producers and Exporters Association was formed after 
overcoming a struggle to form an association, for which the minimum legal requirement in 
Ethiopia is five members. In 2004 there were six growers that regularly exported to the auctions 
in the Netherlands and by 2005 the Ethiopian floriculture industry was the fastest growing in the 
world (see Figure 6.3). The government had offered incentives as part of ETEP including waiving 
corporate income tax for two, and then three, years but it was not until 2004 that the 
government became interested in the floriculture industry in any significant way, following the 
reports of EU and other consultants, and they began to improve the investment code for foreign 
investors to the point where it is now one of the best on offer to investors in floriculture globally.  
Following a meeting between the Ethiopian Prime Minister and the UK’s then Secretary of State 
for International Development, Clare Short, it was agreed that the Department for International 
Development (DfID) would assist in the growth of the industry through the provision of expertise 
and equipment. They discussed the unrealised potential of horticultural exports from Ethiopia and 
as a result DfID commissioned a study entitled ‘Horticultural Exports from Ethiopia and EU 
Supermarket Sourcing’. This was the start of one of many key relationships between the Ethiopian 
government and international partners that have assisted in the growth of the floriculture 
industry. Subsequently, a consultant was placed within the Ethiopian Horticulture Producers and 
Exporters Association (EHPEA) for three years in order to provide technical advice to guide 
government strategy on the industry (IG12). This consultant continues to work within the 
association over five years after the job began. The industry is now firmly established in 
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greenhouse floriculture, specialising in the high-value market for roses, known as the ‘Rolls Royce 
of the flower world’ (IG6). The industry now employs over 100,00011 people, 70% of whom are 
women. There are approximately 90 farms currently exporting flowers from Ethiopia, with 1550 
hectares under greenhouse production (Walta Information Centre, 2010a). 
Flowers vary in terms of the optimum agro-ecological conditions for production. The majority of 
growers in Ethiopia have chosen to specialise in roses due to the high sales price they command 
and the good growing conditions available. Roses can be commercially produced without the use 
of heaters at altitudes between approximately 1000m and 3000m above sea level. Higher 
altitudes produce longer-stemmed, larger-headed roses which command higher prices but are 
lower yielding and more susceptible to disease due to the increased rainfall. Conversely, lower 
altitudes produce shorter-stemmed, smaller-headed roses which command lower prices but are 
higher yielding and less susceptible to disease due to lower levels of rainfall. Producers must, 
then, base their location decision on the precise product and the route they want to take to 
market. As such, growers have located in a number of different areas which satisfy their agro-
climatic requirements, in terms of altitude, soil quality, access to water, rainfall levels etc., and 
have easy access to the necessary infrastructure of Addis Ababa (Figure 6.1). 
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 The integrity of this data is questionable as it is comes from a government source and no methodology 
for its collection is given; it is however the most recent statistic available. This figure was repeated by 
government sources in several interviews, while EHPEA literature produced in 2009 estimate the figure at 
70,000 – the figure targeted by the government in PASDEP (2006). EIA data collected during primary 
research, which as documented elsewhere is based on ex ante evaluations, puts the figure at 60,000 
permanent and 90,000 temporary employees. Based on a production area of 1550 hectares and a high 
estimate of 40 employees per hectare, direct employment would still amount to only 62,000 and so this 
figure must be taken to include employment in associated support industries. 
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Figure 6.1: Principal Flower Growing Areas, 
Data: EHPEA, Original Map: (CIA, 2010) 
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6.2 The Growth of the Ethiopian Flower Industry 
Before beginning a descriptive analysis of the statistics behind the growth of Ethiopian floriculture 
it is important to reiterate a cautionary note from Chapter 3 regarding the integrity of 
quantitative data. In addition to the issues of vested interest which cast doubt on a wide range of 
official statistics in Ethiopia, floriculture presents its own issues with regard to sales figures. As is 
explored in greater detail below, flower producers have a financial incentive to underreport sales 
figures in Ethiopia, as is commonly the case with subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in 
developing countries (Chiao et al., 2009), and a robust system to prevent this has yet to be 
implemented. This problem is thought to be at its most acute in Ethiopia although it has also been 
observed to a degree in Kenya (IG8). Mirror data shows the discrepancy between reported 
exports of floricultural products from Ethiopia and reported imports of floricultural products from 
Ethiopia by Ethiopia’s trading partners has decreased significantly in recent years, from 19.3% in 
2006 to 1% in 2010, averaging 8.6% over the five year period, with the relative sizes of direct and 
mirror data fluctuating. By comparison the discrepancy in Kenya ranges from 27.9-53.3%, with 
mirror data always exceeding direct data, and the Netherlands where discrepancies average 3% 
with direct data most commonly exceeding mirror data (International Trade Centre, 2011). 
Furthermore, the methodology for the collection of mirror data cannot control for some of the 
elusive practices engaged in by exporters as examined throughout this research. The result is that 
the size of the Ethiopian industry is, in reality, larger than is reported below, although the exact 
size is impossible to document accurately given the number of evasive practices engaged in by the 
producers in the industry.  
Figure 6.2 Annual Flower Exports from Ethiopia Data: Consolidated from NBoE and ECEA  
Whilst export floriculture in Ethiopia began in the mid-1990s as described above, Figure 6.2 
displays the significance of the remarkable growth since 2004. In six years the industry has risen 
from a negligible actor in floriculture to the fourth largest exporter of flowers in the world. The 
country overtook Kenya in rose exports in 2010, a flower which comprises over 85% of total 
Year 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
2002/03 -39.2 
2003/04 261.9 
2004/05 19614.1 
2005/06 210.0 
2006/07 137.9 
2007/08 43.1 
2008/09 20.6 
2009/10 22.0 
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flower exports from Africa, and may soon challenge the two largest global exporters, Colombia 
and Ecuador, with the government envisaging exports of $1bn annually by 2014 (van der Ploeg, 
2009)(IG2). This growth has occurred both as a result of rising demand in existing markets and the 
opening up of new markets but more as a result of capturing market share from competing 
nations. As displayed in Figure 6.2, between 2004 and 2007 the growth in the industry was 
exponential. The growth rate then slowed, possibly as a result of the fall in demand caused by the 
Global Financial Crisis, and has resumed a slightly higher, but linear growth rate in the 2009-2010 
period: 
...flowers is still expanding but not at the rate that it was. Obviously you’re not going 
to get 200% growth...200% growth when you’ve got 5 hectares is very easy because 
it just takes it to 15 or 20 hectares. But once you get to 1000 hectares, 100% growth 
to get to 2000 hectares in the next year, these type of things don’t happen. It was 
inevitable that the growth was going to slow down (IG8). 
It is important here to discuss the significant impact of the unforeseen Global Financial Crisis, 
which induced a recession throughout the developed world, on demand and prices for cut 
flowers. The Global Financial Crisis challenged the positive perceptions of the industry based on 
assumptions of a continually growing market, which could affect the overall impact on developing 
countries.  
With regard to the effect of the Global Financial Crisis on Ethiopia, Getnet (2010) found that, in 
the period 2007-2009, FDI and the demand for and prices of exports declined. However, the data 
presented by the author shows that even during this period, the flower industry continued to 
grow. The growth, in value terms, of floricultural exports slowed from 200% in 2006 to around 
25% in 2009. Demand and prices in Europe dipped considerably during 2008 and 2009 but have 
now surpassed pre-crisis levels and continue to grow (IG5). During this time, primary research 
revealed that in Ethiopia growers were exporting as little as 30% of their stock and that which 
they did export was at a loss but they did so simply to maintain a presence at the auction for 
marketing purposes, the reasons for which are discussed in Chapter 8 (IG6). 
The timing of the crisis meant marginal positive growth was maintained throughout both of the 
crisis years and strong growth has resumed in the industry as a whole throughout 2009 and 2010. 
The Global Financial Crisis did impact on the seasonal sales pattern of the industry which is why 
this pattern is not clear in Figure 6.4. The data does, however, show the strong and rapid growth 
the industry has experienced since 2005 and the resumption of growth that has occurred in the 
months since the Global Financial Crisis: 
In relation to the effect of the recession, it’s obviously started to come at the same 
time as some of the beginning farms are starting to realise that growing flowers isn’t 
a licence to print money. So I think there are two pressures on the industry. One is 
the natural pressure that comes when an industry is 3, 4, 5 years old. Bank loans 
have to be paid, crops have to be replanted. It’s the time when you realise the 
money’s gone and the income is not quite as big as you thought it might be. So that is 
natural. And I think it’s fair to say that recession has had a significant impact on price 
in real terms in the last 18 months. It recovers a bit periodically but it’s not an 
exciting recovery. So on that basis the DBoE has rescheduled the loans for a 
significant number of farms. This gives them breathing space to consolidate and get 
their act together (IG8). 
This analysis is confirmed by another (IG7) respondent who believes that growers are not 
necessarily finding the fortunes they sought when entering the industry. Dividing Ethiopian 
growers into three groups, the respondent stated that a group of incompetent growers that failed 
  71 
 
to implement the required control procedures have had institutional support removed and have 
left the industry. A second group are effectively speculators who saw the industry as a ‘golden 
egg’ but have failed to make the financial or temporal commitments necessary to succeed in the 
industry during the Global Financial Crisis. The final group are those that have invested the 
necessary time and money to continue to develop in the industry and have been successful as a 
result. This final group has more in common with the Dutch growers in Ethiopia, with floriculture 
forming their primary business interest. 
The opinion that flower farms are perhaps not as quickly and sustainably profitable as had first 
been assumed by some investors, given the strains placed on the industry by the Global Financial 
Crisis, is best characterised in this extract from an interview with a flower farm investor: 
Flower farms have lives, they continually demand inputs. You can’t just quit and say 
‘let things get better’ (IG13). 
The decrease in the rate of growth has not dampened the government’s enthusiasm and support 
for the sector having set a target of trebling floriculture exports by 2014, with the industry having 
recovered from the recent crisis (The Ethiopian News Agency, 2011). 
Figure 6.3 displays the major nations that export flowers to the EU. The graph shows Ethiopia to 
be the only country to have increased exports year-on-year for the whole of the displayed period. 
Despite the aggregate rise in demand, some countries have experienced significant declines 
including Israel, the second largest exporter at the beginning of the displayed decade, and 
Zimbabwe, which had previously had a vibrant flower sector as a legacy of colonialism in a similar 
way to Kenya. Other African producers such as Uganda, Tanzania, South Africa and Zambia saw 
their exports remain at relatively low and stable levels. The relative positions of the two South 
American producers, Colombia and Ecuador, reversed during the periods shown, while the 
combined contribution to total imports from those two countries fell from 31.3% in 2000 to 29.9% 
in 2010. Some experienced actors within the industry predict that this decline will continue: 
Ecuador and Colombia, maybe they will go too I think. If you know the Chinese will be 
big. They all start with primary industries like textiles. But then they went to hi tech. 
So when other people like Colombia move to hi tech we can probably take over the 
flowers (IG10). 
Kenya’s flower exports to the EU had been growing since the early 1990s and continued to do so 
until 2009 when they fell by more than 7% and again by more than 3% in the subsequent year. 
Ethiopia’s growth has continued at a significant rate during this period. The Ethiopian Minister for 
Agriculture and Rural Development has recently stated that in the 10 months to September 2010, 
Ethiopia earned $250m US from floriculture, making flowers the second most important export 
after coffee (The Ethiopian News Agency, 2010)12. 
                                                          
 
12
 Note that this contradicts the data supplied by the UN International Trade Centre given in Figure 4.3, in 
both value and the relative size of exports. It also significantly exceeds the predictions made for that period 
from Figure 6.2. It is difficult to know the true value of exports because, as documented in this chapter, 
their value is widely believed to have been underreported and growth has not been linear, in addition to 
the influence of various agendas in the presentation of statistics. However, this statement serves both to 
add weight to the significant and growing importance of floriculture in Ethiopia and use of triangulation of 
methods in the present research. 
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Figure 6.3 EU27 Cut flower imports by country; Data: EuroStat 
 
Figure 6.4: Ethiopian Monthly Flower Exports; Data: NBoE/EIA 
Figure 6.4 displays the growth of the Ethiopian flower industry according to a number of different 
metrics. The exported value shows the rapid growth of the industry since 2005, the seasonal 
fluctuations in sales and the reduction in the growth rate during the Global Financial Crisis. The 
annual change in the number of investment permits granted gives a good indication of the 
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number of new entrants to the industry over time and also shows the lag between entry to the 
industry and when these entrants’ production is realised in exported value, although there are 
evidently demand side factors involved in the total value exported. Finally the an0nual change in 
area allocated, when taken in conjunction with the granting of investment permits, gives an 
indication of the extent to which the growth in export value has occurred as a result of the 
expansion of existing firms or as a result of the entry of new firms. It can be seen from this 
relationship that during the early stages of the industry’s growth, the rate of growth in the 
number of new investment permits outstripped the growth in the area allocated for floricultural 
production. More recently, however, the growth in the area allocated has been far closer to the 
rate of growth in the number of new investments and has exceeded it in two of the years 
displayed, indicating a trend towards larger farms for new investors and the expansion of existing 
farms.  
At the Dutch flower auctions – the primary export market for Ethiopian floriculture – sales of 
imported flowers follow a very clear seasonal pattern. When European producers can offer 
competitively priced flowers in the spring and summer, prices and sales volumes of imported 
flowers fall. Sales and prices increase significantly in the European winter and peak around St. 
Valentine’s Day. Revenues increase for certain varieties to coincide with particular religious and 
national celebrations in sales markets and producers will time production so that supply and 
quality peak during these premium sales periods. Conversely, direct buyers look for a steady 
supply of varieties based strictly on what customers want at a given time of year (IG5). 
This gives African producers an advantage for the varieties they are able to produce as the climate 
is relatively stable. Conversely, supply of flowers grown in cooler climates may have to be sourced 
from different hemispheres at different times during the year provided the demand exists.  
6.3 Ownership of Ethiopian Floriculture 
This section uses a number of sources to determine the firm ownership structures in Ethiopian 
floriculture. 
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Country of 
Origin 
Hectares 
Under 
Ownership 
(%) Rank 
 
Country of 
Origin 
Hectares 
Under 
Ownership 
(%) Rank 
Ethiopia 33.57 1 
 
Oman 0.25 22 
Israel 12.09 2 
 
Kenya 0.22 23 
India 10.29 3 
 
Angola 0.20 24 
Netherlands 8.26 4 
 
Ireland 0.20 25 
USA 7.28 5 
 
South Africa 0.20 26 
Jordan 4.86 6 
 
Sweden 0.20 27 
Sudan 4.86 7 
 
Switzerland 0.19 28 
Nigeria 4.29 8 
 
Germany 0.18 29 
Canada 2.03 9 
 
Rwanda 0.15 30 
Britain 1.96 10 
 
Syria 0.15 31 
Saudi Arabia 1.95 11 
 
Uganda 0.11 32 
Egypt 1.50 12 
 
Belgium 0.10 33 
Austria 1.00 13 
 
China 0.10 34 
France 0.65 14 
 
Hungary 0.10 35 
Italy 0.52 15 
 
UAE 0.10 36 
Russia 0.48 16 
 
Ukraine 0.08 37 
Yemen 0.47 17 
 
Somalia 0.05 38 
Lebanon 0.43 18 
 
Benin 0.02 39 
Palestine 0.38 19 
 
Liechtenstein 0.02 40 
Panama 0.28 20 
 
Iraq 0.00 41 
Australia 0.25 21 
 
Jamaica 0.00 42 
Table 6.1: Hectares under Ownership by Nationality; Data: Compiled from various EIA sources 
Every investor in the floriculture sector must obtain an investment permit from the EIA in which 
they must document the land area required and the number of permanent and temporary 
employees involved in the project. They must also give the name and nationality of the primary 
investor. There are multiple problems with this data. The data is taken from an ex-ante 
investment permit application and as such is based on projections. As one of the incentives being 
offered to investors in order to expand the industry, land is an inexpensive factor of production. 
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Many investors have therefore taken leasehold of plots of land vastly in excess of that on which 
they produce. Some of this is for storage, office space and other non-productive uses but much of 
it has been taken to allow for future expansion and for possible use for other agricultural 
investments. There is an average of 155% discrepancy between the data obtained from the EIA on 
land size required and the data obtained on production area for the same farms during the 
quantitative survey, with a standard deviation of 59%. 
A further problem of the EIA data is the bias introduced by the initial regulations imposed by the 
Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBoE) on loan applications. Loans were initially offered only to 
foreign investors which resulted in the applicant for the investment permit being a minor- or non-
shareholder from a foreign country. Alternatively, returnees to Ethiopia who had obtained 
citizenship from a foreign country applied in the name of this country. Ethiopians are not 
permitted to hold dual citizenship and so are classed as foreign even after the DBoE regulations 
changed to allow Ethiopian nationals equal rights to loans. The distinction drawn by this research, 
which is discussed later in the thesis, sees the main difference between foreign and domestic 
investors as being the permanent residence of the investor and the remittance of profits 
overseas, however, this data does not allow this distinction to be drawn accurately. 
Despite these issues with the accuracy of the data, some inferences can be drawn which can be 
triangulated with other data sources. Ethiopian owners account for slightly over one third of the 
total hectares allocated to the flower industry. This tallies closely with the statistics obtained from 
the Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency (EHDA) that foreign ownership within Ethiopian 
floriculture accounts for approximately 70% (IG4). The next most significant country of origin is 
Israel (12%), closely followed by India (10%), Netherlands (8%) and the USA (7%). Overall, 42 
countries are represented in the data. 
 
Figure 6.5: Number of Employees on Ethiopian Flower Farms by Owner Nationality; Data: EIA 
Figure 6.5 is intended as a further measure of the influence of capital from different countries in 
the floriculture industry. In the absence of turnover and profitability data for farms, this diagram 
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together with Table 6.1 and Figure 6.6 are intended to give an indication of the proportion of 
value in the industry that is captured by capital from each country. The data in this diagram was 
also obtained from the EIA and has been transformed so that permanent employees are given 
double the weighting of temporary employees. This transformation was performed based on 
interviews in which it emerged that while employment models vary across farms, over the course 
of a year temporary workers work for half the hours of permanent employees (usually being 
employed full time but only during peak production seasons). The ‘Other’ category summarises 
employment attributable to a total of 36 other countries with fewer than 5000 employees 
individually. The data should again be treated with caution because it is based on the ex-ante 
predictions of employment levels. Some farms may have grown unexpectedly and employ more 
people than predicted while others may have exaggerated the level of employment they would 
create in order to improve their chances of obtaining an investment permit or DBoE loan, playing 
on one of the government’s stated objectives for the industry. A further problem arises in that the 
farms with the greatest number of employees are not necessarily those that make the largest 
contribution to the export earnings or profit of the industry, nor does the number of producing 
hectares correlate directly with turnover. Due to the differences in relative sales prices and costs 
for different flower varieties, labour and land intensity may differ. However, the combination of 
all of these statistics gives a robust indication of the ownership of the industry. 
The broad patterns of ownership shown in Figure 6.5 are closely correlated with Table 6.1. The 
relative importance of Israel increased with 18% of the labour force, while the proportion of 
labour working on Indian-owned farms is lower than the proportion of land leased to Indian 
investors. This is likely to be largely attributable to both the higher presence of Indian investors in 
the lower volume, higher value highland flowers which have a lower labour intensity than the 
lower altitude agro-climatic regions, where there Israeli investors have a stronger presence and to 
the fact that one major Indian investor has leased a great area of land which they intend to use 
for other horticultural production. 
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 6.6 Production Area by Equity Stake, Data: Quantitative Survey   
 
Figure 6.7: Nationality of Ownership; Data: Quantitative Survey 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the production area and employment levels attributable to each 
nationality of investor as given by respondents in the quantitative survey. Whilst the survey could 
only be conducted with 64 of the approximately 90 farms currently exporting, this data has the 
advantage of respondents being able to self-determine the ownership profile of their firms, 
allowing plurality of countries of origin and a guarantee of anonymity removing any fear of an 
alternative agenda that may have existed with the EIA data. For example, as documented 
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elsewhere in this thesis, in the initial stages of the industry it was advantageous for a firm to 
present itself as foreign-owned and so a 40:30:30 equity split between Dutch, Israeli and 
Ethiopian investors respectively would be reported to the EIA as Dutch-owned and so all of that 
firm’s production area and employees would be calculated as Dutch. However, in the quantitative 
survey analysis, individual firms’ equity distributions could be reported and so accuracy is 
improved.  
The most striking difference between this analysis and the EIA data is the significant increase in 
the influence of the Dutch moving from 8% in both of the previous analyses to 27-28% and the 
second largest stakeholder in this analysis. The two primary reasons for this are the ability to 
include several equity holders in response to the question and the fact that none of the 
governmental agencies or QUANGOs involved in the industry take an interest in the equity share 
of individual companies, with no record kept (IG4). 
The two primary sources of finance for investors in the industry are DBoE loans and funding from 
the Dutch government in the form of the Mix-Matching Facility and PSOM and subsequently PSI. 
All of these schemes require partnerships to be formed between investors or firms in the host 
country – in this case Ethiopia - and the applicant. In the early stages of this scheme, when growth 
in Ethiopian floriculture was at its peak, applications were restricted to Dutch applicants before an 
EU ruling required the scheme to be opened to applicants of all nationalities. Even now, interview 
evidence revealed that there is still a strong bias towards Dutch investors in these schemes as 
they are not widely publicised outside the Netherlands. This has resulted in a large number of 
Ethiopian/Dutch partnerships in the industry in addition to the solely Dutch-owned farms which 
have been funded by private capital. The remainder of this analysis broadly reflects that of the EIA 
data with significant influence of Indian and Israeli investors in the sector. 
6.4 Describing the GPN 
Here, the central actors involved in Ethiopian floriculture are identified and the relationships 
between them explored. This GPN, like the GPN for the majority of globally traded commodities, 
is incredibly complex and non-linear and so each actor’s role and interactions with other actors in 
the network must be explained. In order to do this, the GPN is first distilled into diagrammatic 
form before the role of the individual actors is elaborated upon. Due to the complexity of the 
Ethiopian floriculture GPN and the number of actors involved in it, the diagram is divided 
thematically into three key segments; institutional actors; production actors; and transport/retail 
actors. This division is made as production actors operate primarily in Ethiopia, transport/retail 
actors are commonly based outside of the country of production and institutional actors act 
across the entire network with some actors spanning these operational spaces. 
6.4.1 Institutional Actors 
Firstly, the institutional actors involved in the Ethiopian flower industry must be described 
because it was this group whose shift of focus onto the industry has had the greatest impact on its 
recent rapid expansion. Figure 6.7 identifies the actors involved in the industry in an institutional 
capacity and some of the primary interactions between them.  
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Development Bank
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Figure 6.8 Institutional Actors involved in Ethiopian Floriculture 
As described in the earlier part of this chapter there were many institutional actors involved in the 
early development of the industry including the Ethiopian Prime Minister himself, international 
consultants and the industry association. This diagram is intended to represent the production 
network once the industry was established as a significant international production centre and 
while this continues to evolve, the actors involved, with the exception of the government 
involvement described below, has remained broadly static. 
The office of the Prime Minister, in the centre of the diagram, is representative of central 
government and has been integrally involved in the growth of the industry. Prior to 2007, several 
government departments were responsible for different segments of the industry, as it was both 
industrial and agricultural in nature and required both public and private investment in order to 
develop and achieve the exports the government desired. All of these departments were tasked 
by the Prime Minister’s Office with assisting in the growth of different elements of the industry as 
documented fully in Chapter 7. These included the allocation of land to growers, the organisation 
of finance through the DBoE and the designing of an investment code aimed at attracting 
investment to the industry as one of the government’s priority sectors. In 2007, these 
government functions were then unified under the remit of the newly created QUANGO - the 
Ethiopian Horticulture Development Agency. The agency liaises with existing government 
ministries in order to provide a ‘one-stop-shop’ for investors in the floriculture industry. This 
agency acts as the direct government point of contact for flower producers, both individually and 
collectively, in the form of EHPEA. However, such is the Prime Minister’s interest in the industry 
that he maintains direct contact with producers in the form of quarterly meetings where he 
receives feedback on producer issues and government policy on the industry. Part of the 
motivation for the creation of the EHDA was the simplification of the administrative system, as 
requested by the EHPEA, for the benefit for the floriculture industry (IG8). Collective power within 
the EHPEA takes two primary forms and there is a substantial overlap between collective, 
institutional and corporate power. Firstly, the EHPEA is primarily an agent of collective power. 
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However, the members of the EHPEA are corporate actors and so their actions within the network 
are tempered by corporate power. Furthermore, the association has been legitimised by donors, 
as documented below, as a recipient for funding with a view to institutional shaping within the 
network, and so the association also bears the characteristics of a semi-autonomous institutional 
actor, wielding institutional power. The second form taken by collective power within the 
Ethiopian floriculture GPN is the more conventional conception of labour unionisation as 
documented in Chapter 9. 
Consultants are involved in all sectors of the floriculture GPN. They have played, and continue to 
play, a vital role in the development of the Ethiopian floriculture industry. Commissioned by the 
EU, foreign national development institutions such as DfID and EVD, the ILO, the EHDA or by the 
EHPEA, consultants have assisted by advising on issues such as technical floricultural practices, 
investment codes, market strategies and capacity building. 
The EHPEA’s primary task is advocacy, conducted through lobbying the EHDA for their members’ 
interests. However, the association has emerged, in the minds of donors, as an independent and 
suitable recipient for targeted funding and as such has acquired the role of conducting training 
and a certification scheme for the industry. This mission creep could be viewed as a conflict of 
interest as an organisation run for the benefit of its members is made responsible for the 
dissemination of information and training, particularly as membership is not universal amongst 
exporters and the potential exists for a bias in the dissemination of information towards 
members. However, donor concerns about the current competencies and impartiality of other 
potential recipients of funding, together with the donor advocated control mechanisms such as 
the independent auditing of environmental standards documented elsewhere in this study, mean 
that the EHPEA is currently seen as the most suitable recipient for funding. 
The EHPEA lobbies government actors, donors and research institutions in order to address the 
problems being experienced in the industry. This is an important function in attempting to 
address market failures, such as conducting research on technical aspects of the industry 
including integrated pest management or developing locally adapted varieties in the absence of 
international breeders through its lobbying of the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research 
(EIAR) (IG4). 
Internally the association has many problems, but externally the association is 
effective. It has the small scale project which works well, it has the training project 
which works well. It has introduced successfully the Code of Practice (CoP). It’s very 
effective at lobbying with government to achieve favourable conditions to help the 
sector to expand and sustain. It’s an active partner in the Ethio Netherlands 
partnership programme [Ethio Netherlands Horti Partnership (ENHP)] which has a 
number of developmental projects attached to it (IG12). 
The financial institutions on the diagram, namely private banks and the DBoE, should have a 
simple role within the industry of providing capital to investors, which remains their primary role. 
However, as explained below, the DBoE has been required to become more directly involved in 
the sector through the repossession and interim management of defaulting farms. These farms 
are eventually auctioned at as-close-to-market-price as possible. 
The final set of institutional actors involved in Ethiopian floriculture is the international 
intellectual property and trade institutions. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is involved in 
direct negotiations with the Ethiopian government regarding accession to the organisation, 
expected to be completed by 2013, which could directly benefit floriculture exports to non-
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European Union member countries. One of the outstanding conditions required for WTO 
membership are technical barriers to trade including sanitary and phytosanitary services, which 
relate directly to horticultural exports (Kidane, 2009). Another of the conditions of this 
membership is compliance with the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement, 
under which countries are obliged to protect intellectual property on plants. One of the more 
common systems of protection is the Union Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions 
Végétales (UPOV), which lobbies the quango responsible for Ethiopian policy on intellectual 
property, the Ethiopian Intellectual Property Office (EIPO). The EIPO then liaises with government 
to design the most appropriate strategy on intellectual property for the industry. 
6.4.2 Production Actors 
At this stage only a cursory examination of the processes involved in the production of flowers for 
export is required before the elements that have a more significant impact on the research 
questions are engaged with below. 
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Figure 6.9 Production Actors involved in Ethiopian Floriculture 
Figure 6.9 displays the most important processes involved with flower production in Ethiopia. The 
key actors in the diagram are the financiers, without which there would be no need for any of the 
other actors. Financiers receive grants, loans and land from the institutional actors described in 
Figure 6.7. These resources are then used to set up the flower farm, including building 
greenhouses and purchasing inputs. The inputs node of the diagram has been necessarily 
simplified, with a single farm potentially using 114 pesticides and 104 different products to 
control for disease (Emana et al., 2010). Flower farms also purchase planting material which is 
selected from breeders and then multiplied by propagators. In both the initial set-up of the farm 
and its continued operation, flower farms require labour – skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled - and, 
in turn, provide waged employment and a range of community facilities as is described more fully 
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in Chapter 9. As described above, flower farms liaise directly with institutional actors regarding 
their requirements and the remittance of sales revenue. Finally, the finished products are 
transferred to transport/retail actors for final sale to consumers. For the purposes of this diagram, 
the production processes have been simplified so as to provide an initial impression of the 
industry from which the complexities and interactions governing the manifestations of value, 
power and embeddedness within the network are explained. For example, the flower farms node 
of the network features great variation in size, products, ownership structure and industrial 
history, both between farms and in a number of subcategories within a farm which are able to 
capture value to varying degrees due the prevalent structures of power and embeddedness. 
6.4.3 Transport/Retail Actors 
Figure 6.10 shows the actors involved in the Ethiopian floriculture GPN once the flowers have left 
the farm. The first process for the physical commodity is the transferral to handling agents, which 
form an important part of export floriculture. They are responsible for allocating space on flights 
and packing boxes onto pallets to ensure the most efficient use of space and hence keep costs to 
a minimum. The highly contentious role of these agents in the development of the Ethiopian 
floriculture industry is examined below. 
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Figure 6.10 Transport/Retail Actors involved in Ethiopian Floriculture 
Once packed onto pallets, the flowers are transferred either onto cargo planes or on passenger 
aircraft to utilise spare capacity. Prior to 2009 there were several cargo carriers operating flights 
out of Addis Ababa but since this time, the government has decided to limit air freight to the 
government-owned national carrier Ethiopian Airlines, in order to increase foreign currency 
reserves, a measure which has proved contentious in the industry: 
I think the government of Ethiopia...initially they were performing OK but now they 
are putting restrictions on exports. There has been a lot [of anger] about this 
Emirates flight which was forbidden basically. That’s not supportive for an industry to 
develop you know...they needed foreign money and they thought how do we get 
foreign money, by Ethiopian Airways [sic]. ‘What are Emirates doing? Hey let’s block 
emirates’, short term it works for sure but... (IG2). 
Passenger flights are operated by a wide range of carriers. 
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Having landed at either Liege, where the vast majority of Ethiopian flowers headed for auction 
land, or in a number of other airports around the world for direct sales, unpackers perform a 
variable number of specialised tasks that improve the marketability of the flowers but increase 
costs-per-stem. At this point there is a clear divergence in the processes involved in taking flowers 
to market between the traditional auction route and direct sales. The marketing channels, and the 
factors involved in the decision to pursue each, are explored more fully in Chapter 8. 
For flowers being sold through the auction system, at this point the flowers are transferred to a 
specialist ground transportation company that takes the flowers to the auction house either in 
the Netherlands or Germany. The primary customers at auctions are wholesalers/exporters, 
accounting for over 90% of auction sales, who then transport the flowers to the destination 
market for resale to florists, who finally sell the flowers on to the consumer. Some larger florists 
also buy directly from the auction while supermarkets will occasionally compensate for a shortfall 
in their supply with auction purchases. In order to compete with the growing pressure from the 
direct sales market, auctions continue to seek a simplification of these procedures, which has 
been controversial within the industry. 
We’ve got some businesses going straight [to customers] and that’s causing a lot of 
friction with our buyers because they say “you are taking over our business now. So 
we want to deal with you but only if you respect our position”. So far, we’ve chosen 
to stay out of that but the position of the exporter is changing because, where before 
they were more in the role of buying themselves, having stock and selling to the 
customers. Also through these transparent systems the customers themselves are 
getting smarter and smarter so they see what’s happing in the markets...So instead 
of having nice cuts on their sales they have to have tighter margins because it’s all 
transparent. Customers can also see what’s available and so they’re sort of forced to 
take it easy on the margins and supply a wide range basically. The buyers, their 
clients know what’s available, so their function has changed from a buyer and seller 
to a logistical and organisational exports company facilitating, basically, the 
purchasing of their clients (IG2). 
For direct sales, the route to market has been further simplified from this traditional model. 
Importing agents are tasked by large customers, referred to in the diagram as supermarkets but 
also including some major home stores and other large retailers, with providing a particular 
section of their floriculture range e.g. roses, mixed bouquets and carnations. Agents then either 
subcontract or perform every stage of the process right up to delivery to the retailer. 
Supermarkets then sell the flowers directly to consumers. The exact operation of these importing 
agents within the market as well as their impact on Ethiopian floriculture is documented in 
Chapter 8. 
Figure 6.10 gives an indication of the number and size of key actors in nodes of the production 
network where multiple actors exist. This acts as a reference tool for the analysis that follows. 
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Node Number of Actors 
Flower Farms 80 exporting at time of primary fieldwork (currently 90) 
Breeders Approximately eight major breeders supplying to the Ethiopian market 
Propagators Five supplying to the Ethiopian industry 
Handling Agents Two major plus the Cooperative which had not yet begun operations at 
the time of research 
Importing Agents Approximately five major importing agents involved in tropical flowers, 
two of which were involved in the Ethiopian industry at time of writing. 
Several smaller firms operate in individual markets or varieties. 
Air Freight Carriers Only Ethiopian Airlines operate cargo planes. More than 10 other 
carriers offer space on passenger aircraft flying out of Bole International 
Airport. 
Ground Transportation One company is associated with the Dutch auction house and conducts 
the majority of transport to auction. Large numbers of haulage 
companies also offer ground transportation globally for direct sale and 
to auction. 
Auction Houses A single company operates the vast majority of auction houses in the 
Netherlands and a different company in Germany with several auction 
locations. There are other auction houses with far lower turnovers in 
several countries including Saudi Arabia and Japan. 
Unpackers Often allied with auction houses or ground transportation companies 
there are a large number of operators in this node. 
Table 6.2 Quantification of Actors 
The preceding three sections form an elementary mapping of the Ethiopian floriculture GPN 
which is expanded upon in the following chapters. This mapping aims to provide a visual space 
within which the interactions between the various nodes of the GPN can be more accurately 
conceptualised. This stylised GPN necessarily removes the plurality of relationships between 
companies, institutions, labour and consumers which is elucidated in the following chapters. The 
plurality in industrial histories and geographical origin which is examined in this chapter and 
expanded upon in the remainder of the research acts as further justification for the use of a 
framework which allows for a flexible conception of the nodes and actors that influence outcomes 
within a network. 
In the following chapter some of the key processes in Ethiopian floriculture, which have 
contributed to the industry’s growth and involve inputs from a large number of actors, are 
described and analysed. 
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7. Value and Constraints in the GPN 
In this chapter the factors involved in the initial creation of value and the growth of the industry 
and the issues which have limited the creation of value are examined. These range from latent 
natural and economic characteristics of the location to regional, national and international policy 
issues.  
7.1 Value Creation 
A unique set of natural and man-made circumstances have combined to facilitate the creation of 
value within the Ethiopian floriculture industry. These are now evaluated through both the 
analysis of secondary data and through primary research conducted in Ethiopia involving 
interviews with key informants within the industry about their reasons for locating in Ethiopia. 
7.1.1 Natural Resources 
“Ethiopia has an ideal ecology for floricultural development” (Melaku, 2006). In the highlands 
there is an abundance of fertile land ranging from 1500m up to the nation’s highest peak of 
4620m in altitude, although land suitable for floriculture ranges up to 2700m. Here, the volcanic 
soil is fertile and the rains are reliable. The sun is powerful due to the proximity to the equator 
and, owing to the elevation, humidity is low, daytime temperatures are moderate and nights are 
cool. Fresh surface water is available from the Rift Valley lakes as well as abundant ground water 
throughout the region. Altitudes in Ethiopia cover 4500m above to 125m below sea level and with 
them comes a range of microclimates in which a huge range of crops can be grown. The intensity 
of the sunlight and the high altitude result in larger-headed and longer-stemmed roses which are 
the two primary determinants of the price attained for these flowers. The climate is commonly 
judged to be one of the most versatile agricultural environments available anywhere in the world 
and, as such, as summarised by one respondent with over 40 years of agronomic experience 
globally; “If you look at the climate in Ethiopia, somewhere in Ethiopia you can grow anything” 
(IG12). The climate cannot, however, be said to be ‘ideal’ for growing every variety of every crop 
and the extended rainy season when compared with Kenya, which occurs at a key time of year for 
rose production unlike the earlier rainy season in Kenya, means that, particularly in the higher 
altitude areas, there is increased disease prevalence which must be factored into a firm’s business 
strategy (IG2).  
The country also has advantages for floricultural development created by its geography. Addis 
Ababa, situated centrally within the highland region, is home to a new international air terminal 
which opened in 2001 and has flight times to the Netherlands of around seven hours. The areas 
suitable for floriculture are in close proximity to the capital (see Figure 6.1), allowing them to 
access the infrastructural centre of the country, further shortening the time to market. Along with 
other flower growing African countries, Ethiopia is able to produce flowers and get them to 
market at significantly lower environmental costs than the traditional flower growing areas in 
Europe. Williams (2007) examined the total CO2 emissions of flowers produced in the Netherlands 
and compared them to those produced in Kenya and found Kenyan roses resulted in the emission 
of ‘5.8 times less carbon’ than roses grown in the Netherlands. This is confirmed through primary 
research where one supermarket respondent stated this of the reasons for sourcing flowers from 
Africa:  
If we were growing stuff year round in Holland or here [the UK]...the carbon footprint 
is about six times bigger. So it makes perfect sense (IG5). 
  86 
 
The shorter flight time from Ethiopia than Kenya, approximately one and a half hours less to the 
Netherlands, will mean the emissions resulting from flowers produced there are even lower. 
Furthermore, Bole Airport is situated at an altitude approximately 1000m higher than any Kenyan 
airport used for floriculture, resulting in far lower lift and subsequent fuel requirements for 
flights. 
7.1.2 Socioeconomic, ‘Societal and Lifestyle’ Advantage 
The specific costs involved in floricultural production vary significantly depending on where 
flowers are grown. Historically, in commercial floriculture the primary production centre was 
located close to the market in temperate or cool countries before a shift occurred in the 1970s 
towards production in tropical countries, as documented in Chapter 5. There was no transition of 
production through subtropical regions and so the two primary production areas carry with them 
two distinct sets of production costs. In the Netherlands, for example, much of the cost involved 
with the production of flowers is attributable to energy and labour costs as greenhouses need to 
be heated and wages are high. Due to the high labour costs in developed countries, producers 
engage in increased mechanisation which results in higher initial capital input. Conversely, in 
developing countries like Ethiopia, labour costs are far lower and so manual labour is favoured 
over the automation of processes. The climate means energy costs are comparatively insignificant 
and costs are instead diverted to transportation to market (Schumacher and Marsh, 2002). 
Amongst developing world producers, Ethiopia has the lowest labour costs. These ‘perfect 
socioeconomic conditions’ combine with the savings in energy costs through refrigeration offered 
by the lower night time temperatures at higher altitudes to make the cost of production in 
Ethiopia amongst the lowest available (Hengsdijk and Jansen, 2006). 
According to a Global Development Solutions (2006) report for the World Bank, farming costs in 
Ethiopian floriculture were 25% lower per hectare than in Kenya with loss rates at 2% compared 
with 5% in Kenya, at that time. The same report found costs-per-stem to be marginally higher in 
Ethiopia due to lower productivity but the economies of scale that have been gained with the 
growth of the industry since these figures were collated and the increased use of the higher yield 
hydroponics means this advantage has likely been negated. The issue of labour productivity in 
Ethiopia is discussed in Chapter 9. The sales price achieved for Ethiopian roses was 27% higher 
than that of Kenyan roses at the time of the report, indicating superior quality.  
The ‘societal and lifestyle’ advantages of Ethiopia when compared with countries offering similar 
ecological and economic conditions are drawn from qualitative assessments of security, lifestyle 
and public perceptions of the industry obtained from interviews with actors integrally involved 
with the industry and with experience of floriculture in other countries. These are then qualified 
with independent assessments of these metrics from international data sources. 
The quantitative survey conducted amongst all flower producers attributed 12% of the decision to 
locate floricultural operations in Ethiopia to the ‘peaceful environment’. Confirmation of this 
peaceful atmosphere in Ethiopia can be seen in the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report 2008-2009. In the report respondents were asked to name the five most 
problematic factors in conducting business in a country and, in Ethiopia, ‘crime and theft’ received 
only 0.4% of the votes. In Ethiopia’s main competitor for flower production, Kenya, ‘crime and 
theft’ accounted for 7.5% of responses, while in Tanzania it accounted for 2.6%. This is reinforced 
by evidence from investors in primary research: 
...the stability issue.  I'm not talking about just because of police. It’s the surviving 
system you know, people have different values. If you walk in the wilderness and you 
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have lost your way, they won’t chop your head...I say it can never happen but it 
cannot. It comes from our value system. [The Ethiopian people] have morality in built 
you know (IG9). 
This feeling of personal security and political stability is reiterated by an EHPEA respondent who 
cites these factors as second only to incentives in the decision to locate in a country: 
...the major part of investing in one country is security, stability. The first study done 
by investor is ‘how is that country?’ it is safe to work, it is safe to drive night and day, 
it is safe to live there, that is the first thing...that is the choice of foreign investors 
when they come to Ethiopia...I tell you even the word they say, ‘Ethiopia is a place to 
live and work’ or ‘Ethiopia is a place to work and live’. That is what they say...so the 
incentive is part of the decision. OK, they say security is nice, what is the incentive? 
OK this is very nice, this is additional, but first if my life survives, I use the incentive, if 
my life is in danger, I have ten years tax holiday, how can I use it...And we know how 
many people lost their life and lose their life in some countries. So, there is no plan 
for the government to reduce the incentives but if that happens, it is not really 
reducing the security of the country...Did you face anyone to attack you while you 
were walking in Addis Ababa? Exactly! (IG8). 
A further advantage that occurs as a result of cultural norms in Ethiopia is something that 
presents real economic benefits to investors. Weirsinga and de Jager (2009) refer to the 
“relatively low level of corruption in Ethiopia compared to other African countries” which allows 
businesses to budget reliably and reduces transaction costs. The World Bank’s ‘World Governance 
Indicators’ Index 2009 rates the control of corruption in Ethiopia ahead of Uganda and 
substantially ahead of Kenya, with a percentile rank13 of 26.7 to Kenya’s 11.9 (Kaufmann et al., 
2010). Furthermore, the corruption which is present in Ethiopia, is not the culturally ingrained 
systemic corruption seen in countries such as Kenya but rather a favouring of past and present 
government contacts in certain commercial areas, along the ethnic and party lines outlined in 
Chapter 4, which is unlikely to affect foreign investors or the floriculture industry significantly 
(EIU, 2009). 
7.1.3 Institutional Environment 
7.1.3.1 Government 
The final part of Ethiopia’s package in attracting investment to the floriculture sector is the only 
element over which there is direct policy control14; that of the institutional environment including 
government incentives, procedures and processes involved with setting up in the industry, and 
institutional support available to it. 
Strong institutions and a suitable regulatory environment are vital components in 
expanding horticultural exports (Greenhalgh, 2004; 16). 
                                                          
 
13
 The methodology used by the World Bank was to rank all of the economies assessed (209 including some 
quasi autonomous territories) based on a range of indicators and then mapped this ranking to a percentage 
scale to rank the economy with the best control of corruption as 100 and the economy with the least 
control of corruption with a percentile rank of 0. 
14
 Government policy can evidently also affect other aspects of the overall package to attract investment 
including security and infrastructure, but these are far longer term investments where a change in 
government policy will take far longer to implement and see the results of the policy change. 
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The government has been quick and decisive in attempting to facilitate the growth of floriculture 
and have taken seriously any recommendations given in the reports of external organisations. 
Many see this support as crucial to the development of the industry and see the subsidies they 
provided to ‘courageous entrepreneurs’, who pioneered investment in the industry as amongst 
the key factors in the industry reaching critical mass (Rodrik, 2008; Gebreeyesus and Iizuka, 2010) 
When compared with other major horticultural exporters, the Government support 
provides Ethiopia a clear advantage (Joosten, 2007; 21). 
As part of the government’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 
(PASDEP), 2006-2010, a large number of incentives were offered to investors in floriculture. The 
government decreased start-up costs by removing tariffs and import duty on capital goods for use 
in this sector, reducing the risks for investors. The majority of the farms that were previously 
state-owned and significantly under-producing given the quality of the land are now being leased 
to companies at the minimal rate of $18US/hectare/year or less (Ethiopian Investment Agency, 
2008; Karuturi Networks Limited, 2011). The nominal rate of land rent has been controversial as 
some see it as a ‘land grab’ (Cotula et al., 2009; Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009). In Ethiopia 
however, land is the primary productive asset and the land that is being leased was not previously 
creating, or at least capturing, any significant value. Latent value may have been held in the form 
of biodiversity with potential benefits to the ecosystem and in the form of medicinal plants, but 
this had, by and large, not been captured for the benefit of the people. Provided the land is not 
degraded then it remains a productive asset and, from a government perspective, the longer 
investors are there, the more territorially embedded they become and the more value they 
create. The government has had to offer long-leases for the land in order to allay investor fears 
about expropriation of their land as happened during the Derg era. They offered a five-year 
corporate income tax holiday to investors in the industry (PASDEP, 2006). When income tax is 
introduced, although this has yet to occur for any floricultural firm, it is at 30%, the same rate as 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (WDI, 2011). There are also less tangible elements to the facilitative 
role played by the government in the growth of the industry including bypassing regulations on 
the import of pesticides and fertilisers in order to expedite the production process (Emana et al., 
2010). This potentially has a negative environmental impact as documented in Chapter 10. This 
incentive package does not look set to change as confirmed in this extract from an interview with 
a government respondent: 
...the government is very happy to have these incentive packages because we are 
assuming that, because of the potential we have in this country, we have only 
developed one tenth of our potential. We have a lot of untapped resources (IG4). 
This position is reinforced by an influential advisor to the government on policy in the floriculture 
sector: 
...maybe after 5000 hectare we might start reducing incentives but it’s a long way. 
But even then I don’t see reducing the benefit because if reducing the benefits 
means reducing the entrance of new developers, why? (IG10). 
While PASDEP was said to be ‘overly ambitious’ and ‘will not be realised in full’ (EIU, 2008; 17), its 
measures amounted to an attractive package for investors in Ethiopian floriculture, including 
several measures and targets specifically for floriculture. Measures included the development of a 
‘national business plan’ and ‘tailored packages’ for cut flowers and a ‘gradual transfer of state-
owned farms to private investors’ while targets included expanding production area to 1600Ha 
and increasing the employment directly generated by the industry to 70,000. As such, it has 
assisted in attracting investment away from competing countries including Kenya, from where the 
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Sher farm relocated (see section 7.1.3.4.1). In order to reverse this trend there has been a 
movement amongst policy actors in the Kenyan flower industry to put together a new and 
equivalent incentive package for the industry, including the creation of ‘Special Economic Zones’ 
but the proposals continue to stall at cabinet level (Riungu, 2010). This could be seen as an 
indication of the much touted ‘race to the bottom’ but the fact that the Kenyan government has 
refused to ratify the legislation may also signify that they see their comparative advantage in 
other areas. 
Investors have also been able to take advantage of the preferential trade terms with the EU, 
China and other key export markets discussed in Chapter 4. 
In addition to the recent political unrest in Kenya culminating in the riots of 2007/08 that has had 
the effect of diverting some of the foreign investment in floriculture to Ethiopia (The 
Independent, 2006), the differential trade terms experienced by Ethiopia and Kenya are predicted 
to have increased this flow (Hornberger et al., 2007). Whilst the EPA Kenya entered into with the 
EU in late 2007 restored tariff rates on flowers to zero, some investment had already begun to 
move into Ethiopia and the more liberalised trade terms that remain in Kenya still present 
challenges in the form of increased competition in certain sectors to firms operating in those 
countries. 
The current manifestation of the government’s involvement in the floriculture sector is the EDHA 
as described above. The creation of this agency was an example of the government’s willingness 
to solve problems in order to facilitate growth within the industry. The agency was intended to 
simplify the bureaucratic procedures involved with conducting business in the industry, and while 
it has experienced significant difficulties in the early stages of its operation, the majority of 
respondents were optimistic about the agency’s future. 
Whenever you introduce a new actor to a sector it takes a while for the new actor to 
build experience, to understand the sector, and to see where the needs are that 
match their roles and it takes a while to establish their roles and it takes a while to 
establish between the existing actors and the new actors who is going to do what. 
We are at the stage of the teething troubles (IG12). 
It is important here to discuss the influence of political stability on the growth of floriculture in 
Ethiopia. The political situation as a whole, as described in Chapter 4, was identified by many 
respondents as comprising a vital part of the institutional environment and facilitative of the 
growth in the industry. The questionable validity of the democratic system in Ethiopia has 
resulted in a regime whose reign will run to at least 25 years by the time of the next general 
election in 2015.  Respondents unanimously reported that the stable nature of this facilitative 
government gave them increased confidence in investing in Ethiopia and, as such, has enabled 
economic growth. Several interviews were conducted in the weeks surrounding the 2010 general 
election which led to responses such as this from one foreign flower farm owner: 
And they won the election which is very good, but from what I hear now it’s been 
rigged. For instance I want EPRDF to win, I want the government to win; I am a 
businessman (IG13). 
7.1.3.2 Development Bank of Ethiopia 
The DBoE was established in 1970 to provide financial assistance for activities contributing to the 
country’s development. This finance is available to local and overseas investors and the 
reasonable rates of interest give Ethiopia an advantage over neighbouring countries in the race to 
attract investment into floriculture. Rates are up to 15% lower than those offered in Uganda (Asea 
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and Kaija, 2000). New investors in the industry are offered a debt:equity ratio of 70:30 with loans 
for the expansion of existing projects being offered a 60:40 ratio with interest rates of 7.5% for 
investment in Priority 1 industries of which floriculture is one. Loans are available on both 
medium (up to 5 years) and long-term (up to 15 years) bases with different repayment regimes. 
The role of the DBoE is controversial within the industry with many believing their actions have 
hindered rather than assisted the development of the industry, with one respondent saying of the 
DBoE “either they are corrupt or they are stupid!” (IG9). Initially loans were offered only to 
foreign investors with the theory that the knowledge of how to set-up and grow a floricultural 
export business did not exist in Ethiopia and so would have to be imported. This policy both 
discounted the potential for domestic investors to ‘buy-in’ knowledge from abroad in order to 
develop their business and also assumed that foreign investors would possess this knowledge as a 
motivation to start up in the industry. In fact, a large number of foreign investors who sought 
loans from the DBoE in the early stages of the industry were venture capitalists with no previous 
experience in floriculture.  
Additionally, due to the highly favourable terms offered by the DBoE, finance was sought by some 
who had no long-term interest in the industry and saw it as an opportunity to make money 
quickly. Furthermore, evidence emerged during primary research of several firms that sought to 
criminally extract money from the industry, through the DBoE, submitting business plans where 
estimated costs were significantly overstated up to 400% of the actual cost. Over-invoicing in 
applications for grants and loans, including those for the funding provided by the Dutch 
government documented below, was found to be commonplace within the industry (IG6, IG14). 
Due to the lack of expertise in the industry within the DBoE it was difficult for them to accurately 
assess the credibility of proposals, and although over-invoicing was also seen in PSOM and PSI 
schemes where experience of the industry is greater, the DBoE’s inexperience in this area resulted 
in far greater discrepancies between invoiced and actual cost. This meant that, even with the 
70:30 debt:equity ratio and the actual costs of building the farm, the firm would still have spare 
capital from the DBoE loan. This was then remitted overseas and after a year or two in the 
industry the firm would declare bankruptcy leaving the bank to repossess the farm which they 
could only sell for a fraction of the amount owed on the loan (Haddush, 2010). This has 
restructured the industry resulting in a more streamlined pattern of ownership where only 
successful flower farms have been able to survive and expand: 
We’ve also seen some farms that have gone out of business, not a big number and 
not as many as people expected.  I think the rescheduling of the loans has helped 
with that and of the farms that have gone bankrupt, a bankrupt business for one 
investor is a good investment for another investor. So we are seeing a certain 
amount of consolidation of farms where an existing investor will take on one or two 
more and run them together and then we are seeing one or two more new investors 
coming in (IG12).  
Here institutional power is diminished by inability of the bank, and by extension the government, 
to manage repossessed farms and so their position in the negotiation over the terms of loans is 
greatly weakened. If the bank increases the demands on farms in terms of loan repayments or 
interest rates, repossession does not carry the threat that it ordinarily would as investors know 
that the DBoE does not have the capability to manage the farms properly – or the industry would 
have been larger before the introduction of foreign investors - and thus will never achieve a fair 
market price for the farm at auction. Once the DBoE has repossessed a farm, the longer investors 
leave the farm in government hands, the further it deteriorates and the price at auction for the 
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farm plummets. Given this, the bank is reluctant to impose overly stringent restrictions on loans 
and repossession is treated as a last resort: 
...if [the government] do [increase the financial demands on growers] then the 
grower say we can’t pay. Then the government say OK then the farm is ours now 
then they have to run it. That’s not an option in the first place because it will never 
work. I don’t think that will be the added value of Ethiopia. I think the added value 
will be that these projects will last, that the staff will have job, that there will still be 
some revenue for the government. And that still some of the money comes back to 
Ethiopia, even though a lot of it will stay in Europe. So the revenue for Ethiopia will 
not be maximum but at least it will be some. But once these projects keep on 
running...[the money will continue to increase] (IG2). 
These problems caused by inexperience of the floriculture industry within the DBoE have been 
recognised by both government and international institutional actors and attempts are now being 
made to address this deficiency: 
[the Dutch government] would have liked to get involved [with the DBoE] but we 
have too many things...in Holland they look to the entrepreneur. Is he a good guy? 
Does he have the right spirit? And then they assess the business plan but they put 
more weight to the entrepreneur than to the business plan. In Ethiopia I don’t think 
they do that (IG7). 
Whilst such extreme examples of fraud such as those identified above are rare, with only seven 
farms having declared bankruptcy to date, over-invoicing to a lesser degree is considered to be 
common, increasing the share of risk apportioned to the DBoE. The bank has recently sought to 
address this shortcoming by importing experienced personnel from Kenya, with a more realistic 
idea of costs involved in the industry. This failing caused by the pace of industrial growth 
outstripping the pace of knowledge growth is something which has been replicated in a number 
of regulatory areas and has both led to fewer benefits being extracted from the industry by 
government actors and to a curtailing of growth. However, whether considered brave or foolish, 
this generous offer of financing for the industry largely succeeded in removing one of the major 
barriers to entry to the industry in the form of capital availability. 
Investment-levels-in-Ethiopia-seem-to-indicate...that-capital-is-not-a-major-limiting-
factor (Joosten, 2007; 21). 
Foreign banks are not allowed to operate in Ethiopia and so loans must be sought from Ethiopian 
banks. Quantitative survey analysis showed that, during the early stages of the industry, 
commercial banks in Ethiopia were reluctant to give loans to firms trying to move into the sector 
due to a lack of understanding of it. While this has improved to some degree, it is still difficult to 
obtain commercial loans for the industry. 
The government has used the DBoE as one of the principal instruments to encourage growth in 
the industry. In the first instance, this came in the offering of loans with favourable conditions but 
as the industry has matured, the DBoE has also been used as a mechanism to allow the industry to 
cope with exogenous shocks such as the price crash that affected the industry during the Global 
Financial Crisis. Growers faced increased difficulty in meeting their loan repayments during this 
period and as a result the DBoE agreed to reschedule repayments over a far longer term (Capital, 
2009; IG8; IG14). Growers who benefitted from this arrangement were required to pay the 
interest on their loan before the rescheduling was agreed but it undoubtedly lessened the impact 
of the crisis on the industry. The DBoE were keen to ensure the loans were not seen as gifts 
having already received criticism for some investors leaving the industry with money still 
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outstanding. The increased repayment period exacerbated the problems caused by the initial 
loans in that as the loans were made in ETB, the rate of depreciation of the currency meant that 
the real value of the loan decreased significantly over time. The fact that the DBoE still offered the 
rescheduling despite the negative financial impact is indicative of the government’s facilitative 
attitude towards the industry (IG2). The rescheduling of debt, extending the loan repayment 
period by another two or three years has also allowed the government to implement extra 
capacity-building measures before firms are expected to be producing and exporting at optimum 
levels in order to meet loan repayments (IG8). The government’s attitude towards the industry 
and the impact that this has had on its development can best be summarised by this extract from 
an interview with one investor: 
...the government asked us what more mechanism should we put? Not many 
government do this (IG9). 
7.1.3.3 Transport Institutions 
In the trade of high-value agricultural products, the relative importance of factors restricting 
growth varies by agro-ecological conditions, local institutions and market conditions (Davis, 2005; 
3). Ethiopia’s lack of sea access since the secession of Eritrea has proved an obstacle to 
international trade. However, the need to get flowers to market quickly due to the negative 
correlation between senescence and price means flowers must be transported by air, which gives 
Ethiopia an advantage in the location and quality of its state run airport and airline; “Ethiopian 
Airlines, which by all accounts is Africa’s leading airline” (Dia, 1994; 20), winning African Cargo 
Airline of the Year 2011 (The Reporter, 2011). This strong performance has continued throughout 
the EPRDF’s tenure with the Airline winning multiple international awards for quality, determined 
by safety record, punctuality and customer satisfaction and the company will soon become a 
member of the internationally respected group of airlines, the Star Alliance, being only the second 
African carrier to do so (Star Alliance, 2010; Sudan Tribune, 2009). Ethiopian Airlines started 
building a new cargo centre at Bole Airport in 2009 which will increase the quality and efficiency 
of air freight leading to an increased volume and ultimately a reduction in costs. 
The capacity of air transportation in Ethiopia, both in terms of freight planes and spare capacity 
on passenger aircraft, has undoubtedly been one of the factors limiting the growth of the 
industry. More recently, however, significant progress has been made in this area largely due to 
the facilitative environment created by the state run airline and other measures taken by the 
government. Ethiopian airlines now runs eight Boeing 747 cargo flights per week to Liege and a 
large number of airlines offer spare capacity on passenger planes to the UK, Germany and the 
Middle East (IG6). The airline has recently employed a Belgian consultant with experience in the 
industry in order to solve problems with the cool-chain and to make cargo transport more 
efficient for growers (IG15). 
One of the key institutional nodes of the transport element of Ethiopian floriculture’s GPN is that 
referred to in Figure 6.10 as handling agents. These actors have, at different stages and to 
different degrees throughout the development of the industry, played both a facilitative and an 
obstructive role in the development and growth of the industry. Their function is the allocation of 
space on both cargo and passenger flights and the management/assembly of the cargo into 
transportable pallets. This function is essential in cost minimisation as the efficiency and care with 
which flowers are packed can have a significant impact on the volume of flowers that can be put 
onto an aircraft and also on the loss rates which combine to have a significant impact on the 
largest element of costs for Ethiopian flower producers. In the initial stages of the industry, the 
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small number of producers had difficulty in securing space on flights and packing the small 
quantities of flowers in a safe and cost efficient manner. The establishment of the Ethio-Horti 
Share Company (EHSC), by the President of the EHPEA along with other 29 other small growers, 
was designed to overcome this problem and, with the industry in its infancy, the introduction of 
collective bargaining, purchasing of inputs and consolidation of consignments had a significant 
influence in improving the capacity of the industry and attracting foreign investment. During 
these early stages of the industry, the EHSC was supported by the government but as 
documented in section 7.2 this relationship later became a barrier to the industry’s continued 
progress.  
7.1.3.4 Donor Community 
The role of the donor community in the development and continued growth of Ethiopian 
floriculture has undoubtedly been significant if, at times, controversial. There is a consensus 
amongst respondents from all groups including domestic and international institutional actors, 
growers, supermarkets, and handling agents that the influence of the donor community, and 
particularly the Dutch government, has been significant in the growth of the industry (IG16). 
Overall, the donor community has been very positive about the industry and has sought to assist 
in strategic areas to facilitate growth. DfID has been integral in an advisory role as described 
above, and has contributed to the development of the CoP now used in the industry and in 
designing a training programme for implementation on farms through the EHPEA. Their main 
contribution has come in the form of the provision of consultants to assist in these areas and their 
contribution to the development of the industry is highly regarded by one respondent who has 
been integrally involved in the industry’s growth: 
...without DfID’s support the association could not reach to today’s level and even 
the exports. They have contributed a lot. They give us one land rover from DfID Addis 
Ababa. They were helping us a lot with consultants...these consultants contribute a 
lot to the Ethiopian horticulture sector...they were with us for three years (IG8). 
The EHPEA is, in itself, part of the institutional environment that has facilitated the growth of the 
industry. In Taiwan’s post-war development strategy, the government required any industrial 
sector with more than five firms to form an industrial association similar to the EHPEA, which was 
seen as a key part of industrial growth through dialogue and collective problem solving (Wade, 
2009). The EHPEA began as a collective amongst the five small growers of summer flowers that 
existed before 2002 and it developed in tandem with, and partially as a result of, the 
government’s and donor community’s incentivisation of the industry: 
I think the association has done an enormous amount to facilitate growth. They’ve 
talked with government they’ve talked with donors they’ve talked with investors. It’s 
been very much a tripartite arrangement. But the commitment from the government 
has had a big impact on it. It’s very difficult to say whether it was chicken and egg. 
But there are very good relations between the association and the government 
(IG12). 
The role the Dutch government has played in the development of the industry has been both 
crucial and controversial. As the global centre for the floriculture industry, initial interest in the 
industry came from the private sector, when the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs financed a 
scouting mission to Ethiopia with a view to assisting Dutch entrepreneurs in entering new 
markets. Since this time, through a number of financial instruments including the Programme for 
Cooperation with Emerging Markets (PSOM), Private Sector Investment (PSI), and Match Making 
Facility (MMF), floriculture has been seen as an important receptor for development funding. The 
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PSOM and its replacement PSI programmes provide grants of up to €1.5m for innovative projects 
in a selected list of developing countries. These grants provide up to 60% of the capital for the 
project to be taken as a partnership between a company in the developing country and an 
experienced foreign partner company. Initially the foreign partner company was required to be 
Dutch before being required under EU law to expand eligibility to other EU members and the 
scheme has now been opened to companies from any country. The stipulations of the programme 
demand that the project has significant positive impacts on the local community. Furthermore, an 
experienced consultant was placed within the EHPEA with funding from the Dutch government 
with a view to designing and implementing a training strategy and CoP for the industry. The 
consultant has been working on this project for three years and envisages another two years as a 
minimum which continues to be funded by the Dutch government. 
There exist two arguments as to the reasons behind this focus of the Dutch government. Firstly, 
there is an apparent conflict of interest in the promotion by the Dutch government’s 
development arm of an industry which directly benefits the country economically. The funds they 
have invested in Ethiopian floriculture are greatly exceeded by the additional tax revenues 
generated by Ethiopian producers at auction, business for other floricultural actors based in the 
Netherlands and remittances to the Netherlands from companies operating in Ethiopia. This is 
supported by the fact that the initial interest in the industry in Ethiopia came not from EVD but 
from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and that financial support was originally offered only to 
Dutch companies investing in Ethiopia, suggesting motives were economic rather than 
developmental in nature. Even when the criteria for eligibility of foreign investors was broadened, 
according to some respondents from the Ethiopian flower industry, the rapidly signed 
Memorandum of Understanding has been ‘reinterpreted’ to relax the regulations reducing the 
potential benefits to Ethiopia from the scheme. 
It was the fastest memorandum of understanding signing in history. It changed from 
Ethiopian national to ‘an Ethiopian company’. In the beginning the interpretation was 
that you had to have an Ethiopian shareholder but now their interpretation is that 
you just have to be registered in Ethiopia. The whole idea of joint venture is not there 
anymore. The benefit is not there anymore. There is no benefit from PSI (IG10). 
The reasons given by the respondent representing the Dutch government for exclusivity in 
granting loans were primarily attributable to accountability, which, as documented above, the 
DBoE have experienced problems in the distribution and monitoring of similar loans: 
...to be compliant they should be open to everybody. To be tight, that is the general 
principle Holland has agreed to. But there were practical reasons why only to do it for 
Holland because you have to check the bank accounts of somebody in Malawi which 
is more difficult than checking bank accounts in Holland...But they ran into 
institutional issues which is why it was redesigned (IG7). 
The counter argument is simply that, as a significant actor in the floriculture sector, the Dutch 
government is in the best position to provide consultancy services and support to this industry, 
and that the industry represents an excellent pro-poor growth opportunity for Ethiopia which is in 
line with broader EVD objectives. Evidence from numerous interviews with institutional and 
corporate actors does not lend strong support to former argument of economic motivations, 
evidenced in part by the continued support of the Dutch government for activities which may 
negatively impact on their income from floriculture, including funding study visits to alternative 
markets such as Russia and advising the Ethiopian government not to join the UPOV convention 
despite possible negative consequences for Dutch breeders.  
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It’s ODA. The interests of Ethiopia is number one. Why we choose the horticulture 
sector? Because if Holland is to put something there on something it is the 
horticulture sector, because we have the market, we have the knowledge so that is 
why we came in....development is the main objective...And even if I would not do it, I 
mean it would fire back to us because they throw some cookies to us just to keep us 
in our markets. If you are trying to protect your own industries you would be very 
unwise not to go to other markets. They will get suspicious. We are just helping them 
not to help Ethiopia but to help ourselves (IG7). 
This respondent, in fact, argued vociferously that the Dutch involvement in the sector is 
developmentally and not economically motivated and has, in some cases, had negative impacts 
on the Dutch economy while they conceded that the externalisation of production by Dutch 
companies acted as a measure to secure the position of the Netherlands as a floriculture hub: 
1: Have you gathered any data on the benefit to the Dutch economy? The incidental 
benefit? 
2: No it’s not...it’s a complete ODA instrument 
1: but it has had... 
2: yeah yeah but we are not interested in that because the instance is money from 
the ministry of foreign affairs, it’s development aid...I mean things that Dutch people 
go abroad with are things that we are good in, in Holland. But I mean I get mails from 
Dutch people asking how the Dutch ministry is wrecking our industry. The rose 
industry in Holland is closing down and they shout at me. But I think if you look at the 
industry as a whole the movements that is going on, Ethiopia is a lower cost price 
structure. Holland is the hub for flower, we want to remain the hub so it is good for 
us to invest here and to help Ethiopia to grow because it will have benefit for us. That 
logic we fully subscribe to that’s also why my ministry puts me here. Partly 
development but it’s a multiple benefit. That’s also the way Ethiopia sees it (IG7). 
In support of this argument, the Dutch government point out that only one FMO loan (Dutch 
Development Bank Loans) has been granted to the floriculture industry in Ethiopia. These loans 
are given to private sector companies to enable them to enhance entrepreneurship in emerging 
economies. This is used as evidence that the development and economic objectives of the Dutch 
government is largely kept separate: 
...if you can you might as well take a birr loan as the birr is depreciating. So [the 
single investor who has taken an FMO loan is] happy with the loan but he realises 
looking with hindsight that he would have better tried and go the extra mile with the 
development bank and try and get a loan there (IG7). 
Further support for the facilitative nature of Dutch finance within the industry is provided by the 
record of their successes and failures. As the loans are provided to novel and innovative 
applications and functions within the industry, investments are more risky than investments in 
growing and established sectors. As such some of the projects that the loans and grants have 
been provided for by the Dutch government has failed, and one respondent involved in the 
allocation of this finance was certain as to the reasons why this has occurred: 
Mismanagement. Too many people involved. I mean 3, 4, 5 people put money in. 
And 5 people doing the management and some wrong choices. Some projects we 
have had where it did not match between the Ethiopian and the Dutch. The projects 
have not performed. But that’s part of the subsidy. It’s risky, because if everything 
went OK then the subsidy would not be justified (IG7). 
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The majority of respondents were of the opinion that the Dutch government programmes to 
increase investment in the industry were integral to the helping the industry reach critical mass. 
However, some also questioned the developmental intentions of the programme, pointing out 
that the amount given to Ethiopian actors is far less than that given to Dutch and other developed 
world actors. One respondent assessed the role of PSOM, PSI and MMF in the growth of the 
industry as “very great” and explained how the role this finance has played in the industry has 
changed over time: 
...in the beginning it was essential to get it going...[three large flower farms were 
awarded finance], but they are the industry leaders. And later on, it was very 
instrumental in diversification. Both with the chain, to other links in the chain, and to 
other types of flowers...you have to come up with something new, if you come up 
with a proposal for roses you will never get one. It has to be innovative and you 
know, it should be not at the expense of the competition, not unfair 
competition...you get initial funding for a pilot project right. And then they expect to 
expand it...They also contribute substantially to employment creation (IG7). 
As summarised by one respondent, development money is not allocated on a needs basis but on 
the basis of efficiency and where the donors feel it can make the biggest contribution to their 
development goals. The Dutch benefit derived from their investment in Ethiopia means there is 
more scope to invest further, but there is certainly a case to be made that the money could be 
used more efficiently: 
...for me it’s not an issue at all. The benefit that Ethiopia has from Dutch, from 
foreign investors is that they operate their business here. They employ people and 
now they repatriate money. How they extract money from Holland is not really an 
issue for Ethiopia, that’s Dutch money going round the cycle and back to Holland. The 
Dutch, obviously, are interested in developing Ethiopia or contributing to the 
development of Ethiopia as a production base for material which goes to Holland for 
sale. And for the Dutch horticultural sector, the supply of technology, of produce is 
far more important than production. It’s also an opportunity for Dutch investors to 
come and establish a business in Ethiopia and as long as that business is established 
legally, it’s not really an issue if it has two Dutch partners, a Dutch partner and an 
Ethiopian partner, these are business management practices which don’t necessarily 
impact on the benefit for Ethiopia. Because Ethiopia controls the repatriation of 
currency and the activity happens in Ethiopia, how the Dutch are able to screw 
money out of the Dutch government is a problem for the Dutch...It maybe isn’t 
always done in the spirit in which the money was made available you could argue 
about whether this is the right way of managing the donor money and whether the 
return on the donor dollar, from Holland is...enough of it staying in country or is it 
being kept in Holland. There is always a concern with Dutch development money that 
the money comes in and it revolves and comes back. The Ethiopian term for this is it 
goes from the pocket to the pocket. My experience of working with the Dutch is that 
they’ve always been upfront from the beginning in saying that for development aid, 
technical development, we can’t give you very much as things but we can make 
people with skills available to you to develop skills in the sector. This is, I think, 
relatively effective...So you could argue both ways...Holland has made its success of 
being a flower marketing and distributing country. It’s not a flower producing country 
anymore. Its success comes from trading and it needs produce to trade, hence its 
support for Ethiopia. And we do put flowers through Dubai. We put flowers through 
Japan and Russia and...all these other places. And where your flowers go to is 
determined by your producer and if enough people want to go to Dubai, then 
Ethiopian [Airlines] will put more flights to Dubai. (IG12). 
  97 
 
There are also many smaller international institutional actors involved in Ethiopian floriculture 
such as the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) – discussed in later in this chapter and in 
Chapter 11, the EU, the Swedish government, the ILO and a large number of NGOs, each with 
their own operational priorities for the industry. These conflicting priorities can lead to issues 
within government as one donor’s support is contingent on labour welfare issues while another 
focuses their resources on increasing exports, which are not necessarily complementary 
objectives. In one such example, a delegation from the UK and Norwegian governments was 
recently sent to review flower farms in Ethiopia to review environmental and worker welfare 
issues, concluding that they would ‘do everything possible to help promote the industry abroad’ 
(Walta Information Centre, 2010a). Furthermore, many of the issues that these donor agencies 
see as important within the industry, such as the environmental impact, require a sustained 
source of funding in order to succeed. The Horticultural Practical Training Centre (HPTC) discussed 
below is one example of donor agencies contributing to the institution of an initiative, often in the 
form of material goods or buildings, but not to its continued operation, such as staffing (IG8). 
Everybody is quite excited about contributing to a building. If you look at the donors 
they will buy you something, they will buy you a tractor but they won’t pay for the 
maintenance, the salary of the driver and the fuel. Those are things where the donors 
see there is too much opportunity for the resources to disappear away from what 
they are intended for. If they pay for a tractor and the tractor is parked there, they 
can see it. The fact that is doesn’t work is not their problem (IG8). 
7.1.3.4.1 Significance of Dutch Enterprise 
Closely linked to the influence of the donor community on the growth of Ethiopian floriculture is 
its symbiotic relationship with Dutch enterprise. Irrespective of the arguments over the 
motivation for the involvement of the Dutch government engaged with above, Dutch investors 
have undoubtedly played a significant role in the industry’s development, as displayed in the 
statistics in section 6.2. There are a number of Dutch farms, breeders, importing agents, 
marketing companies and auction houses that are integrally involved with the Ethiopian flower 
industry. However, there is one Dutch actor whose involvement has played a vital and 
contentious role in a number of aspects of the flower industry and, in doing so, has played a key 
part in both allowing others to enter the market and altering labour market conditions. 
Sher Ethiopia, along with a number of other subsidiaries or partners of the parent company, 
Agriflora, has had a huge influence in the transformation of Ethiopia into a major exporter in 
international floriculture. The company, under a range of different names, has been operating in 
various aspects of floriculture in a number of countries for over 40 years. In terms of roses, the 
company was the largest producer in Kenya until 2005 when they began the wholesale relocation 
of operations to Ethiopia. When the company began operations in Ethiopia, they maintained 300 
Ha of roses in Kenya, which were sold two years later as Ethiopian operations continued to 
expand (Zenebe, 2008). Sher Ethiopia is now the largest exporter by volume of roses from 
Ethiopia and is a subsidiary of Sher B.V., the world’s largest exporter of roses. Upon moving to 
Ethiopia, Sher signed an agreement with the government of Ethiopia, which, while the particulars 
of the agreement are not available, granted them access to a huge area of land, an allocation in 
excess of 1000 hectares, and other incentives on condition that Sher establish a ‘turn-key’ project 
in Ziway. The model used by Sher is unique within Ethiopia and facilitated the entry of 
inexperienced growers to the market to help it reach critical mass. Sher also initially used around 
half of the site for their own production (Vind and Fold, 2007; Ernst, 2002). Farms of up to 12 
hectares were constructed with greenhouses, irrigation equipment and plants in situ. The plots 
were available on a 9/10-year hire-purchase arrangement, after which time the investor would 
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own the farm. This had a number of implications in determining the type of investor who could 
enter the market. Initial capital investment requirements were far lower than for an investor to 
set up a farm on their own. Knowledge requirements were also far lower in a number of respects. 
All of the necessary inputs and infrastructure in order to establish the farm were already in place, 
removing many of the difficult decisions for a new investor. The proximity of these firms both to 
each other and to Sher’s own production units was intended to facilitate a degree of information 
sharing, reducing the transaction costs incurred by new entrants to the market. The economies of 
scale that could be achieved by the collective purchase of inputs and transportation would further 
reduce costs for new entrants. The firm has also set an example in terms of industrial upgrading, 
exporting products in final sales packaging for sale in European supermarkets, as documented in 
Chapter 8 (IG17). 
Furthermore, other branches of the Sher/Agriflora operation acted as facilitative components of 
the package to attract new investors to the market in order to allow it to reach critical mass. 
Companies under this umbrella conduct breeding, propagation, input supply and transportation 
operations, including those of the handling agent Flowerport discussed later in this chapter, 
allowing new entrants to the market easy access to a range of services so that they may ‘hit the 
ground running’ (Zenebe, 2008). These incentives led to the uptake of Sher plots by 
entrepreneurs, both local and foreign, who were inexperienced within the industry. A small 
number of these firms declared bankruptcy during the Global Financial Crisis and eventually had 
their production taken over by Sher, which increased the proportion of the site for which they 
were directly responsible. Sher’s own production area in Ziway continues to expand at a rate of 
one hectare per week. 
In addition to the impact of Sher encouraging new investors into the industry, they have made a 
significant contribution to broader government objectives in other areas. The firm now employs 
over 10,000 people directly and many more indirectly through the other farms within the Sher 
project, as well as through positive externalities in construction and related services. As such 
Ziway’s population has trebled since 2005 and is now home to over 100,000 people, the reasons 
for which are explored in Chapter 9, as are the details of Sher’s comprehensive Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) programme. Sher are now remitting at least $30m US in export earnings to 
Ethiopia on an annual basis, making a significant contribution to the government’s objective of 
improving the balance of payments deficit, although, as with the majority of companies operating 
in the sector, the amount remitted is believed to be far below the genuine earnings of the 
company (as documented in section 7.2) (IG8, IG9; IG14). 
Despite these positive aspects of Sher’s involvement in the Ethiopian flower industry, the firm’s 
role remains controversial amongst other actors within the industry. Several business practices 
engaged in by the company have drawn criticism from other farms and governments actors, on 
one occasion resulting in the short-term imprisonment of the Sher’s owner. The hire-purchase 
nature of the Sher scheme means that the ‘rent’ component of the land which is effectively 
owned by Sher on a 99 year lease is eligible for taxation. The owner believed the spirit of the 
company’s agreement with the government meant that all of the company’s dealings were 
covered by the tax-holiday but as these were effectively transactions between two domestically 
registered companies and brought no benefit to the government in terms of foreign currency, no 
exemption was applicable (IG14). This is one example of the size of the Sher investment and the 
company’s importance within the network affording the company far greater leverage in 
negotiations with institutional actors than other firms which has made them unpopular with other 
investors. This is also an example of how institutional power within the GPN for floriculture is 
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weak relative to corporate power in the initial stages of the industry’s growth within a country. 
This power asymmetry is exacerbated by the importance of sister company Flowerport to 
floricultural operations in Ethiopia, which allows the production and transportation operations of 
the company to be organised to ensure maximum benefit for the firm. 
[The manager of Sher]...he is not a friend of many people, not even in Kenya, not 
even in Holland...maybe the right word is greedy...He first puts his own flowers then 
everybody else (IG9). 
The involvement of Sher is also something that has angered other farm investors, referring to the 
Manager as a ‘monopolist’ (IG13). Sher is seen to have exploited the knowledge asymmetry 
between themselves and the inexperienced growers they introduce to the industry. 
He sells packing materials and chemicals to his companies. He used to be 30% above 
the rest. Competition and transparency has resulted in him bringing prices down 
(IG9). 
Whilst there is evidently nothing illegal in such practices of profit maximisation, government 
actors view these behaviours as curtailing the success of the industry overall and the 
endogenisation of the industry. The high profit margins sought by Sher in inputs and 
transportation, as well as the relatively high repayment costs of the hire-purchase agreements, 
had a significant impact on the profitability of new entrants to the market; contrary to the 
government’s intention when the agreement with Sher over this ‘turn-key’ project was signed. As 
such the government and a number of other actors are currently considering implementing a 
similar model of their own in different areas of the country, using the knowledge gained by actors 
through incidental knowledge transfer during the past five years of operation within the industry 
(IG4). 
If you do it on your own it can cost you €100,000/Ha. It costs him €100,000 and in 10 
years he has collected 10 times. So that is why other people are looking at this 
business model (IG10). 
Evidently, the view of other investors on the impact of Sher on the sector has the potential to be 
clouded by competitive influences. The company’s involvement in the industry as a whole, and 
the significant personal influence of the company’s manager, can best be summarised by this 
extract from an interview with a respondent from the EHPEA.  
We work on the Sher site and we have amicable agreements. [The manager of Sher 
is] an interesting character...There are those who say he is benevolent, he is good for 
the industry, look at all the good things that he’s done, and there are those that say 
this is a hard as nails, died in the wool, hard businessman. I actually think he’s 
both...He’s done a lot for people that work in and around his farm. (IG8). 
This last sentence refers to the controversial CSR projects engaged in by Sher and others 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
7.1.3.5 Investor Assessments 
The government of Ethiopia, and its instruments in the form of the DBoE and transport 
institutions, can be seen here to have played an active role in the development and growth of the 
floriculture industry. It is evident too that a weaker state would not have been able to implement 
many of the robust and controversial measures, such as the land allocation and infrastructural 
development, that have assisted in the growth of the industry. However, the reasons for growth 
are far more complicated than a simple policy change by a strong facilitative government 
(Blattman, 2009; Wijnands et al., 2007). While the Ethiopian institutions were sufficiently strong 
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to implement the measures outlined here, many of the successful institutions including the EHPEA 
and the Dutch auction cooperative, which functions as both an institutional and corporate actor, 
have imported foreign institutional frameworks which have governed their operations in Ethiopia. 
Moreover, there are a number of natural, socioeconomic, ‘societal and lifestyle’ and donor 
community contexts outlined elsewhere in the present research, without which the growth in 
floriculture would not have occurred. The timing of the growth is important as the correlation 
with changes in each of these variables gives an indication as to which variables were more 
influential in the industry’s development. While some of the factors are relatively stable, it may be 
a certain period of stability which acted as a tipping point for the rapid investment and so this 
method too is not infallible.  
Although a crude measure, investors’ assessments of why they entered floriculture provide 
additional evidence for analysis of the reasons behind the growth of the industry. Figure 7.1 uses 
data from the quantitative survey conducted among flower farm owners and investors to provide 
a subjective perspective on the weighting they allocate to various factors involved in their 
decision to invest in the Ethiopian flower industry. 
 
Figure 7.1 Investor Assessments of Motivations; Data: Survey 
Respondents were asked to select the three most influential factors in their decision to invest in 
floriculture in Ethiopia. These statistics too must be treated with caution as they are self-reported 
motivations and, as such, are subject to political and economic influences. For example, trends 
suggest that investors formerly downplayed the role of economic incentives in their investment 
decisions but this trend has now reversed so that investors now readily admit the importance of 
incentives in their location considerations (Easson, 2001; 272). It is not clear whether this trend is 
reflected in the results obtained from floriculture investors as the veracity of their responses is 
unverifiable, although when viewed in combination with other evidence and given the increased 
likelihood of honesty induced by anonymity, the integrity of the data is improved.  
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For the location of a profit making business, assuming footloose capital and equal natural 
conditions - in this case growing conditions - then location decisions will, again, be primarily 
economic. As can be seen from section 7.2.3, the primary cost in exporting flowers from Ethiopia 
is transport. As the production location moves north from Ethiopia towards the primary market 
destination, in general labour costs will increase as a proportion of the total production cost while 
transport costs will decrease. Other factors such as government incentives can be seen as ways of 
further reducing the production costs of a location so as to attract investment. 
However, despite the apparently logical nature of these economic decisions, the explanation of 
industrial location is far more complex and in asking for the top three motivations in beginning 
floriculture operations in Ethiopia, this question began to unpack some of the other issues 
involved in these production strategies. For example, since the floriculture industry began to 
move production to developing countries in the 1970s, Ethiopia has had the same climatic 
conditions, proximity to major markets and low labour costs but production did not begin in the 
country in any significant way until 2002; other factors evidently influenced the decision. The 
business environment during the Derg era was not conducive to international investment but in 
the 12 years between the change of government and the growth of the floriculture industry, 
international investment was positively encouraged. The significant proportion of responses that 
saw the peaceful environment as an influential factor in entering the industry is important. This 
can be seen as a contrast to both Ethiopia in the recent past with the revolution 1989/90 and the 
Eritrean conflicts in the 1990s and early 2000s and as a contrast to Ethiopia’s major competitor 
for international floriculture investment, Kenya, which saw widespread violence surrounding the 
election in 2007. Indeed, Sher’s manager, having lived in Kenya for two decades, reported the 
primary reason for the company’s relocation as security, stating that many friends had been 
killed, injured or threatened and they no longer felt safe in the country (IG17). This provides 
further evidence to that given in section 7.1.2 regarding the influence of societal and lifestyle 
considerations involved in the growth of the industry. It is not the intention of this study to distil 
this complex mixture of natural, economic, political and social conditions which led to the 
creation of value in floriculture in Ethiopia into a simple formula, assigning different degrees of 
importance to each of the factors. However, Chapter 12 reengages with the issues documented in 
this section in order to determine the key variables. 
7.2 Constraints on Value Creation, Capture and Enhancement 
In the examples drawn from the literature on other countries and from primary and secondary 
research conducted here, it is apparent that many in the industry felt factors remained which 
were impeding both the expansion of the industry through limiting new entrants to the market 
and factors limiting the expansion of established operators within the industry. One of the 
primary factors that may impede growth is conversely that which has contributed most to the 
industry’s success: the prevailing cost structure in the industry. If this were to worsen significantly 
then the incentives for production would be greatly reduced. As such, this section on factors 
inhibiting growth begins with an analysis of the costs and revenues involved in the export of 
flowers from Ethiopia. 
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Figure 7.2: Average Rose Prices and Costs; Source: Interviews 
Figure 7.2 shows the prices achieved by Ethiopian producers at the major auction house over the 
period January-07 to March-09 together with the major components of costs incurred. The red 
line represents total costs and the area below the line shows how the costs are broken down into 
the component parts. The black line represents the average price achieved by rose growers at 
auction over time. When the black line falls below the red line a firm is, according to this dataset, 
making a loss. When the prices (black line) exceed total costs (red line) exporters are making a 
profit. A number of caveats must be applied to the data before drawing inferences from it for the 
industry as a whole. Firstly, this data applies only to roses and while they represent the largest 
component of the Ethiopian floriculture industry, other varieties exhibit different price and cost 
characteristics. Hypericum, for example, can sell for up to four times the price per stem of the 
average rose but is packed less densely, increasing transport costs, and has a shorter growing 
season. Within the roses category, too, there are disparities in prices and costs with highland 
roses earning double the price of lowland roses, but with a far lower yield and higher loss rates as 
explained fully in Chapter 8. Furthermore, this data applies only to sales at the major auction 
house which accounts for over 80% of Ethiopia’s auction sales, which themselves account for 
around 90% of Ethiopia’s total floriculture revenue (see Figure 8.1). Direct sales account for a 
growing percentage of total sales and have different costs and price structures to auction sales. 
Prices are relatively stable as they are often agreed for a whole growing season or longer. Total 
costs are generally slightly lower as the flowers only have to be transported and unpacked once, 
and the overheads of the auction system are removed. However, the introduction of another 
profit-taking actor in the form of the intermediaries that commonly facilitate direct trade, 
referred to here as importing agents, means cost savings are often replaced by alternative costs. 
Finally, these costs are based on the auction costs for members only and are considerably higher 
for non-members as well as for members who declare transactions as NAT and consequently incur 
a penalty charge (IG2). A number of auction member firms are independently audited at random 
each year in order to ensure their reported NAT tallies with the figures they have reported and if 
not, charges are made accordingly. This does, however, rely on accurate accounting which is not 
always executed in Ethiopia (IG2).  
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We are now in the process [in Ethiopia] that actually a few growers still haven’t done 
their declaration. If they don’t or if they do and we disagree, we get to a situation 
where I think we have never been to before...we’ll have to sort it out. And if they 
don’t cooperate then we’ll have to terminate their membership and offer them 
another contract way of supplying the auction at higher rates and it will cost them 
because they haven’t stuck to their promises and so they have to pay. That’s a 
process you don’t want to go into but in the end of the day if they don’t cooperate 
then we’ll have to go that route (IG2). 
It can be seen from Figure 7.2 that the price of Ethiopian roses at auction varies considerably over 
time. Prices are depressed in the European summer by the increased supply of roses grown in 
Europe. The period shown also covers the time when the most severe effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis were being felt in the industry which made prices more volatile and explains the 
slight downward trend overall. When fixed costs are added to the cost structure, profit margins in 
the floriculture industry indicate that when prices are low at auction (as they were in August 
2008) producers lose money on every flower they send to auction. At this point the importance of 
subtleties such as the variable labour force and the long-term price implications of maintaining a 
presence at auction - even at a loss due to reputational advantage - are introduced, discussed in 
greater depth later in the study. 
It can be seen from this data that margins available to producers operating in Ethiopian 
floriculture are highly variable and, on average, fairly small. This is an average of all producers 
supplying the Dutch auction and the most profitable firms will be able to obtain the highest prices 
while reducing production costs. Even taken as an average, due to the scale of the industry, small 
margins can result in significant profits. Average profit margins towards the end of 2008 were 
around €0.08/stem. If this profit margin could be sustained over the whole year for an average 12 
hectare rose farm, the firm would stand to make profits of €2.4m ($3.5m US). Conversely, when 
prices are at their lowest, an average firm would stand to make losses of €2.1m annually. 
However, the fixed costs of the firm, particularly if labour is employed on a casual basis, are very 
low and exports can be reduced significantly to mitigate losses. This introduces issues of market 
presence which are examined further in Chapter 8. 
Figure 7.2 does not cover the unique period, in 2010, when the ash cloud over Europe as a result 
of the eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland put a temporary halt to all Ethiopian 
flower exports to Europe. During this time African producers lost millions of dollars in stock which 
had to be destroyed and whilst such exogenous shocks are likely to be rare, producers bore the 
cost and had to be able to absorb it in order to continue in the industry (BBC News, 2010a). The 
perishable nature of the commodity and the absence of a domestic market means that the 
potential for these, albeit rare, exogenous shocks, represents a threat to the growth of the 
industry. 
7.2.1 Barriers to Entry of New Firms 
In terms of agricultural products, the cut-flower market has high barriers to entry, which limit the 
creation of value. Each type of flower has different optimal conditions varying by light intensity, 
light exposure, soil acidity, water needs and temperature amongst other factors. The knowledge 
of what grows where and how to test for it prevents the majority of Ethiopian entrepreneurs from 
entering the market without significant external assistance at great financial cost (Maharaj and 
Dorren, 1995).  
Joosten (2007) documents how the effective costs were, at the time of the report, much higher 
for Ethiopian growers than for their foreign counterparts. Firstly, the experience of growing 
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flowers results in lower loss rates as growers know how to manage processes to minimise 
wastage and the majority of Ethiopian entrepreneurs that enter the industry “...are not growers 
by trade, they are businessmen...and then you’ve got the Dutch guys who’ve gone over and 
invested and taken all of their knowledge with them” (IG2). This is a very expensive element of 
cost inequalities to address as it requires constant subtle adjustment and management in order to 
achieve optimum production. This gap can only be bridged, for Ethiopian growers, with the 
employment of a permanent and experienced farm/production manager. Even experienced 
production managers reported taking two years of production before optimum quality, 
consistency, and volume are achieved.  
Secondly, knowledge of market and consumer preferences allows growers to react to changes 
more quickly, maximising sales and minimising losses through inappropriate production. This 
knowledge deficit can be addressed through the occasional employment of a consultant on a 
minimum of a biannual basis and regular networking with auction actors. Finally, specific scientific 
knowledge of which varieties are most likely to grow best in which soil and climatic conditions 
increases costs for domestic producers. This can again be addressed through the employment of 
consultants but these can be costly and unresponsive to production problems. This first barrier to 
the entry of new growers is attributable to the different levels of network embeddedness 
amongst Ethiopian and foreign growers, while the ability to overcome these barriers is 
attributable primarily to the prevailing power structures in the industry and how they influence 
knowledge sharing. Morris (2006) separates flower producers in Ethiopia into two groups; those 
owned by foreigners with experience in the industry and those which are owned by Ethiopians 
who are new to the industry. He states that information flow between the two groups is 
insufficient and that: 
It would be naive to think that, in a competitive market, growers would simply give 
information and ‘trade secrets’ away (22). 
The longer the industry exists in Ethiopia the greater the exposure to best practice by all level of 
employees will be. Assisted by the movement of employees between firms this will increase the 
levels of incidental knowledge transfer and begin to address the knowledge deficit. 
One of the key decisions to be made in establishing a new flower farm is the selection of varieties 
based on both market opportunities and growing conditions; a further knowledge asymmetry that 
negatively affects new entrants to the market. Direct customers may look to a particular grower 
to provide a certain product mix and, by concentrating on too few varieties, a producer may not 
be able to fulfil a customer’s needs. Conversely, by diversifying a product mix too widely, a 
producer may not be able to satisfy the volume requirements of larger orders. Breeders are able 
to licence varieties and larger customers may demand that the supply of certain varieties is 
limited to protect the price. The largest farms may negotiate total exclusivity agreements with 
breeders due to their buying power (IG16). In varieties where supply has not been limited, or has 
not been controlled carefully, producers can begin to decrease the auction price of their varieties 
by oversupplying to the auction (IG2). Below, figures displaying the relative Dutch and imported 
sales volumes and prices achieved at auction for some common varieties are displayed as they 
fluctuate over time. As can be seen from this data, for some rose varieties while there is both 
Dutch and foreign production the sales volumes differ greatly. For all three of the varieties shown 
there are great disparities in the prices of Dutch and imported roses. For ‘Marie-Claire!’, imported 
roses earn almost double the price of Dutch products at auction while for Akito, Dutch products 
have sold for up to three times the price of imported products. The reasons for the disparity in 
price are attributable to a number of factors. These include objective quality characteristics 
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derived from the suitability of the variety to the local growing conditions and effective farm 
management; brand rents created by growers as discussed in Chapter 8; and brand rents for a 
national industry as a whole based on factors such as disease prevalence and post-harvest 
handling facilities influencing senescence. Additionally, there is a cachet which can be attained 
with developing country origin (Cramer, 1999; 1251). In some cases the inputs required in order 
to make a Dutch-grown rose of a particular variety competitive with their Ethiopian counterpart 
are such that it would make it unprofitable for Dutch growers to enter this market. However, they 
may wish to enter the market with a lower-input, inferior quality version of a variety, knowing 
that they may achieve a lower price but that may allow for a profit to be made due to the lower 
inputs. This emphasises the importance of varietal choice for Ethiopian growers. They must 
choose a varietal mix for which they have a competitive advantage and for which supply is 
controlled by the breeder to maintain prices.  
 
7.3: Duett Prices at Auction; Source: Floraholland 
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7.4: Marie Claire Prices at Auction; Source: Floraholland 
 
7.5: Akito Prices at Auction; Source: Floraholland 
The industry also requires high initial capital investment in order to buy refrigeration, 
transportation and storage facilities in addition to requiring measures aimed at bridging the 
knowledge gaps described above and inhibiting organic growth from within the country. All rose 
growers in Ethiopia now have cooled packing and storage facilities both on site and at Bole 
Airport as flowers not produced under these conditions would be of lower quality and would 
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senesce more quickly. The loans available from the DBoE have been useful in facilitating the 
purchase of such capital goods but the speed of disbursement has been identified as a factor 
which continues to limit growth with 12 months of bureaucratic processes commonplace 
(Joosten, 2007). As described above, the DBoE’s loan policy restricted access for local 
entrepreneurs in the initial stages of the industry’s growth and acted as a significant barrier to 
entry. While this policy has since been changed to give equal access to foreign and local investors, 
commercial banks in Ethiopia are still reluctant to grant loans to businesses in the industry, 
ensuring that capital availability remains a significant barrier to entry. 
For foreign firms looking to set up a flower farm in a country, domestic skilled labour is a distinct 
advantage as imported skilled labour is significantly more expensive. Dearden et al. (2002) 
identified an acute shortage in this area and the competition amongst both domestic and foreign 
firms for the labour which was available meant that wages were driven up significantly. Since this 
time, access to trained labour has been improved in two ways. Firstly, while the government 
would logically prefer to employ trained labour from within the country, this was not available 
and so the government removed income tax for expatriate workers in the industry in an attempt 
to eliminate the skills deficiency. Secondly, following numerous studies, WUR designed a 
programme of training including a BSc and an MSc in horticulture to be conducted at Jimma 
University, and an HPTC at Melkassa, examined further in Chapter 9.  
In a competitive global market, it is imperative that products acquire a reputation for quality and 
reliability that will only arise through investment in marketing including membership of a CoP. 
This fact was recognised by the EHPEA and donor agencies and so the EHPEA designed a CoP in 
conjunction with WUR to run in parallel with the internationally recognised standards such as 
MPS and GLOBALGAP. The Code is still in development with the Bronze stage having been rolled 
out to 80% of the production area. This is aimed at setting minimum standards for health and 
safety and environmental practices to enable producers to obtain the international standards 
more easily (as documented in Chapter 9). By international standards, the requirements for the 
Bronze stage of the EHPEA’s CoP are not especially stringent and the training and assessment for 
the Code is free of charge. Nevertheless, they do present a barrier to entry for new firms as the 
measures necessitated to become accredited can be expensive – due to expenditure on 
equipment necessary to meet the CoP’s standards - and they may require the input of significant 
employee time for training etc.  
The government has, as of 2010, made this basic Bronze CoP a legal minimum to obtain an export 
permit as a further measure, added to those documented throughout this study, aimed at 
manufacturing and protecting the reputation of the industry as a whole (Tamene, 2010). 
Furthermore, the government is considering linking the advanced stages of the CoP with financial 
incentives such as tax breaks or access to land, although at the time of writing no concrete 
measures had been implemented. International standards are the gateway to the highest level of 
benefits available to producers in floriculture, as documented in Chapter 8, and the EHPEA CoP, 
audited by the same assessors as some of the most prestigious international codes such as MPS 
SQ, goes some way toward assisting producers in accessing these benefits. 
One of the most unavoidable barriers to setting up in the industry is the balance of payments 
deficit the country is running; currently $6bn US/year. This means foreign currency is in short 
supply which makes the acquisition of key inputs to the industry difficult. As documented in 
Chapter 10, one of the government’s primary targets in its support of the industry was to increase 
foreign currency earnings; an objective which has proven highly problematic to achieve. Obtaining 
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inputs, particularly for Ethiopian entrepreneurs, has been difficult due to this shortage of foreign 
currency and the depreciation of assets held in ETB against the US Dollar. 
It is these high barriers to entry that Maharaj & Dorren (1995) believe put floriculture in the 
developing world ‘beyond peasants’ scope’ with no possibility of smallholders being able to enter 
the market and grow their business (Ezedinma and Chukuezi, 1999). This is confirmed by primary 
research which found no evidence of the integration of smallholders into the floriculture GPN, as 
the knowledge and capital requirements are simply too high. There is some precedent for 
smallholders being incorporated into the floriculture GPN in Kenya, with several farms growing 
low input, open field summer flowers grown from bulbs, creating relational rents. Even if 
successful, this represents a small section of the total flower market and the lower sales value of 
these flowers means the profit margin after the deduction of the higher transport costs is far 
smaller than with greenhouse flowers or mass-produced summer flowers. An area where there is 
far greater potential for smallholders to be integrated into the GPN is in the export of tropical 
fruits and vegetables. As described in Chapter 11, this related industry owes its growth in large 
part to the infrastructure and policies created for the floriculture industry. Following the model 
established in a number of other NTAE growing countries, the EHPEA has, with assistance from 
the CFC, designed a project to integrate smallholders into the network by assisting them in 
growing vegetables to contribute to the total supply of a large exporter. This is possible because 
of the lower barriers to entry including a far more developed existing knowledge base involved in 
growing fruits and vegetables. 
7.2.2 Barriers to Growth of Existing Firms 
In addition to the barriers that make it difficult for new firms to enter the industry, there are 
several issues which inhibit the growth of existing firms, limiting the capture and enhancement of 
value. These exist both in the form of factors limiting farm expansion directly and those which 
limit the profitability of farms, diminishing opportunities for capital accumulation (Coe et al., 
2004; Henderson et al., 2002). Dearden et al. (2002) identified several problems with the industry 
which increase costs and reduce demand for the flowers produced. Firstly, agronomic practices 
and post-harvest handling, including a lack of cool-chain facilities, were identified as areas where 
Ethiopian farmers were at a disadvantage compared with the international standard. Since the 
report was produced, and partly as a consequence of it, several consultants have been employed 
in an attempt to improve the agronomic practices of farmers in Ethiopia, thus enabling value 
enhancement through improved quality(Henderson et al., 2002). Additionally, a new cooled 
sorting and grading facility has been built at Bole Airport for both flowers and vegetables and 
several firms operating in the country now offer cooled transportation facilities. Furthermore, a 
taskforce has been set up on cool-chain management including representatives from a number of 
farms, auction houses, the EHDA, EHPEA and transportation companies, aimed at overcoming 
difficulties experienced by actors in this area of the industry (IG15). Such bottlenecks were 
inevitable given the rapid and unprecedented growth of the industry: 
I think if we are honest, the rapid growth rate in the first instance did create some 
problems. It’s very difficult to develop your infrastructure and all these sorts of things 
at such a rapid pace in order to keep up with that. For the time being it worked and 
there is a positive side to that too because you are big enough to be a presence and 
fill your aircraft and have five or six or seven flights per week so they’ve reached, for 
flowers, critical mass quite quickly so that is a good thing (IG8). 
This is one constraint where capacity-building measures have been implemented in order to 
facilitate the continued growth of the industry. Such capacity-building programmes have been 
important in overcoming impediments to the industry’s growth and in order to do so, 
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programmes have been required to increase the level of foreign involvement in the industry, as 
displayed in this extract from an interview with an EHPEA respondent: 
This is not discriminating. A British company wanted to do a packaging factory here, 
it’s allowed...we will not wait for Ethiopians who have no interest or capacity to do 
that. It must be open market. Where there is a [need for] protection the government 
already make a protection. The foreigners can not involve in local trade for 
example...Also telecommunication, bank, the government has strategy on that. But 
for the rest, where the government didn’t put protection... (IG8). 
One key aspect of infrastructure which has acted as a decreasingly influential barrier to the 
growth of existing firms, partially due to the involvement in foreign companies, is that referred to 
in Figure 6.10 as handling agents. In the early stages of the industry it was the lack of handling 
agents due to the small size of the industry that acted as a barrier to growth, inhibiting the 
creation of value. The consolidation of shipments so that they could form pallets and eventually 
charter cargo aircraft was a key function preventing the industry from reaching critical mass, as 
capital expenditure was too high for each firm, given their export volumes, meaning that costs 
could not be lowered to make the industry internationally cost competitive. The EHSC was formed 
by 30 small growers in 2004 with government support in order to overcome this barrier as 
documented in section 7.1.3. However, as the industry grew, this effective monopoly of EHSC 
began to have the effect of keeping costs artificially high and imposing restrictive conditions on 
shipments, making the industry less competitive internationally. In 2006, the government sought 
to address this bottleneck by breaking the monopoly of EHSC and allowing Flowerport, a company 
in which Sher is the majority shareholder, to compete. This had a positive effect on both prices 
and efficiency within the handling agents’ node of the industry (IG6). Flowerport are a Dutch-
based logistics company with international experience of floricultural transport systems and are 
one of the largest companies involved in handling floriculture freight in Kenya. This experience 
meant they were able to introduce cost savings and increase efficiency for their customers in 
several ways. Pallets are packed more efficiently in terms of space meaning Flowerport can 
transport 90 tonnes of cargo on the same Ethiopian Airlines cargo plane that EHSC pack with only 
75 tonnes of cargo (IG17). This is all the more surprising given the onerous three week advanced 
booking requirement for space on EHSC flights has been reduced to just a few days with 
Flowerport. This is detrimental to growers as, in order to conduct optimum market strategy, price 
fluctuations and cut stage (the stage of growth of flower at which they are harvested), determine 
the optimum number of flowers to include in a shipment. Cut stage is affected by micro-variations 
in climate which can be significant over three weeks. Therefore the Flowerport’s requirement of 
shorter notice for booking space on cargo planes was a key development in allowing producers to 
be more responsive to consumer demand and market conditions (IG6). EHSC can provide better 
facilities for growers new to the industry as they have more flexible payment terms than 
Flowerport’s two week invoice settlement requirement, accommodating variations in cash flow 
common when entering the industry (IG9). 
The close relationship between Flowerport and Sher has acted as both an aid and an impediment 
to the growth and efficiency of this node of the GPN.  When the node was opened to competition 
by the government, the fact that Sher had significant production of their own meant that they 
were able to fill cargo flights with the addition of a small number of other farms. Sher’s 
production could then be exported flexibly to utilise flights where demand from other producers 
was lower. However, as demand outstrips supply, particularly during times of year where demand 
is at its peak, Flowerport are seen by many growers to be prioritising Sher’s products over those 
of other growers. As production growth has continued to outstrip growth in freight capacity in the 
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industry, competition between the two handling agents has reduced. Allegations were made by 
several respondents of price fixing between EHSC and Flowerport with both charging €2.25/kilo 
exported. This acted as a restriction on the capture of value both for Ethiopian growers, as they 
had to pay a proportion of the final sales price to this node which was not reflective of market 
rates, and to the Ethiopian government, as value was captured by an actor with lower levels of 
territorial embeddedness (Hess, 2004). The difference in loading capacities between the two firms 
together with this fixed price should have resulted in a large-scale shift toward Flowerport. 
However, while this did occur to some degree, it was mitigated by the allocation of space to EHSC 
on flights, limiting the capacity available to Flowerport, together with the political and loyalty 
issues outlined below. As transport represents the most significant element of costs for Ethiopian 
producers, this represented a threat to the profitability of firms, particularly during a time when 
prices at auction were depressed. This led to the third and most controversial development in the 
handling agents sector of Ethiopian floriculture. 
The ethnically and politically aligned corruption that occurs in Ethiopia manifests itself strongly in 
the handling agents’ node and for a significant period of the history of Ethiopian floriculture, 
corruption determined the prevailing power structures of this key node of the GPN. One of the 
most influential individuals in the growth of the floriculture industry in Ethiopia was Ato Tsegaye 
Abeba, who, as one of the first flower exporters from Ethiopia, was a founder member of the 
EHPEA and remains President of the Association. He was also responsible for the establishment of 
the EHSC and remains an influential shareholder and board member. Ato Tsegaye, a Tigrayan, was 
reported by a large number of respondents to be “well connected”, with more than 10 farm 
owners using the exact phrase without solicitation. As such it was felt that challenging the status 
quo with regard to handling agents would endanger the existing floricultural operations of the 
individuals involved by angering such an influential individual. In May 2010 a small producer, who 
himself had family connections within the government, began to enquire as to the possibility of 
adding an additional option to the handling agents’ market as a way of bringing his costs down. 
The producer wished to do this in the form of a cooperative amongst all growers who wished to 
use the service, unlike EHSC which is effectively a partnership between the board members, and 
under the cooperative no profit would be taken and the price charged would simply reflect the 
costs incurred in getting the flowers to market. In establishing the cooperative the grower 
perceived that he was threatened both personally and professionally and had great difficulty in 
attracting formal support from interested parties for fear that they may suffer the same. 
Eventually, due to his family connections within the government, the producer was able to gain 
an audience with the Prime Minister’s representative where he raised the issue of the prohibitive 
costs associated with handling agents and the constraining effect they were having on the 
industry’s growth. Backed by the Prime Minister’s Office the producer was then able to attract the 
support of a number of other growers, some of whom offered to assist with the running of the 
new cooperative. Once it transpired that the cooperative would succeed in entering the industry, 
both Flowerport and the EHSC lowered their prices to €1.75/kilo, a reduction of 22%. By the time 
the cooperative was officially established (although export operations have yet to begin) 38 
growers had agreed to become members of the cooperative with five being elected as board 
members, one of whom will act as the inaugural president. The members will contribute their 
own capital to allow the cooperative to purchase equipment and begin operations. 
The handling agents’ node of the GPN is one where relational rents have been created and have 
thus enhanced value within the GPN. The cooperative represents a mechanism by which 
supernormal profits have been created by the firms involved which would not have been available 
to any of the actors individually. 
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The advent of this cooperative has also brought to the fore the disparity between the business 
cultures of Ethiopian and foreign growers as the cooperative is being driven by Ethiopians with 
foreign growers sceptical of its potential for success. Foreign growers are amongst those that 
have formed the cooperative but along with a number of international institutional actors, they 
fear the Ethiopian-led cooperative lacks the organisation to succeed: 
I also want some commitment and that is something that Ethiopians are not very 
good in. They want to have things and they never want to give things (IG2). 
Whilst the institutional environment was a key factor in the initial development of Ethiopian 
floriculture, this asset has failed to improve, in certain respects, to accommodate the growth of 
the industry and, as such, the business environment can be considered a constraint to the 
industry’s continued growth. Business processes are still widely regarded as very slow and there is 
a conflict between ‘business cultures’ of the European and Ethiopian actors within the industry. 
They never reply to emails though especially these government guys. And that’s also 
the annoying thing and that breaks me up. And nothing happens you know, always 
good meetings and they promise you many things...but nothing happens. And then 
you have to do something else, maybe it’s also through the government but maybe 
it’s a different angle and different people (IG2). 
Whilst the problems in the institutional environment exist amongst government, the banks, 
transport institutions and the donor community, respondents saw the problems in their 
interactions with the government as the most restrictive. This is strongly related to the data 
contained in section 4.1 regarding the post-communist nature of the state, in the period after the 
Derg, and consequent autocratic governance. The rollback of state involvement in many 
industries has continued but the desire for floriculture to succeed, as a target industry for export 
growth, has resulted in heavy involvement in several aspects of the industry.  This interview 
extract reflects a view typical of many in the industry, that the government’s involvement in all 
aspects of the industry has proved an impediment to growth: 
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The desire of government for the industry to succeed coupled with the micromanagement style of 
governance employed has led to state interference in increasingly small nodes of the industry, 
favouring intervention over the market as the solution to the industry’s issues. This interventionist 
autocracy together with the lack of ‘agencies of restraint’ has led some to take the view with 
regard to the industry in Ethiopia that ‘a train wreck is in the offing’ (Blattman, 2009). One 
example of such top-down governance comes in the area of packaging. In the initial stages of the 
industry high quality packaging for the export of flowers had to be imported, increasing costs for 
producers and reducing the benefits available to local actors within the industry. The 
government’s solution to this was to create their own packaging firm, which continues to operate 
and supply many firms in the industry. This had the effect of increasing pressure on local 
packaging producers, removing the turnover they required to develop their packaging to meet the 
industry standard. Since this time a number of packaging firms have begun operating in Ethiopia 
and farms now use a range of government, privately made and imported packaging for flower 
export. Several growers highlighted the value of this government intervention as the increase in 
the price of packaging caused by the increased quality has been nullified, as the loss rates during 
transit have been significantly reduced. Auction and other institutional actors, however, said that 
the market would have produced the same outcome and those who do not have varieties which 
are easily damaged would prefer lower cost options (IG11, IG2, IG7).  
The rapid growth of the industry has resulted in a process whereby a single problem becomes the 
focus of firms and policy makers within the industry and once this problem has been addressed, 
focus shifts to the next priority. This is in contrast to industries that have developed more 
gradually where problems arise over time caused by changes in external conditions and changes 
in the market overall, such as a gradual shift to direct market supply.  As such, when the problem 
Respondent: ...the farms, they have to fill in all kinds of forms to do with their shipments so they 
have an idea what is going on...the trucks, so they do like a check, an annual check and then half 
of the truck was put on the red list and if they were not fixed within three weeks or something 
they would be taken off the street or something. But they order it kind of thing. They wrote a 
directive which is stupid you know. And we are fighting against it within the taskforce and all the 
Dutch growers are saying to go against it and it worked more or less but in the end nothing has 
been done on the airport and that’s the main problem, if you want to achieve things which is also 
beneficial for the good growers then do something over there because that is something they 
don’t have in their own hands. 
Interviewer: But surely the government shouldn’t need to step in when it’s a firm’s own benefit. 
Respondent: Well that’s the strange thing, you know, and that’s a very weird discussion when 
you are discussing this directive.  You know, our interest is bigger than yours but they think their 
interest is bigger in term of this product comes from Ethiopia, and they think the only way they 
can change it is to put these regulations in place but they don’t realise that the whole investment 
climate will go down because of this stupid cool chain, I really cannot understand it.  
Interviewer: Do you see this as a product of the country and the government’s political history? 
Respondent: Of course. It’s slowly changing but not quick enough. You know at the agency there 
are quite some good ones and some nice one but a few they come from the old state farms and I 
used to have very severe discussions with them and if they can ignore you they will. They cannot 
handle discussion, you know they say they do but when it comes to it they listen and they say OK 
we do it my way. You know, you have something in mind, you have a discussion and at the end 
they say OK we’re going to do it like this.  
(IG2) 
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of the quality and availability of packaging had been solved to a large extent, the issue of 
efficiency among handling agents came to the fore. As is documented below, transport costs 
account for a significant proportion of total costs and so the more efficiently an aircraft can be 
packed, the lower these costs will be. In an attempt to achieve this efficiency, the government 
instituted a directive meaning all flower producers must use boxes of standardised size and 
quality, which were to be supplied by the government-owned packaging firm. This directive 
encountered heavy opposition from the industry. Whilst it would be helpful in the stacking of 
pallets if boxes were standardised, roses produced in Ziway have very different packaging 
requirements from the taller roses produced in Holeta and those required for the hardier 
hypericum do not need to be of equal quality to those for the delicate gypsophelia. The 
government was consequently forced to alter the directive so that it applies only to Ethiopia’s 
primary export variety, roses, although the directive remains controversial, with one respondent 
reporting that the events surrounding this directive were symptomatic of the government’s 
attitude and that “things cannot continue like this!” (IG15, IG6, IG4). 
Another part of the same directive had initially stipulated that flowers, which are only exported, 
and fertilisers and pesticides, which are only imported, could not use the same truck for 
transportation. The idea was that growers were becoming careless or intentionally cutting corners 
by not cleaning the truck in between journeys and the phytosanitary and health and safety 
implications were having a negative impact on the reputation of the industry as a whole. A 
market-orientated solution would have been to allow those growers who do not ensure proper 
handling of materials to see their prices fall at auction and their own reputation damaged by 
failing checks on their health and safety standards. This part of the directive was met with fierce 
opposition by growers who considered themselves as conducting all the necessary precautions 
and saw this as a high and unnecessary cost, increasing the total costs of every shipment for no 
benefit. This part of the directive was eventually removed due to heavy opposition as is displayed 
in the following exchange between a flower farm manager and an international institutional 
actor: 
1:...the taskforce is so screwed up. This is what they say, if a cold truck is dropping 
the flowers from Debre Zeit, on the way back it cannot take any fertilisers or 
chemicals – What the fuck! 
2: That’s changed now. 
1: I don’t know why, maybe they thought flower is some kind of delicate or 
something. 
2: They don’t think that the growers will clean their cold trucks. 
1: this is a Mummy state. This is my farm, my truck; I’m the one who paid for it, who 
the fuck is he to tell me put this in that! 
2: He is the government of Ethiopia. They have to protect their name. 
1:  All they have to do is put a policy and tax. 
2: I agree with you completely. 
(Round table meeting – IG2, IG13) 
The government’s desire for the industry to succeed has also had a negative impact on the 
benefits extracted by different actors from the industry. Despite initially appearing to favour 
foreign growers in the policies of the DBoE, several initiatives have since emerged offering 
financial incentives, the provision of expertise or capital equipment to growers for actions which 
they believe will enhance the industry, such as diversification or expansion in certain areas. These 
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policies have in some cases been restricted to Ethiopian growers to the annoyance of both foreign 
growers and international institutional actors who see the policy as restrictive of growth, referring 
to the policies and the agency that introduced them, the EHDA, as ‘stupid’ (IG2). 
Conversely, in the operation of Ethiopian Airlines, the government has implemented policies 
which have had a negative impact on the benefits extracted by local actors. Whilst the reliability, 
consistency and service offered by the state-run airline have in some respects facilitated the 
industry’s growth, the government has sought to mitigate the high contribution of transport costs 
to total costs by effectively subsidising exports on Ethiopian Airlines. It is a well established fact 
within the floriculture industry that the cost advantages of flowers exported from developing 
countries over flowers produced under manufactured conditions in Europe are largely eroded if 
the airline cannot, at least partially, utilise the cargo capacity of the aeroplane on the return 
journey, known in the industry as ‘southbound’. Ethiopia exported $192m of goods to the 
Netherlands in 2010, compared with $79m of goods which flowed in the opposite direction, the 
vast majority of which is shipped via sea (International Trade Centre, 2011). In order to be 
economical when compared with shipping, southbound air freight needs to be both high-value 
and perishable, as well as having a sufficient demand within Ethiopia. Indeed major supermarkets 
are examining the possibility of consolidating freight including flowers and other fresh produce as 
they have begun to develop retail outlets globally. They have been able to use air freight capacity 
in both directions, which, due to the proportion of production cost that transport accounts for, 
has begun to influence their source locations (Wrigley and Lowe, 2007; Wrigley, 2002). Whilst it 
has not, as yet, proven a major factor in any reported location decision, it is likely to become an 
increasingly influential variable as supermarkets continue to spread their influence 
internationally. For Ethiopian floriculture, the demand does not exist for imports from Europe 
and, in any case, purchasing imports from Europe would negate the primary government 
objective of the industry: to increase foreign currency reserves. Furthermore, due to the elevation 
of Bole Airport (2334m) the fuel required for uplift is lower than it would be at a lower altitude 
and growers lobby for lower transport prices as a result. With little or no southbound, however, 
airlines must account for the price of the uplift from both Bole Airport and for the return leg from 
Europe. As a result of this, Ethiopian airlines charge a price which is not only unprofitable but is in 
fact a loss-making enterprise as a result of partially subsidising southbound.  
The airline has also operated using fixed prices, insulating exporters from fluctuations in fuel costs 
which is another cost that must be absorbed by the airline. In Kenya, by comparison, freight prices 
are altered weekly to account for fluctuations in fuel prices. The ability of the state-owned airline 
to operate a loss-making enterprise gives the country a competitive advantage over other 
developing countries which either have no state-owned airline or have an airline without 
sufficient capacity to conduct such operations. In the long-term, however, this has to be seen as 
an unsustainable part of the industry. Furthermore, there is an absence of multinational retail 
outlets in Ethiopia due to the government’s policy on foreign investment in this area and so, if this 
does become a more influential factor in production location due to the possibilities of 
multidirectional freight, then Ethiopia’s position can be considered relatively weak (IG5). 
As is the case with the ‘tax holiday’, it is clear here that the policy choices of the government are 
made as a result of the power inequalities that exist between institutional and international 
corporate actors in the early stages of the industry, while at the same time reflecting the political 
strength of the state in being able to execute these policies. In pursuing such policies, the 
institutional actors intent on ensuring the sustainability of the industry are effectively investing in 
the embeddedness of corporate actors and international capital in both the country and the 
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industry which, by the time taxes are introduced and freight prices are increased to reflect either 
their cost or even market price, will be sufficient to ensure farms continue to operate in the 
country (IG2). As reported by one investor, profitable operators should not be deterred by the 
eventual introduction of tax as the tax holiday is extended for firms which made losses in the 
firms two years of operation; “The only reason you should worry not to pay tax is if you are not 
making money so if you are making loss you can get an extension” (IG9). The tax holiday is 
effectively an exemption from tax on profits for the first five profit making years, used by the 
government as a mechanism to support firms new to the industry and manufacture 
embeddedness amongst them. 
Other parts of the institutional environment have also hampered the continued growth of the 
industry. The inexperience of the industry within the DBoE has acted as a constraint on the 
operation of existing firms within the industry, with the conditions imposed by the bank aimed at 
preventing firms abusing the favourable terms offered to the industry acting as a barrier to the 
profitability of firms. To ensure the prompt remittance of revenues firms are given 30 days to 
return the sales revenues to their Ethiopian bank accounts after which time they may transfer 
90% of the money abroad. If they fail to do this they do not receive an export permit for the 
following month. This allows very little scope for late payment or other delays such as public 
holidays and has in some cases resulted in the delayed export of shipments, which means, as a 
perishable good, that the sales price can be affected and on some occasions the shipment has 
been lost (IG6). From a government perspective however, without such tight controls on 
repatriation of foreign currency the primary objective of the promotion of the industry in 
addressing the foreign currency deficit will not be satisfied. One auction respondent reported that 
they cancelled a planned development of the auction system which would have allowed people to 
view the prices being achieved at auction via webcam. It was feared that the Ethiopian 
government would have used the webcam to determine the prices their growers were obtaining 
and then demanded that this amount was remitted to the country, ignoring the costs which were 
to be deducted because of a lack of understanding of the industry (IG2). This would have been the 
latest in a number of attempts made by the government to maximise their foreign currency 
earnings which have resulted in bureaucratic and obstructive practices for growers. Whilst the 
search continues for a better, more efficient system, with EHDA study visits having taken place in 
Israel and Colombia, the current system results in a far higher level of foreign currency remittance 
than when the system was based on trust alone. A respondent from the EHDA reported that the 
industry was “a mess, a serious mess” when the association began operations and they are still in 
the process of improving (IG4). The most recent incarnation of the system to ensure maximum 
repatriation of revenues involves higher levels of communication between the Customs Agency, 
which issues the export permits, and the National Bank, which monitors the revenues received. A 
permit will be issued for a certain number of stems per month, which given the average/minimum 
revenue per stem expected for the variety being exported, allows the National Bank to know how 
much should be remitted. Previously, this figure was absolute, regardless of whether a firm failed 
to export its entire quota of permitted stems. The system does, however, remain primitive in 
terms of international floriculture as it is based on a number of approximations which are applied 
rigidly and it can prove arduous for growers even if they are fully compliant with regulations (IG6, 
IG4). This fact is conceded by a respondent from the EHDA: 
...currently we prefer to establish a flower price, a minimum flower price and be it for 
direct or auction market, to use that as a blanket of flower price system for 
everything because we don’t have a proper system today...The most problem is 
people know the weakness of our system...we feel that we are not earning the hard 
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currency earnings that we should from the sector because of the weakness of the 
controlling system (IG4). 
This is a clear case of where the information asymmetries between established floricultural 
actors, particularly producers that have been operating in export floriculture for many years, and 
institutional and commercial actors new to the industry, have led to differences in the ability to 
capture value (Shin et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, no matter how efficient the system, many respondents believe there are ‘rogues in 
any industry’ and as such there will always be a degree of leakage (IG12). Many growers in the 
industry admitted, confidentially, that they do not even report one third of the true sales value of 
their flowers, while it is commonly accepted within the industry that “Everybody cheats, 
everybody!”, with repatriation evasion techniques including the virtual sale and resale of flowers 
to fictional offshore companies (IG14). Indeed Ethiopian flower farm owners believe that the only 
solution to this problem is Ethiopianisation, as “most Ethiopians don’t keep money outside” 
(IG14). 
As identified earlier, the price achieved for flowers is largely influenced by the variety and in order 
to keep pace with changing trends, access to genetic material is vital in order to achieve the 
highest price. Numerous supermarket respondents reported altering their range on a daily basis in 
response to trends and growers must be as flexible as possible within the context of a long-term 
contract in order to ensure success (IG5). Dearden et al. (2002) identified access to planting 
material as a significant problem in the early stages of the industry but, since this time, access has 
improved and one breeder now produces varieties for licensing within the country while seven 
others licence foreign varieties for production within the country.  
During primary research it initially appeared that this issue may still present a significant barrier to 
the growth of the industry with several breeders boycotting the Hortiflora 2009. However, it later 
became apparent that this was a temporary problem and the profit motive of breeders means 
that, whatever the conditions, breeders will be willing to provide their varieties at a price. The 
breeders node of the GPN exhibits high levels of territorial and network embeddedness. While 
royalties for plants appear high, as documented in the following section, the development costs 
for new varieties are also high and the royalties from successful varieties pays for the many 
failures that were created in the development process. Capital costs are high and the relative 
factor endowments of the countries in which the breeding node is territorially embedded and the 
developing countries in which flowers are now primarily produced, means that the locations of 
these nodes is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Even in Colombia, which has been 
producing flowers for export for over four decades, breeding is still not conducted in any 
significant way. 
Further issues which can affect price, as identified by Dearden et al. (ibid.), are logistical and 
infrastructural constraints. Poor roads in rural areas and poor telecommunications were 
increasing the time from farm to market and increasing transaction costs for growers. This has 
been tackled by the government with a huge road building programme which has seen the roads 
between major cities and particularly roads around the capital improved significantly. Despite an 
overburdened and bureaucratic mobile network and slow internet connections this is one area 
where the government seem unlikely to bow to investor and international pressure over 
privatisation (IG4). However, during the last year significant improvements have been made and 
options are now available to business users to give them sufficient internet speeds: 
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...we have the telecommunications. Maybe it is not as efficient as we may expect but 
compared to what we had, the growth rate. 3/4 years ago maybe we had 20/30,000 
mobile, now there are over 300,000 maybe coming to a million ah? We cannot claim 
that we are masters but we have people who can be (IG9). 
In recent months bankruptcy has befallen a number of farms in the industry and was a threat to 
many more. Of the six farms to have gone out of business, two were Dutch-owned, three were 
Israeli-owned and one was American-owned. The central question is, then, when the market 
takes a significant downturn, what do companies lose by declaring themselves bankrupt? What 
would normally be the principal asset of an agricultural firm - land - was leased to investors at a 
rate which would have at best only paid the interest of a mortgage and so no effective equity has 
been lost. No collateral is required for the loan from the DBoE and only their 30% capital 
investment has been eroded. When this is considered alongside the evidence of fraud through 
over-invoicing discussed above, the financial risk to foreign investors could be minimal. Finance 
received from the DBoE has most likely been spent on saleable assets such as greenhouses and 
irrigation equipment which may have been completed before bankruptcy was declared. 
Personally, the individuals may have been drawing a wage from the business with no income tax 
and could have repatriated any profit made, tax-free. Whilst it may be difficult to suggest that 
anyone would want to spend three years of their life and invest 30% of the capital in a farm, only 
to extract short-term benefits, it can be seen from the above example that the risk undertaken by 
foreign investors is potentially very low and certain government policies lead to low levels of 
embeddedness amongst foreign entrants to the market. In this case it can be seen that Ethiopian 
investors, who may be experiencing similar circumstances to these foreign growers given the 
state of the market, have higher levels of both territorial and network embeddedness and so, in 
times when the market is depressed, are more likely to remain in the industry. It may not be 
through inferior farm management or inferior quality produce that these foreign growers have 
gone bankrupt but rather, a lower level of embeddedness and hence commitment to the industry 
and the country. This extract from an interview with one farm manager illustrates this point: 
Not many flower farms are going bankrupt, if they are it is for their own reason, 
maybe mismanagement or maybe they are criminal! Most will make it with this 
climate and the labour costs and the land costs unless something unexpected 
happens. In [X Flower Farm] in the last 5 years they have made nearly $4m profit, not 
in the books but in the real one (IG11). 
7.2.3 Costs Analysis 
The preceding sections contribute to an overall impression of the costs and benefits for producers 
operating in the Ethiopian flower industry. What follows is an approximation of the total costs 
involved in producing flowers in Ethiopia based on data from a large number of sources including 
a range of farm managers/owners and horticulture/management consultants. As outlined in 
research to this point, financial data is heavily guarded within the Ethiopian flower industry and, 
as such, the data has been approximated from that which could be obtained. One interview 
respondent who had previously conducted research on the industry stated that: 
[I]t was very difficult to get anything beyond the sort of basic stuff such as number of 
plants or the size but as soon as you get to more detailed figures you won’t get them 
from the producers. So that was very difficult (IG1). 
There are several start-up costs, mitigated by government and donor incentives to the industry, 
which must be factored into the overall cost calculation of a farm. The plants - for roses as the 
primary export from the Ethiopian floriculture industry - require renewal approximately every 
seven years which is also the average depreciation period for the greenhouses required to grow 
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the plants. These costs are, then, nominally divided equally over the seven-year period in an 
attempt to calculate an average annual cost. 
Annual Costs/Ha/Year Euros Percentage 
Royalties 93750 23.0 
Propagators 43750 10.7 
Fertilisers 12000 2.9 
Air Transportation 110000 27.0 
Ground Transportation in Ethiopia 1700 0.4 
Ground Transportation in Netherlands/Marketing 66000 16.2 
Packaging 12000 2.9 
Auction Charges 29000 7.1 
Greenhouse inc. packing area, office space and irrigation equip. 21429 5.3 
Unskilled Labour 6570 1.6 
Supervisors/Management/Agronomists 2400 0.6 
Consultants 9372 2.3 
Association Fees 100 0.0 
Total Costs 408071 100 
Table 7.1: Costs Analysis; Sources: Interviews (IG3; IG6; IG9; IG12; IG13) 
Table 7.1 displays an approximation of the costs involved in establishing and exporting from one 
hectare of flowers for one year, weighted in favour of roses exported to the flower auctions in the 
Netherlands to reflect the primary revenue streams of the industry. Figures are based on growers 
achieving an average production of 17-19 stems/plant/year. Based on these projections a grower 
would need to achieve a price of €0.18/stem at auction in order to break even. This is around the 
average price that has been achieved by Ethiopian growers at the auction although there are large 
seasonal and varietal variations. Highland ‘Tee-hybrid’ roses from the Holeta growing cluster, 
which are longer stemmed and larger headed, are slow growing but can fetch up to four or five 
times the price at auction of the ‘Sweetheart’ roses grown in Ziway. These highland roses are 
exported in lower volume and so incur lower annual transport costs and have higher profit 
margins but conversely have lower turnover and are more susceptible to disease due to higher 
rainfall. As such fewer labourers-per-hectare are required in highland areas as flowers are 
harvested less frequently. In Ziway 26-28 workers-per-hectare are required compared with 
approximately 17 workers in the intermediate altitude region of Debre Zeit. Growers that are part 
of large multinational firms whose operations encompass breeding operations are able to 
significantly reduce the considerable expenditure component of royalties, and may also draw on 
expertise from the company’s other operations to reduce the need for consultants. Larger 
growers are also able to decrease costs by conducting their own propagation, while auction 
charges decrease proportionally with increased sales. In fact, many of the functions identified 
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here as part of the cost structure of flower firms can be decreased through economies of scale, 
vertical integration of functions or efficiency savings. Good growers should be able to achieve 20 
or more stems/plant/year and proper management may decrease the rate of depreciation of 
greenhouses to extend their life beyond the 7 years factored into this equation, both of which will 
lower the price required to break even. Vertical integration, in some cases, but also the 
development of alternative methods of organisation within firms including the outsourcing of 
certain functions where appropriate, such as that of importing agents, have led to the creation of 
organisational rents and thus has enhanced value within the GPN (Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et 
al., 2002; Franz and Hassler). 
This cost analysis makes it clear that floriculture in Ethiopia is far from a cash cow for new 
investors. However, if investors are able to optimise their business so that all of these elements of 
costs are minimised while sales revenues are maximised, then substantial profits are available for 
investors, having borne comparatively little risk in the pursuit of this goal. Whilst this might 
appear to be an obvious statement, in many commodities exported from developing countries, 
even the most efficient producers stand to make only modest profits. One successful company 
reported, in confidence, to having made ‘off-the-books’ profits of $4m US in 5 years from only 10 
hectares of land. For companies such as Sher, with significant production areas, long-term direct 
supply agreements, broad product ranges, vertically integrated functions, preferential trade 
terms, and annual turnover (even before false reporting of remittances is accounted for) 
exceeding $30m US, profits available from Ethiopian floriculture are significantly larger. 
This chapter has documented and analysed the reasons for rapid growth in the Ethiopian 
floriculture industry and how the relationships between the firms, institutions and the natural and 
social characteristics of Ethiopia itself have combined to create value. It has also displayed how 
personal relationships between certain actors and nodes of the industry serve to limit value 
creation and capture. The chapter has highlighted issues of power relations between institutional 
and firm-level actors and how they influence value dynamics. The following chapter documents 
one of the few ways in which value can be enhanced and how value might be captured by 
different actors together with how these value dynamics are influenced by network 
embeddedness over time. 
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8. Value Enhancement and Capture through Marketing 
The ability of a firm to capture and enhance value within a GPN is one most influential factors in 
the profitability of firms operating in Ethiopian floriculture. Key to ensuring both of these goals 
are achieved is the mixture of marketing channels pursued by the firm which affects and is 
affected by the entire business strategy of the firm from the production location through to the 
product range. As described throughout the previous chapter, there are many important 
decisions to be made for a new firm entering floriculture. In the initial stages of establishing a 
firm, an investor must concurrently identify: where they see potential in the market; the expertise 
available to enable them to fill this gap; the resources available to them in terms of land, labour, 
and capital to fill the gap; and the barriers that might prevent the firm entering this market 
segment. Invariably, firms are not able to achieve their optimum outcomes in all of these areas 
from the time they enter the industry and so are constantly required to re-evaluate their 
objectives. This chapter outlines the different marketing channels available to flower producers in 
Ethiopia and different barriers that exist in following either strategy, each resulting in the capture 
and enhancement of value to varying degrees. Woven throughout the decisions on marketing 
streams, the influence of power in relation to the ability of each node to dictate the terms of 
trade and also embeddedness can be seen to influence the ability of particular producers or 
groups of producers to pursue their desired marketing strategy. 
8.1 Marketing Channels 
In the modern market, there are two distinct ways flower producers can take their produce to 
market: the auction system and through direct sales. The auction system is described first as this 
is the traditional method of selling flowers and has been the primary marketing channel for more 
than 100 years. Historically, retail was conducted through a large number of small, specialist 
florists, some of which were part of multiple-outlet chains, but with the vast majority of these 
chains having 10 outlets or fewer. All of these florists purchased their flowers from regional 
wholesalers which meant that no single retailer or wholesaler was large enough to influence the 
production varieties or volumes, and growers attempted to satisfy broader trends in the market 
as a whole. Wholesalers and some of the larger florist chains would travel to auction sites in the 
Netherlands and Germany, view the flowers paraded in front of them at the auction house, and 
then buy the quantity they desired at the price they were willing to pay using the auction clock.  
The clock is central to the auction system. It gives information on quality, which can be visually 
verified by the buyer at the auction; minimum purchase volume; name and country of origin of 
the growers; and measurements. A dial then counts down in Euro cents from an amount 
designated by the auctioneer as above the maximum price anyone would pay per stem and the 
first buyer to stop the clock pays that price per stem and buys that consignment. The 
consignments for each variety from each grower begin with a large minimum number of boxes so 
that larger buyers get a chance to buy at a bulk discount (as smaller buyers do not want large 
consignments even if the price per stem is lower). The nature of auction sales changed slightly 
with the advent of electronic auctions as documented in section 5.2. Further changes are planned 
within the auction system including simplifying logistics so that flowers are no longer paraded 
and, eventually, are sold whilst still on the farm with a view to reducing the costs to growers. 
However, the major change in the retail of flowers that has occurred in the last 20 years has been 
the shift towards direct sales. 
As part of a wider trend in retail, particularly in the UK and Germany but also across the rest of 
Europe and the USA to varying degrees, during the 1990s there was a significant centralisation of 
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sales, with the market share of specialist retailers including greengrocers, butchers, bakers, and 
florists falling as a proportion of total sales, as supermarkets grew in both turnover and product 
range (Kacker, 1993). This switch combined with the aggregate growth of the floriculture market 
identified above so that a small number of buyers became large enough to enter partnerships 
with growers who would grow exclusively for that buyer, with the buyer dictating the volume and 
nature of production. The UK’s floriculture market is the largest in Europe and was worth €2.61Bn 
in 2009, 81% of which is cut flowers (IG25). The market continues to grow and UK industry 
respondents envisage a bright future for the sector as it is “still, relatively, a small number of 
shoppers who buy [flowers] regularly so, huge opportunities” (IG5). Supermarket sales now 
account for 40% of overall floriculture sales in the UK, with 30% through florists, 4% through 
internet sales and the remainder through a mixture of DIY stores, garden centres and garages. The 
proportion of total sales attributable to supermarkets has been increasing every year since the 
mid-1990s. The majority of sales not conducted through supermarkets, florists or online are not 
flowers but sales of plants and sundries in which Ethiopia is not a major supplier (IG25). Statistics 
such as these lead some in the industry to believe that “the auction system is outdated” while 
others see the slowing in the growth rate of direct sales in recent years as indicative of a more 
mixed future for marketing channels in the industry (IG7, IG9, IG25).  
The growth of the direct sales marketing channel led to the creation of a new node within the 
global floriculture GPN: that of importing agents identified in section 6.4.3. This new node acted 
as a facilitator, linking customers (i.e. supermarkets and wholesalers) with producers via an arm’s 
length agreement whereby they would manage the growers, handling agents, transport actors 
and other actors at the site of production, shifting a large portion of the risk from the buyer. If a 
grower cannot supply a variety then the importing agent will suffer as they are under obligation 
to source the variety from somewhere to supply to the buyer and so may pay more for the variety 
at auction or from another grower. Ultimately the grower will suffer from a loss of reputation or a 
lack of repeat custom but the importing agent too will suffer the immediate financial loss incurred 
if they source the flowers from elsewhere or the longer term loss if they fail to fulfil their 
obligation to the buyer. 
In this marketing channel, margins for all actors are smaller than in the auction marketing stream. 
In both marketing streams, however, profit is skewed towards the retail sector. Roses sold at 
auction for €0.50 can sell for up to ten times that in a florist, with only importers and wholesalers 
as profit-taking actors in the intervening stages. A supermarket that pays an importing agent 
€0.25-35/stem for roses, which are bought from a grower at €0.15-20/stem, will retail them at a 
mark-up of around 50%. The key difference in these relationships is the burden of risk, which in 
the short-term is borne by the importing agent where they are involved in the buying agreement 
but, in the longer term, is always externalised to the grower as it is they that plant the varieties 
and have to sell them where contracts for guaranteed purchase are unenforceable (IG2, IG13, 
IG16).  
Despite the growth of direct sales, both auction and direct marketing streams retain unique 
characteristics, giving them a niche within the overall market which maintains the profitability of 
each stream. The two primary auction companies, one based in the Netherlands and the other in 
Germany, continue to see growth with turnover of over €4bn and €1bn respectively. The different 
characteristics of the marketing streams and the challenges that face Ethiopian growers in their 
integration into each are now discussed. 
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8.2 Integration to Marketing Streams 
The challenges facing Ethiopian growers in their integration into international floriculture markets 
differ according to the degree to which they wish to pursue direct or auction marketing streams. 
This is a decision which has to be made very early in the process of setting up a farm as the 
location of the farm has a significant impact on what is both possible and profitable to grow and 
thus the degree to which each marketing stream is plausible. 
[F]rom East Africa it’s interesting or tempting for growers to go into summer flowers 
because you do not need to have a large input...It’s easy to start but then you are 
also very dependent on weather circumstances and market prices because they 
fluctuate so much more. I’ve had several clients who have moved into summer 
flowers and then moved out of it a year later...being drained basically...Rose takes a 
lot of investment but it’s a relatively stable market you could say (IG2). 
As a result of this instability, the vast majority of flowers grown in Ethiopia are roses and within 
the market for roses there are key pre-production decisions on location and varietal choice which 
can influence decisions on marketing streams. Ideally, these decisions are made as part of the 
business plan before a firm begins operations, as the market opportunities vary according to the 
type of flowers produced, which, in turn, depend on the location of the farm and so firms should 
consider all of these factors in their initial business plan. The warmer, lower altitudes in Ethiopia 
(approx. 1600m), in the area of Ziway, are well suited to sweetheart and intermediate roses which 
compose the majority of the range available in major supermarkets. This is the largest growing 
area in Ethiopia and has taken the vast majority of its market share from other East African rose-
growing countries.  
[I]f you are in a lower segment [in terms of price per stem], higher production, 
smaller head size, you know, a more supermarket orientated product, you should 
consider also direct sales...the clock system itself is a relatively expensive method of 
selling your flowers (IG2). 
The cooler, medium altitudes (approx. 1900m), in areas such as Debre Zeit have a climate which 
lends itself to larger, intermediate roses and some Tee-hybrid roses. These roses can fetch a 
higher price at auction but are lower yielding and the higher incidence of rain associated with the 
high altitude is likely to impact negatively on consistency and disease prevalence, making roses 
from this altitude less suitable for supermarket buyers. Competition in this sector comes, in part, 
from both East Africa and South America and the roses grown in this medium altitude area are 
equatable with the largest roses grown in Kenya.  
Finally, the highest, coolest altitudes (2300m and above), in areas such as Holeta are capable of 
producing some of the largest-budded, longest-stemmed roses available anywhere in the world. 
These roses are best suited to specialist retailers and achieve a high price at auction, where the 
majority are sold. Growers who chose to enter this sector face competition from the established 
industries in Ecuador and Colombia over which they have cost advantages in labour and freight 
but experience higher rainfall and therefore higher disease prevalence, as documented below. 
Again however, with the change in climate, production is reduced by both longer flush times and 
loss rates.  As documented in Chapters 5-7, the path to market for developing country growers 
has been eased considerably in recent years which has, in part, facilitated the growth of the 
industry, and the considerations involved in the integration to each marketing stream are now 
considered. 
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8.2.1 Integration to the Direct Market 
For the direct market, integration for new developing country growers can be difficult, although 
the rewards are potentially greater than the auction stream. The prevailing system of governance 
within floriculture is undoubtedly trust. Written contracts are very rare in any node of the 
industry, but verbal agreements exist in direct sales, either between the grower and a buyer or a 
supermarket and an importing agent, to supply a given quantity of flowers at a given price for a 
period of up to two years, regardless of price fluctuations in the auction system: 
...we’re-very-loyal-to-people-that-we-buy...we-tend-to-have-agreements-and-then,-
assuming-everything-goes-fine,-then-we-review-again-for-the-following-year...once-we-say-
we’re-going-to-do-that,-we-do-that...we-need-loads-of-flowers-and-we-need-them-at-
consistent-quality-and-consistent-availability.-And-we-need-to-know-what-we’re-going-to-be-
paying-for-them-so-we-need-to-fix-prices-over-a-longer-term...So-the-idea-of-a-sort-of-free-
market-which-is-what-the-auction-is-doesn’t-really-lend-itself-to-what-we-need.-If-I-ask-one-
of-our-suppliers-to-go-and-buy-all-of-our-roses-from-the-auction-next-week-because-of-how-
big-we-are-the-auction-prices-would-go-through...sky-high-so-we-don’t-buy-very-much-that-
way-at-all (IG5). 
Another supermarket respondent reported how the relationship between growers and 
supermarkets, via importing agents as the intermediaries, operates largely outside of the market: 
...we all have to guess a bit what’s going to happen in the market place but so long as 
we can offer our customers the right value and we got it at a price we’re happy with, 
and the grower’s happy with the price he’s getting, then the market is completely 
irrelevant (IG5). 
This is a successful strategy for supermarkets as consumers do not have perfect information. The 
convenience offered by supermarkets through the centralisation of consumption means that 
consumers who buy flowers from a supermarket, usually as part of a multi-purpose shopping trip, 
are unlikely to be aware of the prices of flowers in florists and their fluctuations, nor is it certain 
that a low auction price will be passed on to consumers in the form of a low retail price. 
Consumers are far more likely to be aware of fluctuations in prices or in quality in the same 
product at the same outlet over time. Therefore, from a supermarket perspective, if a grower can 
supply a consistent quality of product which sells at both the volume and price which allows the 
supermarket to make their desired margin, there is no need to alter the buying agreement with 
the grower (IG5). 
Evidently, if the market price falls significantly below the agreed price it is possible for the buyer 
to cancel the arrangement and buy on the open market or renegotiate the ‘contract’. However, if 
the market price rises significantly above the agreed price, growers can withhold the flowers until 
they receive a price more reflective of the market price. Both growers and buyers understand that 
either of these situations can occur, and the trust built up over time between suppliers and 
buyers means that agreements are, in general, upheld and growers work together with buyers 
and importing agents (IG2, IG5, IG9, IG11, IG13, IG16).  
The direct market can be difficult for new growers to enter due to their focus on optimising 
production. Direct sales requires the establishment of a sales office, which “if you want to do it 
properly it’s a very expensive venture”, and so, for this and a number of other reasons 
documented here, the majority of new entrants to the market focus on auction sales until the 
farm is established (IG2): 
  124 
 
...when you sell direct you have to be performing at all times otherwise you lose 
customers...so at the auction it’s still relatively easy even when you fluctuate in 
production because you do, especially for your first year for sure...and quality as well. 
Yeah the auction is of course an easy market to supply (IG2). 
Direct buyers understand that the security provided by the long-term agreements they offer is a 
highly desirable commodity for growers. As such they are able to demand high standards in 
quality, consistency, and social and environmental responsibility, as described by this respondent 
from a major UK retailer:  
...our-biggest-supplier-[importing-agent]-is-a-Dutch-company...they-understand-what-we-
want-and-they-might-develop-the-bouquet-the-design-and-so-on-and-then-help-a-grower-
get-to-the-quality-levels-and-the-social-and-ethical-and-environmental-levels-that-we-want 
(IG5). 
To emphasise the importance of regular, predictable quality for large direct buyers, one such 
buyer that has, as yet, chosen not to source flowers from Ethiopia despite numerous study visits 
explains why: 
...there’s a good product being grown [in Ethiopia] in terms of roses and so on and 
it’s another possible opportunity in the longer term but I know there are issues about 
quality being consistent and logistics and so on (IG5). 
Despite the five years of continued growth and improvement leading to Ethiopia emerging as the 
fourth largest exporter of flowers globally, described in Chapter 6, large supermarket buyers 
require further evidence of consistency and quality, displaying how high requirements are. These 
are all difficult attributes to manufacture in the early stages of an industry. As described in section 
7.2.1, it can take two years of production before a crop achieves optimal stability and yield. Rose 
plants will begin to lose productivity and should be replaced between five and seven years after 
planting. In selecting a new variety from one of their established growers, a direct buyer will begin 
by testing the robustness during transit, senescence and post-harvest opening of the flower 
before beginning consumer-focused trials to test for popularity (IG5). Achieving the quality and 
consistency standards demanded by direct buyers under these conditions can be very difficult for 
new firms. One respondent integrally involved in the marketing strategies of the industry believes 
that this problem is the major reason behind the failure of Ethiopian growers to enter the direct 
market, as yet, in any significant way: 
...because Ethiopia has no constant quality you cannot buy from Ethiopia yet...[direct 
buyers] are not interested in that because they are interested in bulk. At the top end 
you have to, everybody brings the top end to the auction because the auction has the 
best prices (IG7). 
Internationally recognised standards of worker welfare and environmental care such as MPS SQ 
or GLOBALGAP (discussed in detail in Chapter 9) are, in the majority of cases, minimum 
requirements for direct buyers. Although their exact criteria vary, all of these international 
standards require time and investment to achieve. Furthermore, many direct sales agreements 
require flowers to be delivered in ‘ready-for-sale’ condition, including final sales packaging and 
labelling, for which many of the inputs are not yet available to the required standard in Ethiopia. 
The majority of direct sale agreements are negotiated through intermediaries, referred to here as 
importing agents, but are referred to elsewhere variously as packers, agents and importing 
wholesalers (some of these terms may also refer to other nodes of the network). Large buyers, 
including supermarkets, will approach importing agents with their list of finished product 
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requirements including single varieties and bouquets in final sales packaging. Some may even 
employ the services of the importing agent in the design of the bouquets. Importing agents 
source the flowers from many different farms which, in some cases, they own. These companies 
have seen the cost savings and produce quality available from Ethiopia and, in order to achieve 
the consistency and standards desired by buyers, have begun working with some growers that 
they feel have the right product mix and farm management to allow them to contribute to their 
buyer’s needs and so are assisting these growers in achieving the required standards (IG3, IG6, 
IG9, IG11, IG13, IG16).  Importing agents can also act as a consolidator so that inputs can be 
sourced from a number of farms that are, individually, unable to fill diversity or packaging 
requirements and then assemble the bouquets and bunches required for sale. Indeed many 
importing agents will import flowers to the UK for assembly and distribution, despite the huge 
increase in labour costs incurred as a result, because all of the necessary inputs cannot be sourced 
in any one production location. In order to minimise costs through economies of scale, the 
majority of large direct buyers seek to deal with only a small number of importing agents. Indeed 
UK supermarkets source an average of 70% of their produce from just two importing agents (from 
a total of five major suppliers to UK supermarkets), obtaining the remainder of their produce from 
an average of three other smaller importing agents. Supermarkets are, however, unlikely to let 
the share of any of these importing agents grow further in order to maintain internal competition. 
As such, importing agents themselves are able to exercise immense buying power over growers 
because of the stability and volume of custom they offer (IG5). 
The requirements for producers involved in direct purchasing agreements, such as those 
documented above, have become more stringent as supermarkets have increased their market 
share within the industry and competition amongst producers has increased: 
Previously [the supermarkets] didn’t know anything about flowers, they just did it. 
Now they understand, they get some information, they start asking. They guarantee 
one week, they ask this, they ask that, they ask that [upwards motion]. They want to 
increase the amount [they are asking of growers] and not their price (IG7). 
Furthermore, as this extract from an interview with a major direct buyer shows, the atmosphere 
of competitive cooperation and conviviality is expected not just between buyers and importing 
agents but between competing growers in order to facilitate knowledge sharing. This was 
identified as an issue in Ethiopia in Chapter 7 by auction and industrial actors regarding the 
reluctance of Ethiopian growers to share information with their competitors due to the different 
business cultures of the entrepreneurs: 
[W]e like to build up a relationship not only with the [importing agents] that we use 
which we’ve used for many years but also with the growers that we use so we have 
grower group meetings every six months where we talk about what’s happening in 
[this supermarket], look at what their issues are and they learn best practice from 
each other and they talk about technology, we have different technology people in 
and so it’s really working together to help them do a good job but also to give us a 
better product (IG5).   
While supermarkets’ buying agreements with growers operate through third party importing 
agents, in order to ensure the standards of CSR they demand are being met, as documented in 
Chapter 9, they conduct regular farm visits and organise meetings with growers to ensure 
maximum transparency. 
Many in the industry believe the involvement of direct buyers in the Ethiopian floriculture 
industry has been limited by the dominance of Kenya in this sector. The reasons for this 
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dominance are more complex than might first appear. In the mid-1990s when international 
growers were effectively excluded from the Dutch flower auctions as documented in Chapter 10, 
exporters from Kenya, whose industry had already reached critical mass, were forced to find 
alternative routes to market. One such route was through the establishment of the Tele-Flower 
Auction (TFA), a competing electronically-based auction system, but the other was through direct 
buyer relationships. The foundation of direct buying arrangements was facilitated by the historical 
involvement of the UK in Kenyan agriculture. The UK is the primary direct buyer from Kenya due 
to the power and size of its supermarkets and while there are indications that the share of 
supermarkets in the European floriculture market is set to grow, the fact that Kenya has already 
established networks of direct supply with major supermarket chains gives them a competitive 
advantage over countries new to the industry (IG4, IG5): 
...that’s also historical part uh? Because one time Holland is a cooperative, at one 
stage in the development Holland stopped buying flowers from abroad, which has 
changed the path of Kenya dramatically and they were forced to find alternative 
markets. So that is a historical thing...if that would not happen, it would have been 
different maybe today. Other thing is that there are much more English connected 
people in the Kenyan market and in England the main market generally is 
supermarkets. These things together could also partly give an explanation for why 
Kenya is like that...It is not purely the economics of the market, it is also what they 
call in Holland padafhankelijkheid, historical paths (IG7). 
In fact, one of the largest importing agents in world floriculture responsible for a significant 
proportion of flowers bought by UK supermarkets is owned by one of the largest Kenyan rose 
farms. The firm began as a flower farm and gradually expanded to form a subsidiary concentrating 
on marketing flowers in the Netherlands and the UK. The subsidiary status allows the company to 
use a separate brand from the flower farm and buy flowers from a total of 50 other farms in order 
to serve their customer’s needs (IG16). The parent company also has a joint venture in 
propagation which allows total vertical integration from planting material until sale into retail 
outlets, leading to the creation of significant organisational rents. This integrated model is unique 
to the Kenyan industry within floriculture and has arisen as a result of the historical ties discussed 
above in combination with the coincidence of the development of the Kenyan industry with an 
increase in the market share of supermarkets. However, a number of companies operating in 
other countries, including Sher in Ethiopia, continue to vertically integrate functions and their 
embeddedness within the industry has recently resulted in them overcoming this path-
dependency to operate similar models in parts of their business. Indeed Sher now produce single 
variety bunches at their farm in Ziway, labelled in final sales packaging complete with flower food 
packets for delivery to direct buyers in Europe (IG17). This integrated model does, however, 
restrict the flexibility of importing agents in responding to market demands, necessitating a ‘push 
strategy’ whereby they have to sell their own products and allow competitors using a more 
flexible sourcing strategy to find their niche (IG16). 
Despite the disadvantages resulting from path dependencies of Kenyan producers, new direct 
markets are being explored by Ethiopian exporters which have the potential to be highly 
profitable. Some growers have seen great success in exporting directly to Japan where, despite 
the extra distance, freight costs are just 10-15% higher and the prices flowers command can be up 
to 50% higher. However, knowledge of the local market is less common within the Ethiopian 
industry and it can be vital to attaining these higher revenues. Local production is available during 
Japanese summer and, during this time, prices for the majority of varieties fall below cost price 
for African exporters. In addition to the timing of targeting export markets, varietal selection can 
be crucial in profit maximisation; “it’s only the experts who find out what to grow in each place” 
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(IG9). In contrast to the European market, in Japan bi-colour roses attract very low prices with the 
premium varieties being high quality, soft pink varieties (IG2). The auction marketing channel 
allows flexibility in this regard not afforded to producers with long-term direct supply contracts. 
For example, in the summer of 2009 a typhoon in Japan’s flower growing regions destroyed the 
crop of gypsophelia and so prices for imports at the auction increased rapidly. Growers were then 
able to divert some of their crop destined for the Dutch auctions to the Japanese market to take 
advantage of these higher prices, provided they maintained a presence at the Dutch auction and 
could obtain the necessary freight capacity. 
This is one example of the important role played by network embeddedness in the success of 
flower farms. As discussed elsewhere in the present research, information sharing amongst 
established actors in the industry is far more common than amongst those new to it. Information 
about the higher potential profits available on the Japanese auction came from a range of 
sources. Transnational corporations with producers in South America that more regularly sell into 
the Japanese market were able to relay the information to these other satellite companies in 
order to maximise the profits of the group. Other actors with high levels of network 
embeddedness were able to rely on global contacts to keep them abreast of potentially profitable 
developments in overseas markets. On this occasion, the auction too acted as a facilitator as the 
fees that they would receive for growers using their payment system at these inflated prices 
meant it was profitable for them for good growers to divert their produce away from the auction 
itself. Ethiopian producers, and particularly new entrants, experience a significant barrier to 
growth in situations such as this and institutional actors have recognised the need to manufacture 
network embeddedness amongst them. The study visits discussed below conducted by the EHPEA 
and the activities of other interested parties such as the Royal Netherlands Embassy, together 
with the employment of actors who are themselves embedded within the network, have 
contributed to the bridging of the knowledge asymmetry that the differing levels of network 
embeddedness amongst producers creates. 
The EHPEA, donor agencies and the EHDA have recognised the possible benefits of diversifying 
the customer base of the industry and have funded study visits to, and negotiated trade terms in, 
new potential markets including Hong Kong, Japan, Australia and the vast potential market of 
Russia, to where one grower has subsequently established a direct supply. By targeting new or 
growing markets Ethiopian growers can both negate the advantages of historical connections that 
other African growers have in direct supply to the European market and also play a role in 
expanding the industry, establishing Ethiopian growers as the dominant supplier and 
manufacturing a reputation before their competitors do (IG7). This of one of the key ways in 
which brand rents might be created by firms in Ethiopian floriculture which can lead to the 
enhancement of value. 
Figure 8.1 displays the countries to which Ethiopia has exported more than $100,000 US in any 
individual year in the period 2005-2010. 
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Destination Exports (thousand $US) 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Netherlands 16,529 56,853 92,372 118,238 143,328 
Germany 3,324 4,066 3,946 5,598 4,233 
Saudi Arabia 623 591 827 1,328 2,319 
Norway 266 223 412 430 2,096 
UAE 988 816 1,283 1,224 1,742 
Japan 154 865 1,317 1,598 1,720 
USA 1,285 2,766 3,423 2,197 1,398 
UK 1,264 2,637 1,537 815 960 
France 34 63 161 655 802 
South Africa 20 11 268 81 342 
Israel 753 1,309 609 306 248 
Italy 378 65 176 248 245 
Russia 35 223 676 443 213 
Oman 0 13 89 157 129 
Yemen 37 5 16 51 104 
Belgium 281 159 6 36 83 
Australia 0 16 107 20 30 
Sweden 122 58 70 31 24 
Cyprus 16 95 122 57 3 
Hungary 35 100 49 1 0 
Ireland 0 229 455 0 0 
Figure 8.1 Ethiopian Floriculture Export Destinations; Source (International Trade Centre, 2011) 
In total Ethiopia has exported $100,000 US or more of floricultural products to 21 countries in any 
one of the five years displayed. There are a large and increasing number of additional countries to 
which flowers are exported but which have not reached this level. The figures for the 
Netherlands, when assessed together with figures obtained from the Dutch auctions indicates 
that the proportion of the total Ethiopian exports to the Netherlands sold through auction 
decreased from 96% to 77% to 71% in the last three reported years. This is likely to be the highest 
proportion of any of the export destinations. Other interesting trends which can be seen in the 
data are the fall, or slowing in the growth, in revenues seen in 2008 caused by the Global Financial 
Crisis and also the possibility for sales to particular areas to fall as well as rise. Growers may 
decide, on the expiry of a supply agreement, that they can achieve better prices for their produce 
either at auction or in an alternative direct market. Buyers too may choose to source their 
produce through an alternative channel and so, as has been the case with the countries at the 
lower end of this table, direct supply can fluctuate significantly. 
8.2.2 Integration to the Auction Market 
The challenges involved with auction selling are very different from those faced in opting for the 
direct marketing channels. Direct buyers primarily buy sweetheart (short-stemmed) and 
intermediate (medium-stemmed) roses from developing countries. The highest quality 
intermediates and the vast majority of Tee-hybrid roses are still primarily sold at auction for 
resale at specialist florists and premium retailers. This retail pattern is due to a combination of the 
increased cost of producing these roses as a result of slower growth and greater loss rates and the 
higher demand for the product resulting in a final sales price which put the flowers beyond the 
product range of supermarkets:  
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Some of the very, very premium ones are probably more for florists than they would 
be for [supermarkets] because they would be very, very expensive. They can quite 
easily charge 50 quid for bouquets. It’s a bit more tricky for us. Twenty maybe (IG5). 
Sweetheart roses and intermediates are still sold in higher volume at auction than through direct 
sale (as in a number of countries the direct marketing stream has yet to develop) but quality, and 
therefore prices, are far more variable. For Ethiopian growers, access to auction markets is far 
easier than access to direct markets. Whilst quality and standards are presented to buyers at 
auction in the form of logos, visual display of flowers and gradings displayed on screen, poor 
quality, a lack of international standards such as MPS, or even the presence of disease within a 
farm doesn’t preclude entry to the market. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, growers can either choose to become members of the auction and 
qualify for discounted rates, or sell on an occasional basis through the auction and pay higher 
rates. One of the conditions of auction membership is that a grower sells 100% of their produce 
through the auction system. They are allowed to sell a small amount through other channels but 
must declare this as NAT and pay penalty rates on this revenue. Ethiopian growers and, more 
significantly, the auction houses themselves have encountered significant problems in this regard 
due to the poor statistical capacity/fraudulent bookkeeping of businesses in Ethiopia. The auction 
houses are unable to determine whether Ethiopian growers that are members of the auction are 
indeed selling all of their produce through the auction or are underreporting their NAT as 
indicated in this interview with an auction actor: 
Just through talking to other growers, and indeed some are more nice or more stupid 
to tell these things, and then you know. If you talk to them quite often then they 
cannot hide it. Or you are in their cold store and you all of a sudden see, ‘where are 
these going?’ Even I just got, even I just feel screwed as well because I just got a list 
of [the primary rival auction] and people were selling over there and there were not 
more growers but growers who did much more turnover than I expected. If they 
don’t announce it, and I know that some of them didn’t, then they are going to get a 
visit from me. And it won’t be nice (IG2). 
Like the direct route to market, auction sale has become increasingly governed by trust in 
buyer/grower relationships while the exchange relationship retains its fundamental market 
governance. Each consignment of flowers is marked with the logo of the grower on the auction 
clock. This enables the creation of brand loyalty and allows growers to build a reputation through 
the auction system: 
...it is important, of course, extremely important as a supplier when you supply the 
auction floors to realise it’s buyers there who will appreciate you depending on how 
you perform...If you if you are stable, if you are reliable, if you’re good quality, if 
you’re consistent, if you supply information, those are all extremely relevant issues 
to build up a proper reputation. If you don’t manage, you know, it will cost you your 
reputation and it’s easy to lose and it’s very hard to build (IG2). 
Historically, the auction would check every batch of flowers for quality and disease and grade 
them accordingly. As a cost-cutting measure and in order to reduce the huge logistical burden of 
the auction system, growers now grade their own roses although spot checks are still occasionally 
conducted. If a buyer finds flowers have been misgraded, that grower will attract a negative 
reputation and will be subject to more frequent spot checks. Alternatively, if a buyer receives a 
particularly good batch from a grower with a good vase life, they are likely to want to buy from 
that grower again. Buyers are also obliged to pay for the sale within two weeks of the auction. 
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This can be very helpful for new entrants to the market as cash flow can present a problem in the 
early stages of an industry. 
The most common disease afflicting roses, botrytis, is caused by moist conditions which are 
common in places where there is a significant difference between day and night time 
temperatures causing airborne moisture to condense on the plants and it can have a significant 
impact on the trust related governance of the industry. The highland areas where these 
conditions are common are the areas which grow the high-value long-stemmed roses which are 
primarily sold through the auction marketing stream. In the majority of cases a rose will not 
present symptoms of botrytis until long after it has been harvested and sold but the disease has a 
significant impact on senescence. Growers and buyers must trust that they are not intentionally 
selling affected products and can build a reputation by conducting regular stress testing and 
honesty in their relationships with their buyers (IG2): 
I really noticed that if a grower is taking an effort to give really good information to a 
buyer it will work for long term. It may well be that sometimes he will get worse 
prices because they say my product is not as good as usual, be careful the price will 
not be as good as usual but if he’s really consistent in that, the price will be up on a 
high in general...then buyers trust it and even other growers they say yeah it’s good. 
But for a grower to do this is quite hard because they look by the day at their prices 
and they say actually it’s A2 quality, well they can say that if they want but it’s 
tempting to say A1 (IG2). 
Similarly, a grower knows the earliest stage at which they can harvest their crop and still have it 
open to saleable condition. While this may not visually appear significantly different to flowers 
which have been harvested too early, it is widely accepted within the industry that growers are 
aware of this and their buyers know that they are aware of this. Therefore, if a buyer receives a 
shipment from a grower that fails to open, this is likely to have a significant impact on the trust 
which governs the relationship between the two, as displayed in this extract from an interview 
with a grower: 
...the opening is fixed. Everyone knows that. If you don’t wait for it to open you’re 
cheating the buyers. See if it’s too tight it may never open at all. No one wants that I 
mean they might buy it the first time but they will not come back and buy your 
product (IG13). 
If the trust-based system between buyers and growers breaks down due to a series of breaches, a 
buyer will return to the market system of the auction and any brand rents created by the grower 
will be dissipated. 
Whilst these facets of the trust-based governance of the industry are manufactured on an 
individual firm basis, there is a barrier to integration into the auction market presented by the 
reputation of the industry as a whole, which could be considered to have limited the creation of 
individual brand rents. Growers from firms with production locations in several countries 
reported having packers mix bunches from Ethiopia with flowers from another, more established 
production location for auction and presenting them as having come solely from the more 
established location. These flowers then achieve a higher price than if the flowers were sold as 
‘Ethiopian’. Some growers see this as ‘racism’ but it could also be attributed to rumours that 
periodically spread through the auction system about invisible quality aspects such as disease 
prevalence among flowers from a particular country (IG2, IG6, IG9, IG13). 
The effect of an industry-wide reputation on sellers at auction has distinct similarities with that of 
the direct sales marketing channel. At auction, it is the buyers - including wholesalers, importers, 
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and some large, multiple-site retailers - who consider the reputation of both a grower and their 
country of origin in purchasing the flowers according to information displayed on the auction 
clock. In direct buyer relationships the reputation of the country of origin is considered by the 
importing agent in establishing supply from a farm. Under both types of marketing channel, it is 
rare for the country of origin to be visible to the consumer at the final point of sale, although this 
is not the case at some of the more upmarket UK supermarket chains. With foodstuffs, it is a legal 
requirement that the country of origin is displayed on the final sales packaging which, in addition 
to improving the traceability of the product, has allowed for countries to manufacture a 
reputation in certain products such as Colombian Coffee and New Zealand lamb. The reasons 
behind the lack of labelling are not clear. One possible reason which has emerged from 
supermarket focus groups, which regularly convene to discuss the issue, is the misperception 
among consumers that flowers from Africa have a higher carbon footprint than those produced in 
Europe when, in fact, as discussed above, it is a fraction of that produced by flowers grown under 
artificial heat sources. Other possible explanations to emerge from focus groups include an 
indifference to the origin of flowers as they are not a food item and that no geographically bound 
reputations currently exist and so there is little incentive to label products. Customers’ 
perspectives on the issue also vary according to the socioeconomic profile of customers, with 
consumers of higher-priced market sectors more likely to regard labelling the country of origin as 
desirable: 
...there-is-a-potential-risk-of-putting-[a-country-of-origin-label]-on-there-if-people-associate-
some-of-these-countries-with-negativity-around-ethical-or-environmental...We-always-just-
go-and-ask-people-‘what-do-you-think?’-So-if-people-start-saying-we-want-to-know-where-
every-flower-comes-from-then-we,-we’ll-put-it-on-the-label (IG5). 
While entry to the auction system is relatively simple in the first instance, significant barriers to 
success still exist within the auction system. As detailed above, prices at auction for each variety 
can be influenced by a number of farm-level variables. These include quality, which is a product of 
varietal selection for the specific growing conditions of the farm; agro-ecological practices, cut-
stage and post-harvest handling; the certification the farm has achieved; the farm’s reputation 
within the industry; and marketing, which is a combination of the size of the batches that are sold, 
packaging and pre-sale treatment such as head equalisation. Sale price is also, of course, affected 
by demand. Aggregate demand has by and large been growing, with the exception of the brief 
decline as a result of the Global Financial Crisis. However demand is not equal across all seasons 
and across all markets.  
Celebrations and public holidays result in a result in a spike in demand and producers must time 
their flush (cutting back all stems so that they bloom at the appropriate time to be harvested on a 
desired day) so that the highest number of premium quality stems can be delivered to auction to 
coincide with peak demand. Weather variations, even in the fairly stable climate present in the 
flower-growing areas of Ethiopia, can affect the number of days between flushing and ideal 
harvest by up to 20%. In Debre Zeit for example, under ideal growing conditions a flush could be 
conducted every 46-47 days. However, the longer than average rainy season in 2010 meant the 
duration between flushes increased to 60-65 days, resulting in the loss of one flush over the 
course of the year (IG13). These climatic variations can lead to prematurely harvested roses being 
taken to auction for a major demand spike, such as St. Valentine’s Day, resulting in significantly 
depressed prices, for example. Conversely when Kenya experienced a prolonged rainy season in 
2010, prices of Ethiopian roses increased at auction by around 30%, displaying the 
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interdependence of the global floriculture system and the instability of prices at auction (Taye, 
2010).  
The German auction at Landgard caters primarily to the German market and so exporters to that 
auction must time their auction deliveries to coincide with German holidays and festivals. The 
Dutch auctions however have a far broader buyer base and so holidays and festivals from all 
nations must be catered for and timed so that they can be bought at auction and distributed to 
the customer market in time for resale before the festival. The decision of whether to send all 
produce to auction, to sell to different markets and pay the NAT premium, or to attempt to cheat 
the system by underreporting NAT together with timing exports to market, as many in the 
industry have, are skills that must be perfected in order to successfully use the auction marketing 
channel. The reliability of demand and revenue streams through the direct marketing channel 
removes the majority of these concerns (IG2). 
The auction system, then, allows a far easier route to market than direct sales for new entrants to 
export floriculture. It can assist new growers in finding their particular market niche and allows 
mistakes to be made at a relatively low cost when compared with planting hectares of a single 
variety for direct sales and then discovering quality issues. However, direct sales can represent a 
more stable income for growers and can insulate them against events such as the price crash 
following the Global Financial Crisis. This protection is not infallible, however, as direct contracts 
that were negotiated when prices were depressed can negatively affect growers, as displayed in 
this extract from an interview with a grower: 
I’m selling 30% to a direct buyer but I’m not happy, I have to negotiate, you know we 
negotiated when the price was down. So he was paying us F.O.B. €0.10/stem, for 
40cm. And he was paying 14 for 60cm. Now I hear that he should be paying at least 
12 for the 10 and 16 for the 60cm...it’s a year round [contract]...If the price dips then 
they can get away with it, exactly. That’s exactly what happened...but it works both 
ways. I can say no I’m not gonna send you anything and I can tell him to fuck off but 
one guarantee he has is he pays me every two weeks and he pays me and then I say 
no that’s it I’m not gonna send you anything (IG13). 
Any new entrant to the floriculture industry is almost certain to enter via the auction marketing 
stream. Once the firm is established and experienced within the industry and they have paid their 
‘learning money’, they may then decide to move into direct sales. However, this is by no means a 
logical progression. Different firms have been successful in different sectors of the market and 
their success has been attributable to a huge number of elements of good farm management, of 
which the selection of marketing channel is one aspect. This extract from an interview with a 
Dutch institutional actor who has been crucial in the development of the Ethiopian industry 
forecasts a mixed and diverse future for the industry: 
There are so many options where you can be successful. You can be very successful 
at the auctions right. You have to be there every day...[an established Ethiopian 
grower] they grow hypericum right. They make their own varieties. They don’t give 
their varieties to anybody else. They have a farm in Kenya, they have a farm here. So 
the only variety which comes on the Dutch market is their variety of hypericum there 
are many other varieties but of that one they are the only one. They put them on all 
the auctions in Holland. And you know they are there every day, with the same 
quality, so the man who comes there he says people in the auction are lazy. They like 
to come half an hour late, so they know [the grower in question] is there always, they 
just have to push the button. Stable supplier, reliable supplier, their name is good in 
the auction, if you have the top quality there is nothing better than that. Then if you 
want to be big and bulky then you have to have long term contracts.  
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You have to analyse the different systems in the market and no one knows how the 
future will be...There are the different players. This major share of the market is the 
most primitive share of the market. Supermarkets everyday lower prices. You just 
have to look what has happened in Holland, in Germany, in England, they are fighting 
with the dairy farmers every day...So you claim that supermarkets is a better chain to 
sell to than the small florists? (IG7). 
8.3 Marketing Stream Outcomes in Ethiopian Floriculture 
Although accurate data on market destinations is not available given the secrecy surrounding 
financial information in the industry, sufficiently sound conclusions can be drawn from the 
following proxy analysis. With the Netherlands and Germany housing the only two major 
international flower auctions, two variables - the number of destination countries and the 
percentage of total exports destined for alternative markets - can be used to assess any possible 
trend towards direct marketing, whilst it is acknowledged that the proportion of direct markets 
within these two countries may also have changed. 
 
Figure 8.1: Routes to Market for Ethiopian Flowers; Data: Customs and Excise Authority 
Figure 8.1 indicates how the Ethiopian floriculture industry has developed over time. It gives a 
crude measure of the proportion of the exports from Ethiopia that are direct sales and the 
proportion that are sold through auction. The flower auctions in the Netherlands account for the 
vast majority of imports to that country while imports to the other flower auction site in Germany 
accounts for a large proportion of imports to that country. The percentage of total exports to the 
Netherlands/Germany as against exports elsewhere gives an approximate indication of 
composition of the industry in terms of direct and auction sales. This does not show the volume or 
value of sales to different destinations - at this early stage of the industry the absolute values are 
too low - but by displaying the number of countries to which Ethiopia exports it displays how the 
export profile of Ethiopian floriculture and the options for producers to sell directly are rapidly 
increasing. 
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As the industry has grown, a far higher proportion of exports have been sold at auction. This is 
attributable to a number of factors. Firstly, in the early stages of an industry it is difficult for both 
the firm and the country as a whole to establish a reputation at auction as the industry is not of 
sufficient size to obtain notoriety. This lack of reputation can significantly affect price, especially 
following the removal of the physical procession of the flowers through the auction house. 
Secondly, before an industry reaches critical mass to benefit from economies of scale, such as 
chartering cargo planes, it can be more profitable to look for niche markets. Thirdly, the onerous 
conditions imposed on developing country growers until the merger of VBA and Floraholland 
meant that it was more expensive for African growers to sell at auction three years ago than it is 
now and, consequently, the rate at which established growers may have moved towards direct 
sales in order to benefit from increased revenue stability has slowed. Finally, and possibly most 
influentially, the total number of farms has increased rapidly in recent years and with the 
conditions above having changed - i.e. the Ethiopian flower industry is now of sufficient size to 
charter aircraft, has a reputation at auction, and the conditions for African growers at auction are 
now favourable - it is far easier for new entrants to the market to establish themselves at auction 
before potentially moving on to direct sales. As discussed elsewhere in this analysis, it can take 
two years or more for growers with decades of experience to optimise the production yields, 
quality and consistency of a new farm.  
The auctions provide a platform for growers to optimise their production and try out new 
varieties. It also gives an opportunity for new farms to receive payment within a week of sale. This 
can be important for new farms where capital availability is limited and differs from direct sales 
where payments can take two months or more to receive, meaning that the payment system is “a 
big reason actually for people to stick with the auction” (IG2). Because of this, Floraholland offer a 
facility whereby growers who are members of the auction can sell directly to buyers who are 
registered with the auction and use the auction system for the payment process for the 
transaction, although sales conducted in this way are still classified as direct sales. Currently, a 
large proportion of the flowers grown in Ziway and sold directly in this way with growers seeing 
the auction fees payable for the service as acceptable for the security that the auction system of 
payment offers. Some of the sales conducted by Ethiopian growers through the Japanese auction 
system are also conducted through the Floraholland payment system in order to minimise the 
financial risk to growers. Direct sales through Floraholland account for a small but growing 
percentage of the company’s total sales and will, in future, decrease the proportion of Ethiopia’s 
exports sent to the Netherlands (IG2).  
As the industry has matured, Figure 8.1 shows that the number of export destinations has grown 
and flowers are now sent from Ethiopia directly to over 80 countries around the world in addition 
to the countries which purchase Ethiopian flowers from the auctions in the Netherlands and 
Germany. The rate of increase in the number of export destinations slowed markedly with the 
Global Financial Crisis. This is potentially owing to the necessity for a more regular cash flow and 
less willingness to engage in risky behaviour in exploring new markets during this period.  
Projections based on data for the first five months of 2010 in comparison to the same period in 
the previous year see a sharp increase in the number of export destinations for 2010. The flower 
industry has emerged from the Global Financial Crisis to a period of strong growth during this 
time. Qualitative interviews have shown that some of the more well-established firms in the 
industry have begun to meet the criteria for quality and consistency and are now moving 
increasing proportions of their business towards direct sales. The number of destination countries 
for Ethiopian exports is likely to remain relatively stable as it has now reached a similar level to 
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that of the majority of mature production locations. Ethiopia has been among the first to move 
into new growth markets and it is likely that, due to the investment of the institutional actors in 
exploring new market opportunities described in Chapter 7, they will keep pace with the 
expansion of all major producers into any new markets. The broad investment base of the 
industry has facilitated the inflow of knowledge of local markets and business practices in these 
target markets. For example, flower producers have historically experienced difficulties remitting 
revenue from exports to Russia due to bureaucratic processes but the introduction of a Russian 
producer to the Ethiopian market has allowed exports to be sold F.O.B. in Addis Ababa and then 
resold through contacts in Russia (IG8).  
It is likely that the rate of increase in both the number of new firms entering the market and the 
number of firms relocating from other production locations will slow as both significantly exceed 
the growth in aggregate demand within the industry. As growth within the industry becomes 
increasingly attributable to the expansion of existing firms - having already optimised their 
production and established a reputation - rather than the entrance of new firms, the proportion 
of exports attributable to direct sales is likely to increase. This trend will be exacerbated by the 
general switch in the market from auction to direct sales. However, the findings of this research 
indicate that several firms will remain successful in the auction marketing channels and will 
continue to take their products to market in this way. 
This chapter has, then, focused on the challenges that face producers in entering the global 
floriculture market and initially creating value, identifying the many different ways in which firms 
have been successful. Auction markets provide an opportunity for producers to obtain the highest 
prices for their products while direct markets provide greater stability. For producers of shorter-
stemmed, smaller-headed roses, and other varieties commonly sold in supermarkets, 
opportunities exist for the enhancement of value which are uncommon in floriculture. Final sales 
packaging and bouquets can be manufactured at the site of production and delivered to the 
customer in ready-for-sale condition. However, in order to access the benefits of stability and 
value enhancement opportunities, growers are commonly expected to achieve standards of 
quality and consistency which can take several years to attain. Within the auction marketing 
stream, value can be enhanced through the creation of brand rents; maintaining high quality and 
consistency, together with building long-term, trust-based relationships with buyers allows for the 
creation of a reputation at auction. 
The capture of value by a firm is determined to a large extent by the optimisation of industrial 
strategy, including the negotiation over terms of trade within each marketing stream. However, 
the ability to pursue a firm’s optimal mix of marketing streams and to obtain the best possible 
value for their product within a marketing stream is influenced to a large extent by the 
manifestations of power and network embeddedness within the GPN. The network 
embeddedness of certain actors within broader floriculture networks has allowed direct 
marketing streams to be opened to areas that would not have otherwise been possible, as with 
the example of Russia. This displays an interesting conceptual link in that actors who are 
territorially embedded in target markets are able to mobilise personal networks in pursuing their 
marketing strategy. Similarly, territorial embeddedness amongst other nodes such as the 
importing agents, who act as gatekeepers to many direct markets in alternative production 
locations such as Kenya, has had the effect of limiting the availability of certain markets to 
Ethiopian producers. The temporal dimension of the link between network and territorial 
embeddedness is exhibited here as network embedded actors have become more territorially 
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embedded in these alternative production locations with time in the industry and have their 
mobility to more economically attractive locations has decreased. 
The ability of producers new to global floriculture to enter direct marketing streams highlights 
both the advantages held by experienced producers embedded in the network and the prevailing 
power structures that allow major buyers to dictate the terms of trade to growers who bear the 
majority of the burden of cost in trading relationships. Collective power too is shown to have an 
influence in the form of consumers demanding particular standards of their flower retailer, both 
through formal collective action via NGOs and individual consumer choice, which is then passed 
on to the grower; issues that are expanded upon in the following chapter. Also in the following 
chapter, another important factor in determining the developmental outcomes of the floriculture 
industry in Ethiopia - namely labour issues - is examined. This is closely related to a firm’s strategy 
on marketing streams as ability to alter and maintain production levels and the standards of 
environmental care and worker welfare required can be influential in a firm’s ability to pursue 
each of the marketing streams. 
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9. Labour Issues 
Previous research on floriculture has, by and large, focussed on the welfare of workers and/or 
environmental concerns. These issues were not among the primary aims of this research in order 
to avoid re-covering existing ground and because of the temporal and financial constraints of the 
research. However, some aspects of labour welfare are integral to addressing the central research 
questions of the economic sustainability of the industry and the benefits accruing to local actors 
over time. Further, in conducting qualitative interviews several novel and interesting findings 
emerged which can contribute to existing literature on these aspects of floriculture. This chapter 
examines the issues surrounding labour in Ethiopian floriculture that relate directly to the 
research questions. Firstly, the considerations for firms in the initial construction or 
transformation of a workforce are documented as a firm’s ability to attract appropriately skilled 
staff can have a significant impact on the profitability of the firm. The next section looks at 
industry standards including standards of worker welfare and environmental standards, which are 
becoming more influential in the success of exporting firms as they are increasingly demanded by 
consumers. This is followed by a section documenting the impact on migration that the industry 
has had as this is a dynamic with the potential to influence the growth of the industry, both 
through its impact on labour availability and the impact on resource availability and pressure on 
services. 
9.1 Labour Categorisation 
Here, labour within the floriculture industry has been divided into three categories: managerial, 
technical, and manual. The processes involved in the creation or transformation of a workforce in 
the technical and managerial categories are similar to each other and distinct from those involved 
for manual labour and so these two groups are addressed separately.  
9.1.1. Manual Labour 
The manual element of the labour force requires a set of basic agricultural skills which, in a 
country that is 85% rurally-based, were available in abundance in Ethiopia. This follows a pattern 
present with many NTAEs in developing countries whereby the majority of labour is provided by 
the local workforce and capital intensive or highly skilled parts of the network are filled by 
imported labour (Bridge, 2008).  
Nadvi’s (2004) argument regarding the potential for poverty gains from export horticulture 
through job creation for the landless, rural poor is to some extent true in Ethiopian floriculture 
with the exception that, constitutionally, everyone in Ethiopia is landless. Land law in Ethiopia is 
complex, as documented in Chapter 4, and the government has circumvented some of its own 
policies in this area in order to facilitate the growth of the industry. All land belongs to the state 
and is allocated to individuals, with every individual entitled to land provided they utilise it to the 
satisfaction of the government (World Bank, 2002). This is one of many factors that have led to a 
perpetuation of subsistence farming.  
The flower sector in Ethiopia is divided into several clusters located within 200Km of Addis Ababa, 
all but three of which are in the Oromia region. The Debre Zeit cluster is the only cluster located in 
close proximity to an urban area although, as documented in section 9.3, the growth of the 
industry and subsequent migration to Ziway has had an urbanising effect. Consequently, in all of 
the other clusters there are not large numbers of people in rural areas that are ‘unemployed’.  
Manual labour in floriculture firms in developing countries is primarily conducted by females, who 
also conduct a significant proportion of agricultural labour in food production, although the 
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dynamics of this are highly culturally and geographically influenced (Aredo, 1995) . In Ethiopia, the 
proportion of females in the floriculture workforce is the highest of any major exporting country 
(IG8; Meier, 1999).  
Investors entering the industry had to transform subsistence farmers into manual labourers in 
order to source their workforce. The industrial recommended minimum wage is 9 ETB (~$0.75 US) 
per day for a shift of up to 12 hours dependant on workload, with most firms paying between 9-
12 ETB (~$0.75-1 US)(IG3, IG4, IG8, IG10, IG13, IG14). Apart from the notable exceptions detailed 
below where employees in certain firms have been able to move between the unskilled and 
skilled labour categories, the characteristics of manual labourers who perform different tasks in 
the industry such as packing, cutting, and spraying, in terms of recruitment processes, 
unionisation, skill sets etc. are similar. Whilst the wage for manual labour is evidently low, this 
represents a significant increase in household income for many rural families. The problem for 
flower farms lay not in offering incentives to workers - although many have, including 
transportation, subsidised food and healthcare - but rather in changing the mindset of the 
individuals to allow them to take up formal employment. This is not to suggest that mindset was 
the only barrier. As explained in Chapter 4, usufruct rights of subsistence farmers determine that 
failure to utilise land allocated by the government, the chances of which would be substantially 
increased by engaging in full-time employment at the expense of subsistence agricultural labour, 
may result in the repossession of that land. Furthermore, for those with smaller households and 
thus fewer dependents, incomes available from unskilled floricultural labour may be lower than 
those available from smallholder agriculture and, as such, they may prefer to continue to devote 
their time to their own farm. However, in the majority of cases women are able to engage in 
floricultural labour instead of or in addition to work on their own smallholding or that of their 
extended family and increase their household income as a result (IG3; IG6; IG9). 
The negotiations involved in the creation and retention of a workforce are one example of how 
the situational specificity and geographical context emphasised in the GPN framework are vital to 
explaining the outcomes of a particular network. As found by Smith et al.: 
Labour process dynamics strongly influence wealth creation and work conditions 
within any one node (2002; 47). 
Different firms that entered the Ethiopian floriculture network dealt with this need to create a 
workforce in different ways and with varying degrees of success. A small number of firms, where 
Ethiopians were involved in the business strategy, engaged in an incremental process of 
introducing subsistence farmers to the workforce by graduating their entry through working for a 
small number of hours on a few days per week. Help was given in arranging childcare so that 
eventually workers were both available and comfortable engaging in full-time employment. The 
nature of the export flower industry means that much of the employment in this category is 
seasonal, as demand for African flowers reduces in the European summer. Seasonal work is often 
seen as a negative aspect of employment in export industries, however in this case it was used as 
a method by which to encourage smallholders into the workforce as the time they spend 
unemployed could be used to attend to their own crops. All firms relied on word of mouth to 
attract workers in this category but those that introduced the workforce gradually had a far lower 
staff turnover rate (IG6, IG9). Formal contracts remain rare and manual labour is easily 
transferable to a neighbouring farm in the cluster which is one reason why some of the benefits 
described here are offered with a view to minimising staff turnover (Morris, 2006).  
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Maintaining a manual workforce in areas where the growing cluster has expanded rapidly has 
become very challenging, resulting in benefits being offered to minimise the labour turnover 
between farms. The formalisation of labour through contracts has been met with resistance both 
from farm managers keen to maintain flexibility in the workforce, and also from the workers 
themselves. Having never been formally employed, the idea of a contract is difficult to adapt to, 
as shown in this interview with a domestic institutional respondent who plays a facilitative role in 
formalising labour relations: 
When you consider, for a number of people working on the farms, this is their first 
formal employment, the first time that they’ve signed an employment contract and 
the resistance we get to employment contracts from the workers is bigger than we 
do from the farm managers. Because it’s unfamiliar (IG8). 
An interesting paradox is that there is also considerable inter-sectoral labour mobility between 
flower farms and government and other infrastructural contractors, whose aim is to improve 
facilities for the industry, consequently depriving the flower farms of the labour they require. 
Furthermore as a consequence of Ethiopia’s overall growth, other industries such as leather and 
oilseed processing and factory industries have begun to locate in the areas around Addis Ababa 
where flower farming occurs and have begun to compete for manual labour (IG2, IG4, IG7, IG8, 
IG9, IG10, IG13, IG14). 
Manual labour is further stratified with the introduction of supervisors. No specific skills are 
required for workers in this category beyond that of manual labour but it is important that these 
workers command a level of respect from other manual labourers in order to achieve high levels 
of productivity. To this end, a number of different tactics were employed by businesses to 
differentiate between labourers and supervisors. The majority of firms, particularly in the rural 
clusters, employed local elites in these roles. These are primarily older people who command a 
great deal of respect in Ethiopian society. In less rural areas, such as the Debre Zeit cluster where 
the traditional hierarchical societal organisation is less strong, many firms employed a different 
method. Employees were contracted at an equal level of responsibility and then during the 
training prior to export, those who showed the most aptitude were given responsibility for a 
certain growing area. These areas then compete in terms of yield, absenteeism and many other 
performance-related metrics and the supervisors are awarded bonuses. The supervisors are 
taught all but the most advanced agronomic techniques over time, which decreases the number 
of specialists required. Manual labourers in this system are motivated by the possibility of internal 
promotion, which is not present in other types of labour organisation in different flower growing 
areas of Ethiopia. However, in both of these systems of labour organisation, it is important to 
recognise the micro-regional context as respondents reported that the meritocracy method 
would not work in rural areas and the differentiation of labour according to a social hierarchy 
would not be possible in more urban areas (IG6, IG9, IG13).  
It can be seen in the preceding analysis that firms have had to engage in a number of different 
strategies in order to develop and maintain a workforce. However, given the costs analysis 
contained in Chapter 7 which identifies labour as a small component of total costs, one might 
question the necessity of labour efficiency in order to maintain profit. Figure 7.2 displays that 
while labour costs constitute a small proportion of total expenditure, they account for a 
significantly higher proportion (approximately 36%) of costs which vary by production location 
hence the cost-basis on which countries compete for international investment. The low average 
profit margins within floriculture mean that labour efficiency and management can have a 
significant impact on the profitability of a firm. 
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Consequently firms that can maximise productivity and manage labour effectively are more likely 
to be able to capture value for the benefit of the firm. Low productivity is a chronic problem in 
Ethiopia and one which prevents natural resources being exploited to their full potential. The 
World Bank’s second Investment Climate Assessment for Ethiopia, identifies the relatively low 
productivity of workers in the broader Ethiopian economy - when compared with Kenya and 
Vietnam as alternative production locations, as being a product of the country’s socialist past but 
sees signs of improvement in this area as the market system matures, with production shifting 
from inefficient to efficient firms (World Bank, 2009b). Indeed, as documented elsewhere in the 
present research, this process has already begun in floriculture - induced by the Global Financial 
Crisis - and the fact that labour is transferable between farms has led to more efficient firms 
increasing their production area and total employment. 
One example of how different techniques of labour management affect productivity is in the 
handling agents node of the network. As discussed in Chapter 6, the two main firms involved in 
packing flowers for export (EHSC and Flowerport) exhibit different capabilities in reaching the 
total freight capacity of the same aircraft; briefly, Flowerport commonly pack 90 tonnes of flowers 
onto the same cargo aircraft that EHSC pack 75, effectively decreasing costs by 20%. One might 
expect that an agent with years of experience of packing operations in several countries may be 
able to conduct operations more efficiently due to more skilled management of the workforce 
and more advanced packing techniques. However, security concerns, partially vindicated by the 
recent foiled bomb plot involving cargo leaving Yemen, combined with Ethiopia’s strategic 
position in anti-terrorism negotiations, mean that Ethiopian Airlines maintain control over the 
construction of pallets (Economist, 2007; Rayment, 2010). All companies use the same equipment 
and the same workforce and therefore the only differences between the companies are the 
management of the workforce and the methods they use to assemble the pallets. In respect of 
methodology, as one respondent reported, “it’s easier to build a wall if you’ve got the same size 
bricks” and so, in an attempt to make domestic handlers more competitive, the government 
attempted to standardise boxes as detailed below. However, as reflected in this typical response 
from a domestic institutional actor, methodology is not the primary difference between the 
different handling agents: 
I think there is nothing technical to why one company can do it and the other can’t 
because they are all using Ethiopian labour. This is to do with man management 
skills, nothing else. So if we can get the supervision right and the controls right then 
there is no problem (IG12). 
In the longer term the potential exists for knowledge transfer between firms through the transfer 
of employees between firms and subsequent knowledge leakage. However, several factors 
including the ability of the transferred employees to feed into management practices might 
influence the degree to which this transfer occurs. 
From a management perspective, one might expect local knowledge and language skills to give 
local agents an advantage in the organisation of manual labour but in fact, respondents 
documented that experience in human resources management was more effective as foreign 
actors were able to organise labour more efficiently (IG12).  
Despite these measures to manufacture a stable and committed workforce, localised industrial 
action has become commonplace demonstrating a clear influence of collective power on the 
configuration of the Ethiopian floriculture GPN and, as found by Smith et al.:  
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Organised labour can have an important influence both within and between 
countries (2002; 47). 
A labour union for the industry has recently been inaugurated but attracting membership and 
coordinating any cohesive policies has proven problematic due to the dispersed and isolated 
nature of the workforce. In addition to the issues regarding signing formal contracts discussed 
elsewhere, this failure of the union to attract membership is possibly attributable in part to the 
sociological phenomenon discussed in Chapter 4, whereby in post-socialist Ethiopia people are 
unlikely to engage in behaviour which makes them more conspicuous (Young, 1998). This is 
compounded by the autocratic government which has been keen to minimise the existence of any 
civil society organisation which it perceives as having any political association, however innocuous 
(Abbink, 2010). The union has the nominal support of the EHDA but it is in the early stages of its 
operations and the practical application of this support has yet to be seen. Indeed the relationship 
between the EPRDF and civil society, which manifests itself in the Charities and Societies 
Proclamation, 2009, has been strained and the nominal support for the union may simply be a 
means of satisfying international institutional actors. There is no doubt, from an analysis of 
primary data gathered from government actors, that the lack of labour unionisation is regarded as 
an asset in the attraction and retention of FDI, and as such government actors have been cautious 
to implement labour regulations which may be seen as onerous for investors: 
...as a government office we have interest to protect our labourers’ rights but we also 
like to build the capacity on our labourers to clearly tell them what their right is. If we 
do that we are afraid we will have a problem like you had in British [Airways]...So that 
is going to be an uncontrollable problem. We support [the formation of a union] and 
we are very keen to see our labourers supported but we want to make this in a 
friendly way, you know, whereby the owner of the farm is convinced that, without 
these labourers, he cannot do this business and also the labourers have acquired a 
skill so that we have a room for bargaining you know. But if there is mistakes, he will 
send you off today and bring Mr Y. At the same time, in such a situation, it’s difficult 
to bargain. So that’s why we want to build the knowledge of our labourers, the way 
of thinking and other things (IG4). 
This displays how, in the early stages of an industry, institutional power is able to manipulate 
collective power because of the relative strength of corporate power in the initial configuration of 
the GPN. However the EHPEA - for which labour relations fall outside the remit of working in the 
interests of farm owners - sees the unionisation as a positive development for the industry: 
...we don’t get involved in negotiations of wages and interestingly enough, running 
parallel with the code, we’ve seen a big increase in the number of farms that are 
running with a farm union. It’s gone from 5 or 6 farms to almost 50 farms and in one 
or two farms now, the Sher farms and one or two of the other bigger farms, these 
unions are established enough now to have collective bargaining and have proper 
collective bargaining agreements and it’s registered and approved and 
implemented...So, in that way, I think the association has done quite a lot to 
contribute to better conditions. We have friendly relations, mostly, with the union 
and if there are problems with the farm then very often the association will be 
involved in the resolution (IG8). 
Far more common are informal labour unions for individual farms where communication is easier 
and collective action can be more readily organised. These localised unions, however, have far 
less power than if an industry-wide labour union - possibly linked to other low paid worker unions 
which operate more successfully in Ethiopia - were to be operationalised. Firms have, in several 
cases, attempted to organise labour unions within their own farms in the interest of obtaining 
certain marketing labels. However, uptake of union membership has been poor due to the 
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nominal 0.5 ETB/month (~$0.03US) contribution necessitated for administration. The industrial 
action that has occurred has been limited to individual farms and is usually short-lived. 
Furthermore: 
...we have a number of farms that have very good staff relations and, equally, 
problems in staff relations are spread between Ethiopian farms and expatriate 
investors. You can’t say it’s a problem that’s particular to expatriate managed farms 
because people don’t understand, it doesn’t work like that (IG8). 
One farm, however, has maintained significantly better labour relations than all others operating 
in the sector. Despite the incentives being offered to investors in the industry in terms of cheap 
land rents, this firm paid up to 30 times the government-offered rate and effectively sublet land 
from farmers. Whilst the foreign investors thought this an unnecessary cost, their Ethiopian 
partners recognised that this was insignificant as a proportion of total costs. Additionally, the 
government initially disapproved of this investor’s approach, feeling it undermined efforts to 
incentivise the industry with discounted land prices, as a further example of the government’s 
attempts to micro-manage the industry described in Chapter 7. As well as the above methods, all 
of which this farm employed, renting land from farmers gave the surrounding community a 
vested interest in the success of the business. A Dutch manager was employed by the owners but, 
unlike many other farms, this manager had no floricultural background. He had lived in Ethiopia 
for 17 years, was married to an Ethiopian and had children in school in Ethiopia, which, according 
to a number of respondents, “all helps to build understanding and tolerance” (IG8, IG9, IG12). 
9.1.2 Managerial and Technical Labour 
The second category of labour necessary for the floriculture industry is managerial labour. Given 
equivalent skill levels, it is preferable for the Ethiopian government, foreign investors and the 
industry as a whole to employ Ethiopian nationals in managerial positions. For the investors, local 
managers command lower wages, involve fewer administrative issues and are more sensitive to 
local requirements and conditions. For the government, the income earned by these actors is 
likely to be remitted to and subsequently be spent in the country; they are more territorially 
embedded, as documented elsewhere in the research, and represent a more stable future for the 
industry (IG14). This category concerns only the business management of the farm as the 
floricultural management is part of the technical category. Once the DBoE altered its loan 
conditions to include local investors, Ethiopian businessmen successful in another and often 
totally unrelated industry began to enter floriculture. Employees skilled in accountancy, business 
negotiation and people management, as well as experienced in the administrative aspects of 
running a business, were and remain available, to some extent, in Ethiopia. However, foreign 
investors still report shortages in these skill sets, particularly in the clusters where the labour 
market is more competitive, and Ethiopian managers on the business side of flower farms 
represent little over 50% of the total managers in this industry segment. Ethiopian managers are 
far more common in Ethiopian-owned farms and, owing to the ownership structure of the 
industry with a greater proportion of Ethiopian ownership amongst smaller farms, there is a skew 
of Ethiopian managers towards smaller firms (Survey; IG3). 
Shortages in terms of technical labour and of floriculture management are far more acute. These 
actors are responsible for a great number of duties within firms including the selection of 
varieties, the choice of route to market (in conjunction with the business manager) and the 
selection of input materials. The decisions made by actors in this category determine yield, 
damage, and loss rates, and have a large impact on profitability (IG6, IG9, IG13). In Ethiopia there 
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was an almost total absence of qualified and experienced farm managers and other technical 
labour when the industry began to expand: 
The bottom line is that Ethiopia requires qualified personnel to guide its floriculture 
industry so that it can maintain the momentum of growth (Africa Research Bulletin, 
2006; 17161). 
Overcoming the labour shortages in both the technical and managerial labour categories 
presented a huge challenge to the sustainability of the sector. Unlike with manual labour, there 
was no latent labour force that could be coerced into the sector. The solution the industry 
employed was threefold, and each element entailed a different timescale. The first element of 
this solution was to employ foreign managers and technical staff. The majority of indigenous and 
foreign-owned firms had to engage in the same competitive processes in order to acquire 
specialised labour (Oliver et al., 2008). These employees were drawn from the flower industries in 
Kenya, Israel and the Netherlands where, as a result the expansion of the Ethiopian industry, 
there had been a slowing of the growth rates or decline in their flower export industries and 
surplus labour was available. The value of ornamental flower exports from the Netherlands has 
reduced by more than a quarter since 2004 and Israel’s exports are down by over 10%, with 
Kenya’s growth also slowing (UN Comtrade, 2010). However, the labour surplus caused by the 
decline of industries in other countries, did not match the demand for technical and to a lesser 
extent managerial labour in Ethiopia and so competition was high.  
Many of the Dutch companies and some of the Indian and Israeli companies that established 
themselves in Ethiopia were part of multinational organisations with flower farms in other 
countries and so they could draw expertise from these other production sites. The infrastructure 
in terms of training and work experience in these more established production locations, together 
with the stable or falling demand for such employees, meant they could easily replace employees 
and because the other farms were already operational, they were easier to maintain. Companies 
that were new to the industry had more of a pressing need to employ expertise in this area and 
without the resources of multinational floriculture companies, had to pay high salaries in order to 
do so. As part of the government incentive package, these employees were exempt from paying 
income tax which further assisted in the recruitment process (IG4, IG7, IG8, IG14). 
As described above, it is neither sustainable, given the temporary nature of income tax relief and 
the higher wages involved, nor desirable for a company to continue to employ foreign managerial 
and technical labour and the second aspect of the industry’s solution to this problem came in the 
form of foreign consultants. Whilst the need for a business manager is almost constant, the 
requirement for technical labour is periodical. In the initial stages of setting up a farm, a high level 
of technical knowledge is required in order to choose the correct varieties, materials, fertilisers, 
irrigation systems etc. Subsequently, advice will be needed on pest and disease control, yield 
maximisation, harvest techniques and packing, amongst other things. It cannot be expected that 
any individual farm will have expertise to cover all eventualities in any of these areas. It is 
therefore part of the business model of the majority of floricultural firms to employ specialist 
consultants on regular basis, the need for which decreases with experience in the industry. For 
multinational floriculture firms, where other firms would employ consultants, permanent experts 
are employed by the parent company and then used across all their farms (IG11). Other farms will 
buy-in this expertise, either from Europe or at a slightly reduced rate from non-European nations 
with experience in floriculture such as Israel or some South American nations. The frequency and 
duration of employment of consultants varies amongst Ethiopian and foreign investors due to 
experience in the industry and the relative costs and visible benefits: 
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...it’s very costly to have consultants at your farm it can easily cost you 1000 US a 
day. And you don’t actually see what you get. It’s important but that is the first thing 
people see if they want to save some money. If you don’t have the knowledge you 
have to buy it and if you don’t it’ll cost you (IG2). 
The final and most long-term element of the strategy to solve the labour shortage lies in training. 
Here, too, international actors are heavily involved. The Royal Netherlands Embassy has employed 
the services of WUR to design training programmes at Jimma University. BA and MSc programmes 
have been implemented which include practical training at their purpose built greenhouse 
facilities and internships within floricultural firms. The first graduates have yet to emerge from the 
programmes and an ex-post evaluation is likely to reveal areas for improvement but several key 
actors within the industry see the programmes as having potential to create competent farm 
managers within five years of graduation, giving graduates the opportunity to progress far more 
quickly than they would in a mature industry (IG4, IG9, IG13): 
It is a formal education. The problem is, people from the University cannot help 
much. It is on a theoretical basis you know. There are practitioners who have 
theoretical knowledge, conceptual understanding and at the same time the practical 
[people] trained by skill...you see, those new graduates coming from the University, 
we are not allowing them to simply jump on a flower farm. That’s not going to be 
worthwhile. Because there is a lot of opportunity cost that the investor is going to 
lose because this person is going to learn by trial and error (IG4).  
Some of the graduates from the Jimma University programmes have, in fact, been employed by 
the EHPEA to assist in the design and execution of the training programmes the association 
conducts. The academic nature of degree programmes has led to supplementary training being 
required in order to make graduates ‘industry ready’: 
There’s been a significant amount of input put into training for [Jimma University’s] 
instructors to help them to be a little bit more practical and to be a little bit more 
participatory...In relation to the graduates who come out of Jimma, I think it’s fair to 
say that there is a proportion who are not suited to practical work in the sector...If 
you look at your traditional Dutch manager or a manager in the UK, he’s got masses 
of experience. A whole team of people to work with and an established system. 
That’s not here. Anyone who’s a good manager here, you’ve got one good manager 
and a farm, whereas in Europe you’ve got 5 good managers and a farm and a system 
that‘s established so they can grow their own staff (IG12). 
The HPTC has been set up by the EHDA with international support at Melkassa to complement the 
academic programmes with practical training in lower altitude flowers, fruits and vegetables. This 
will eventually be accompanied by an equivalent HPTC for highland flowers: 
Our target group is the graduates now. When someone is graduating in Horticulture 
we are taking him to the HPTC for six months or three months training. Then he will 
be capable to be employed by the sector (IG4). 
In time, and with experience, there exists the potential for consultants too to be drawn from the 
growing pool of expertise within the country, although this is a very long-term strategy (IG4, IG8). 
These training programmes could prove influential in the benefits extracted from the sector by 
local actors in the future. It is important to recognise that this donor-supported initiative is not 
primarily intended as a mechanism for upgrading but rather as a way ensuring a continued supply 
of labour in appropriate positions to guarantee the industry’s continued growth. However, one of 
the key factors influencing the benefits accruing to local actors at present is the implementation 
of internationally recognised codes of conduct. 
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9.2 Standards, CSR and Worker Welfare 
There are three main aspects to the overall influence of the industry on the lives of workers. The 
first and potentially most significant of these aspects, is income. As described in the preceding 
chapters, the industry has created a large number of new jobs, the vast majority of which are for 
manual labourers. The second element of the impact of the industry on labour, is worker welfare 
through peripheral benefits. Whilst, as documented below, these are not universally seen as 
positive, close to one million people now have improved access to a range of services including 
medical care, education, and social and sporting activities (IG4; IG8; IG17). The final way in which 
the industry has, or has the potential to have, an impact on workers’ lives is physically, through 
the chemicals and pesticides used in the industry. This last element potentially has far longer-
term and more wide-ranging consequences than the previous two. The internationally and 
nationally recognised standards, including the EHPEA’s CoP, and broader CSR initiatives that have 
been implemented throughout the industry, are intended to ensure that, to different degrees, 
minimum standards have to be met in each of the three areas outlined here, namely wages, 
worker welfare, and environmental standards. 
In Ethiopia, market forces such as labour shortages in certain sectors caused by the rapid 
expansion of the industry have had a far greater effect on increasing wages and other fringe 
benefits available to workers, than by international standards. However, despite these exogenous 
factors involved in improving conditions for workers, the industry standards implemented have 
undoubtedly had an impact and, unlike the temporary spike in wages which could be altered by 
increases in the supply of labour, the improvements that occur as a result of these standards are 
protected and policed so long as companies wish to continue to receive the benefits that these 
standards bring.  
The CoP implemented by the EHPEA has had a significant impact on welfare and conditions for 
workers in the industry, evidenced by both the ILO (Woel, 2010) and by DfID in their support for 
the Code through their funding of Marks and Spencer’s through the Food Retail Industry 
Challenge Fund (DfID, 2011). This is how one informant who acts as a consultant to the EHPEA 
summarised the effect the association, which is run for the benefit of its members (the farm 
owners) has on labourers within the industry: 
...the biggest impact [on labour in the industry] is the Code of Practice and it’s fair to 
say that, with the Code, we have seen a huge improvement in training, use and 
provision of PPE for spraying on the farm. Provision of washing facilities, eating 
facilities, contracts of employment, grievance and disciplinary procedures, 
transparency of employment practices...People on the farm will say, ‘thank you for 
getting us to do the Code, because it’s been good for us’. The people who’ve done it 
actually see that the Code benefits them on the farm maybe much more than it 
benefits the investor. They get the indirect benefits (IG8). 
The EHPEA’s CoP has been introduced gradually since 2007 in order to increase the uptake of the 
Code by growers, ensuring that the initial stages of the Code were not too onerous for producers 
new to the industry. This has allowed the Code’s reputation, both within the industry and 
amongst the institutional actors that continue to support it, to increase to a point where it is now 
a trusted symbol of good practice in several respects. This gradual implementation of new 
legislation to maximise floriculture’s reputation and maintain trust between institutional and 
commercial actors is rare in Ethiopia (Araia, 1995). However, the international drivers of this Code 
through the ENHP and interventions through DfID documented elsewhere in this research mean 
that the implementation of the Code has been governed by the institutional norms of these 
countries rather than the Ethiopian actors directly responsible for their implementation. 
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The Horticulture Development Regulation, designed by the Environmental Protection Agency, 
enshrines the CoP in law and was approved by the Council of Ministers in February of 2011. The 
new Regulation is designed to prevent any negative environmental and social impacts of the 
floriculture industry, create a competitive market and improve the quality of produce from 
Ethiopia. The Code now has three stages; Bronze, Silver and Gold, which are audited by some of 
the same auditors of the international Codes. The Bronze stage has 13 requirements, which are 
more heavily biased towards environmental considerations, and include: no use of 
banned/unregistered chemicals; the provision of medical care for employees; and 
environmentally friendly waste disposal. This stage of the Code is now a minimum requirement in 
order to obtain an export permit. The Silver stage of the code is more ambitious and requires 
firms to have a social and environmental auditing mechanism, develop efficient ways of using 
water sources, conduct best practice in stock storage and pesticide use, and implement feedback 
procedures for employees and customers so that they are aware of the areas where they may 
improve. Finally, the gold stage of the code necessitates community development programmes 
and environmental conservation schemes (Ethiopian Flower Export, 2011). The CoP has attracted 
praise from institutional actors due to the constant presence of the EHPEA in the country and 
regular visits to farms allowing constant appraisal of farm’s adherence to the standards, giving the 
Code an advantage over many of the internationally recognised codes which are only audited at 
predetermined intervals (IG7, IG8, IG12). 
Outside of the CoP, and one of the primary reasons for its creation, there are a large number of 
international standards governing environmental practice and worker welfare. Some of these are 
market labels, aimed at giving consumers information on these aspects of the production of a 
commodity, while others are business-to-business labels, aimed at assuring direct buyers that 
certain standards are being met in the production of the flowers and will not be displayed on the 
final product. The codes have slightly different emphases, with some concentrating more on 
environmental aspects of production, while others focus on issues of worker welfare. 
Perhaps one of the most well-known market labels is Fair Trade. To meet this standard, producers 
must comply with a range of initiatives aimed mainly at ensuring the welfare of workers but also 
covering broader sustainable development issues. Fair Trade flowers are sold in all major British 
flower retailers but, in general, constitute a small part (approx. 5%) of total turnover on flowers.  
At the moment it’s a small part of our range because it’s a small part of the demand 
but we’re always, always looking at this again and again and again because things 
change (IG5). 
The proportion of a retailer’s turnover accounted for by Fair Trade flowers is broadly reflective of 
the market segment in which they operate. In higher-end retailers, Fair Trade flowers make up a 
greater proportion of the total turnover on flowers than in budget retailers. The proportion of 
flowers sold in this way does increase, however, when the number of different quality standards, 
with largely similar criteria, are included. These alternative standards can be cheaper to audit and 
allow retailers to include bespoke metrics which they want their producers to be assessed by. This 
has the effect of complicating purchases for consumers and adherence to the standards’ 
stipulations for producers. This can greatly increase the costs for producers in complying with 
these regulations and can decrease the mobility of producers between direct customers, further 
increasing the power of major direct buyers. Other international standards which aim to 
guarantee labour welfare include the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), favoured by one of the major 
importing agents, Fair Flowers Fair Plants (FFFP), and bespoke supermarket foundations which 
conform to similar standards (IG16).  
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One high-end UK flower retailer – whose entire imported rose range adheres to a standard similar 
to Fair Trade - when asked whether the company had tested the market for cheaper flowers that 
did not adhere to such stringent conditions, indicated that it was CSR and not consumer demand 
which governed their policy in this area: 
...intrinsically what we want to do as a company is put money back into you know 
where we grow stuff. If Africa, which definitely needs it, and you go out there and 
you see what the money has helped them achieve in terms of extra school facilities, 
bursaries for kids, and run a football team, computers all sorts of stuff. You’ve got to 
do it and that’s how, that’s where [the supermarket] comes from. Everybody else 
tinkers with it but what we’ve been able to give back is massive. I mean last year we 
gave them £178,000. It might not sound a lot here but in Kenyan shillings that is 
massive. It does a lot and when you go back each year and you see what else they’ve 
done with it. We don’t charge our customers any more. We do it because we want to 
do it...it’s a massive part of their economy, it’s really important to them and we’re 
giving stuff back (IG5). 
At the time of writing only one Ethiopian farm had obtained Fair Trade accreditation. This farm is 
one of the longest-established within Ethiopian floriculture and was one of the first to adopt 
many new developments in the industry, including the vertical integration of functions and 
exploration of new markets, leading to this firm having created significant relational, 
organisational and brand rents, hence enhancing value significantly. The requirements for this 
label are viewed within the industry as being difficult and expensive to obtain but the early 
investment by this farm has proven profitable. One of the world’s largest importing agents, a 
major supplier to the UK market, now sources much of their Fair Trade range from this supplier. 
This firm has its own production of Fair Trade flowers in Kenya but stated that “Ethiopian Fair 
Trade suppliers are more cost-competitive” and as “supermarkets always want lower 
prices...price is king” (IG12, IG16). 
There are also several other standards which focus on environmental rather than worker welfare 
aspects of floriculture. These include BOPP, LEAF accreditation, GLOBALGAP and, most 
influentially for Ethiopia, MPS, which integrates two different types of standard through its MPS-
SQ certificate which includes several measures of worker welfare. The environmental standards 
variously determine the chemical inputs that can be used, proper usage and care of chemicals, 
discharge into groundwater, soil and water courses, phytosanitary services and training given to 
staff to minimise the environmental impact of the farm’s operations. There is no doubt that, if 
managed incorrectly, floriculture can have significant negative impacts on the environment and 
on the health of those who work in the industry due to the chemical inputs involved in the 
production process. These international standards are intended as a measure to mitigate these 
potential problems. The question is whether these measures are monitored strictly enough. Sher 
engages in a number of measures in order to prevent or minimise any possible negative effects on 
the environment. These include spraying of chemicals being conducted after 4pm when only 
spraying personnel remain onsite, so that harmful chemicals dissipate within 3 hours; screening 
random blood samples from employees on a monthly basis; and taking samples of lake water on a 
monthly basis to check for chemical pollution. If any of these testing procedures reveal 
unexpected results then production ceases until the result can be explained and corrected. 
Although international standards are generally audited only once annually, supermarkets and 
importing agents commissioned on their behalf conduct far more frequent visits to their suppliers 
to ensure compliance with environmental standards. If firms are found to have fallen below the 
required standards then, due to the absence of written contracts, supply can easily be switched to 
an alternative supplier and so it is in a farm’s economic interest to remain compliant with these 
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standards at all times. Indeed Sher’s owner sees his personal involvement in the industry as 
evidence for its safety: 
There is no reason to be scared. Flower is an old industry, not for Ethiopia, for 
Ethiopia it is quite new, people don’t know what it is...When there is a risk I was 
dying already, I was working 40 years in this industry, I was spraying 20 years by 
myself, still I am alive and still I have a lot of energy (IG17). 
However, control procedures have not been totally infallible and Emana et al. (2010) document 
the admission of 20 people to hospital with poisoning; an incident which the company attributes 
to employees not following procedures (IG17). 
In addition to the environmental and worker welfare standards, MPS-SQ, which is seen from a 
producers’ perspective as the foundation for obtaining both ETI and FFFP, contains a series of 
environmental and labour protection measures on areas including: collective bargaining; 
discrimination in the work place; forced labour; working age; written contracts; wages; working 
hours; paid leave; maternity leave; housing; medical care; and occupational health and safety. At 
the time of writing, nine firms had obtained MPS-SQ certification. 
In addition to the standards which govern both inter-firm trade in flowers and consumer labels, 
CSR plays a significant role in the outcomes experienced by labourers in the floriculture industry. 
CSR measures have far exceeded those demanded by these standards. These range from the 
widespread practice of providing transport to take rural employees to and from the farm and the 
provision of highly subsidised or free meals whilst at work (although these could be seen as 
measures necessary to attract a workforce) to education and healthcare benefits. Two of the 
largest producers have established hospitals, schools and recreational facilities. Treatment at the 
hospital is free to workers on the farms and, to a certain extent, their families, and is available for 
paid use by the local community. This has significantly improved the standard and proximity of 
medical facilities available to the communities that surround the flower farms. At smaller farms, 
medical care is often paid for by the firm at a local clinic.  
At Sher, wages began at 7 ETB/worker/day (~$0.8US) when the firm began operations in 2005 and 
are now at over 22 ETB/day (~$1.3US), significantly above the average for the industry and the 
country, having increased by 20% annually in recent years compared to only 8% in the public 
sector. The firm also engages in one of the most comprehensive CSR programmes of any 
floriculture firm in the country. On the Ziway site, Sher have paid for a school with an advanced 
computing facility, available to all children in the town with over 2500 currently enrolled; a high-
specification hospital, with free treatment available to workers and their families and at a 
substantially discounted rate to all other Ziway residents; a football stadium in which the Sher 
team compete in a national league; and a club house with a number of social facilities available to 
the town’s residents. The construction for all of these non-farm activities is tendered to local 
building companies, further adding to the positive externalities of the firm documented in 
Chapter 11 (IG8; IG17; Zenebe, 2008).  
This approach to CSR has been criticised for many years as ‘Bad Capitalism’ (Blowfield and Frynas, 
2005; Husted, 2003; Levitt, 1958). While it is difficult to argue that building a hospital supplying 
medical care to people for whom there was previously none is anything other than a positive 
thing, critics see the role of business replacing the state as a way of firms increasing the role of 
corporate power within the industry at the expense of collective and institutional power by 
making large firms essential to the functioning of society. The fact that a single firm controls 
healthcare, education and leisure activities in a community decreases labour mobility and 
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leverage in wage negotiations. The firm is, then, also able to negotiate a position of increased 
power in their relationships with the state as the fear of capital flight is made more acute by the 
potential negative impact on the affected communities. This is in addition to criticism levelled at 
CSR based on its ultimate profit motive through its positive effect on public relations, effectively 
taking the perspective that firms are acting from a position of enlightened self-interest. As in 
situations such as this, the state lacks the ability to implement these social measures itself; an 
ideal alternative to this CSR strategy would be to transfer to money invested in these social 
measures either directly to employees in the form of higher wages or to the government in the 
form of taxes so that they may provide the services themselves. Both of these practices would act 
as disincentives to the original investment and may worsen the competitive position of the 
country in attracting foreign investment. Furthermore, the capital outlay for the company in 
building hospitals, schools and football stadia, in addition to the outlay on the farm itself, is in the 
short-term higher than the gradual outlay in taxes or wages and allows the facilities to be used 
instantly.  
This investment also contributes to the territorial embeddedness of the firm as the investments 
they make are not mobile. From a capital mobility perspective, territorial embeddedness is always 
detrimental to a firm as it diminishes the influence of corporate power relative to institutional and 
collective power. However, the nature of this territorial embeddedness mitigates any potentially 
negative impacts for corporate actors. A firm replacing government in the provision of social 
services, as has been the case in many of the CSR strategies outlined here, has the effect of 
reducing institutional power in negotiations with corporate actors. Consequently, CSR strategies, 
while they undoubtedly have altruistic, marketing and employee relations motives, are also 
preferable for corporate actors than investment in immobile infrastructural improvements, for 
example roads or power generation. The key difference is a manufactured dependence built into 
the CSR strategies engaged in by companies like Sher, whereby if they were to leave the country 
the value of their investments would depreciate rapidly. 
Interesting parallels can be drawn here between the strategies of donors, documented in Chapter 
7, and the strategies of corporate actors. While donors are keen to fund short-term or one-off 
purchases which can easily be factored into budgets and are viewed positively from a public 
relations perspective, corporate actors seek to only make flexible investments, which are more 
easily withdrawn if profitability drops. 
Much has been written about worker welfare in floriculture but not, as yet, in an Ethiopian 
context (Dolan, 2007; Hale and Opondo, 2005). There exists a great deal of literature on the 
negative aspects of the standards of worker welfare in the flower industry although much of this 
does little by way of assessment of alternatives. For example many NGOs, including War on Want 
(Morser and McRae, 2007), have presented evidence on the negative health consequences of 
working in the flower industry, criticising some of the standards set by international bodies 
detailed here and, by extension, the supermarkets that demand them. They draw attention to the 
low pay by international standards, lack of job security and low levels of unionisation in flower 
production for the UK market. However, this report, and much of the academic literature on the 
subject, fails to assess the alternatives. As displayed in the primary research for this study, the 
‘low wages’ referred to in the study are considerably above the minimum wage in the production 
locations and greatly exceed wages available in alternative forms of employment requiring similar 
qualifications and skills. While the low level of wages is one of the factors that have drawn foreign 
investors to the industry in Ethiopia, when compared to alternative production locations, wages 
are low enough that there is scope to pay employees above average wages. In the above example, 
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Sher - with the growth in profitability of the firm, the increase in competition for workers, and 
due to the owner’s desire to pay a ‘living wage’ amid high inflation - has seen rapid rises in wages 
to a point where they are one of the highest paying employers of low-skilled labour in the 
country, despite the challenges that faced the industry during recent times (IG17). 
Furthermore, alternative employment opportunities available are few. Many of the alternative 
employment opportunities that are available are not subject to international standards governing 
worker welfare, regardless of how ineffectively those in floriculture are enforced, and working 
conditions are inferior, such as the conditions seen in textile factories (Abebe and Fantahun, 2000; 
Woldeyohannes et al., 1991). Specific criticisms, such as the prevalence of repetitive strain injury 
and harmful exposure to chemicals, are genuine concerns but the international standards 
adhered to by producers in order to compete for direct sales mitigate these problems whereas 
other industries which compete for the same labour do not. Furthermore, the focus on the 
supermarket marketing channel is misguided, as highlighted in Chapter 8, as the standards of 
worker welfare and environmental accountability are far more stringent in this marketing stream 
than for auction sales.  
The action called for in the War on Want report (and others like it) includes giving overseas 
workers the right of redress in the UK over negative consequences of UK companies’ involvement 
overseas, contacting UK supermarkets to voice their concerns about the negative impacts of 
sourcing cut flowers from developing countries and switching to Fair Trade flowers. This, 
however, fails to account for the potential negative impact on welfare and poverty for workers in 
developing countries which could be caused by an increase in costs associated with this action. 
Floriculture has created a large number of jobs in Ethiopia, paying significantly above the average 
wage and has the potential to create many more as documented in Chapter 11. One of the 
primary reasons this has occurred is the prevailing cost structure in Ethiopia relative to alternative 
production locations. To impose further costly conditions on companies operating in the country 
may alter the cost structure sufficiently to significantly impact on the number of jobs available 
and, as a result, negatively impact on the ability of the industry to assist in broad-based poverty 
reduction. 
Hughes discusses the nature of auditing of codes of practice and CSR initiatives in Kenyan 
floriculture. The author finds that “there is a continual need for evaluating the success of the 
audit process in guaranteeing responsible business” (2001; 400). Hughes et al. (2008) document 
how media campaigns have been required to highlight ‘abuses undiscovered by third-party audits’ 
in the cut flower sector in Kenya, casting further doubt on the integrity of external independent 
auditing of environmental and social conditions. However, a number of conditions exist in the 
present Ethiopian industry that differ from those experienced at other times in other countries 
meaning the degree to which international standards, codes of conduct and CSR programmes are 
being practically enforced has improved. Firstly, the codes themselves have developed in 
response to previous criticism to make them more accountable, including the ETI as referred to by 
Hughes et al. (ibid). Secondly, as advocated by Hughes (2001) and Hale and Opondo (2005), 
participation of local NGOs and civil society organisations in auditing has been carried out in 
Ethiopia through the involvement of Confederation of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU) in dialogue 
regarding training and auditing procedures (Amera and Aklilu, 2008). Finally, the autocratic, 
interventionist nature of the state in its relations with the industry means that their desire to 
protect the reputation of the industry - both within the industry itself and amongst developed 
world consumers - has allowed them to impose measures on particular producers to ensure they 
comply with the stipulations of the codes. While this does not improve the efficacy of auditing 
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procedures per se, the potential financial implications for producers found in contravention of the 
terms of the codes means that these conditions are more likely to be adhered to. Indeed, shortly 
before the Code was formally ratified, 20 flower farms received notice that they would not be 
granted export permits once the new law enforcing the Code was brought into force if they failed 
to improve environmental and labour standards to comply with the Bronze stage of the Code’s 
requirements (Tamene, 2010). 
9.3 Migration Impact 
The creation of such a large number of new jobs cannot be expected to occur without having an 
impact on migration patterns. The growth of the floriculture industry in Kenya has been criticised 
for the impact it has had on local migration patterns. The centralised nature of the Kenyan 
industry around Lake Naivasha, Lake Nakuru and Mount Kenya means that labour resources in 
these areas quickly became stretched and significant migration occurred from the surrounding 
areas, putting further pressure resources (Hughes, 2000). In Ethiopia, however, the impact on 
migration patterns has in general been far lower, but varies by both the geographical area and the 
labour category. 
It can be seen from the above labour categorisation that migrants with two distinct sets of pull 
factors have been attracted to the Ethiopian floriculture industry, namely domestic and 
international, and these migrants face two very different sets of issues in being absorbed into the 
industry and its geographical and cultural context. Unlike in Kenya for a number of reasons, in the 
majority of the flower growing clusters there has not been significant permanent migration of 
domestic workers. Firstly, population densities in the flower growing areas of Ethiopia are very 
low. Even in the most urban of the flower growing clusters, Debre Zeit, manual labourers have to 
commute distances of up to 20km on a daily basis without any private transport. The majority of 
farms have provided free transport from workers’ homes to the farm and back again in the 
evening. This limits permanent migration as the commutable distance of the farm is increased. 
Farms that have assessed the facility have also found that this improves absentee rates and 
increases employee loyalty at a relatively low cost (Survey; IG6, IG9, IG11, IG13). This is closely 
related to the second reason that migration has not occurred in Ethiopia to the extent that it has 
in Kenya: the land policy in Ethiopia.  This is the primary reason for the low population density in 
rural areas relative to urban areas with a relatively even distribution of population over space. 
Rural-urban migration is low in Ethiopia due to the allocation of plots of land for subsistence and 
exchange farming, which provides a large proportion of income for the rural population and, 
consequently, Ethiopia has the lowest rate of urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa (de Brauwa and 
Mueller, 2011). However, the nature of population growth and inheritance in Ethiopia may mean 
that this situation is temporally limited. Land is being divided into increasingly small plots and in 
certain areas these plots have become insufficient for subsistence. This has the initial impact of 
forcing some household members to find alternative waged employment, utilising the additional 
labour capacity created by plot shrinkage, but could eventually lead to large scale migration of 
entire households in order to sustain livelihoods (Kebede, 2002). 
The current production area of the industry, in all areas except Ziway which is addressed below, 
meant commuter-migrants could be drawn from the local unemployed and underemployed 
population and there was no mass migration of workers. However, if the industry continues to 
expand significantly and the other elements of the horticulture and associated industries grow at 
the projected rates, as discussed on Chapter 11, then these areas are unlikely to be able to 
continue to provide labour in this way. During the peak production period - European winter and 
particularly around Valentine’s Day - farms have begun to experience more severe labour 
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shortages in this category which, if the growth of the industry continues, will not be addressed by 
this local migration: 
...one year and two years back, if they want one labourer they were getting ten. Now 
if they want two or four labourers they are getting one. Because we have a lot of 
employments also in the road construction and so many things that we are facing a 
shortage of labourers now (IG4). 
Labour shortages may force wages up far beyond their current levels and could be sufficient to 
encourage regional and inter-regional migration. In order to do this, incentives would need to be 
such that either families would be split so that labourers (most likely women as discussed above) 
could take up residence close to the flower farm while their subsistence plot is maintained by the 
rest of the family or that the entire family may migrate close to the flower farm and relinquish 
their subsistence plot. Currently, wage differences between Ethiopia and competitor countries are 
such that there is scope for them to increase significantly without jeopardising the country’s 
competitive position. Further research is needed to determine the point at which economic 
incentives are sufficient to induce migration, both individual and familial, and the point at which 
wage increases will cause labour costs in Ethiopia to exceed those of Kenya. 
Almost all of the commuter-migrants are less well-educated, unskilled women and the wage they 
receive provides their family with a supplementary income to farming activity. However, their 
position is particularly vulnerable to changes in the production process or in demand levels. 
Although it is unlikely that any of the manual labour positions in Ethiopian floriculture would ever 
be mechanised as they have been in more developed countries (due to the relative cost and 
efficiency of labour and capital goods in Ethiopia) it is these workers whose hours will be reduced 
or who may be temporarily laid-off due to seasonal and aggregate demand changes (Nadvi, 2004).   
The situation for domestic migrants in Ziway is different to other areas of the country. Permanent 
migration in this area has been significant. At the time of the last census in 2005, when the 
industry was in its infancy in Ziway before Sher relocated operations to the area, the population 
of the town was approximately 35,000. While this remains the last official estimate of population, 
which is, as discussed earlier in the study, questionable in itself, government and industry sources 
estimate the current population of Ziway at 125,000-150,000 (IG4, IG17). This represents a huge 
and rapid increase in the population of the town which coincides exactly with the growth in the 
floriculture industry. There are several factors that have contributed to the migration which 
differentiate the Ziway cluster from other flower growing areas that have seen little immigration. 
Chief among these reasons is the labour requirements for this cluster. As discussed in Chapter 8, 
the fast-maturing nature of the flowers grown in the relatively low altitude Ziway cluster means 
that the labourers/Ha needed in this area are more than double those required in Holeta. This, 
combined with the overall size of the growing cluster – the largest production area of any cluster 
in Ethiopia - means that the total labour requirements of the Ziway cluster are greater than any of 
the other growing areas. 
Furthermore, due to the relocation and subsequent establishment of production area by Sher, the 
expansion of productive capacity in the area was far more rapid than in other clusters. Sher had 
vast experience in the industry and was able to establish both its own production and those 
available on a hire-purchase arrangement far more quickly than new entrants to the industry. This 
speed of development meant that there was no time to introduce commuter-migrants and 
investors were not fully aware of the labour availability and wage levels when entering the 
industry. An additional consideration was the impediment to commuting posed by Lake Ziway 
itself. The lake is by far the largest lake in any of the flower growing clusters in Ethiopia. The town 
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of Ziway is located on the Western shore of the lake, eliminating the potential pool of commuters 
from the west for 15km, and to the north and south for 10km, for all of the lake’s 20km width. A 
commute from Ogolcho on the Eastern shore to the Sher site would take in excess of an hour. The 
scope of this research did not extend to investigating the origins of migrants to the Ziway area but 
this could prove an interesting avenue for further research and has the potential to impact on the 
benefits extracted by labourers in this cluster. 
As identified throughout this study, international migrants were essential in the industry reaching 
critical mass. As such they are welcomed by both the government and the farms themselves with 
an attractive package of salary and benefits. The government waives income tax for foreign 
employees in the flower sector. Farms are allowed to import a number of vehicles tax-free 
(otherwise typically subject to 150-200% tax) dependent on the size of the farm. These will 
commonly be used by foreign employees. This attractive incentives package has led to investors 
and employees migrating from all over the world. This indicates a low level of territorial 
embeddedness amongst the investors and employees but also a low level of network 
embeddedness amongst some investors as they come to floriculture from fields as diverse as 
telecommunications, investment banking, and engineering. Data gathered from the EIA lists 
investors from 42 different countries involved in the industry, although it is likely that only a 
minority of investors have actually moved to the country. Other investors are seen to have 
resisted the temporal link between territorial and network embeddedness as despite decades in 
the industry in a particular location, some network embedded actors have been able to relocate 
to seek out the best opportunities within the GPN in which they are embedded. 
International migrants are sourced from many different locations for different reasons. The 
nationality of investors in a firm has a significant impact on the origin of international migrants. 
Foreign investors from a huge number of countries will, by and large, relocate to Ethiopia and 
bring with them their families and frequently a number of management staff from their country 
of origin; often family members act as management staff. Consultants are almost exclusively 
drawn from the traditional high-tech floriculture sectors of the Netherlands and Israel although in 
terms of a migratory impact, they will have often been more recently based in Kenya or in South 
American production locations. Despite its proximity, there has been very little migration of semi-
skilled labour from Kenya due to the higher wages on offer to this category of labour in Kenya. 
Firms that have relocated operations from Kenya to Ethiopia have, in some cases, brought Kenyan 
staff to fill skills gaps in Ethiopia. 
9.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has documented the processes involved with creating and transforming the labour 
force to fill the requirements of Ethiopia’s rapidly expanding floriculture industry. It has looked at 
the transformation and creation of a labour force and impact of these processes on regional and 
international migration.  
It can be seen from the analysis here that the industry has had a significant impact in improving 
the incomes of the rural poor, by providing those in subsistence farming with an additional 
income. Young people looking to enter the labour force have benefitted from the creation of 
bespoke training programmes with good post-qualification job prospects while those who already 
had some level of qualification or experience in the industry have benefitted from the temporary 
shortage of such workers and have been able to command high salaries. 
The express intentions of the government in promoting the growth of the industry were 
employment creation, knowledge transfer, and foreign currency earnings to address the massive 
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balance of payments deficit. There has undoubtedly been progress in achieving the first of these 
stated goals. There are now an estimated 100,000 employees dependent on the industry and 
there is an increasing level of Ethiopian involvement in the more knowledge-intensive parts of the 
industry such as breeding and farm management (Walta Information Centre, 2010b). The 
question remains, however, how are the benefits extracted by local actors to be secured and 
perhaps increased for the long-term? As can be seen above, the benefits accruing to local actors 
have increased with time since the industry began its expansion. It is argued throughout this 
research that the sustainability and continued transfer of these benefits lies, as determined by the 
GPN framework, in the degree of territorial and network embeddedness of companies within the 
network. For Ethiopia, as can be seen from the transferral of focus to the fruit and vegetable 
export sector documented in Chapter 11 and the efforts at endogenisation to increase the 
proportion of actors with high levels of territorial embeddedness, it is this, rather than network 
embeddedness, that is far more influential as growth opportunities spread into related industries. 
If a government can ‘anchor’ firms in the country or region by manufacturing territorial 
embeddedness, then policies can be used to steer investment toward strategically important 
sectors. Manufacturing territorial embeddedness amongst foreign and local investors, then, 
should be seen as a key policy objective of developing country governments in attempting to 
maximise the benefits local actors extract from NTAEs. While network embeddedness can lead to 
greater enhancement and capture of value by actors within the network, benefits available to 
local actors are limited by the parameters of this industry and are susceptible to its fluctuations. 
Territorial embeddedness, then, leads to diversification of the export base to other commodities, 
and to more sustainable benefits for local actors. 
The evidence presented here to some extent contradicts that of Smith et al., who state that: 
Chains of commodity production and selling thus become mechanisms to enable 
increases in productivity, reductions in the value of labour power and reductions of 
the turnover time of capital to enhance the extraction of surplus value (2002; 47). 
With a production network, the reorganisation of production location has indeed served to 
reduce the value of labour relative to other nodes of the production process. However, the value 
of labour is spatially embedded and the evidence presented here displays how the integration of 
Ethiopian labour into the global economy through the floriculture industry has resulted in the 
value of labour in this context having increased. The value of labour must be conceptualised 
beyond the simple understanding of the proportion of value allocated to work done in the 
production of a commodity. The ability of workers to influence their own pay and conditions must 
also be considered in determining the value of labour within a network and, as has been displayed 
here, the value of labour power in Ethiopia has increased as a result of the floriculture industry’s 
growth. This has occurred partially as a result of demand having outstripped supply for labour, 
and has resulted in the creation of a labour union and an increase in the peripheral benefits 
offered to employees. 
For manual labour, when low wages are offset against the relinquishing of subsistence and trading 
income that would occur as a result of foregoing land rights, permanent economic migration is 
precluded in the majority of clusters; the workforce in each growing cluster is finite, which has 
likely increased the value of labour power in these regions. Caveats must be applied in that the 
land law which effectively limits the supply of labour changes - unlikely given the constitutionally 
entrenched nature of the law - or, perhaps more probably, current population growth means that 
subsistence plots can no longer sustain the livelihoods of the increasing number who depend on 
them, then permanent migration will increase in search of the high wages on offer in floriculture. 
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If this is the case then the effect that constrained labour supply currently has in increasing wages 
will be removed. As a reflection on the status quo, however, productivity gains and increases in 
the extraction of surplus value do not necessarily, as implied by Smith et al. (ibid), have negative 
connotations for the power of and value capture by labour. This is dependent upon institutional 
power and how it manifests itself within the industry.  
This chapter has displayed the importance of situational specificity in an assessment of power 
dynamics in a GPN. Unique economic characteristics of Ethiopia have influenced the ability of 
firms to create and maintain a workforce which has had implications for the capture of value by 
different nodes of the network. In the following chapter the capture of benefits by different 
actors is assessed in greater detail. 
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10. Developmental Impacts 
This chapter addresses two distinct but related aspects of the floriculture industry and the overall 
benefits to Ethiopia in the long-term. The first issues considered are those which may impact on 
the continued growth of the Ethiopian floriculture industry as a whole. From a developmental 
perspective, this set of issues assumes that benefits are accruing to Ethiopian actors without an 
attempt to quantify these benefits or identify the actors to whom they accrue. The second 
element considered in an assessment of the developmental impacts of the industry is to whom 
the benefits generated by floriculture accrue, which can be separated into two key enquiries. The 
first of these enquiries is the degree to which endogenisation15 or Ethiopianisation is occurring 
within the industry as a mechanism to increase the proportion of benefits accruing to local actors. 
The second line of enquiry relates to the progressive nature of the industry and the effect it has 
on the poorest people in society. 
10.1 Factors Affecting the Overall Growth of Ethiopian Floriculture 
This section addresses issues which affect the profitability of firms in the Ethiopian flower industry 
and its continued potential for growth. One such issue, marketing channels, was examined in 
detail in Chapter 8 and so is not discussed fully here.  
Many of the factors which have contributed to the growth of the industry are long-term 
competitive advantages which ensure the industry will continue to attract investment both 
domestically and from abroad. These factors, documented in Chapter 7, include 1) natural 
resources, 2) socioeconomic, ‘social and lifestyle’ advantages, and the 3) institutional 
environment.  
The natural resources that give Ethiopia an advantage in terms of floriculture are largely stable, 
although the scope of this study does not allow for a full environmental impact analysis. An 
exception to this positive portrayal of environmental impact into which research has already been 
conducted, may be water resources. While currently plentiful in Ethiopia, water resources have 
historically been depleted in countries including Kenya through the export of virtual water. 
Pollution of water courses through run-off of improperly managed irrigation systems has the 
potential to damage the water resources for both floriculture and other agricultural uses. 
Hengsdijk and Jansen (2006) have conducted the only study to date, which, while the authors 
admit the study is not sufficient, finds that although water consumption and pollution-per-
hectare is greater from greenhouse floriculture than from open-field vegetable production, the 
relative scales of the industries mean floriculture has a lower environmental impact than the 
majority of agricultural production. Furthermore, the concentrated nature of floricultural 
production offers greater potential for the management of emissions through, for example, the 
creation of artificial wetlands for filtration. The potential negative impacts of run-off from flower 
farms are exacerbated by regulations on the inputs used for the industry having been waived 
(Emana et al., 2010). Hengsdijk and Jansen (2006) find that environmental impact varies greatly by 
farm; reinforced by this research with one farm operating a highly-advanced low-input system 
with the run-off from a hydroponic greenhouse being used to irrigate a drip-fed greenhouse, 
                                                          
 
15
 “Endogenisation” is used in this research to refer to the process of increasing local ownership of the 
industry as a whole or a particular node of the GPN, as it was in this way that the term was used by a 
number of respondents within the industry. 
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while other farms were largely complying with the EHPEA CoP minimum standards documented in 
Chapter 9. In time these considerations may impact on other agricultural activities and force the 
government to regulate the environmental impacts of the sector more carefully with options 
including the withdrawal of the current incentive of free access to water resources for investors in 
floriculture.  
The second factor which initially drew investors to the industry includes low cost labour and a 
peaceful environment and is likely to remain an advantage for the foreseeable future. Despite 
rapid economic growth in recent years and subsequent increases in average wages, labour costs 
in Ethiopia remain significantly below those in competitor countries and so, even if the trend 
continues, Ethiopia is likely to maintain a competitive advantage in this area. The political stability 
aspect of this asset also looks likely to remain with the EPRDF obtaining a mandate until 2015 at 
the earliest and consistently low crime rates contributing to the perception of a peaceful 
environment amongst investors. 
The final factor which assisted Ethiopia in attracting international investment was the institutional 
environment which is considerably more fluid than the previous two factors. Many of the 
provisions encompassed by the institutional environment were enacted to facilitate the 
establishment of the industry to allow it to compete in the international floriculture market. As 
such, components including donor backing and, to some extent, government support in the form 
of tax exemptions and infrastructural investment, may be moved to another sector once the 
industry is deemed to be self-sustaining in order to broaden the economic base. The government 
will also seek to recoup some of its investment in the industry in the form of taxes. Whilst 
revenue was not one of the government’s core objectives in its promotion of the industry – 
explicitly given as employment, knowledge transfer and foreign exchange earnings – once the 
industry becomes self-sustaining it will become an important source of tax revenues (IG4).  
These changes in conditions have the potential to affect Ethiopia’s competitiveness which could 
act as a barrier to the growth of the industry overall. As documented in section 6.2, the 
investment in Ethiopian floriculture came both in response to a growth in aggregate demand 
within the industry and as a result of capital relocating from other flower growing countries. 
While, after the brief reversal in the trend of growing aggregate demand caused by the Global 
Financial Crisis, demand continues to increase in floriculture, particularly in Europe, Ethiopia looks 
set to attract a growing proportion of total floriculture investment. This trend is something that 
both individual producers and the EHPEA have sought to perpetuate by attempting to enter and 
augment new markets such as Russia and the Middle East. However, the growth in aggregate 
demand will inevitably stagnate as markets become saturated, meaning that countries must 
compete for international investment from floricultural producers and offer significant incentives 
to ensure domestic producers remain in the country. It is this competition, combined with the 
changes in the factors which contributed to the initial growth of the industry, which acts as a 
threat to the overall growth of the industry.  
Institutional power within global floriculture is weakened by the international mobility of capital 
as documented in Chapter 5. Accordingly, the Ethiopian government’s ability to attract 
investment is significantly diminished by the fact that there are other developing countries 
seeking to increase FDI by offering similar incentives. Although Ethiopia has a number of 
competitive advantages in attracting foreign investment, they are by no means unique and there 
are any number of additional developing countries in tropical areas which may soon see the 
potential of the industry and may instigate a bidding war, trading off fiscal revenue and workers’ 
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rights as bargaining chips, as frequently argued from a neo-populist perspective (Thompson and 
Scoones, 1994; Thrupp et al., 1995): 
In Maharaj and Dorren’s (1995) critique of the floriculture boom they focus on the inequitable 
conditions that exist for flower growers in developing countries that will never allow them to 
compete in the international market. Due to a lack of domestic demand, developing countries are 
largely dependent upon the consumption patterns of the countries to which they export. As such, 
until 2000 the EU increased the tariff on imported flowers from June-October so that, when 
coupled with the freight costs, developing countries could not compete with European-grown 
flowers. Until 2008, a similar policy could be seen at the Dutch auction houses, still responsible for 
a large percentage of global flower distribution, where foreign growers had to pay 8% of revenue 
in fees as opposed to the 5% that auction house members paid. The merger of Floraholland and 
the Aalsmeer Auction House resulted in a change of membership conditions so that now all 
members receive a discounted rate. Crucially, growers from developing countries are now treated 
equally at the auctions. Ethiopian members are invited to be on the board of the auction, can 
attend meetings and pay the same fees as Dutch members. Floraholland now have 
representatives permanently based in Ethiopia to improve relations and expedite processing 
(Joosten, 2007; IG2).  
The problems associated with the price drop following the Global Financial Crisis also uncovered 
an issue of unequal power relations between corporate actors. The single firm currently breeding 
varieties within Ethiopia is also a medium-sized producer of flowers for export. When the price of 
varieties falls significantly at the auctions over a sustained period this breeder then controls the 
supply of those varieties in order to ensure a minimum price. Breeders will always guarantee 
certain limits on the supply of varieties at the time of sale as - to the buyer - the value of a variety 
is affected greatly by supply. However, in this instance, supply is further reduced in order to 
protect the breeder’s own export interests (IG6). As all breeders that licence varieties in Ethiopia 
are foreign-owned, this is one example of the spatial power asymmetries which persist in the 
production network. Government actors are keen to increase the presence of breeders in the 
country in order to diversify the profile of varieties grown and minimise the power existing 
breeders have over growers. The presence of breeders in a country is likely to result in the 
development of bespoke varieties suited to the climatic needs of the country and the government 
has therefore begun to offer the same incentives for breeders to enter the industry as they do to 
growers (IG4). 
Another way in which Ethiopian producers could add value to their exports is either by exporting 
in final sales packaging, often preferred by direct buyers, or by producing a mixed bouquet ready 
for sale. Supermarket respondents stated that, presuming that the requisite quality is available, it 
is preferable for flowers sourced from Africa to be packed on the farm due to the cost 
advantages, as opposed to flowers sourced from Europe where exchange rates can affect relative 
costs (IG5). The obstacles to both of these options, and hence to the growth of the industry 
through these avenues, are the same: a lack of available inputs. While roses, carnations, 
hypericum, gypsophelia and a range of other ‘filler’ flowers are available in Ethiopia, the range of 
decorative grasses, twigs and leaves needed to complete bouquets for sale are not, as yet, 
produced in Ethiopia: 
...if you want to do arrangements and nice things for hotels and weddings and all 
these sort of things, there is an opportunity for fillers and foliages and grasses and all 
these sort of things. There are plenty roses, we tend to have more roses that we 
compost than anywhere else in the world (IG12). 
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Similarly, packaging and printed label production of a saleable quality is not yet conducted in 
Ethiopia and importing these materials would, in both cases, remove the majority of the value 
added by performing this task in Ethiopia. By contrast, as the flower industries in Columbia and 
subsequently Ecuador have developed, their focus on the direct market in North America has 
resulted in a single farm manufacturing all necessary inputs for bouquets and in some cases 
manufacturing the final sales packaging so that a ready-for-sale product leaves the farm. Due to 
the low labour costs in Ethiopia and the high labour requirements in bouquet production, this 
represents a potential avenue for future expansion of the industry once the key inputs can be 
sourced (IG12). In order to do this Ethiopian producers would need to adapt quickly to market 
trends, in addition to sourcing a wide range of input material (IG5). The lead time of around 60 
days on roses, excluding the far longer time required to establish new plants, is longer than the 
time required to react to trends in the broader market and so for producers to engage in this 
market, they must maintain a wide enough range so that they can alter the mix of products within 
a bouquet. 
In addition to changes in the incentives, both natural and manufactured, for continued 
floricultural production, other factors which may inhibit the continued development of the 
industry include the illegal practices identified above. One such practice is the underreporting of 
sales revenues and subsequent failure to remit turnover to Ethiopia. This has a number of adverse 
effects on Ethiopian actors. Firstly, the government’s objective of earning foreign currency will not 
be fully realised. Government respondents saw no reason for withholding sales revenues as farms 
are permitted to repatriate 90% of their turnover tax-free once it has reached Ethiopia. One of the 
motivations for flower farms in failing to do so - in addition to concerns about the security of their 
finances should government policy on the industry change as it did with the sugar industry under 
the Derg - is that when income tax is introduced after the farm has been exporting profitably for 
five years, tax will be taken from the turnover and if the full amount were to be remitted now, 
and then suddenly drop when they became eligible for tax, suspicion would be raised. 
In addition to the impact on foreign currency reserves owing to the schemes offered by 
international institutional actors identified above, many firms which act as subsidiaries of foreign 
floriculture firms and firms from other sectors have Ethiopian shareholders. One of the 
consequences of underreporting turnover is that these subsidiaries commonly sell their produce 
to their parent company at greatly reduced rates and the commodity is then sold by the parent 
company at auction or to a direct buyer at the market rate. The Ethiopian subsidiary companies, 
therefore, commonly make no profit and some even make a loss. This is evidently an 
unacceptable situation for the Ethiopian shareholders, or indeed partners in joint ventures, 
leading many respondents in this category to be dissatisfied with the situation: 
They [the Ethiopian subsidiary of a Dutch floriculture firm] are always in theory 
making losses here. Shareholders here do not get any dividends. Now I am asking for 
my fair deal or I will become a whistleblower (IG11). 
10.2 Factors Affecting the Distribution of Benefits 
This section serves as a summary of the distribution of benefits explored in the preceding 
chapters before looking more specifically at two important issues which affect the benefits 
available to Ethiopian actors in the long-term. Firstly, endogenisation is an important issue in the 
territorial embeddedness of the industry and the long-term benefits available to Ethiopian actors. 
Secondly, as a developing country the impacts of the industry on the poorest people in society has 
to be central to any assessment of the outcomes for the country. 
  160 
 
As discussed throughout this research, data of a financial nature is very difficult to obtain from the 
industry, and so it is difficult to assess where rents accrue. While there is an assessment of the 
costs involved in set-up and production for auction, it is difficult to know the costs and 
profitability of each stage of the operation. Even in the retail sector where research revealed large 
mark-ups of 50-80% on the importing agent or wholesaler price, overhead and wastage costs are 
unknown and so, while profitability of retailers is likely to be significant, the exact scales of profits 
are unclear. Competition is significant in every node of the GPN, with the possible exception of 
labour, as described in the previous chapter, which has led to wage inflation. Again, until recently, 
competition was limited in the handling agents sector but the introduction of more actors in this 
node has resulted in lower prices paid by growers for export services. 
10.2.1 Endogenisation 
Endogenisation of the floriculture industry is desirable for the Ethiopian government as it will 
have positive developmental impacts in increasing the proportion of benefits accruing to local 
actors. The GPN framework sees two aspects of endogenisation as key determinants of the 
distribution of benefits throughout the production network i) entrepreneurship at the site of 
production, for the enhancement of value, and ii) firm ownership structures, for the capture of 
value. Another of the conceptual categories within the GPN framework is embeddedness which 
plays a crucial role in determining the capture and enhancement of value for local actors within a 
network and thus is a key factor in endogenisation. As discussed elsewhere in the present 
research, power structures, and changes therein, are highly influential in determining the levels of 
embeddedness amongst different actors within the network, showing how the interaction of 
these conceptual categories determines the configuration, and thus developmental outcomes, of 
a given GPN. Territorial embeddedness is far higher amongst local actors as the social, political, 
cultural and economic ties that influence territorial embeddedness grow stronger with time in the 
country. However, measurement of the exact degrees of territorial embeddedness amongst 
different actors within a network has proven empirically problematic to quantify (Hardy and 
Hollinshead, 2011; Sunley, 2008), as has the proportion of revenues that remain in the country in 
the form of reinvestment, savings and consumer spending. In this section, the issues that affect 
foreign and local actors in the industry asymmetrically, and other issues which impact on the 
endogenous growth of the industry, are examined.  
For both Ethiopian and foreign-owned farms as well as for the government, there is a desire to fill 
as many of the positions as possible within the farm with Ethiopians, not simply as a cost-cutting 
measure but for an array of other reasons which makes the demand for such personnel high: 
When you look at the need in country for Ethiopian management, your need starts at 
supervisor level and finishes with investor. There is need for people to feed in at 
appropriate levels and for people to feed from one level to the next level. For any 
business, and for Ethiopia, it is desirable to fill as much of the profile as possible with 
Ethiopian staff. If you employ an expatriate manager, you employ him on a 2 year 
contract it will take him six months to learn the farm, one year to work and six 
months to find the next job. This is neither constructive nor sustainable (IG12).  
It is also important to recognise that a successful foreign-owned farm is far more desirable from a 
government perspective than an unsuccessful Ethiopian-owned farm, provided the opportunity 
cost of the resources afforded to them is not greater than the benefits they bring. This quote from 
an influential institutional actor illustrates the reasons why Ethiopian managers are desirable and 
introduces the issue of trust, which is expanded upon in this section: 
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It’s the quality of the managers [that determines success] not the nationality of the 
manager and a good quality Ethiopian manager will achieve more than a foreign 
manager because he understands the culture and the people.  For the expatriate who 
comes in, crops are a piece of cake but 90% of the success of the farm depends on 
people being able to get people to do the things that you want them to do, to the 
standards you want, on time. People management and understanding is enormously 
important and very complicated in Ethiopia. When you look at who a farm will 
employ by choice, whether a farm will employ an Ethiopian manager or a foreign 
manager, this depends on the philosophy of the investor. Some people of both 
Ethiopian and foreign origin find it difficult to believe that they can trust an Ethiopian 
manager. Similarly, some people will say why do I need a foreign manager when I can 
find a good Ethiopian manager who will make this work? So there is an element of 
personal choice in this. So there are always going to be some foreign managers but 
the percentage of Ethiopians will increase (IG12). 
Foreign firms experience several benefits not afforded to local entrepreneurs attempting to enter 
the industry. Foreign investors who have worked in the floriculture industry in other countries 
come with pre-existing relationships with buyers, suppliers and intermediaries which significantly 
reduce transaction costs. Established supplier relationships can result in more flexible payment 
terms and improved after-sales support. Established buyer relationships mean more guaranteed 
orders and brand loyalty with easier routes to market. New entrants to the industry in Ethiopia 
have had problems obtaining the inputs they need in the quantities they require, often having to 
pay in advance for purchases (Morris, 2006). The longer the industry exists in Ethiopia and the 
more the market grows, the broader and deeper the network of contacts local actors will be able 
to build and consequently, it will become easier for new entrants to become established in the 
market.  
In Phyne and Mansilla’s (2003) study of the salmon export industry in Chile - another high income-
YED product with consumption centred in the developed world where similar governmental 
incentives are offered to those available to floriculture investors in Ethiopia - they found the 
industry to have had a significant impact on overall GDP. However, they did find that the majority 
of benefits were centralised within the country, a problem likely to be repeated in Ethiopia given 
the location of the floriculture industry, and they found the influence of domestic capital to be a 
major factor in growth. Whilst the World Investment Report is not able to provide data on 
domestic investment in Ethiopia, the level of domestic capital available is likely to be far lower 
than that of Chile, reducing the potential for entrance to the market of local entrepreneurs in all 
nodes of the floriculture industry. 
The major criticism in existing literature on floriculture is that the majority of profits from foreign 
entrepreneurs investing in a developing country with policies of tax exemptions, will simply flow 
back in remittances leading them to the conclusion that the only thing a developing country has 
to gain is poorly waged labour (Hale and Opondo, 2005; Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 
2007; Maharaj and Dorren, 1995). In Ethiopia, the five-year exemption from corporate income tax 
with two years loss transferral has not been officially extended, though no flower exporter has 
paid any corporate tax to date. As identified above, the Ethiopian government did not see tax 
revenue as one of their primary goals for the industry. They did, however, target employment as 
one of their three objectives, although they do envisage greater Ethiopian involvement in 
employment categories which allow a greater proportion of value to be captured, through 
increased wages and resultant taxes, over time. The critiques of floriculture based on the absence 
of tax revenue clearly set out corporate power as important in determining benefit distribution 
due to its lack of territorial or network embeddedness. An inverse correlation exists between 
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embeddedness and power for corporate actors within a GPN; the more mobile their capital, the 
greater the influence they can exert over other actors within the network. In the initial stages of 
the industry, Ethiopian actors exhibit a far higher degree of territorial embeddedness as displayed 
by the firms that have filed for bankruptcy. The longer a foreign firm is involved in the industry, 
consistently investing capital and developing local networks, the more they will be embedded in 
both the network and the location, and the balance of power will shift towards institutional 
actors, increasing their ability to influence the distribution of benefits within the network. 
Another issue that specifically affects endogenous growth is the lack of domestic inputs for 
floriculture, increasing costs to growers and decreasing the benefits accruing to local actors 
(Hengsdijk and Jansen, 2006; Joosten, 2007). Whilst in the interim, provisions have been made by 
the government to facilitate easier import of floricultural inputs, their eventual intention is to 
create domestic industries for all floricultural inputs. Success in this objective will result in a 
greater proportion of the value within the GPN being captured by local actors. The multiplier 
effects that have occurred as part of the endogenisation of the industry are discussed in Chapter 
11. 
This chapter summarises the problems involved with using floriculture as a means of 
development in what Maharaj & Dorren call a ‘very dubious development strategy’ (1995; 51). 
They believe the key to making floriculture work as a development strategy is using the initial 
model of power skew towards corporate actors as a mechanism by which information and 
knowledge produced in the North can be accessed, reproduced, and developed by those in the 
South for their own gain. Kugler (2006) argues that: 
MNC’s deployment of subsidiaries via FDI is designed to minimize the risk of 
propagation of specific technical knowledge to potential competitors (445). 
It is then argued that any dissipation of knowledge that does occur serves only to improve 
efficiency and productivity in non-competing and complementary sectors as the foreign investor 
will organise production to maximise imitation lag. If this were the case in the Ethiopian 
floriculture industry, then the potential for endogenous growth would be greatly reduced and 
corporate power would remain stronger than both institutional and collective power. Although 
protection of knowledge inhibiting endogenisation was evident to a degree from primary 
research, several factors contributed to the flow of knowledge between actors within the network 
facilitating Ethiopian involvement in many nodes. Firstly, as explained above, because of the 
unique microclimatic, and other, conditions involved with achieving the optimum production from 
each farm, consultants are commonly required and as such are accessible to both Ethiopian and 
foreign entrepreneurs: 
...most of the flower farms are requiring consultant. Even if you are experienced 
grower you still require consultant. Ethiopian Agricultural research centre can also 
move into this (IG9). 
The second factor which accelerated knowledge flow and allowed Ethiopian actors to enter 
different market sectors is related to the necessity of the employment of consultants and the 
limited supply of local skilled personnel. The small number of skilled personnel including 
biologists, agronomists and botanists that were available in Ethiopia when investment began to 
flow into floriculture were in high demand amongst both Ethiopian and foreign entrepreneurs as 
they were cheaper and more knowledgeable of local conditions than their foreign equivalents. As 
such, these workers were in demand and were able to enter the industry at a higher level than 
they may have been able to in a mature industry with an adequate supply of skilled personnel.  
  163 
 
This promotion of Ethiopian personnel above the level they would achieve in an established 
floriculture industry is evident throughout the industry and has enabled a faster transfer of 
information to local actors. This has been accelerated by the high turnover of staff and transferral 
between farms caused by the overall shortage of skilled personnel. This finding reinforces 
theoretical work of Katz and Ziderman (1990) who argued that, contrary to the previous 
orthodoxy of Becker (1964), firms would continue to finance on-the-job training due to the 
information asymmetries between training and recruiting firms. Under Becker’s theory, recruiting 
firms could allocate part of the cost of training to inflating wages in order to recruit trained 
personnel and thus the cost of training would be passed on to the trainee. Katz and Ziderman 
contend that the significant transaction costs and information asymmetries between firms would 
result in the firms continuing to finance training. In Ethiopian floriculture, transferral rates are 
high where training costs are low, in jobs such as packing and harvesting. However, as argued by 
Katz and Ziderman, in more skilled jobs where training costs and transaction costs are higher, the 
situational specificity of the training for the flower variety, area, and farm, including the soil type, 
irrigation system, and equipment used as discussed elsewhere in this study, means that the 
trained personnel are more valuable to the training firm than the recruiting firm, and so firms will 
continue to pay for training. There is also a degree of knowledge transfer across professional 
fields. Ethiopia had sufficient skills in certain areas including accountancy, elements of logistics, 
and air freight to accommodate the growth of the industry. Professionals in these industries have 
been able to develop the specific skills required to adapt to the floriculture industry and some 
have acquired sufficient knowledge of other aspects of the industry to set up their own farms or 
become more involved in the management of existing farms: 
Of course, we should not close our doors you know. There is always advantage in this 
cross knowledge you know...freedom does not limit your creativeness – it gives you a 
lot of confidence. If you are to be a successful entrepreneur you always have to think 
free and Ethiopian entrepreneurs they come from this background. Now, it has been 
40 years in Kenya, what percentage of the flower growers are Kenyan, I can tell you, 
5%... But we still need always foreign players, you can learn from them (IG10). 
The extent to which these knowledge flows have occurred in sectors in which foreign actors are 
directly involved has been limited by the personal relationships between Ethiopian and foreign 
actors in these sectors. Knowledge sharing has proven to be significant in industrial growth in 
many exporting countries. Growers share information on pest control techniques, post-harvest 
care and other technical and marketing techniques which allow the industry to grow. However, 
research revealed an almost universal disregard for the benefits of grower interaction in Ethiopia. 
Foreign actors, including those from auctions, growers, breeders, and institutional actors 
frequently reported complacency among Ethiopian growers and an unwillingness to learn (IG2, 
IG5, IG7, IG20):  
They think they know it all...they go to one meeting and then never turn up again 
(IG2). 
Conversely, Ethiopian respondents regularly reported that they did not see the benefits of 
information sharing with their foreign counterparts as they felt it would affect their competitive 
position, stating that the Dutch were “difficult people” who were “a little bit mean” (IG9). This is 
one of the few areas where there is an observable difference in the perceptions of these two 
groups, which is partly attributable to the different business cultures of the locations. Whilst 
many in all sectors of the industry reported differences between ‘Ethiopian growers’ and ‘foreign 
growers’ in productivity, behaviour and export practices, in reality the differences that do exist 
are equally spread amongst these groups.  
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Growers’ meetings are held regularly, arranged by auction house representatives, supermarket 
buyers and industry associations for the purpose of information sharing. While it might appear 
that collaboration would harm competition among flower firms, such arrangements have proven 
mutually beneficial in the growth of flower industries globally. Local entrants to the market can 
assist foreign entrants in local business practices and assimilation into society, while experienced 
floriculture actors can assist local entrants to the market with advice on agronomic practices. 
Growers will also discuss common problems such as diseases or the cost of air freight and 
potential solutions and it was through one such growers’ meeting that the freight cooperative, 
discussed above, was conceived.  However Ethiopian growers have been, or at least are perceived 
to have been, reluctant to attend such meetings, a perception accurately characterised by this 
excerpt from an interview conducted with an auction actor: 
...our opinion being Dutch, looking in a Dutch way at the world we think that they 
[Ethiopians], they’re proud people but they’re all very stubborn as well. And whereas 
we might say we like to keep on learning, the Dutch have been well in organising 
themselves in working collectively, sharing information, we think you never know it 
you always have to keep on discovering and learning and working together whereas 
in Ethiopia we feel that if we organise a growers meeting in Ethiopia, it’s very hard to 
get them coming because they’ve been twice. So they think they know ‘hey what’s 
new, I've got other business to do’. The Dutch would never ever take that approach 
and [the Ethiopians are] a bit stubborn and I think that makes them adapt slower 
(IG2). 
This limitation to knowledge transfer is broadly reflective of Kugler’s (2006) findings that 
knowledge flows more easily between than within industries. For example, it is not uncommon 
for experienced growers to assist packaging suppliers in the manufacture of more robust or 
appropriate packaging that will allow higher export volumes and lower loss rates. This is an 
example of relational rent being created resulting in the enhancing of value within the Ethiopian 
floriculture GPN. However, unlike in Kugler’s study, the international floriculture industry is an 
industry where knowledge sharing would usually be common and its limitation is due to the 
personal relationships that exist within this specific network in this specific location.  
Primary research has found that, in this industry and in this locality, the limitations to knowledge 
sharing have not proven to be significant in preventing the vast majority of Ethiopian involvement 
in the industry. While in certain nodes such as breeding, the floriculture industry is knowledge-
intensive, these are not areas in which Ethiopia has a comparative advantage and are not likely to 
be endogenised in the foreseeable future. The technical aspects of what are otherwise not 
knowledge-intensive nodes, such as growing or packaging production, are commonly outsourced 
to consultants by foreign and domestic investors alike and so a lack of knowledge sharing does 
not put domestic actors at a disadvantage in this regard. The fact that growers do not share 
information on common issues undoubtedly means the industry is not creating the maximum 
possible value, but the successful engagement of domestic actors new to the industry in a wide 
variety of different nodes within the industry in which the country is well placed to compete 
means the industry has not suffered significantly from the low rate of knowledge transferral. 
In defence of the prospects for endogenisation within the industry, this respondent drew 
comparison with what he viewed as the more knowledge-intensive sugar industry: 
[T]here are lots of other industry which require much more skill, knowhow, for 
example sugar industry...it’s more complex...we have our own research centre. They 
assist in the selection of varieties and they follow any disease of pest even we have 
haematologist...and then you have to maintain, irrigate them properly for the sugar 
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yield...[The industry] is even growing. And when the Dutch started it, 10 15 years it 
was the private sector...and then it was nationalised but then it continued and the 
Ethiopians are managing it very well. And now they have grown it even two three 
times more...So there used to be one agricultural college in Alemaya now we have so 
many universities now...So, I think when it comes to the Ethiopianisation aspect, the 
knowhow transfer is not such a big problem. We have a stubborn Ethiopian mentality 
but it is good because we now have the confidence to do things for ourselves (IG9). 
Given the above findings about the relative benefits extracted by local and foreign actors, an 
important distinction was drawn here by a number of respondents in this area between who 
benefits and to what degree. While benefits are available to a range of Ethiopian and foreign 
actors, questions have been raised by Ethiopians as to whether the continued involvement of 
foreign actors is beneficial, given the difficulties experienced in knowledge transfer and tax 
exemptions. These views are best summarised in this excerpt from an interview with an Ethiopian 
flower farm investor who has been involved in horticulture in Ethiopia for over 30 years: 
You come to a developing country, you say you want to help, how do you help?! 
When you are only helping and enriching yourself, you know. OK, some margin I can 
understand, some margin is understandable...The whole idea, you know, motives for 
the incentives given was employment, knowledge transfer and foreign exchange. 
None of it is coming. Infrastructure is not...it’s insignificant, because once you go the 
boreholes will not be of use for anybody else. And the road in Debre Zeit is an 
isolated case, all other roads are built by the government. So there is not much 
coming to the people from the foreign involvement in the flowers. And consider also 
the environmental impact, it may be difficult to quantify but it is there. It harms 
people who do not benefit. The 20 30% of the industry that is Ethiopian owned is 
good for the country but it did not require the foreign investors to come in. The 
incentives here are much better than in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. So we give and 
what do we get, like in the bible, what does the bible say; for those who give bread 
you return by stones? But the sector will grow, with or without foreign investment 
(IG10). 
Endogenisation is desirable from a developmental perspective. In the short-term it seems unlikely 
that Ethiopian ownership of farms will increase without a significant change in government policy, 
which is by no means unimaginable. However, knowledge transfer both between and within 
nodes will allow higher levels of Ethiopian participation in all nodes of the network in which 
Ethiopia has a competitive advantage. This will be facilitated in part by the education programmes 
implemented at Jimma and Melkassa. 
10.2.2 Poverty Impacts 
Despite the recent economic growth in Ethiopia, the country remains one of the poorest in the 
world. Although the issues surrounding unemployment and poverty are highly complex in 
Ethiopia due to the nature of land entitlement and the proliferation of subsistence farming, the 
government sees increasing incomes amongst the poorest members of society as one of its 
primary objectives. With 85% of the population rurally-based and the majority of the rural 
inhabitants among the poorest in society, the government is continually searching for ways of 
improving livelihoods specifically in rural areas. The flower industry was targeted by the 
government for promotion, with the employment it would provide to rural inhabitants being one 
of the three primary motivations for doing so. Prior to the take-off of the flower industry, 
subsistence farming was the primary occupation in the rural areas surrounding Addis Ababa, while 
other workers reported employment on state farms or enrolment in education as their 
occupation. Only 8% of rural households in Ethiopia have a non-farm activity as their main source 
of income, giving an indication as to the skill set available for new enterprises in rural areas 
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(Loening and Imru, 2009). Whilst subsistence and exchange agriculture was able to supply the 
basic needs of the majority of the population the majority of the time, it provided limited scope 
for capital accumulation and the provision of healthcare and left households susceptible to agro-
climatic variations. Floriculture takes advantage of relatively small plots of land when compared 
with commercial food production, and so allows subsistence farming to continue, although a 
small number of households have been displaced. Smallholders have been able to gain 
supplementary income, in addition to income from their subsistence and exchange agricultural 
income, from employment on flower farms. However, further research is needed to investigate 
empirically the net impact on food security for households that participate in manual labour in 
floriculture; the effect of the transferral of human resources when food prices are rising rapidly 
needs to be assessed in order for this to be factored into any policy analysis.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, current accounts of the impact of participation as a labourer in NTAE 
production in addition to subsistence production are inadequate and, where available, flawed. 
Furthermore, as advocated by the GPN framework, the particular circumstances of Ethiopia make 
the impact of floriculture on food security a different consideration than those in Colombia as 
examined by Patel-Campillo (2010). In Colombia, the government has traded off workers’ rights, 
and consequently their food security, as a means to improve the attractiveness of the country to 
international investors in the industry, in the face of competition both locally from Ecuador and 
from lower-cost producers such as Ethiopia. Although the evidence presented by Patel-Campillo 
(ibid.) is not robust, evidence presented elsewhere (Farne, 1998; Meier, 1999; Korovkin and 
Sanmiguel-Valderrama, 2007) shows workers capturing decreasing proportions of the value 
created in the GPN, with increased job flexibility decreasing income security. High rural 
unemployment levels mean positions will remain filled if conditions worsen. A government’s 
failure to manufacture territorial embeddedness amongst investors can effectively necessitate 
subsidising industries in which they do not have a comparative advantage using the food security 
of the workers as their subsidy. 
In Ethiopia, however, the situation regarding land rights, the attempts by the government to 
manufacture territorial embeddedness and the competitive advantage of the country in terms of 
international floriculture have allowed the government to pursue a more redistributive agenda. 
As discussed elsewhere in the present research, subsistence agriculture has occurred in addition 
to, rather than at the expense of, productive engagement in floriculture, due largely to Ethiopia’s 
land policy. Labour shortages and CSR initiatives have resulted in improving rather than worsening 
conditions for workers in the industry. Ethiopia is also unlikely to have to compete on a cost basis 
with other production locations in the near future. This combines with measures aimed at 
increasing territorial embeddedness including endogenisation, infrastructural investment and 
encouraging investors to diversify their investment profile, to decrease the mobility of capital and 
thus increase the power of labour to dictate the terms of its engagement in the global floriculture 
GPN. As explored in the following chapter, this territorial embeddedness which has led to 
significant increases in food production forms the other part of the argument as to the positive 
impact of the floriculture industry on food security, summarised in Chapter 11. 
Although wages are low by international standards, the many jobs that have been created by the 
floriculture industry now pay more than double the national recommended minimum wage on 
average. Wages have been inflated by the rapid rise in demand for labour both in floriculture and 
in related industries, meaning farms must pay higher wages in order to retain workers or to 
attract workers from nearby settlements. Furthermore, employment in the industry has been 
skewed significantly towards women, who make up 70-80% of the workforce. This is an additional 
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progressive impact of the industry as employment opportunities for rural women were previously 
very limited (Loening and Imru, 2009).  
In addition to the positive developmental impact of the industry through the provision of 
employment in rural areas, non-monetary benefits have had a significant impact on the lives of 
many of the rural poor involved in floriculture. As well as the increased wages as a result of 
competition for labour, employers have begun to offer a range of other benefits and services in a 
wide range of areas in order to improve employee retention. As documented in Chapter 9, these 
non-monetary benefits are not universally seen as having a positive impact on poverty reduction, 
and have been brought about by the implementation of international standards and CSR 
initiatives. 
Some firms have made less controversial investments which have had positive developmental 
impacts on the wider community in which they are located. Firms have contributed to building 
roads and other infrastructural projects in the areas surrounding their farms, which have assisted 
poverty alleviation by allowing rural populations easier access to markets and connections to 
urban areas where they may sell surplus produce and acquire goods. Primary evidence suggests, 
however, that contributions from growers in this area are over emphasised and the government is 
keen to increase growers’ input to broader infrastructural projects: 
They are only investing in greenhouses and other things with loans from the bank. No 
capital. Not for infrastructure. Not Ethiopians let alone for foreigners. They don’t like 
to spend on infrastructure. If there is five or two kilometre road they don’t like to 
invest on it...we have to have all the time contribution for maintenance. And we are 
also identifying focus companies for coordination, for collection of maintenance and 
other things (IG4). 
This links back to the initial and most important impact that industry has had on poverty: 
employment creation. Road building by the government and private firms has, along with another 
range of sectors that have grown from the industry as a result of multiplier effects, competed for 
the same unskilled labour, further contributing to the upward pressure on wages. Construction, 
like floriculture, is primarily a female occupation in Ethiopia meaning that these unskilled, 
previously marginalised labourers have found a range of new and relatively highly paid 
employment opportunities. Agricultural labour is more male orientated and, as such, no negative 
effects have yet been seen on small farmers as a result of increased wages. Significant 
underemployment still exists within floricultural areas. This pressure is further reduced by the fact 
that on flower farms, outside the peak employment period leading up to St. Valentine’s Day, the 
majority of the tasks are conducted during the morning allowing labourers time to assist with 
harvesting tasks during the remainder of the day. It is possible that the biggest impact of 
floriculture on job creation in the coming years will occur through multiplier effects, as is 
documented in Chapter 11. 
Through its impacts on job creation, household incomes, improvement of inputs and marketing 
opportunities for smallholders, food security, and non-monetary benefits such as healthcare, 
significant poverty gains are available from the floriculture industry in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the 
effect of greater availability of foreign exchange and, in future, fiscal revenues for the Ethiopian 
government, provides the possibility of additional progressive outcomes through spending on 
infrastructure and job creation in rural areas. However, it is important both in the conclusions 
drawn from this chapter and that of the subsequent chapter on multiplier effects, not to 
overstate the poverty impacts of the floriculture industry. Poverty is a chronic problem in Ethiopia 
and the areas that have benefitted directly from floriculture are not among the most food 
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insecure. The only way in which these areas could benefit is through the greater availability of 
food, the potential for which is described in the next chapter, leading to lower prices and through 
progressive government spending. 
This chapter has displayed a more dispersed capture of value than is often found in developing 
country’s engagement in GPNs. Domestic firms, labourers, foreign investors and institutional 
actors have all seen their objectives met to some degree. As territorial embeddedness of investors 
has grown with time in the country, the capture of value by local actors has increased, a process 
that looks set to continue. The following chapter examines one way in which the government has 
successfully manufactured territorial embeddedness and how value created at the site of 
production, prospects for the enhancement of value and the capture of value by local actors all 
look set to increase as a result. 
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11. Multiplier Effects 
Industrial multiplier effects can be divided into three individual effects that occur as the result of 
the growth of one industry on the economy as a whole, assessed through a number of metrics 
including employment, output, income and gross value-added. Firstly, direct effects are simply the 
effects on the industry concerned, in this case flower farms. Secondly, indirect effects are impacts 
on related industries, most commonly suppliers, otherwise defined as the inter-firm transactions 
conducted to satisfy the direct effects. Finally, induced effects are effects attributable to products 
of direct and indirect effects. Induced effects include the spending by employees involved in both 
floriculture and the industries that support it, and profit reinvested by shareholders of firms in 
these industries in other areas which create further employment, output, income, or gross value-
added. It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which induced effects, and to a lesser extent 
indirect effects, are attributable to direct effects. In this chapter attempts are made to determine 
the nature of multipliers that have occurred as a result of floriculture and assess the potential 
significance they may hold for the Ethiopian economy. 
As outlined in Chapter 7, the primary objective of the government in the promotion of the flower 
industry is foreign exchange earnings. However, spillovers from the industry satisfy one of the 
secondary objectives of providing employment while simultaneously diversifying exports, making 
the economy less susceptible to fluctuations in individual commodity prices. This has the 
additional effect of increasing territorial embeddedness amongst foreign investors. Two 
concurrent multiplier effects have occurred as a result of the growth of the flower industry in 
Ethiopia. Firstly there is the indirect effect that as the industry has grown the demand for supplies 
to the industry has become sufficient for local investors to engage in import substitution in inputs. 
Further, as some producers begin to move towards direct marketing having attained the requisite 
levels of quality and consistency, the demand for locally-produced high-quality packaging has 
increased. These direct and indirect effects have proven to be of significant benefit to the broader 
economy emerging from the floriculture industry in Uganda (Asea and Kaija, 2000). Secondly, 
there is the induced effect of growth having occurred as a result of the flower industry in the 
related sector of high-value fruit and vegetable exports. This sector shares some of the same 
infrastructural requirements as the flower industry and the success of floriculture led many 
investors to diversify their interests into this sector. Both of these growth areas have led to an 
increase in demand in the services and construction sectors in the areas in which they are based.  
Without further primary research it is difficult to accurately predict the multipliers that occur as a 
result of floriculture in Ethiopia. However, using two existing sets of research on multipliers, 
namely those that occur as a result of floriculture in other countries and statistics on cash 
increases for the rural poor in developing countries, particularly those from agricultural exports, 
some approximations can be made. The first of these data sets allows some inferences to be 
drawn about the multiplier impacts of the floriculture industry as a whole, while the second 
comparison allows inferences to be drawn about the multiplier impacts that occur as a result of 
the creation of value by a single input, unskilled labour, at multiple nodes.  
The USDA recently produced a model predicting the multipliers, in terms of both jobs and output, 
of the floriculture export industry on the US economy. While this model cannot be used to predict 
multipliers from floriculture in Ethiopia, some useful inferences can be drawn with the following 
caveats. In terms of employment, the number of jobs created by floriculture in Ethiopia will be far 
greater than the number created by the industry in the US for two main reasons. Firstly, the issue 
of low productivity in Ethiopia raised in Chapter 9 means that, in all sectors, more jobs will be 
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created for every dollar generated in export revenue. Secondly, the nature of floriculture exports 
from the US is less labour intensive than those from Ethiopia meaning more jobs are created 
directly in the industry in Ethiopia. These jobs are primarily in the manual labour category 
identified in Chapter 9 and are taken by members of low-income households. As such, the jobs 
are likely to be far more transformative in Ethiopia than a similar job in the US, resulting in a 
higher proportion of workers’ incomes being spent rather than saved, leading to the creation of 
further jobs. The figure for jobs created by floriculture in the US is approximately 12,000 per $1Bn 
US exported, which is likely to be far lower than the equivalent figure for Ethiopia. 
In terms of output, the USDA model predicts $2.36 in total output/dollar in exported value from 
floriculture. This is likely to be closer to the equivalent figure for Ethiopia than the figure for jobs, 
as the inputs to the industry in the two countries are more similar. However, the US floriculture 
industry is likely to exhibit a far lower degree of import leakage with a greater proportion of the 
inputs being manufactured in the country. In the advanced economy of the US, the producer-
output multiplier is likely to be primarily comprised of the externalities covered by section 11.1: 
associated support industries. The externalities addressed in section 11.2 - new industrial 
opportunities - if indeed a causal relationship can be established here, represents somewhat of a 
special case that would be unlikely to occur in an advanced economy. The likely result is that, in 
terms of output as well as in terms of jobs, if sufficient data were available to produce a similar 
model for Ethiopian floriculture, the multipliers from the industry would be higher than they are 
for the US (Edmondson, 2011).  
It is useful to examine the multipliers for export floriculture from a different country, as 
floriculture possesses very different characteristics to both other agricultural exports and 
manufacturing exports in terms of its cost and revenue structure. However, for the reasons 
outlined above, the multipliers that occur as a result of export floriculture in a developing country 
such as Ethiopia will differ significantly from those in a developed nation such as the US. As such it 
is useful to briefly examine research on multipliers that occur as a result of sudden increases in 
income for the rural poor in developing countries.   
The first example of such a case comes in the form of cash transfers. Cash transfers have become 
an increasingly popular means of targeting aid toward the poorest members of society in 
developing countries, intended to bypass inefficiencies including corruption. The impact of cash 
transfer programmes can be seen as similar to the impact of the floriculture industry in that they 
represent a sudden increase in income for people with either no income or very low incomes in 
rural areas. The majority of studies have found significant multipliers, as high as 2.6, as a result of 
cash transfer programmes (Sadoulet and Janvry Benjamin, 2001; Kakwani et al., 2005; Davies and 
Davey, 2008). However, two issues exist that prevent robust inferences being drawn from 
research on cash transfers. Firstly, if distributed efficiently, cash transfers reach the poorest 
people in rural areas and while those involved in unskilled or semi-skilled labour in Ethiopian 
floriculture are poor, their incomes will commonly exceed those of cash transfer recipients and, as 
such, the multipliers that result from an increase in income will differ. A second and related way 
in which multipliers from cash transfers differ is the situational specificity in which the transfers 
occur. As described elsewhere in this research, land policy in Ethiopia means that subsistence 
farming is widespread and so while cash incomes may appear to be similar, income from cash 
transfers and income from floriculture (assuming subsistence output can be maintained) will have 
very different impacts. 
There is a body of evidence which suggests that, in developing countries, growth in the 
agricultural sector can have a substantial complementary impact in increasing broader economic 
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growth as the balance of payments improves and resources are freed for the import of strategic 
capital goods. There is a growth in demand in many sectors amongst the rural poor which 
provides sufficient markets for the manufacturing sector to expand (Timmer and Block, 1994; 
Thirtle et al., 2001; Delgado et al., 1994). Multipliers as a result of exported agricultural 
commodities are lower (Arndt et al., 2000). Bautista and Thomas (1999) investigate the multipliers 
that occur as a result of different agricultural sectors including food crops, traditional exports and 
NTAEs in Zimbabwe, and find that while all were significant (1.55-1.95), NTAEs result in lower 
multipliers as they are dominated by large-scale commercial (LSC) farms. 
These examples from similar geographical, socio-economic and sectoral contexts indicate that 
significant multiplier effects will be seen from Ethiopian floriculture. The way in which multiplier 
effects are realised in both associated support industries and in new industries related to 
floriculture are now documented and the degree to which they affect the overall outcomes of the 
flower industry for local actors is analysed using the GPN framework. 
11.1 Associated Support Industries 
With the growth of Ethiopia’s flower industry there has also been a huge growth in demand in all 
of its support industries. The industries that have benefitted from the growth of the floriculture 
industry include the supply of packing, chemicals and fertilisers, greenhouse materials, irrigation 
systems, building materials, transportation, and cool-chain facilities to complete what is by no 
means an exhaustive list. However, lack of capacity in many of these areas has meant that some 
inputs have had to be imported in order to satisfy demand and quality requirements. 
Endogenisation of associated support industries has been targeted by the government as a 
strategic priority for the industry as it serves to decrease the reliance on imports improving the 
balance of payments, has the potential to provide significant levels of employment, increase the 
levels of embeddedness amongst floriculture actors by establishing local supply networks, and 
incentivise investment in complementary industries. As such the government has extended the 
incentives offered to investors in floriculture to investors in many other areas including breeding 
and have begun construction of a substantial fertiliser factory to supply the industry. 
Many jobs have also been created in the construction and assembly of infrastructure for the 
industry, including building greenhouses, roads, schools, hospitals, housing etc., and further jobs 
have arisen in service sectors which are needed both directly for the industry in areas such as 
accountancy and - for the foreign and local employees involved in the industry who are either 
new to the country or have increased levels of disposable income  respectively - restaurants and 
shops.  
The industries that have benefitted as a result of floriculture require different degrees of skill and 
capital input and, as a result, have been endogenised to varying degrees. In the initial stages of 
the industry, packaging materials were adapted from other industries and, as a result, did not 
meet the quality requirements of the industry. Several packaging firms, including one run by the 
government itself, imported specialist machinery and are now able to produce packaging to a 
standard whereby the vast majority of producers now use domestically produced packaging. This 
progress will soon be negated as the government is set to standardise packaging, initially only for 
roses, in order to increase export volumes and reduce loss rates, meaning the government 
packaging supplier is likely to be the sole provider (see Chapter 7) (IG2, IG4). The vast majority of 
other manufactured goods associated with the industry are imported but jobs have been created 
in sourcing and importing products. Figure 11.1 is a basic diagram of the positive externalities of 
one firm in which research was conducted. 
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Figure 11.1: Positive Externalities of 13.6Ha Floriculture Farm 
The studied firm employs a total of 169 temporary and permanent staff in their farm on which 
they have 12.3Ha under production (an additional 1.3Ha were under construction at time of 
writing). Workers require food and transport and some temporary workers also require 
accommodation and additional utilities. The firm imports from several companies which, 
regulations dictate, must use Ethiopian shipping agents, customs clearance and transportation 
firms. They also use some locally produced inputs where the quality and volume are available and 
competitively priced. The firm itself requires utilities including a private satellite connection for 
more reliable internet. They employ the services of export agents and air freight companies for 
the export of their goods, which have in turn had to employ builders to construct a new cargo 
terminal at Bole Airport. Although for practical reasons they could not be included on this 
diagram, positive externalities can be drawn down further by looking at the extra jobs created by, 
for example, the growth caused by the demand from this firm in a local packaging company and in 
turn the positive impact of those jobs for local service providers etc. The number of people 
employed directly in floriculture is smaller than the total number whose job is directly reliant on 
the industry. 
From this example it can be seen that in terms of associated support industries, some potential 
exists for the indirect effects component of multipliers to occur as a result of Ethiopian 
floriculture. However, without further endogenisation of the peripheral nodes of the GPN, these 
multipliers are likely to be very small. Outside of the direct employment of manual, technical and 
managerial labour, and of consultants employed on farms, floriculture creates employment in a 
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number of low-waged sectors, from manufacturing supplies to logistics. However, the cost 
analysis in Chapter 7 documents how little of a firm’s costs can be attributed to these functions. It 
is important for Ethiopia, then, that functions for which the requisite knowledge and capital 
resources exist, such as the manufacture of inputs, transportation and administrative functions, 
are endogenised in order to maximise the indirect multipliers from floriculture. Furthermore, 
endogenisation of flower farms themselves, through increasing the proportion equity attributable 
to local actors, results in greater indirect multipliers as more of the money earned is spent within 
the country (IG12). Therefore, provided the industry’s aggregate growth does not suffer, 
endogenisation must remain a target of the government in the long-term. 
While the government has been keen to encourage foreign investment in the floriculture industry 
and has designed the investment code to facilitate this, many areas of the Ethiopian economy 
remain protected from foreign investment. As outlined earlier in this research, the government 
feels sufficiently strongly about the protection of certain sectors from foreign involvement that it 
is one of the factors jeopardising accession to the WTO. Some of these sectors are among support 
industries that have benefitted from the growth of the floriculture industry, including the service 
sector which is largely protected for domestic investors. This means that while embeddedness of 
flower farms is limited by the level of foreign ownership, the sectors which have grown to support 
the industry exhibit a far greater degree of territorial embeddedness and, as a result, more of the 
value is captured by local actors. Despite these measures aimed at maximising the indirect effects 
of floriculture and the ability of local actors to capture the benefits of them, far greater potential 
exists for Ethiopia to benefit from multipliers through induced effects. 
11.2 New Industrial Opportunities 
The induced effect from floriculture that has the greatest potential for long-term growth is the 
burgeoning fruit and vegetable sector. Unlike with flowers, which many see as having found their 
‘natural home’ in Ethiopia for the reasons outlined in Chapter 7, there are numerous possible 
production locations offering equivalent if not superior factors of production for the NTAEs which 
have experienced rapid growth in Ethiopia in recent times. Countries with superior ground 
transportation infrastructure and better sea access and shipping infrastructure, with similar 
surpluses of fertile land and low-cost labour and institutional environments conducive to FDI 
represent a far more attractive prospect to agricultural investors. So why have NTAEs expanded 
so rapidly? 
As with all multiplier effects, robust causality can be difficult to establish. In this section an 
attempt is made at triangulation using evidence from primary research including analysis of trade 
data, analysis of secondary documents on changes in government policy and, finally interviews 
with flower farm owners who have diversified into food export and foreign investors that have 
entered other NTAEs directly. Using this triangulation of evidence it is argued that the pace and 
extent of the growth in NTAEs is directly related to the growth of floriculture. The possibility of 
the growth having occurred as a geographical spillover from the growth of NTAEs in Kenya is not 
engaged with fully due to a lack of primary evidence from Kenya. However, the length of time 
between the growth of the industry in Kenya and that of Ethiopia, together with the number of 
differences in key variables affecting investment such as policy climate and factors of production, 
mean that this cannot reasonably be considered a regional spillover. 
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While the global market for cut flowers has existed for hundreds of years and continues to grow 
annually, flowers are fundamentally a non-essential commodity and, as such, are susceptible to 
fashions and trends; indeed the effect of the Global Financial Crisis on flower prices at auction 
displayed the potential pitfalls of an overreliance on this single commodity. Additionally, while 
roses produced in Ethiopia and sold in Europe result in significantly lower carbon emissions than 
those grown in Europe, the impending and unknown realities of fuel price volatility and climate 
change may result in a shift in public opinion making the purchase of flowers, regardless of their 
origin, socially unacceptable. Conversely, food is fundamental to human existence. Food prices 
continue to rise owing to a number of factors documented extensively elsewhere (Headey and 
Fan, 2008; Mitchell, 2008; Trostle, 2008) including an increase in demand caused by a growing 
population and rising incomes in populous nations. Whilst there is a movement towards lowering 
‘food miles’ in order to mitigate the carbon emissions from food transportation, the limited 
production area and necessity for year round supply and diversity of produce means the demand 
for production from the developing world is only going to increase. Furthermore, unlike with 
flowers, there exists the potential to create a significant domestic market for food commodities 
produced for export. Indeed, a significant amount of the investment that has flowed into the 
production of food commodities in recent years is intended primarily to satisfy domestic demand. 
Here, the trade data for cut flowers is analysed alongside data for other NTAEs from Ethiopia in 
order to both display the growth of NTAEs and to display the chronological patterns of growth in 
various commodities. 
 
Figure 11.2 Ethiopian Exports of NTAEs; Source: (International Trade Centre, 2011) 
Figure 11.2 displays the export receipts for a number of NTAEs over the past decade. In order to 
display trends, the figures for cut flowers and vegetables are displayed on the secondary y axis as 
the receipts from these two commodities exceed those of the other NTAEs by up to 20 times. The 
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commodities displayed were selected according to a number of criteria: i) total receipts for the 
second half of the decade exceeded those for the first half of the decade, making it plausible that 
floriculture had influenced the growth of the industry; ii) a figure of at least $1000 US must have 
been recorded for at least five of the ten reporting years, making it possible to assess trends; iii) 
receipts greater than or equal to $50,000 US must have been recorded for 2010, meaning the 
commodity must have grown sufficiently to comprise notable part of the country’s current export 
profile. Floriculture is likely to have influenced export industries where receipts do not yet total 
$50,000 US as they are still in the very early stages of growth but these industries cannot yet be 
analysed quantitatively. 
The first point to address from Figure 11.2 is the relationship between exports of flowers and 
vegetables. The export of cut flowers remained fairly low in absolute terms until 2004 when 
growth rose rapidly to a high and sustained level until 2010. Exports of vegetables, however, 
remained low until three years later when they began to grow at an even faster rate than 
floriculture, overtaking the total export receipts for floriculture by 2009; this growth continued in 
2010. This reinforces the qualitative accounts of several floriculture farms which had entered the 
industry in 2002/3 and begun to export by 2004/2005 diversifying their exports and looking for 
alternative investment opportunities in food markets, having established themselves as 
floriculture exporters. Further, it fits with the narrative that external investors saw the success of 
floriculture exporters utilising similar production conditions before investing in the industry. 
Additionally, suggestions that the growth of new industrial opportunities occurred not as a result 
of an induced effect from floriculture but rather as a result of a change in government policy are 
chronologically dispelled by these statistics. The government’s decision, as part of the GTP, to 
allocate three million hectares of land for investment in agriculture, occurred in late 2009, two 
years after the rapid growth of vegetable exports began. This policy decision merely represents an 
extension of the policies contained in PASDEP and was designed to capitalise on and accelerate 
the successes of this growth sector rather than induce them. 
The second point of analysis from Figure 11.2 relates to what are currently the lower-earning 
commodities displayed on the primary y axis. Until 2004, all of the displayed commodities 
exhibited low and erratic export levels, up to $1.5m US. All commodities, with the exception of 
fresh fruits, experienced a rapid fall in exports during 2005 and 2006, at a time when floriculture 
exports were growing rapidly. Evidence contained elsewhere in this study confirms that this did 
not occur as a result of a production switch as no floriculture firms were previously engaged in 
food production in Ethiopia. Since 2007, exports of these commodities have universally 
experienced rapid growth and all have reached their peak at the end of the recorded period in 
2010. The growth of all of these commodities suffered to some extent as a result of the Global 
Financial Crisis, which, as with floriculture, affected exports most severely in 2008. While the 
precise patterns and rates of growth of this selection of NTAEs vary, all serve to reinforce the 
narrative that the rapid growth in these commodities was correlated with growth in floriculture 
approximately three years earlier. 
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Year 
Exported Volume 
(Metric Tonnes) 
Exported Value 
(Thousand USD) 
Average Value 
(USD)/Tonne Exported 
2002/03 25300 9600 397.4 
2003/04 28452 6870 241.5 
2004/05 37645 15971 424.2 
2005/06 35294 14071 398.7 
2006/07 41028 16373 399.1 
2007/08 41117 18526 450.5 
2008/09 44300 20000 451.5 
2009/10 63140 30000 475.1 
Table 11.1 Fruit and Vegetable Export Performance; Adapted from (Joosten et al., 2011) 
Table 11.1 displays that in addition to the above analysis which shows the scale of growth in food 
exports from Ethiopia, the nature of exports has altered in terms of value. There has been a 
significant growth in average value/tonne of exported fruit and vegetables in recent years. This 
could be reflective of either a switch to the production of higher value commodities, supply-side 
drivers, an increase in the quality of exports, or of changes in global food prices and is likely to be 
partially attributable to a combination of these phenomena. 
The second element of the triangulation of evidence to prove causality between the growth of the 
floriculture industry and the new industrial opportunities that have arisen subsequently is the 
analysis of government policy on the industry. Ethiopia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP), ‘Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme’ (SDPRP), delivered to the 
IMF and World Bank in 2002, was the first official indicator of the government’s pro-floriculture 
policies as displayed in this extract from the document:  
 
Subsequently, PASDEP (2006) noted the ‘real success stories in new businesses such as the flower 
industry’ and identified further measures to be implemented in support of the industry as 
detailed here: 
The enhancement of exports plays an important role in availing foreign exchange for the 
procurement of new technology and to achieve competitiveness in the international market. 
The availability of more foreign currency enables increased processing of agricultural raw 
materials for export enabling a higher number of people to live on off farm activities. This will in 
turn lead to freeing land for fewer and more efficient users who can increase the rate of 
production. Furthermore, the introduction of high value agricultural products for export will 
bring about diversification in the peasant private sector, increase household income, expand the 
market for both excess agricultural production and local manufactures and create more urban 
rural integration and commercialization of the agricultural sector in the longer term. 
In recognition of the above, profitable opportunities will be created for private sector driven 
exports arising from: 
• The production of high value agricultural products such as horticulture including cut flower 
and organic coffee (MOFED, 2002) 
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This clearly outlines that, from a government perspective, it was the success of the floriculture 
industry that led to refocusing policies towards other complementary industries. The measures 
outlined in the SDPRP were aimed at export promotion in general and were by no means 
specifically targeted at floriculture. However, in the period between the design of the SDPRP and 
PASDEP, it was floriculture which experienced the greatest success as a result of these measures, 
which then led to further incentivisation of investment in this industry to build on that growth. It 
is, then, at this stage that ‘winners’ are ‘picked’, carefully observing the response of target 
industries to various incentives and then focusing on these industries. No mention is made of 
attracting foreign investment to or developing fruit and vegetable production in the SDPRP. In 
PASDEP fruits and vegetables are identified along with cereals, oilseeds, pulses, fibre crops, 
coffee, tea and spices, as ‘agricultural crops that will receive special focus’ during the five-year 
period the plan covers. However, the main policy motivation in this regard is to increase 
production through technical assistance and varietal selection with the primary focus being on the 
domestic market. Despite this, export-orientated infrastructural measures are included in the 
document including the construction of 11 cold storage facilities.  
The plan targets annual earnings rising to $120.03m US from fruit and vegetable exports by 
2009/2010. In reality, fruit and vegetable exports amounted to in excess of $300m US in 
2009/2010, greatly exceeding the target set by what was an ‘overly ambitious’ plan (EIU, 2008; 
17). This makes the argument for policy change being the driving force behind the massive growth 
in NTAEs weak. With the GTP, again policy seemed to be reflective and supportive of recent 
With regard to the production of flowers, it is targeted to intensify the initiated flower production 
in areas with altitude of 1,600 2,600 meters above sea level. Accordingly: 
 Out of a total of 2,031 hectares of land leased to investors, the land covered by green 
houses is expected to reach 1,600 hectares; 
 To put an additional 400 hectares of land under green house shelter; 
 By the end of the plan period, a total of 2,000 hectares of land will be utilized for flower 
production; of which 519 hectares of land will be cultivated in 2005/06; 
 Gradual transfer of state owned farms; of which 3,000 hectares of land will be cultivated to 
produce vegetables and fruits for export purposes; 
 By the end of February 2004/05, the 322 hectares of land covered with flower production 
generated employment opportunities for 21,356 people; of which 64.4% are women. From 
those employed for related construction works, 71.4% are male; and, 
 By the end of the plan period, the industry is expected to create employment 
opportunities for more than 70,000 people. 
...The largest success story in the recent past has been the expansion of the cut flower industry. 
The Government has been instrumental in supporting the industry through refining the ongoing 
duty drawback scheme, voucher, and bonded manufacturing warehouse schemes, ensuring access 
to land and finance. As a result, the activities undertaken during the past three years contributed 
to better performance of the export sector. The objective is to expand this kind of experience to 
other sectors. Accordingly, the Government is undertaking sector and product specific studies to 
help identify market opportunities and constraints, and to provide fuller information to potential 
exporters. Among the most promising export items are: oilseeds and pulses, and in the near future 
the export of selected specialized crops that can be grown in Ethiopia’s high altitude environment 
and/or at times of the year when they cannot be produced elsewhere (examples include 
cardamom and other spices, selected legumes, vegetables and fruits), increased export of meat, of 
hides and leather goods, and of garments and textiles, and development of tourism.  
(PASDEP, 2006) 
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growth trends in the economy rather than selecting strategic sectors with the greatest potential 
for achieving the country’s economic objectives, stating in September 2010 for the period 
2010/11-2014/15: 
In the highlands and areas close to major cities, the private investment activities will 
be centered on high value horticulture products that can be produced on limited 
land, using abundant labor, thus generating large employment as well as supply for 
export (25). 
This policy came after large numbers of farms had not only set up operations but had been 
experiencing remarkable growth rates, with exports of fresh vegetables outstripping those of cut 
flowers. Indeed in the period 2004-early 2009, 157 investment projects were allocated to foreign 
investors on land totalling over 600,000 Ha (Cotula et al., 2009). It is not the task of this research 
to ascertain definitively the events or motivations that led in 2009 to the government deciding to 
accelerate the pace of growth in agricultural exports with the allocation of huge swathes of 
additional land for agricultural development. However, the evidence contained here serves to 
invalidate the claim that it was the change in policy that led to the recent growth of agricultural 
exports. 
It is highly likely that some growth in these new industrial opportunities would have occurred 
without the growth of the floriculture industry, as has occurred in a number of other African 
nations with similar factor endowments. However, this research argues that through both the 
expansion of floricultural firms and through the pioneering and successful example set by 
floricultural firms to potential investors in complementary sectors, the pace and extent of growth 
in these new industrial opportunities were greatly increased. The statistical and policy analyses to 
this point have highlighted the extent of the growth in NTAEs and how it chronologically followed 
the explosion of investment in floriculture as well as the fact that policy built upon rather than 
created the growth in these exports. What follows, then, is an analysis of primary research 
displaying the extent to which floriculture was involved in the entry of firms, both floricultural and 
non-floricultural, into the production of other NTAEs. Further, it is shown that the territorial 
embeddedness, which this research sees as vital to the capture and further creation of value, has 
been an important factor in the expansion of firms into other NTAEs. 
Following successful entrance into export floriculture many flower farms started to expand their 
plots and use many of the same growing, transport and export capabilities used in the flower 
industry to produce food commodities. Some farms, with limited growing space, have begun to 
remove less productive flower varieties and grow fruit and vegetables under greenhouses. This 
has occurred partially in response to demand side-drivers with a large increase in year-round 
demand for exotic fruits and vegetables, particularly in the Middle East, from where a great deal 
of new investment has arrived in the sector (Victor, 2007). Many of the larger investors in 
floriculture have, using their experience in agri-business in Ethiopia, either expanded their 
floriculture site(s) or sought new production sites in different climatic regions for the production 
of export food crops. One notable example is the 139,000Ha of a proposed 500,000Ha currently 
being developed by Ethio-Saudi Sheikh Mohammad Al-Amoudi’s Saudi Star Agricultural 
Developments company (Zenebe, 2010). Indeed, Al-Amoudi initially entered the horticulture 
industry in Ethiopia with the purchase of a flower firm, in which he subsequently employed the 
former owner as the general manager. Within two years the firm had switched production away 
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from flowers to exotic fruits and vegetables for export to the Middle East which now constitutes 
the vast majority of the firm’s production (IG3; IG26).  
Similarly, Karuturi, the world’s largest producer of roses, entered Ethiopia in 2004 to begin 
production of Tee-hybrid roses in Holeta. The firm leased an initial 50Ha of land gradually 
increasing the area under production. They now have one of the largest areas of roses under 
production in Ethiopia at 75 Ha, but in 2007 began to diversify their production into food 
products, in which they have since invested heavily. The company now sees Ethiopia as its 
primary food production location and will have 300,000Ha of mainly palm oil and cereal crops 
under production by 2013. This provides a further interesting opportunity as some of these 
products are not initially intended for export but rather as import substitutes. Ethiopia currently 
imports 90,000 tons of palm oil annually and the Karuturi project plans to add 100,000 tons to 
domestic production (Vidal, 2011; IG3; Karuturi Networks Limited, 2011; Indo-Asian News Service, 
2011; The Economic Times, 2011).  
Overall, from the primary survey data collected from 64 of the 68 exporting firms in 2008, 14 
farms had begun some production of food items. Of these firms, six had sought alternative 
production sites solely for the production of food. At this time the majority of the firms that had 
begun production of foodstuffs had done so in order to test the production conditions and the 
markets for their produce: 
I have been looking for ways to spread my investment. You tell me how to make 
money! I'm trying some vegetables and fruit on the farm and I'm looking at a really 
cheap site in the south where we can grow cotton or tobacco or something, the land 
and conditions there are really cheap (IG13). 
Since this time, the rapid upsurge in food exports has not occurred as a result of a switch of flower 
producers into food production, although the exports of Saudi Star Agricultural Developments, 
Sher and Karuturi have made a significant contribution. The majority of exports have come from 
the introduction of new foreign investors including 20,000 hectares developed by the National 
Bank of Egypt, (Afrik-News, 2010; Galal, 2010) and 100,000 hectares of land developed by Punjabi 
farmers in Gambella and Tigray (Global Sikh News, 2010). Several large fruit and vegetable 
producers which have export operations in other developing countries, including Kenya, have 
begun the process of setting up farms for export to various stages of completion. Many 
respondents not involved in floriculture directly alluded to the fact that the entire horticulture 
sector is connected through their related GPNs which had an influence over investment in 
growing food products in Ethiopia (IG12, IG26): 
Everyone was aware that something big was happening in Ethiopia. We all talk, you 
know. And big, big players were investing and having success there. We use a lot of 
the same stuff you know, fertilisers and these things and also people. So we began to 
look more seriously and now we have moved [to Ethiopia] (IG26). 
A small number of farms have also now begun processing fruit and vegetables to produce, 
amongst other commodities, fruit juices, in final sales packaging  (Maritz, 2011; IG8; MIGA, 2011). 
This is conceptually interesting as it introduces prospects of upgrading from the GVC literature. In 
floriculture, this study has found opportunities for industrial upgrading to be few. While some 
have progressed in their production processes so that they can export a product in ‘ready-for-
sale’ condition and others have begun production of bouquet materials for local assembly, there 
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is limited opportunity for movement into the higher-value added sectors such as breeding, 
because of its knowledge or capital intensive nature. In fruit and vegetable production, however, 
there are a number of different ways in which upgrading is possible for Ethiopian producers, 
exemplified by the production of fruit juice. Unlike with flowers which are essentially sold in a 
similar state to that which they are harvested, fruit can be pulped for juice, dried as a snack, 
canned and processed into other products such as baby foods or fruit purees amongst a wide 
range of other ways in which value can be added to the product. Such processes would enable 
local actors to capture more of the final sales value of the products, creating more new jobs by 
continuing to exploit the advantages of low-cost labour. 
Overall the government plans to lease three million hectares of land in the five years to the end of 
2015, costing around $10/Ha/year, with conditions including the satisfaction of domestic demand 
for a commodity before it can be exported, which will potentially have a positive impact on 
domestic food supply and, by extension, poverty (Butler, 2010). There are a huge number of 
issues raised by this land policy. Opinions range from those who view it as a ‘land grab’, with 
investors acting as the new colonisers causing internal displacement and greater rural poverty, to 
the government perspective of this being effective resource utilisation based on factor 
endowment leading to a path out of poverty (Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009; Cotula et al., 2009). 
It is, however, beyond the scope of this research to engage with this debate, seeking instead to 
begin to examine the links between floriculture and the broader expansion of agricultural exports. 
This extract from an interview with a major floriculture investor who has now diversified his 
investment portfolio into a range of other agricultural commodities shows the enthusiasm for 
these new investment opportunities throughout this sector: 
Everyone is investing in China for manufacturing, everyone is investing in India for 
services, everyone needs to invest in Africa for food (IG3). 
Now that both the floriculture industry and other NTAEs have become established, new investors 
continue to be attracted to each sector individually but also, as infrastructures for the supply and 
transportation required for the industries have been established and institutions developed, 
investors who have interests in both flowers and fruit and vegetable production now see the fact 
that the country has producers established in both sectors as a distinct advantage of Ethiopia over 
alternative production locations (Fresh Plaza, 2011). 
The final element of the evidence for the early reliance of the horticulture industry on the 
development of floriculture, and later the symbiosis of the two, is their shared infrastructure. 
Firstly, the on-farm cooled storage facilities allowed the flower farms which did expand into 
horticultural produce to do so at relatively low cost. The cooled grading, sorting and storage 
facility built for floricultural produce at Bole Airport was also adapted in the early stages of export 
horticulture to accommodate food produce. Later a more specialised facility was built to 
accommodate the growth of both industries. Roads have been improved in the areas leading to 
major floricultural developments but this is part of a far more extensive road building programme 
and it would be difficult to prove any causal link in this area (IG4). 
11.3 Developmental Implications 
The government has seen the development of the new industrial opportunities as a chance both 
to diversify the risk involved with reliance on a single crop and to geographically spread the 
benefits of the industry. It must be recognised, however, that the growth of export horticulture 
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has not occurred in any way at the expense of export floriculture and the two sectors are, in fact, 
complementary (IG8, IG12). 
As such the EHDA has improved the already attractive investment code for investors in more 
remote regions where airports in Bahar Dar, Mekele, and Dire Dawa, are being upgraded to 
international status with cool-chain and phytosanitary facilities (IG4, IG15): 
...the horticulture sector, we are looking today at only around Addis. This is because 
of the infrastructure, facilities and other things...There is a direct international flight 
from Bahar Dar to Netherlands, we have arranged that. We are also doing the same 
thing from Mekele...And by doing this we are expecting that we have to attract a lot 
of investors...we want to keep this package...we are struggling to make 
improvements for those who will go to Bahar Dar, Mekele. Instead of 70 30 we are 
planning to make it even 90 10 (IG4). 
However, the problems with the cool-chain that still exist at Bole Airport, despite the high level of 
investment in recent years, are likely to be far more severe at these airports where facilities are 
beginning at a lower standard (IG15). The EHPEA has set a target from the combined floriculture 
and fruit and vegetables sectors of $1.9Bn US/year in sales by the end of 2014. This is a perfect 
example of what Coe et al. (2008a) see as the potential of a flexible labour market to create 
economies of scope through the ‘untraded interdependencies’ of the industries. As Coe et al. 
(ibid) postulate, the role of the local institutions, in this case Oromia state and the national 
government, has been instrumental in the upskilling of labour in the region and, in particular, in 
transferable skills, manifested in part through the education programmes at Jimma and the 
training programmes implemented by the EHPEA. 
This broader horticulture industry is potentially of far greater direct benefit to smallholders and 
the rural poor than the floriculture industry. In the late 1990s the population of Ethiopia was 
estimated at around the same size as that of the UK with a land area approximately five times as 
big. However, the rapid population growth rate (regardless of contestation of its exact degree), 
has led to population having increased by anything up to 50% little more than a decade later, 
which has increased pressure on the food supply significantly. When this fact is combined with 
the pattern of land ownership in Ethiopia, the potential importance of a sector which could 
simultaneously increase domestic food production, decrease the reliance on imported food and 
earn foreign currency becomes evident: 
Ethiopia is quite a big country but the population of Ethiopia is growing enormously. 
And all these people need feeding and if Ethiopia’s going to feed these people the 
subsistence farmers who now feed themselves, have to feed themselves and 
somebody else. There are two ways of contributing to food security, one is to 
increase people’s ability to earn money either by farming or in a job and the other is 
to produce more food (IG12). 
As part of the GTP, the government has, for the first time, begun to focus policy on integrating 
smallholders into high-value export markets, such as fruit, vegetables, herbs and spices. However, 
the nexus of developmental potential and investor profitability available through such integration 
had been recognised and successfully implemented in Ethiopia in the years leading up to the 
formulation of the GTP and the government is, again, trying to reinforce and extend the gains 
already made. The EHPEA has established a project funded by the CFC in Ziway whereby farmers 
are trained in pest management and good agricultural practices so that they can be integrated 
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into the network for food exports. A pack house has been built for communal use in post-harvest 
management. Initially the project was used to allow farmers to sell their produce to the large 
foreign exporter who operates a farm in the area. The project was established after an 
international vegetable exporter sought to increase production but, due to the subsistence 
farming which bordered the farm site, could not increase production area. As such he sought to 
incorporate smallholders into the production of export crops through his firm. The project has 
now been developed so that a cooperative of farmers also have the option to export products for 
themselves with a view to obtaining a fairer price for their produce (IG7, IG8). One respondent 
summarised the broader benefits of this project: 
...a project like this contributes in two ways. It gives [farmers] better market access 
and therefore helps with money but it also gives them better technical agronomy 
skills which don’t just apply to the crop they’re growing for export but they can apply 
to their whole farm (IG12). 
Therefore, in terms of output, in a country where subsistence farming remains the primary source 
of calories for the majority of people, the improvement in agronomy skills that can occur as a 
result of such a project could be positive in terms of overall production, although this will 
evidently vary depending on the type of crops being grown and transferability of the skills 
learned. The real impact of both the improved market access and the diffusion of agronomy skills 
is likely to be slight given the size of the project in relation to the scale of smallholder agriculture 
in Ethiopia. 
The farmers involved in this cooperative have been organised so that chemical inputs are 
allocated on a ‘prescription’ basis. One farmer, on a rotational basis, receives supplementary 
income and training to allow them to dispense chemicals and advice on their proper use on a daily 
or weekly basis. This minimises the risk to both the health of the farmers and the quality of the 
produce (IG8). There are also a number of changes in the attitudes of the farmers and the 
practices engaged in on the farm, which are required in order for the farmers to be successful in 
the industry. In the implementation of the project the EHPEA have experienced difficulty in 
getting farmers to comply with sanitary requirements in separating the human excretory 
fertilisation practices which are both common and beneficial in areas where inputs are scarce 
(Baumgartner and Belevi, 2001), from the requirements for the export of foodstuffs. Toilets are 
now being provided on farm sites and their use is increasingly becoming standard practice. In 
terms of attitudes, it has been difficult to convince smallholders to upgrade the percentage of 
their profit spent on packaging for transport. Smallholders have traditionally been prepared to 
accept losses of 30% of their produce in transport to market locally as a result of poor packaging 
instead of investing more heavily in packaging to mitigate losses. When goods are transported to 
Europe, the relative costs of losses are increased exponentially due to transport costs and so it is 
important to minimise these losses, which the EHPEA are attempting to do with the construction 
of a centralised pack house for all of the farms involved in the scheme (IG8). 
This scheme is already being emulated by private actors in the industry, who see it as satisfying 
the dual objectives of profitability and compliance with the broader CSR objectives discussed in 
Chapter 9. Indeed Sher, as one of the biggest rose growers in the world, began trialling tomatoes 
and capsicum on their Ziway site soon after relocating to Ethiopia. The success of this trial led to 
the building of a 10 hectare site in Awassa at a cost of €75m. Plans are now in place to extend this 
with the implementation of an outgrowers scheme in Meki where the company will construct a 
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packhouse and management facilities (Zenebe, 2008; IG17). Indeed the Meki-Batu Farmer’s 
Cooperative Scheme now supplies crops to a number of different fruit and vegetable exporters 
(Joosten et al., 2011; ACDI-VOCA, 2011). Outgrowers are also now involved in the GPN for 
commodities being processed in Ethiopia such as fruit juice, where they are benefitting from 
better access to irrigation, fertilisers, and pesticides which assist in subsistence production as well 
as supplementary income (MIGA, 2011). The benefits realised by employees in floriculture, such 
as better wages and conditions than in other unskilled employment opportunities, are likely to be 
repeated to some degree in export horticulture as suppliers are subject to the similar 
international standards demanded by buyers (IG4). 
There is a possibility that the example set by the fruit and vegetable sector will have an exoteric 
effect in facilitating the inclusion of smallholders in the export floriculture market through their 
inclusion into a cooperative, as has occurred in Kenya. While the barriers to entry into the market 
for greenhouse grown flowers put the industry beyond the reach of smallholders, some open-field 
summer flowers possess the natural attributes to allow the integration of farmers with any land 
area. In Kenya, Onetha Harlem has been grown by small farmers on plots from a single square 
metre up to 50 square metres. Bulbs are harvested for replanting, allowing farmers to minimise 
the cost of inputs, and the flowers - a variety which is relatively robust in transit allowing for poor 
post-harvest handling - are collected by a central packing and export unit. Farmers receive 
payment as soon as the flowers are delivered to their local collection point (IG8). While this has 
been successful on a small scale and is encouraged by international institutions such as CFC, it is 
unlikely to form a major contribution to the export floriculture industry and is unlikely to provide 
additional income for the majority of the rural poor in Ethiopia. 
This integration of smallholders into the food export markets is one aspect of the broader 
argument of how floriculture has, in the case of Ethiopia and in contrast to arguments of Patel-
Campillo (2010), contributed to increased food security. This is a controversial and multifaceted 
debate but the main arguments for a positive contribution to food security being made by 
floriculture are summarised here. Firstly, incomes of labourers are increased. Wages are 
significantly above the market rate and have increased in line with or in excess of inflation. 
Whether this is spent directly on food or invested in other assets in order to generate further 
buying power, this has increased the purchasing power of households to feed themselves. 
Secondly, total food production will increase through the induced multiplier effects outlined in 
this chapter. The effects on domestic food security are increased by the government’s 
requirement to satisfy domestic demand before engaging in export. Although the conditions of 
this government policy, and the concrete measures the government intends to employ to ensure 
its execution, are unclear, if successful this would likely reduce the price of food in the domestic 
market and increase stability of supply. This will be of particular benefit to those in urban areas 
without access to subsistence production. However, empirical observations are not possible at 
this time due to the early stage of export production of the majority of commodities and the fact 
that the government has artificially capped prices for a number of key commodities to ‘address 
the prevailing unhealthy market competition’. This means that the upward pressure on prices of 
increased wages and the downwards pressure on prices from increased production are obscured 
by food price caps at below market rates (Davison, 2011). It remains to be seen how long these 
caps will remain in place, which represents an interesting avenue for further research. 
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Thirdly, the improved supply of inputs and dissemination of improved agricultural techniques will 
have the effect of further increasing yields, hence increasing total food production. While there 
will be increased demand for some of the inputs used by smallholders, the efficiencies that arise 
from the establishment of supply lines and, in certain areas such as fertiliser, the increased 
market size leading to import substitution, will lead to lower cost inputs, potentially resulting in 
greater utilisation and therefore yields amongst smallholders. 
A final impact of floriculture on food security comes through its impact on infrastructure. 
Smallholders in the area of flower farms are allowed free access to the boreholes, improving their 
ability to irrigate and therefore improving yields. Furthermore, the infrastructural improvements 
including road construction which, whether financed directly by the farms or by government in 
order to facilitate exports from the industry, have facilitated the marketing of surplus produce by 
smallholders, further contributing to food security. 
There are, however, potentially some negative impacts on food security as a result of the flower 
industry, which can be summarised as follows. Firstly, as stated elsewhere in the present 
research, there exists the potential, if floriculture continues to grow, that labour resources will 
begin to be drawn from other sources including the seasonal labour pool required during harvest 
periods. This could increase the price of agricultural labour with the two possible effects both 
leading to rising food prices. Firstly a reduction in available agricultural labour could reduce total 
food production and therefore increase prices. Secondly, the increased cost of labour will mean 
that in order to cover costs, food prices will increase. While the primary labour source for 
floriculture is underemployed female labour which does not have a direct impact on agriculture, 
female labour is used in other aspects of agricultural production such as marketing and processing 
and so their integration into employment in floriculture will have an impact. A mitigating factor in 
this calculation is the provision of healthcare through CSR to workers and their families, which will 
have a noticeable impact on the availability of labour to smallholders, who commonly rely on a 
small, healthy family workforce. An additional consideration is the potential for imported food to 
meet domestic needs and therefore limit prices. However, the gap between key agricultural 
products for food security in terms of domestic and imported prices – once tariffs have been 
applied and excluding the impact of food aid – is large enough that the impact of imported food 
on limiting prices rises is unlikely to be a factor.  
Secondly, the main way in which floriculture - and the industries that have grown as a 
consequence - could impact negatively on food security in Ethiopia is if there is a change in 
several of the policy conditions which have enabled the current situation to emerge. If 
smallholders were to be dispossessed of their land - whether through a general change in land 
policy or through the expansion of commercial agriculture - then their ability to produce their 
own food would be reduced, while their reliance on wages from other agricultural labour would 
increase. As identified above, if labour demand does continue to increase, particularly if there is a 
change in land policy, then migration and therefore labour supply will also increase and the 
conditions for labourers are likely to worsen. The food security of households would consequently 
decrease. Finally, if food producers were not obliged to satisfy domestic demand before engaging 
in export then it is likely that commodity prices would increase and food security would decrease. 
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Figure 11.3 Production of Major Food Crops; Source FAO 
Figure 11.3 shows recent production of five major and two lower-volume food crops. In all of 
these crops production has increased since 2007, when the major expansion of new industrial 
opportunities from floriculture began, with the exception of sugar cane production, which has 
been stable. Although relatively early to identify trends, particularly as some short-term variation 
in production is likely to be partially attributable to weather variations, these early indications 
show that total food production is set to increase. 
In summary, floriculture and the industries that have grown as a result of the industry, have, to 
some degree, had positive developmental outcomes including increased food security in Ethiopia. 
However, these gains could be reversed if changes occur in the policies and labour market 
conditions that have allowed these gains to occur. Furthermore, the areas in which these new 
production industries have arisen are not those areas which experience the greatest food 
insecurity and so, on a macroeconomic level, the impact should not be overstated. 
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12. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this chapter the research questions from Chapter 1 and the more conceptual analytical schema 
in Chapter 2 are returned to, so that the key findings of the thesis may be extrapolated and 
reflections can be made on possible directions for future research. 
Firstly, evidence from the research which contributes to addressing the research questions is 
evaluated as an attempt to consolidate the findings. Following this, focus is expanded to address 
the broader analytical schema so that policy implications can be addressed and the ways in which 
this research can inform further academic enquiry in a number of areas including GPN analysis 
and NTAEs can be examined. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, criticism of the GPN framework has centred on its lack of analytical 
focus. The chapter justified the selection of the framework based on lack of previous work 
examining the particular GPN, meaning a flexible analytical focus was desirable, in addition to 
other discernable advantages over alternative frameworks including flexible method set and 
inclusivity of institutional dimensions. During the research, the conceptual categories which were 
important in determining the configuration of the dimensions of firms, institutions, networks, and 
sectors for the production of this commodity in this location, began to emerge. It was at this point 
that the flexibility of the framework began to present an issue in its failure to guide the analysis. 
Having used the framework to identify the principal factors involved in determining outcomes in 
the GPN, alternative frameworks were utilised, such as political economy work which examined 
the concept of embeddedness in greater detail and management literature examining labour 
dynamics, in order to guide analysis in particular areas. The GPN framework, then, can be best 
utilised as an umbrella under which research into new patterns of production and trade can be 
conducted. In the majority of cases, owing to the flexibility of the framework certain conceptual 
categories and dimensions will become more prominent and insight can be sought from other 
frameworks in order to guide analysis in these areas. 
More rigid frameworks of commodity analysis purposefully exclude potential explanatory 
dimensions including geographical scale - both micro- and macro-level dynamics - and the 
influence of particular groups of actors including formal and informal institutional actors, firms, 
and civil society organisations. In doing this, such frameworks dictate the questions that should be 
asked and, to a lesser extent, the methodology that should be used in asking them. Conversely, 
the GPN framework relies on a researcher’s ability to uncover the most influential processes and 
actors within an individual network. 
12.1 Research Questions 
12.1.1 Why did the cut flower export industry in Ethiopia grow as rapidly and to the 
size that it did and why did this growth occur when it did? 
Chapter 6 established the pace and extent of growth in Ethiopian floriculture upon which this 
research question was based. The key to addressing this question lay in evaluating the local 
context, global context and specific industrial circumstances in which the growth occurred; 
accomplished in Chapters 4, 5, and 7 respectively. 
Chapter 4 explores how the political and economic circumstances in Ethiopia until the last decade 
prevented the industry from attracting significant investment, and how the changes within the 
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last decade which facilitated investment, contributed to the growth of the floriculture industry. 
Ethiopia was previously characterised by political instability and economic policies, including land 
policy, which discouraged FDI. A stable and relatively outward-looking government and changes in 
land and investment policy to facilitate FDI and commercialisation in agriculture were partially 
responsible for the timing and extent of growth in floriculture. Furthermore, through economic 
growth and an influx of overseas aid, infrastructure around the capital was now developed 
sufficiently to accommodate such an industry. 
Chapter 5 documents both the growth of the global floriculture market and relocation of 
production that has occurred over the past 40 years. The reasons for the patterns of production 
that currently exist in floriculture and how they have changed in recent years are explored in 
order to examine the motivations of investors that have relocated production. Push factors, such 
as the rising wages in developed countries or expiry of tax exemptions and violence in alternative 
locations like Kenya, which drove investment to Ethiopia from both traditional and new 
production locations alike are examined. First mention is also made here of the influence of direct 
buyer relationships that have begun to influence the production and consumption of flowers and 
how this has affected the growth of Ethiopian floriculture. 
Chapters 6 and 7 then form the major contribution in terms of addressing this research question. 
They firstly identify the latent assets of Ethiopia as a production location for floricultural products, 
such as the climate, and land and labour availability which set it apart in the minds of investors as 
a place with enormous potential. The chapters examine investor profiles and their various 
motivations for entering the industry. They look at the changes that occurred in the institutional 
environment, both domestically and internationally, aimed at facilitating investment in the 
industry. 
There was no single trigger for the rapid growth of Ethiopian floriculture but rather a combination 
of latent attributes, policy changes reinforced by international institutional support, push factors 
for producers in other countries and imitation of successes by early entrants. The key factor 
appears to have been reaching critical mass, defined by the ability to charter aircraft, secure the 
necessary inputs and form an association to lobby government in the industry’s interest. Natural 
conditions and a low cost structure already existed and government incentives acted as an 
accelerant to growth after the industry had reached critical mass. The factor which did change 
prior to the growth period was the peaceful environment. Whilst not a binary aspect of a society, 
in the minds of investors it can become so; if investors perceive a country to be safe to live and 
work in then they will relocate and if not, they will not. Once the country was perceived to be 
stable after the threat from war with Eritrea had passed, investors began to consider the other 
factors as accessible. Once certain investors had become successful in the industry it began to 
attract domestic and foreign institutional support and growth accelerated rapidly. 
12.1.2 What is the structure of the industry in terms of the actors involved and the 
relationships between them including the geographical origin and industrial histories 
of firms involved? 
Chapter 6 accomplished the goal of identifying the nodes and actors involved in the Ethiopian 
floriculture GPN. It uncovered a network which is truly global in nature with a sphere of influence 
which is expanding along with the industry. The key functions of the industry are identified along 
with the processes involved with getting flowers to market from the idea to invest in the industry 
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through obtaining the required inputs, growing, transportation and finding a market for the 
produce.  
Through Figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10, the multidirectional interconnectedness of these nodes is 
displayed visually, while the plurality in the relationships between nodes is explored in the 
remainder of the research. What is revealed is a range of different relationship patterns between 
nodes of the GPN ranging from entirely vertically integrated firms to nodes with no prior 
connection to others within the network. This finding adds to the justification of adopting a 
framework which allows for an exploration of different patterns of inter-firm and intra-firm 
relationships within a network. 
Chapter 6 provides several different views of the equity stakes held within floriculture by 
nationality. These equity structures reveal a strong influence from actors with high levels of 
network embeddedness originating in the Netherlands and Israel, but also significant equity held 
by investors from a wide range of countries with no significant floricultural background. 
Furthermore, Chapters 6-9 include case studies displaying the industrial histories of firms ranging 
from those with four decades of floriculture experience to those whose background is in 
telecommunications or investment banking, showing a diverse mix of territorially and network 
embedded actors who have become involved in the industry. 
12.1.3 Who have been the primary beneficiaries of this growth to this point and how 
might the distribution of benefits change in future? 
Chapters 6-10 contribute evidence toward the current distribution of benefits from floriculture. It 
would not be an overstatement to say that everyone involved in Ethiopian floriculture at this 
point has benefitted in some way. Exceptions to this statement might be those whose land has 
been repossessed for lease to floricultural farms and those that have been affected negatively by 
the environmental impact of the industry, but evidence of either of these phenomena - if indeed 
they exist - is not as yet available. Land repossessed for floriculture has been small due to the 
small scale of the industry when compared with, for example, the broader agricultural expansion 
documented in Chapter 11, and land which was repossessed was deemed to have been 
underutilised. The environmental impact of the industry is not fully engaged with here but due to 
its relatively dispersed nature, high levels of groundwater availability, and presence of 
international environmental standards from the early stages of the industry’s development, the 
environmental impact of the industry is unlikely to be as severe as in Kenya. 
The question is, then, who has benefitted the most from the growth of the floriculture industry? 
The answer is not easily quantifiable, but there are two ways in which an indication of the accrual 
of benefits can be gained. Firstly, one could engage in a financial assessment of the profitability of 
firms in each node of the GPN, or the proportion of final sales value accruing to each node. 
Unfortunately, this is hindered by the difficulty in obtaining financial data documented 
throughout this research and further complicated by having to offset the different risks involved 
with each stage of the process against the profits. The second way to assess the relative benefits 
of the industry for different actors is to look qualitatively at what they have gained from the 
industry in relation to the potential benefits if the industry had not developed in Ethiopia. This 
method, too, is problematic as a result of poor access to information, and so a combination of a 
qualitative assessment of the benefits accruing to different actors and any available financial data 
is used here to assess the distribution of benefits.  
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Firstly, labourers have taken their cash income from effectively zero to up to $2 per day, with little 
opportunity cost as this has occurred through a utilisation of surplus labour, which represents a 
huge percentage increase in their incomes and a probable increase in the food security of their 
households. Working conditions, too, are superior to comparable positions in other industries. If 
floriculture had not developed in the way that it did, alternative means for improving incomes 
and lifestyle would have been few. Investors that have managed their firms successfully, choosing 
the correct variety for the correct location, identifying the most profitable target market and 
managing labour successfully to ensure maximum productivity, have realised significant returns 
on their investment, which they have been able to repatriate if they desire. For those who have 
not managed their farm successfully, risks undertaken in entering the industry were not 
particularly arduous and many have left the industry having lost, primarily, only time. Successful 
foreign investors have been able to use the natural, socio-economic and policy conditions in 
Ethiopia to allow them to extract greater profits than would be available in alternative production 
locations, explaining their decision to locate there. However, investors with high levels of network 
embeddedness would still have been able to make substantial profits in other production 
locations and so their marginal benefit from the industry is lower than labourers’. The same could 
be said of other actors embedded in the network that have entered the Ethiopian industry such as 
importing agents, breeders, and retailers. Such actors have been able to decrease their costs 
through their involvement in the industry but involvement has served to increase the profitability 
of their operations from alternative production locations by a relatively small amount, although 
they are now able to conduct their business in what they perceive to be a more desirable location. 
Local investors, in the majority of cases, have entered an industry in which they previously had 
little or no experience. They have acquired knowledge from experienced actors in the industry to 
allow some of them to be successful. Without the introduction of foreign actors, both commercial 
and institutional, the industry would be unlikely to have reached critical mass, learning processes 
would have been slower and integration into global markets would have been more difficult. They 
may also have found it more difficult to acquire the necessary capital as it was the success of early 
foreign investors who took DBoE loans that persuaded the DBoE to expand their finance scheme 
to domestic entrepreneurs. 
As described throughout the research, the benefits created by Ethiopian involvement in 
floriculture are many and range from improvements in the quality of life for foreign investors to 
improvements in the availability of education and healthcare in the communities where flower 
farms are located. In absolute financial terms, however, the additional rents that have been 
created by firms that have relocated to Ethiopia are attributable to a range of natural and 
socioeconomic characteristics. For example, Sher, having operated profitably in Kenya for over 20 
years, relocated to Ziway where they perceive the primary advantages over alternative 
production locations to be a secure environment, but the lower labour costs – at up to 25% lower 
than those in Kenya – have created differential rents. Conversely, for producers in Holeta, when 
compared with alternative production locations, differential rents have been created by the 
superior ecological conditions available in Ethiopia when compared with Kenya, or lower labour 
and transport costs when compared with Ecuador. Domestic entrepreneurs have invested in 
floriculture as they are potentially able to make greater returns than in alternative investment 
opportunities and at a significantly lower financial risk.  
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Amongst corporate actors financial data is scant. The costs analysis in Chapter 7 is unable to 
provide any suggestion as to where value is captured as, for example, evidence given on air 
transportation proves that despite that fact that it accounts for a significant proportion of costs, 
the only operator in the sector is, in fact, subsidising the industry. Royalties, too, constitute a 
significant proportion of total costs but research revealed high development costs and 
competition amongst breeders meaning it is unlikely that breeders are able to appropriate a large 
proportion of the value created. Retail actors have benefitted by being able to obtain quality 
produce at a lower price while simultaneously externalising the burden of risk to growers either 
directly or via importing agents. Importing agents have been able to supply these retail actors 
with similar or higher quality produce at a lower cost. However, they must bear the additional 
cost of auditing and the risks involved with breaking from established supply agreements, and so 
while they have been able to appropriate a greater proportion of the value created, this has been 
tempered by additional risks. 
As examined throughout the research, the additional rents created by both domestic and foreign 
investors in all of the growing clusters - whether they are network embedded investors creating 
additional rents over alternative production locations or territorially embedded investors creating 
additional rents over alternative investment opportunities - are to some degree dissipated by 
lower productivity, infrastructural investment, and investment in meeting environmental and 
welfare standards. However, these investments do not completely eliminate additional rents, 
particularly for successful investors; for these investors the current policy structure means that it 
is they who, in the short-term, capture the additional value that has been created. If the 
government is successful in manufacturing territorial embeddedness amongst investors, who 
through diversification can create further organisational and relational rents, the government can 
begin to appropriate a greater proportion of the additional rents through the introduction of 
taxation. The maintenance of low land rent is unlikely to change, with 99-year leases as a 
mechanism for manufacturing embeddedness. 
From a government perspective, benefits to this point have come primarily in the form of foreign 
exchange, a highly desirable feature of a new industry in a country with a severe balance of 
payments deficit. Secondarily, the government has seen employment created in rural areas and 
will, in future, receive significant tax income from the industry if it remains profitable and if they 
can minimise capital flight. The government has been able to achieve these benefits at relatively 
little opportunity cost, making use of underutilised resources in achieving these benefits. 
Furthermore, the next research question concerning multiplier effects could ensure that, in 
future, the benefits accruing to the government of Ethiopia as a result of floriculture could 
increase significantly. If this is the case, however, the opportunity cost is likely to be far greater. 
While economic rent accruing to labour is likely to be the lowest of any node in the network, this 
analysis has shown that relative to an alternative situation in which the floriculture industry had 
not developed, it is labourers who have achieved the greatest relative benefit. When taken with 
local investors and state actors, local actors have undoubtedly received the greatest marginal 
benefit from the growth of the floriculture industry in Ethiopia. 
12.1.4 What, if any, are the multiplier impacts of the industry on the broader economy? 
Chapter 11 addresses the dual multiplier impacts of floriculture on the broader Ethiopian 
economy. Evidence suggests that in the short-term direct multiplier effects are small, as they are 
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limited to the small proportion of exported value attributable to wages. In the longer term 
however, as import substitution continues - as it has with fertiliser and packaging production - 
and the industry is further endogenised these indirect multiplier effects are set to increase 
significantly. 
Despite the potential of these indirect multipliers, the most significant multiplier impact of the 
floriculture industry is the induced multiplier of the growth of new industrial opportunities. 
Chapter 11 shows that the rapid and continuing growth of export food production in Ethiopia, 
particularly of exotic fruits and vegetables, can be attributed, to some extent, to the growth of the 
floriculture industry. The potential benefits in terms of foreign exchange earnings, tax revenue 
and employment from these industries have the potential to dwarf those of floriculture, with the 
possible additional benefits of improved domestic food security. However, the negative aspects of 
floriculture would also be exacerbated by the spread of export agriculture. Floriculture commands 
a far higher value-per-hectare than other agricultural commodities and so the land required to 
satisfy demand is far smaller. Commercial agriculture will likely result in higher levels of 
displacement and the environmental impacts will be far greater owing to the industrial scale. 
12.1.5 What are the developmental impacts of the industry, both now and in the longer 
term? 
This research question is strongly related to the third research question but focuses more 
concretely on development and poverty alleviation outcomes and how they might change over 
time. The floriculture industry has created employment leading to higher incomes for people - 
primarily women - in rural areas where employment opportunities were previously few. 
Furthermore, as examined in section 11.3, floriculture has made a contribution to improved food 
security for some people, although not those in the most food insecure areas. This has been 
achieved through a combination of increased incomes and increased total food production partly 
facilitated by improved agronomic practices and availability of agricultural inputs. These benefits 
have been secured by government policy on food prices and satisfaction of domestic demand 
prior to export. Ethiopian entrepreneurs have also been given the opportunity, by the 
combination of circumstances outlined above, to invest in a profitable industry and in the 
majority of cases profits are reinvested in expansion or other business opportunities within the 
Ethiopian economy. These additional investments then create further employment and contribute 
to poverty alleviation. 
In the longer term, then, an improvement in the developmental impacts of floriculture on 
Ethiopia depends on four key factors. Firstly, employment: can employment be secured, the 
number of jobs increased and geographically dispersed in order to ensure the transformational 
effects of even relatively low-waged jobs are felt by as many as possible? Secondly, 
endogenisation: can the various nodes of the industry be endogenised sufficiently to create 
higher levels of Ethiopian involvement in higher value-added sectors of the industry and ensure 
profits and wages are retained and reinvested in the domestic economy? Thirdly, macro-
economically: can the government begin to obtain income through taxation of the industry, and 
can the industry grow sufficiently so that, with continued endogenisation, balance of payments is 
improved so that more public money is freed for progressive spending on infrastructural projects 
continuing with ADLI? Finally, food security: can the floriculture industry, both directly and 
through its multipliers with respect to food production, continue to improve food security for the 
rural poor so as to remove them from the spectre of continued food shortages? 
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12.2 Analytical Schema 
This section is used to revisit the analytical schema identified in Chapter 2 using the GPN 
framework in order to evaluate how the research has addressed it and what the research has 
added to debate in these areas. 
12.2.1  An exploration of how Ethiopian floriculture created, enhanced and captured 
value through the relationship between regional and national government, local 
employees and entrepreneurs, and the potential for each of these value 
transformations to change over time. 
There is no doubt from the evidence presented here that floriculture has created value in 
Ethiopia. Land obtained from several sources including unproductive government farms, 
subsistence plots, and unutilised land, has been transformed from 1550Ha which had been able to 
sustain a small number of households and a handful of jobs into an industry with an annual 
turnover of around $200m in little over half a decade. The value, by any measure including the 
conversion of previous subsistence output and current floriculture revenue to calories, created by 
the same resources, has increased significantly. Questions might be raised about the depletion of 
assets as a result of the industry, and while further research needs to be done on the 
environmental impact of floricultural operations in Ethiopia, control procedures conducted by 
firms outlined in Chapter 9 and the relatively small geographical scale of the industry (0.05% of 
the total three million hectares that the government has allocated for agricultural development), 
mean that the depletion of assets for future use is likely to be minimal. Indeed, access to 
resources may have been improved through newly dug boreholes, provided it is sustainably 
extracted. 
The situation regarding enhancement of value is less clear cut. Henderson et al. (2002) identify 
four issues involved in the enhancement of value, the first of which is the nature and extent of 
technology transfer. While floriculture - especially in nodes such as breeding - is a knowledge-
intensive industry, the technology required to be successful is relatively basic and the companies 
selling infrastructural supplies such as greenhouse materials, irrigation equipment and grading 
machinery will seek expansion into new markets. Some of these nodes have subsequently been 
endogenised, with Ethiopian companies now manufacturing high quality packaging materials and 
other inputs. 
The second issue involved in value enhancement is how major firms in the GPN engage with 
suppliers and subcontractors to improve the quality and technological sophistication of their 
products. This has occurred in many nodes of the Ethiopian floriculture GPN during the industry’s 
growth. Chapter 8 in particular displays how lead firms and importing agents have worked with 
suppliers in order to improve the standard of packaging available for the industry and the 
technological sophistication of the product to the extent that bouquets can now be exported in 
final sales packaging for the direct market. This element of the GPN framework draws 
substantially from more traditional commodity literature using the GVC and commodity chains 
frameworks on upgrading. However, these alternative frameworks see upgrading as a necessary 
process for developing countries to enhance value in their engagement in production networks 
(Porter, 1990; Kaplinsky, 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Conversely, the present research 
has displayed the necessity of engagement with individual production networks, using the GPN 
framework to show that for some developing country actors in certain networks, upgrading is not 
influential in the distribution of benefits.  
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In floriculture, the degree to which functional upgrading is possible is highly constrained by both 
the nature of the commodity, in that the final retail product differs little from the primary 
commodity, and the geographical patterns of consumption, in that the transformations or further 
processing of the commodity is constrained by the necessity of rapid long-distance transportation. 
Product upgrading too is constrained as, for the reasons discussed in Chapter 8, farms are suited 
to grow a certain type of flower based primarily on natural conditions and while good varietal 
selection will enable a producer to maximise profit, this is within a very limited sphere of what can 
be grown on that site. Furthermore, process upgrading is neither likely nor feasible given the cost 
structure of Ethiopia. The majority of farms have automated grading procedures and use labour 
intensive processes where it is economical to do so. The natural conditions mean that, unlike with 
flower production in the Netherlands, further capital investment in equipment is unlikely to 
improve returns. Finally, inter-chain upgrading is occurring to some degree as discussed in 
Chapter 11 but this is by no means a logical progression and will only occur for a minority of 
flower producers. This, combined with the high value-per-hectare available from floriculture, 
means that floriculture possesses different characteristics to many of the commodities analysed 
using GVC or commodity chain frameworks. The key to enhancing value for developing countries 
in floriculture lies in performing well against the specific metrics in an identified target market as 
documented in Chapter 8. 
Thirdly, as a result of the above increase in quality and technological sophistication, the demand 
for skill in a given labour process can increase and this can enhance value. The learning process 
for floriculturalists in Ethiopia for all entrants but particularly those new to the industry - was 
rapid. As such, methods used at each stage of the production process in the network have 
developed, including in the production of input materials, and there has been a rapid up-skilling of 
labour throughout the industry. However, this has occurred largely because of the position of the 
Ethiopian industry in global floriculture five years ago relative to now and thus does not 
necessarily reflect a trend which will continue. As more companies mature in the industry and 
obtain the necessary reputation for quality and consistency, the option of direct supply - together 
with the opportunities this marketing channel provides for upgrading into producing ‘ready-for-
sale’ flowers - and the demand for skill within the labour process will increase, which provides a 
more likely avenue for value enhancement in this regard. 
Finally, enhancement of value can be influenced by whether local firms can begin to create 
organisational, relational and brand rents of their own. As another product of the rapid pace of 
the development of the industry, value has been enhanced as organisational rents have been 
created through the removal of internal inefficiencies within firms. New entrants to the market 
have been able to vertically integrate certain functions and outsource others which has 
contributed to enhancing value. Relational rents have also been important in the enhancement of 
value. The nodes of the GPN and the relationships between the nodes have been consistently 
restructured with the objective of improving efficiency within the industry. From the institutional 
nodes, relations between nodes of the network have been altered during the industry’s 
development to enhance value. Many actors have become one - from an investor’s perspective - 
in the form of the EHDA to the expansion of the handling agents sector from a single operator to 
three main operators. Finally, brand rents, which do not manifest themselves in floriculture as 
clearly as they do in manufacturing and service sectors, have been created through the auction 
system, where certain farms have been able to enhance value through a consistent, quality supply 
to the auction, encouraging repeat custom. In other nodes of the GPN too, brand rents have been 
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created. Packaging manufacturers have been able to develop a reputation for quality and value 
which has resulted in their promotion through farm interactions. 
The final element of value to be addressed in this question is capture of value for the benefit of 
the location in which the value is created and enhanced. Here, Henderson et al. highlight 
government policy, firm ownership and the nature of corporate governance as the pertinent 
issues. As discussed throughout this research, and particularly in Chapter 7, government policy 
has had a significant influence on how value is created and enhanced but also captured, with 
evidence suggesting the latter has been traded off at the expense of the other two aspects of 
value in the short- to medium-term. 
Government policy on the floriculture industry is not as clear an example of ‘picking winners’ as it 
might first appear. As described in Chapter 4, government policy in Ethiopia tends to channel 
scarce resources towards a few priority sectors (World Bank, 2009b). This policy is defended by 
Rodrik (2008) who argues that, in a developing country, entrepreneurship consists of discovering 
the underlying cost structure and finding out what can be produced profitably. Initial investors in 
any sector face great risks and their cost discovery becomes public knowledge so that the social 
value they generate exceeds the private costs. Rodrik (2008) therefore commends the 
government for subsidising the ‘courageous entrepreneurs’, as latecomers to the market are now 
the beneficiaries of the ‘tinkering’ of early investors, in an industry where local soil conditions 
contribute greatly to the profitability of a farm. However, the evidence presented here contends 
that government policy has followed rather than led development in both the floriculture industry 
and subsequently in other NTAEs. The policies presented here, which have undoubtedly had an 
impact on the industry’s growth, came after the initial growth of the industry occurred. This 
research seeks to re-package the concept of ‘picking winners’ as picking saplings rather than 
picking seeds (Wade, 2009). The government is now pursuing similar policies in other priority 
sectors including the agricultural export commodities documented above together with textiles. 
Firm ownership is explored throughout Chapter 7 and one of the principal findings of this research 
is how value capture is influenced by the ownership profile of firms. While only a third of the 
industry is owned by local actors, this represents a higher proportion than in many other 
developing country floriculture industries. How this profile develops over time will be a key factor 
in determining the overall impact of the industry on Ethiopia. The nature of corporate governance 
in the industry is found to be pluralistic and varies greatly by the origin of the investor, the degree 
to which they pursue each marketing channel, and the size of the company. However, the nature 
of corporate governance was found to be less influential in the capture of value than the other 
factors. The larger firms and those that pursue the direct marketing stream tend to employ more 
people through the implementation of CSR initiatives and greater positive externalities. 
An important issue which is not included in the above evaluation is the influence of the overall 
governance of the GPN in the creation, enhancement and capture of value. This study has found, 
in Chapters 7 and 8, that the overriding governance system of the industry and Ethiopian society 
(although not formal government) is based on trust and, as such, it is those actors who are able to 
foster trust between themselves and other actors in the network that are the most successful in 
the creation, enhancement and capture of value. Both the nature of the industry (see Claro et al., 
2006, for evidence of trust-based governance in floriculture) and the nature of the country, with 
its long-term financing arrangements and inefficient legal systems lead to a prevailing system of 
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trust and reputation-based governance (Fafchamps, 1999; Fafchamps, 2004). Conventional 
economic logic sees the by-products of this system of governance as being inefficiency and the 
stifling of innovation, which has negative connotations for the creation of value (World Bank, 
2009b). While markets where there is an absence of regulatory enforcement and where different 
forms of network governance prevail are common in sub-Saharan Africa, the research has shown 
that the governance of exchange in an industry can be determined by a combination of specific 
local, network and market circumstances (Fafchamps, 2004). The lack of regulatory enforcement 
in sub-Saharan Africa has little to do with the trust and reputation-based governance system of 
the floriculture industry. Floriculture has been governed in this way since before the entrance of 
developing countries into the production sphere and it is largely determined by the nature of the 
product than capabilities of any regulatory bodies. Industry leaders in auction marketing have 
grown within a system largely based on trust and reputation but even these actors have retained 
the need for a key element of regulatory protection through the auction payment system. Direct 
marketing systems are governed more formally with longer term buying agreements but with 
written contracts rare, trust remains the key factor governing the exchange. 
Embeddedness has also been found to assist in the capture of value through the formation of 
trust between actors in other networks and the effect of embeddedness on Ethiopian floriculture 
is evaluated below (Vieira and Traill, 2008; Oliver et al., 2008; Coase, 1937). 
12.2.2 An analysis of how territorial and network embeddedness affected the level and 
distribution of benefits accruing to different nodes of the Ethiopian floriculture GPN 
and how might levels of embeddedness change over time. 
Table 12.1, drawn from information throughout the thesis, gives an indication as to the views of 
different actors within the GPN regarding the different types of embeddedness among farm 
owners/investors. 
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Actors 
Type of 
Embeddedness Impact Reasons 
Unskilled 
Workers16 
Territorial Positive 
Jobs-have-been-created-and-high-levels-of-
territorial-embeddedness-increases-job-security 
Network Neutral 
Sectoral-labour-mobility-is-high-amongst-these-
workers-and-if-investment-moved-from-floriculture-
to-another-industry,-in-the-same-region,-with-
equal-employment-opportunities-then-there-would-
be-little-impact 
Skilled Local 
Workers 
Territorial Positive 
Geographical-mobility-is-relatively-low-amongst-
these-workers-and-they-are-unlikely-to-be-able-to-
relocate-in-search-of-work 
Network Positive 
These workers would not be able to command equal 
wages in other sectors. 
Farm 
Owners/ 
Investors 
Territorial Negative 
High-levels-of-territorial-embeddedness-decreases-
investors'-power-relative-to-institutional-actors-as-
the-threat-of-capital-flight-can-incentivise-
government-to-provide-better-investment-
conditions. 
Network Neutral 
Experience-in-a-sector-may-lead-to-higher-profits-
but-capitalising-on-growth-opportunities-in-other-
sectors-may-also-provide-profits. 
Ethiopian 
Government 
Territorial Positive 
This is the key to harnessing the benefits of 
investment code liberalisation - making capital stick 
Network Positive 
If-the-sector-remains-profitable-then-the-
government-can-begin-to-capture-a-greater-
proportion-of-value-from-the-sector-through-
taxation.-If,-however,-territorial-embeddedness-
means-new-growth-opportunities-are-underutilised-
then-network-embeddedness-may-have-a-negative-
influence-on-growth 
Table 12.1 Actors’ Perspectives of Embeddedness in Farm Owners 
This research found a complex relationship between territorial and network forms of 
embeddedness based on the industrial and geographical origins of the investor. When asked to 
speculate on the likely strategy in a given range of scenarios of changes in investment conditions, 
farms whose industrial history lay in floriculture were less likely to look for alternative 
investments elsewhere in Ethiopia and would be more likely to relocate investment to an 
alternative production location, exhibiting a lower degree of territorial embeddedness. 
Conversely, firms new to the industry, given the same scenarios, would be more likely to look for 
alternative investment opportunities in Ethiopia. However, outside of these hypothetical 
scenarios, firms from a range of investment and geographical backgrounds have diversified their 
investment profiles in Ethiopia, exhibiting greater territorial and lower network embeddedness. In 
either case, local investors, as characterised by this research, exhibit far higher territorial 
                                                          
 
16
 All unskilled workers are local as wages offered are not sufficient to result in migration for this category of 
labour. 
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embeddedness than their foreign counterparts. This is the case for a range of reasons, which 
include issues of personal preference attributable to social, cultural and language ties and 
difficulties in investing abroad owing to the weak position of the Birr and visa problems, while 
quantification of embeddedness is empirically problematic (Hardy and Hollinshead, 2011; Sunley, 
2008). 
Embeddedness has the potential to increase and cement the capture of value for local actors in 
the long-term. Put simply, from a government perspective if people are going to produce flowers 
in a developing country, they want it to be Ethiopia. To this end it is partially the job of the 
government to manufacture network embeddedness by absorbing some of the learning costs of 
the industry as a public good, ensuring the industry reaches critical mass. The government must 
adapt to the challenges that face the industry using a mixture of regulation and investment to 
ensure continued capacity building. If, however, external conditions limit the growth of the 
industry, or if firms seek to diversify their investment portfolio, the government would rather this 
investment occur in Ethiopia, than elsewhere. Fostering territorial embeddedness amongst 
investors, then, has to be the government’s key priority in securing the benefits of the industry in 
the long-term. This has been attempted by steering capital towards strategic industries using the 
same incentives offered to floriculture. In fact, while floriculture is desirable for the reasons 
identified above including the high-value added nature of production, employees/Ha and growing 
foreign market, it could be argued that network embeddedness is actually a negative attribute for 
investors in Ethiopian floriculture to exhibit from a government perspective. Having investors with 
high levels of territorial embeddedness whose capital is not mobile between industries will limit 
efficient use of this capital. Furthermore, some of the negative aspects of floriculture, such as the 
lack of a domestic market or a contribution to food security together with the overreliance on a 
single industry, are not addressed if capital is unwilling to flow into alternative investment 
opportunities. 
Chapter 11 displays one clear area where the government has been successful in fostering 
territorial embeddedness. As the floriculture industry faced challenges caused by the coincidence 
of the Global Financial Crisis and the need to repay loans to the DBoE, investors sought 
opportunities in alternative sectors, which have continued to expand in the post-crisis period. The 
high level of territorial embeddedness has occurred as a result of the combination of natural and 
physical circumstances, and a set of government policies which have had a significant impact on 
the power structures within the industry as discussed in the following section. 
From a temporal perspective then, both territorial and network forms of embeddedness among 
foreign investors increase over time. For local investors too, network embeddedness increases 
over time while territorial embeddedness is, in general higher. On a personal basis, investors who 
had been involved in the industry for a number of years and established it in their own mind as a 
long-term employment opportunity, spoke of how they bought houses, moved their family to 
Ethiopia, enrolled children in school and begun learning Amharic, all of which contribute to 
territorial embeddedness. From a business perspective too, the example of Sher and other 
established actors within the industry engaging in comprehensive long-term CSR programmes 
which have increased as the industry has matured, all contribute to furthering territorial 
embeddedness. 
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With time in the industry, actors in the GPN also become more embedded in the network. Firms 
manufacture a reputation at auction which cannot be transferred or replaced, workers gain non-
transferable skills, institutional actors learn the inner workings of the industry and settle upon 
their role within it, and suppliers invest capital in specialist machinery which cannot be 
transferred to other sectors. Moreover, for all actors in the network, in an industry governed by 
reputation and trust, time in the industry means an increased number of increasingly deep 
connections and relationships to other actors within the GPN, which are increasingly difficult to 
transfer or recreate if capital is switched to alternative investment opportunities. Perhaps, then, 
in order to extract maximum benefits from the floriculture industry, the government has decided 
to encourage diversification of investments and inter-industrial linkages at this relatively early 
stage in the industry’s development, before network embeddedness becomes such that capital 
becomes immobile. 
12.2.3 An examination of the current structures of corporate, institutional and 
collective power in floriculture and the potential for the interaction between value and 
embeddedness to impact on power structures over time. 
Within a GPN, corporate, collective and institutional power flows between actors and nodes over 
time. Corporate power is viewed by Henderson et al. (2002) as the ability of a lead firm to 
influence the distribution of resources and other actors’ decisions within the network. 
Institutional power is seen as power held by local and national state actors and international 
agencies. This research has shown an unequal and dynamic distribution of power within the 
network. In the initial stages of the industry, international production actors were able to 
negotiate a position whereby the distribution of risk and resources was skewed in their favour. As 
there was little effective competition for land and significant competition for investment from 
more well-established production locations, government actors were forced to reduce the 
benefits they extracted from the sector. This situation continued as the industry underwent 
difficulties caused by the Global Financial Crisis and repayment terms of government loans 
through the DBoE were relaxed. However, as the territorial embeddedness of production actors 
has grown, with their economic and social integration having increased since they entered the 
industry, and as competition for land from alternative sources has increased, power relations 
have altered such that loans are beginning to be repaid, regulations are being enforced and tax 
revenues have begun to be collected. This shift of power from corporate production actors to 
institutional actors is also reflected in the ability of government to impose increasingly stringent 
regulations on the industry with a view to protecting the industry’s overall reputation, the success 
of which remains debateable as documented in Chapter 7. Furthermore, as documented in 
Chapter 9, the transferral of power from corporate to institutional actors has been tempered by 
the CSR programmes engaged in by large firms effectively replacing the role of the state in several 
key functions, making the firm essential to the functioning of local society. 
Collective power is conceptualised as power held by trade unions, employer associations, NGOs 
and informal organisations, used to pressure other bearers of power including corporate and 
state actors. In this area too, this research has found that there is a flow of power from corporate 
to collective nodes. As suggested by Korovkin and Sanmiguel-Valderrama (2007), in the initial 
stages of the industry, a lack of labour organisation and low levels of labour rights act as some of 
the many factors that draw investors to an industry. However, this research has found that 
through the dual drivers of production and consumption side collective actors, power has shifted 
from corporate to collective actors. Firstly, international organisations such as the ILO and, more 
  199 
 
influentially, the domestic employer association of the EHPEA acting in collaboration with 
international donors, have been able to enforce increasingly high levels of environmental and 
workers’ rights protection. Evidently, in order to do this, collective actors have been able to draw 
on increasing levels of support from institutional actors so that the regulations they have lobbied 
for, such as the EHPEA’s CoP, are enforceable. Secondly, consumer demand for higher worker 
welfare and environmental standards has driven corporate retail actors to demand these 
standards of their suppliers, which are met due to the desirable volume and length of contract 
offered by major direct buyers. Corporate power amongst retail actors will be addressed below as 
a special case due to the recent and rapid change in its structure. 
Territorial embeddedness has been the key factor in determining flows of power in each of the 
above relationships. If corporate power amongst producers is viewed as a seed blowing around a 
large plot of potential growing locations then a metaphor can be applied to explain how 
embeddedness influences power within the network. When attempting to attract a seed of 
investment, the government prepare their plot with the fertilisers of an attractive investment 
code, cheap labour, low levels of unionisation etc., to encourage the seed to grow there rather 
than on an alternative plot. Once the seed has settled in the location, growth is delicate in the 
early stages and factors which allow it to grow must be constantly adjusted to give the plant the 
best possible chance of taking root.  To begin to remove fertilisers or take cuttings from the plant 
at this stage would greatly increase the chance of it failing. However, once the roots of the plant 
had been established, which in this metaphor are greenhouses, water supply, supplier 
relationships etc., fertilisers can begin to be removed and cuttings, or taxes, can be taken and the 
plant will continue to survive. The plant may have become entwined in the ecosystem with 
several symbiotic relationships and networks of supply being established in the local area. To 
uproot the plant at this time and replant it elsewhere would potentially jeopardise the future 
growth of the plant with no guarantees of the stability of the new environment. The only way in 
which this could be beneficial for the plant is if continued growth on the existing plot becomes 
too difficult with a high number of plants competing for the same resources and fertilisers 
becoming to sparse for the plant to continue to succeed. 
Corporate power in the retail sector is one node to which power has continued to flow in the 
floriculture industry as a whole. As the proportion of total floriculture sales conducted through 
direct sales contracts – primarily supermarkets – has increased, the power of retailers to dictate 
the terms of trade with suppliers has increased accordingly. This research has shown how the 
development of importing agents as a mechanism for risk minimisation has allowed major direct 
buyers to use the threat of mobility as another means to control numerous elements of the 
power relations between themselves and the rest of the network. In some cases this power has 
had a positive impact on the benefits accruing to local actors, as is the case with the improvement 
in environmental and labour standards. Furthermore, supply agreements are made between 
growers and retailers for periods of up to two years at a guaranteed price, offering developing 
country growers the security to plan for the long-term, which is not possible with the uncertainty 
of the auction. However, retailers are the largest profit taking actor within the network which 
continually squeezes the profits available to growers as pressure is passed on through importing 
agents. While the margin of mark-up between supermarkets and importing agents is large the 
mark-up between wholesalers and florists is greater. However, due to the low prices in 
supermarkets and the lower number of profit taking actors involved in the process, squeezes on 
profit margins are quickly passed down to growers in a direct marketing stream. Corporate power 
  200 
 
within this node is such that retail actors are able to maintain their profit margin while 
externalising pressure to other actors in the network: 
I know the retailer gets far too much profit and the rest of the chain is left with 
virtually nothing (IG16). 
Non-market solutions have been employed in several areas throughout the GPN, including the 
auction cooperatives and air transportation, which decreases the financial burden and risk on 
other nodes of the network. This is supported by evidence from a respondent within the 
importing agent node of the GPN: 
...more or less we know the profit margin of the retailers because they have a specific 
retail price of course and you know of course your own selling price so of course that 
difference between that and the selling price is the profit of the retailer.  Erm, well 
our margin is at the moment not very high...You need to stay competitive and the 
market is really hard. And I suppose the same goes for all growers, they are having a 
really hard time also but their margins I don’t know...But the highest margins will be 
at the retail end, I’m positive. That’s sure (IG16). 
Corporate power amongst retail actors is strong within the floriculture GPN and this research sees 
a lack of territorial embeddedness created through the arms length relationships with growers as 
being a critical explanatory factor in this power structure. However, in contrast to the views of 
Thrupp et al. (1995), for the reasons outlined in Chapter 8, the accumulation of power in this node 
is not seen to have been entirely at the expense of labour power. 
12.3 Configuration/Coordination 
The GPN framework sees configuration/coordination - the result of the interplay between the 
dimensions of networks, firms, institutions and sectors - as being the principal determinant of the 
developmental impact of the GPN. Previous studies of the floriculture industry in developing 
countries have reached largely negative conclusions about its developmental potential. However, 
this study has, with the use of the GPN framework, examined the importance of the local context 
in understanding why benefits are accruing to individual nodes within the network and which 
factors have the potential to change this distribution. The far more mixed picture portrayed by 
this research is that the floriculture industry in Ethiopia has the potential to have a positive 
developmental impact, which will increase over time if managed properly; a position shared by 
the government: 
We are considering the past three, four years as a transition period whereby we also 
learn about the sector and how to make it happen, what type of system we have to 
put in place and other things. So, in that time of transition, we are expecting that we 
have an employment opportunity and a little bit contribution of hard currency as 
well. But we have the feeling that we can make a better benefit from the sector than 
today if we are managing this sector in a proper way (IG4). 
Employment, foreign currency earnings, and the emergence of increasingly locally-owned nodes 
of the industry through a process of knowledge transfer and technological upgrading, are all 
realistic and achievable goals in the short-term, and to some extent are already providing real 
benefits to the economy. In the longer term, tax revenues appear to be a realistic possibility in the 
near future and the facilitative role played by floriculture in the establishment of the export 
sector in other NTAEs could also have positive developmental impacts. Conversely, questions 
must be raised as to the environmental sustainability of the industry if it continues to grow at its 
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current rate in parallel with the growth of new export industries, devaluing the natural capital of 
the country. Furthermore, while lead firms competing for direct contracts engage in 
comprehensive CSR programmes and pay relatively high wages, no price can be put on the 
potential for exploitation of workers in other parts of the industry, among smaller firms. The 
government must ensure that their policies reflect the potential for exploitation of workers and 
the environment and sufficient monitoring procedures are implemented to prevent this. This 
extract from an interview with an EHPEA respondent summarises the mixed prospects for 
Ethiopian floriculture supported by this research: 
I would always try to present a balanced view of the sector. There is still work to be 
done but in three years I can see where we started and where we are now. It is a 
factor which will contribute to the development of Ethiopia how much of a 
contribution it is depends on how well the farms develop and what happens in the 
next five years. You don’t see the benefit of this type of investment in the first five 
years and that’s because of...how long it takes to develop a farm, for a farm to 
become sustainable. And it’s one of many factors in the development of Ethiopia. 
There are all sorts of things. Your production costs, your freight costs, what the 
market wants, which is changing, what the market is prepared to pay what sort of 
other things that market wants in terms of quality and social standards and 
environment protection, all of these are factors and also how the buyers are going to 
respond to the global warming issues as a whole (IG8).  
One area in which this research has highlighted a deficiency in the emphasis of the GPN 
framework is in changes in the importance of - and relationship between - the conceptual 
categories of value, power and embeddedness over time, which has the potential to alter the 
configuration of the GPN significantly. Indeed, in Henderson et al.’s (2002) seminal article a 
temporal element is only explicitly included in one of the five suggested key foci for study, namely 
‘the distribution of corporate power within these networks, and changes therein’. In the study of 
economic globalisation, the examination of the outcomes being realised now can best be 
understood through an examination of the interplay between the conceptual categories of value, 
power and embeddedness within the network not simply as it exists now but also how this has 
developed over time. A recent debate has emerged surrounding the incorporation of more 
traditional path dependency literature (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and evolutionary economic 
geography (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Boschma and Martin, 2007) with a view to addressing 
this deficiency in the GPN framework. MacKinnon (2012) outlines a framework for the 
introduction of path dependency dynamics to the GPN framework. Furthermore, MacKinnon 
(ibid.) highlights the need for another insight from evolutionary economics to be explicitly 
incorporated into GPN research, as identified in this thesis. The concepts of conversion and 
recombination are established mechanisms by which embeddedness can be manufacturer and 
perhaps resisted and the inclusion of this into GPN research would allow for additional insight into 
the agency of different nodes of the network in altering outcomes in their favour. This study has 
shown that the distribution of power between institutional, collective and corporate actors in the 
early stages of the industry, for the early entrants to it, was very different to the power relations 
which currently exist between i) the institutional actors and those early entrants, which are now 
established firms, and ii) between the institutional actors and new entrants to the market. 
12.4 Further Research 
While this research has achieved the objectives identified at the outset, several further questions 
have arisen as a result of the research that would benefit from further academic attention and 
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were beyond the scope of this research. The first area in which the achievements of this study 
could be extended is in the temporal scope of the research. The timing of this study was 
important to look at the rapid early growth stages of the industry and the reasons for it. However, 
a study which returned to examine the same phenomena in another five years would allow an 
appraisal of how the dynamics of power, value and embeddedness have changed and whether 
the current trends continue. It would also be interesting to evaluate trends in global floriculture; 
whether any new countries have emerged as poles for investment and the influential factors that 
allowed this to occur. 
In terms of research that is currently possible, one avenue for further academic enquiry would be 
to evaluate the growth of the fruit and vegetable sector in Ethiopia by conducting research into 
the reasons for investment in the industry and its potential for manufacturing territorial 
embeddedness. Further research could also be conducted into the impact of local-level spillovers 
from both floriculture and the associated industries documented in Chapter 11 on rural 
livelihoods to give a more complete picture of the impact of the industry on the rural poor. 
There are two further areas of research which were beyond the scope of this research but would 
build further on its findings in the area of migration. Firstly, analysis could be conducted to 
determine the level at which economic incentives become sufficient to induce migration from 
Kenya to fill the knowledge gaps in the Ethiopian floriculture industry and, potentially, the value 
added by such experienced labour when compared with less experienced Ethiopian personnel. 
This would give further information about the level of labour shortage that may be sufficient to 
encourage capital to relocate. Secondly, as the industry continues to grow, a more comprehensive 
study displaying how labour is sourced would be welcome. Given the structure of the industry and 
the reasons mass migration has not yet occurred, an analysis of where workers in Ziway have 
come from and whether migration occurs as the industry continues to grow in other areas of the 
country would give a more complete picture of the impacts of the industry on local labour 
markets and the sustainability of benefits. This too may have implications for the economic 
sustainability of the industry as a move away from subsistence agriculture and the increased 
pressure on infrastructure caused by migration would have an impact on many of the factors 
which have mitigated any negative aspects of the industry in Ethiopia to this point. Investigation is 
also warranted into the broader impacts of migration and labour patterns on productivity within 
households and on smallholdings, as farms may begin to experience labour shortages during 
economically important periods such as harvests. 
Indeed from a more conceptual perspective, having established within this research the various 
relationships between actors and how they are affected by changes in levels of embeddedness, 
further research is needed to establish exactly how embeddedness can be manufactured and 
perhaps resisted. This could have significant policy implications in terms of developing countries 
securing benefits from NTAEs. From a firm’s perspective too, cognisance of embeddedness could 
have implications for their profitability and so investigation is required to discover whether this is 
considered a transaction cost of investment in developing countries or whether firms engage in 
strategies to ensure their capital remains mobile. 
In order to test the findings of this research it would be useful to conduct a comparative study of 
the floriculture industries in Ethiopia and Ecuador. As documented elsewhere in this study, the 
switch from Kenyan production to Ethiopian production broadly mirrored the switch some years 
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earlier from Colombian to Ecuadorian production, with many similar conditions apparently 
influential in the relocation decisions. It could, therefore, provide an interesting indication for the 
future of the Ethiopian industry to examine the current situation in Ecuadorian floriculture and 
the changes that have taken place since the early, rapid growth of the industry. 
One area which, in the initial stages of this research, appeared to be integral to both profitability 
and possibilities for upgrading within Ethiopian floriculture was that of intellectual property. It 
quickly became apparent that upgrading in this area was unlikely given Ethiopia’s factor 
endowment. During pilot research, limited access to breeding material indicated that membership 
of an international system of intellectual property protection would be required for the country to 
progress in the industry. However, it later became apparent that, while this impediment to 
growth was preventing some operators in certain market segments from operating at maximum 
profitability, the profit motive of breeders and lack of control procedures meant that the impact 
on the overall sustainability on the floriculture industry was not significant. Research that was 
conducted on IPR issues to that point uncovered a number of interesting points which could be 
more pertinent for the export of other NTAEs. The dual objectives of export growth and domestic 
food security and biodiversity are seemingly conflicted in the membership of international IPR 
protection regimes and so the impact of membership of such regimes for developing countries 
could represent an important area for future research. 
Further, as stipulated in Chapter 10, there is a need for further research to identify the impact of 
participation in the floriculture industry on poverty and food security at the household level. 
While evidence is contained here of increased incomes for labourers in rural areas as a result of 
floriculture, the impact this will have in the medium to long-term on total food production and 
consequently food prices is an important aspect of the developmental impact of the industry. 
Household survey data could be employed in order to present a more complete picture of the 
impact of engagement in the floriculture industry on the lives of labourers, including the price 
changes for agricultural inputs, changes in food prices, and where appropriate, changes in the 
price of agricultural labour for smallholders. 
The conclusions of this study are cautiously and marginally positive about the impact of 
floriculture on development in Ethiopia, and certainly more positive than the majority of previous 
work on floriculture in alternative production locations, having taken a greater number of factors 
into consideration. In doing so the study was not able to focus as intently as previous studies of 
floriculture in developing countries on areas such as the environmental impacts of the industry 
and issues of worker welfare. As such it would now be useful to collect primary data on both of 
these issues to allow some more concrete conclusions to be drawn about the overall effect of the 
industry. 
This study then has acted as an initial examination of an under-researched industry which has 
experienced rapid growth in recent times. It has set the foundation for further research which 
looks at floriculture in developing countries and NTAEs in general by examining the nature and 
extent of the growth which has occurred and the developmental implications of it. 
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Interview Coding (Numbers of Interviews) 
A small number of individuals were interviewed in more than one capacity but are not identified 
here in order to protect anonymity. 
 IG1: Dutch Academics who have conducted research in Ethiopia (2) 
 IG2: Auction Respondents (5) 
 IG3: Foreign Farm Owners (18) 
 IG4: Ethiopian Government Respondents (5) 
 IG5: Supermarket Respondents (7) 
 IG6: Ethiopian Nationals in Senior Positions in Foreign Farm (5) 
 IG7: Dutch Institutional Actors (3) 
 IG8: EHPEA Respondents (7) 
 IG9: Experienced Ethiopian Farm Owners (8) 
 IG10: Government Advisors on Floriculture (3) 
 IG11: Ethiopian Partners with Foreign Investors in Flower Farm (7) 
 IG12: Horticulture Consultants (3) 
 IG13: Ethiopian Flower Farm Owners New to the Industry (9) 
 IG14: Ethiopian Financial Sector Respondents (3) 
 IG15: Members of Cool-Chain Task Force (2) 
 IG16: Importing Agent Respondents (5) 
 IG17: Sher Ethiopia Founder (1) 
 IG18: Breeders (4) 
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 IG19: UPOV Respondents (2) 
 IG20: International Logistics Company Respondents (3) 
 IG21: International Packaging Producers (2) 
 IG22: Ethiopian Airlines Respondents (2) 
 IG23: Ethiopian Packaging Producers (3) 
 IG24: Management Consultants to Flower Farms (3) 
 IG25: UK Flower and Plants Association Respondents (1) 
 IG26: Foreign Investor in Ethiopian Agriculture (3) 
 
Appendix 1 
Flower Farm Key Informant Interview Schedule 
Name of respondent......................................................................................................... 
Name of firm.................................................................................................................... 
Year of Incorporation........................................................................................................ 
 Explain purpose of research 
 Distribute and explain anonymity form and discuss written reference to interview. 
 Tour farm and clarify product range, functions performed, production area etc. 
 
Firm History, Composition, and Strategy 
1. Could you begin by telling me about the history of the firm and how and why you entered 
the Ethiopian floriculture industry? 
 
2. Can you explain your role within the firm and your personal background of how you got 
into the floriculture industry? 
 
3. Do you now live in Ethiopia? Do you maintain a property abroad? Do you have any family 
members who now live in Ethiopia with you/children in school etc? 
 
4. What were the primary motivations for the firm’s investment in Ethiopia? Talk around 
security, corruption, incentives, government attitude etc. as they arise. 
 
5. What was the origin of the capital used to establish the firm? 
 
6. What is the equity composition of the firm? 
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7. Can you give me an idea of the cost breakdown involved with the establishment and 
running of the farm? 
 
8. Can you give me an indication of the turnover and profitability of the firm and how this 
has changed over the firm’s time in the industry? 
 
9. Where do you obtain your supplies from and how did you establish these buying 
agreements? 
 
10. Which of your supply functions are located in Ethiopia and which are negotiated 
elsewhere? 
 
11. Do you employ consultants on the farm? How often? What functions do they perform? 
How much do they cost? Where do you source the consultants from? 
 
12. Which international labour/environmental/quality standards do you have? Were they 
difficult to achieve? Do you have plans to obtain any further standards? What were the 
major obstacles achieving the standards? What do you feel are the benefits of having 
these standards to the firm? 
 
Network Relationships 
13. How do you feel about your company’s relationships with government institutions and 
actors? 
 
14. How has this changed since the creation of the EHDA? 
 
15. How would you react to a change in the government in the upcoming election? 
 
16. How would you assess your relationship with other growers in terms of cooperation, 
knowledge sharing etc.? Does this differ between Ethiopian and foreign growers? 
 
17. How would you assess the handling agents available to growers in Ethiopian floriculture 
and your relationships with them? 
 
18. How would you assess your relationships with breeders? Have you ever had any issues 
with regards to royalties? 
 
19. How would you assess the role of the DBoE in the industry? 
 
20. How would you assess the role of the EHPEA in the industry? 
 
Market Strategy 
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21. Can you explain the market strategy, in terms of final destinations, of the firm as it has 
progressed over time? 
 
22. How many varieties do you grow on the farm and how has this changed over time? 
 
23. What are your a long-term goals in terms of market strategy? 
 
24. What steps have you taken to maximise profit through you market strategy? Diversifying 
market base? Contacting importing agents? Supermarkets? 
 
25. At what stage in the process of setting up the farm did you decide on where you would 
target your products? Did market strategy influence the location of the farm? What other 
factors influenced the location of the farm? 
 
26. What have been your main challenges in pursuing the auction/direct marketing stream? 
Labour Issues 
27. Can you tell me about you staffing levels in terms of how many permanent and temporary 
staff you employ and how these requirements change over time? 
 
28. Can you tell me about the processes involved in obtaining your staff for all of the levels of 
the business? 
 
29. What training do you conduct with employees on your farm? 
 
30. How is labour organised on your farm in terms of supervision, incentives etc? 
 
31. Have you employed any skilled labour from within Ethiopia? Have you had any contact 
with graduates from the Jimma programmes? What is your opinion of the EHPEA training 
programmes? 
 
Multiplier Effects 
32. Have you examined the possibility of performing other functions within floriculture i.e. 
packaging production, bouquet production, propagation etc? What steps have you taken 
towards these developments? 
 
33. Does the firm have any other investments/interests in Ethiopia? When did these 
investments occur? Were they affected/influenced in any way by your investment in the 
flower industry? 
 
34. Have you considered producing into fruits and vegetables? What steps have you taken in 
this regard? Has this production been in addition to or at the expense of flower 
production? 
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Overarching Issues 
35. What would you describe as the major constraints to your continued growth in the 
industry? 
 
36. Do you regularly assess alternative production locations outside of Ethiopia? 
 
37. What would be the key factors in causing you to move your investment out of Ethiopia? 
 
 
 
